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This thesis explores the relationship between ex-combatants and the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in Sierra Leone. It fills 
important empirical and conceptual lacunae in foregrounding the 
transitional justice experiences of ex-combatants, a population that is 
both necessary to, but neglected within, the broader study and practice 
of transitional justice. Using qualitative research methods, it develops 
a multi-level and nuanced understanding of the relationship between 
ex-combatants and the TRC. On the institutional level this thesis 
critically examines the rhetoric, ritual and reality of transitional justice, 
and of post-conflict truth commissions in particular. On the micro-level, 
it unearths ex-combatant expectations, experiences and impacts in 
relation to Sierra Leone’s TRC. Along its institutional axis, a critique of 
the rhetoric of transitional justice addresses the normative foundations 
of this discourse. The dimension of ritual addresses the question of 
whose justice was formally captured within the TRC in Sierra Leone. 
The problematic binary identity model of transitional justice, that 
simplifies, dichotomises and pits pure victims against evil perpetrators 
is exposed. The reality of transitional justice empirically explores the 
practice of justice-seeking on the ground. This highlights the 
translation of the normative production, and institutional practices of, 
privilege, onto local transitional justice participant populations, and the 
deleterious effects thereof. Along its micro-level axis, this thesis 
develops an in-depth localised understanding of the relationship 
between ex-combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone. This thesis 
illuminates ex-combatant expectations held towards the TRC, and in 
so doing reveals their justice needs. It assesses their experiences of 
the TRC, and in particular analyses participation deterrents. A 
localised framework for evaluating TRC impact is used to analyse the 
effects of the TRC on this population. The complex lived experiences 
of war, among ex-combatants, do not conform to the neat binary 
identity framework provided by transitional justice. Their relegation to 
the fringes of this discourse and practice has significant effects on the 





which must break these binaries if the truth-telling, reconciliation and 







This thesis explores the relationship between ex-combatants and the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in Sierra Leone. Truth 
commissions are restoratively-oriented mechanisms of transitional 
justice, and are premised on a foundation of local inclusivity and 
establishing a historical record of violence and abuse (truth-telling). 
This thesis adopts a multi-level approach, interrogating the normative, 
institutional and individual levels of Sierra Leone’s TRC, to uncover the 
experiences of ex-combatants in relation to the TRC. This thesis 
argues that the ex-combatant community, considered ‘perpetrators’ 
within the TRC, is a necessary but neglected population within truth 
commission structures and operations.  
On the normative and institutional levels, this thesis highlights the 
binary identity framework of transitional justice, and its application 
within Sierra Leone’s TRC. This binary identity framework constructs 
rigid ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ identities for its participants and applies 
them to conflict-affected individuals. Victim needs are privileged within 
this binary participation structure, and designated perpetrators are 
marginalised from participating within purportedly restoratively-
oriented truth commissions. This restricts the ability of truth 
commissions to fulfil their own mandates of inclusive participation and 
establishing a full historical record. Using the lens of the ex-combatant 
population in Sierra Leone, this thesis uncovers the disjuncture 
between the TRC’s promise of inclusivity against its practice of 
exclusion, as experienced by ex-combatants themselves. Sierra 
Leone’s TRC empirically demonstrates the detrimental effects of this 
binary identity framework within in transitional justice in action.  
To explore and describe the relationship between ex-combatants and 
the TRC in Sierra Leone, 147 interviews were conducted for this 
research. A total of 112 ex-combatants, belonging to each of the main 
domestic armed groups active during Sierra Leone’s civil war, have 
been interviewed. Additionally, 21 members of civil society, 
instrumental in the establishment and operations of the TRC were 





shed empirical light on the institutional dimension of the relationship 
between the TRC and the ex-combatant community. Lastly, three 
victims were also interviewed. Interviews took place across the three 
regional capitals of Sierra Leone, in Freetown (the country’s capital), 
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The implementation of transitional justice mechanisms in post-conflict 
societies has undergone a remarkable proliferation in recent decades 
(Sriram, 2013; Thoms, Ron and Paris, 2010). Concurrently, the field of 
transitional justice has witnessed a rapid evolution, moving from the 
“margins to the mainstream of global politics” (Dancy, Kim and 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010, p. 1; Bell, 2009). However, despite their 
averred importance for post-conflict stability, these processes are 
increasingly criticised for their lack of local responsiveness (Fletcher 
and Weinstein, 2015). This thesis focuses on one particularly 
significant transitional justice mechanism – post-conflict truth 
commissions – to better understand ex-combatant engagement in 
post-conflict peacebuilding processes, through the empirically 
illustrative case of Sierra Leone. Specifically, it explores the TRC 
expectations, experiences and impacts of predominantly non-
participant1 ex-combatants, in order to illuminate the transitional justice 
experiences of this particular segment of ‘the local’ and critically 
assess the supposed cascading effects of truth commissions 
according to their proponents. This thesis presents the first in-depth 
and empirically grounded examination of the relationship between ex-
combatants (also referred to as perpetrators) and post-conflict truth 
commissions. Through a nuanced exploration, this thesis seeks to 
understand both the institutional treatment of this population and the 
micro-level transitional justice experiences of ex-combatants in relation 
to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in Sierra Leone. 
The relationship between perpetrators and truth commissions has 
received no dedicated consideration (Skjelsbæk, 2015), despite the 
important and necessary participation of perpetrators therein 
(Freeman, 2006). This thesis joins a growing sub-field of research that 
                                                          
1 The term ‘non-participant’ is used throughout this thesis to refer to ex-
combatants that did not directly participate in the TRC, meaning that they did 





examines variation in local attitudes towards, and experiences of, 
transitional justice processes (see Aguilar, Balcells and Cebolla-
Boado, 2011; Nussio, Rettberg and Ugarriza, 2015; Stover and 
Weinstein, 2004). It challenges the traditional and problematic binary 
presentation of conflict experiences that the normative and institutional 
dimensions of transitional justice have produced and proliferated: that 
of victims and perpetrators.  
Through an abductive approach, this thesis uses qualitative methods 
to explore, describe and understand the relationship between ex-
combatants and truth commissions. In particular, this thesis explores 
the relationship between Sierra Leone’s TRC and the community of ex-
combatants who did not directly participate within it. A detailed 
understanding of the relationship between ex-combatants and the 
post-conflict truth commission in Sierra Leone is achieved through a 
multi-level analysis of this relationship, along institutional and micro-
level axes. The first axis of this research (its institutional axis), of 
transitional justice rhetoric, ritual and reality reflects the normative and 
structural2 dimensions of transitional justice broadly, and the TRC in 
Sierra Leone specifically. The rhetoric of transitional justice refers to 
the normative plane of this discourse, which this thesis reveals to be 
replete with problematic and unforgiving binary identity assumptions. 
These assumptions restrict the responsiveness of the field to the 
realities of complex lived conflict experiences, and dangerously 
privilege the voices and needs of some, at the costs of others. This, in 
turn, risks cementing oppositional conflict identities instead of 
dismantling them. The ritual of transitional justice refers to the 
institutional or structural domain of the discourse, and examines the 
translation of the field’s broader normative assumptions onto its 
particular institutional mechanism of the TRC in Sierra Leone. This 
particularised institutional examination involves analysing the model of 
                                                          
2 Throughout this thesis, the terms institutional and structural are used 
interchangeably, to refer to the formal structure of the TRC in Sierra Leone 
specifically. Discussions around the ‘structural (or institutional) dimension’ of 
this research therefore refer to examinations of the formal mandate and 





participation constructed by the TRC. Lastly, the reality of transitional 
justice practice is assessed, to shed empirical light on how these 
normatively derived and institutionally expressed binary and 
hierarchical models of participation were implemented in Sierra Leone. 
Together, these three dimensions illuminate the macro-level 
component of this thesis, and allow for an analysis of the relationship 
between the TRC and ex-combatant community on the institutional 
level. The second axis of this research (its micro-level axis) comprises 
an in-depth exploration of non-participant ex-combatant expectations 
towards the TRC, their experiences of it, and the impacts they 
associate with it. This is achieved through the construction of ex-
combatant narratives in relation to the TRC in Sierra Leone, using the 
meanings, values, experiences and interpretations that they attach to 
this institution. Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted 
with 112 ex-combatants, who did not participate directly within the TRC 
in Sierra Leone, throughout a period of over two years of fieldwork in 
Sierra Leone. Archival data in the form of TRC statements 
supplemented primary data collection to broaden and enrich the scope 
of research. In-depth interviews with 11 TRC officials, and analysis of 
the TRC’s mandate and final report has enabled a detailed 
examination of the TRC’s institutional design and operations. Finally, 
in-depth interviews with 21 members of civil society, involved in the 
work of the TRC adds nuance to this research, due to the role played 
by civil society in calling for the TRC, aiding in its outreach work, and 
as representatives of the wider realm of the local in Sierra Leone. 
Unearthing ex-combatant expectations towards the TRC sheds 
empirical light on localised justice needs and reveals important 
disparities between local understandings around the TRC and its 
institutional ambitions. The dimension of experiences showcases the 
significant limiting effects of multiple processes and sources of 
exclusion on ex-combatant participation within the TRC. Finally, an 
analysis of the impacts associated with the TRC among this population 
highlights the need to re-examine conventional and limited measures 
of transitional justice success, and popular but unaccommodating 





axis forms the micro-level dimension of this thesis. This multi-level 
approach enables the comprehensive and detailed illumination of the 
relationship between ex-combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone. The 
normative and institutional critiques put forward throughout this thesis 
makes several conceptual contributions to the discourse of transitional 
justice, while rich empirical analysis advances the burgeoning 
localisation scholarship in the field. 
An understanding of the relationship between the TRC and non-
participant ex-combatants in Sierra Leone enables this thesis to 
critically engage with one of the core claims of truth commission 
advocacy: that these bodies exercise a positive impact on not only their 
direct participants, but also on the wider population of individuals, 
communities and states (comprising the full breadth of the local) 
wherein they are implemented (Ainley, 2015; Skaar, 2018). Through 
its localised approach, this thesis addresses core questions such as 
institutional inclusivity, non-participation, micro-level justice needs, 
expectations, experiences, impact and agency.  
Along its two axes of research, this thesis examines a number of 
questions to comprehensively address its overall research puzzle: 
understanding the relationship between ex-combatants and the TRC 
in Sierra Leone. Along its institutional axis, within the three dimensions 
of the rhetoric, ritual and reality of transitional justice under 
examination, the following sub-questions enable a comprehensive 
understanding of the institutional relationship between the TRC and 
ex-combatant community in Sierra Leone.  
1. Rhetoric: Why is there a globalised need for transitional justice 
and what is the identity framework produced by this discourse? 
What space do perpetrators occupy in this identity framework? 
2. Ritual: Whose justice agendas determined the design and 
goals of Sierra Leone’s TRC? What was the participation 
framework of the TRC and did this privilege certain transitional 






3. Reality: How did the TRC in Sierra Leone implement its local 
participation framework? How inclusive (or exclusive) were its 
operations in reality? What was the practice of justice-seeking 
implemented by the TRC in relation to its identified local TRC 
participants? 
Along its second, micro-level axis, this research uses the following 
sub-questions to generate a nuanced localised understanding of the 
transitional justice expectations, experiences and impacts of ex-
combatants in relation to Sierra Leone’s TRC. 
1. Expectations: What were the post-conflict justice needs of ex-
combatants in Sierra Leone? What did they expect the TRC to 
achieve in Sierra Leone; why and how? What informed these 
expectations? 
2. Experiences: Why did this population of ex-combatants choose 
not to participate in the TRC? 
3. Impact: What impact, if any, did the TRC have on this 
population of non-participant ex-combatants? What impact, if 
any, did the TRC have in Sierra Leone, according to this 
population?   
According to Macdonald (2013), understanding perpetrator 
experiences is one of the most heavily neglected themes in transitional 
justice research to-date. It is precisely this empirical and conceptual 
gap that this study addresses. Additionally, prior research has 
identified variation in individual responses to, and experiences of, truth 
commissions on the local level (see for instance Aguilar et al., 2011; 
Nussio et al., 2015; Samii, 2013; and Millar, 2011) and simultaneously 
celebrated truth commissions for their high levels of local participation 
(Freeman, 2006; Hayner, 2010). Transitional justice processes vary in 
their impact across local actors. Evidence of this implicit awareness 
within research abounds. Work highlighting the importance of local 
examinations of transitional justice has begun to address micro-level 
variation from both agency (how individuals affect these processes) 
and structural (how these processes impact individuals) perspectives. 





highlights the role of local agency in determining the path of transitional 
justice implementation. Such research identifies the significant role 
that ‘drivers’ and ‘spoilers’ of justice can play in the successful 
implementation and even design of these processes. The need to 
disaggregate the impact of transitional justice processes along the 
micro-level of conflict-affected individuals and segments of the local is 
also growing. Studies by Nussio et al. (2015), Aguilar et al. (2011), 
Samii (2013) and Millar (2011) highlight the reality of transitional justice 
impact variance on the micro-level, and shed light on local attitudes 
towards, and experiences of, these processes. It is against this 
backdrop of truth commission impact variance and the purported 
inclusivity of such institutions, that this study showcases (i) the need to 
develop a nuanced and localised understanding of perpetrator 
experiences of transitional justice, and (ii) the relationship between 
perpetrators and truth commissions in particular.  
This thesis is composed of three parts, and contains 11 chapters. Part 
One comprises three chapters: the introduction, research design and 
methodology, and a literature review of transitional justice and 
background summary of the context of Sierra Leone. Following this 
chapter’s introduction Chapter 2 details the research design and 
methodology employed to develop the empirically rich and detailed 
analysis of the relationship between ex-combatants and Sierra Leone’s 
TRC in this thesis. Chapter 3 comprises a literature review tracing the 
development of transitional justice and the core debates within the 
field, and is followed by a historical background of Sierra Leone, its 
civil war, and relevant post-conflict processes.  Part Two develops the 
theoretical frameworks used throughout the thesis, and is composed 
of two chapters (Chapters 4 and 5). Chapter 4 lays out the theoretical 
foundations of this study’s critical examination of the rhetoric, ritual and 
reality of the broader enterprise of transitional justice. Chapter 5 
develops the two frameworks constructed for subsequent analysis in 
this thesis: an institutional engagement framework to examine the 
TRC’s structural treatment of ex-combatants, and a localised 
evaluation framework against which the impacts of the TRC among 





the detailed empirical analysis of the relationship between ex-
combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone, and contains six chapters 
(Chapters 6 to 11), presented along the lines of expectations, 
experiences and impact. It also contains the concluding chapter of this 
thesis, which synthesises its findings and presents recommendations 
for further expanding and enhancing localised understandings of 
transitional justice for future research. This chapter now proceeds by 
clarifying the central concepts of this thesis’s investigation, by defining 
truth commissions, perpetrators, transitional justice actors and the 
local.  
Defining Truth Commissions 
As outlined above, this thesis examines the relationship between ex-
combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone. The case of Sierra Leone is 
used as an illustrative case study of an official, post-conflict truth 
commission, established in Africa after 1995, whose operations have 
been completed. Definitional inconsistencies around what constitutes 
a truth commission makes it necessary to clarify why the case of Sierra 
Leone’s TRC has been selected as the case study for this examination. 
Inconsistencies around how truth commissions are defined in research 
has resulted in an elastic universe of cases that varies between studies 
(Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2009; Skaar, 2018). Hayner (2001;2011) has 
provided the “most widely used” (Skaar, 2018, p. 403) definition and 
she is considered to be “the leading authority on the subject” 
(Freeman, 2006, p. 12). This study therefore adopts Hayner’s updated 
definition of truth commissions, as official (state-authorised or 
empowered), temporary bodies established to investigate patterns of 
violations over a particular period in the past that conclude with a final 
report and recommendations for reforms, and which engage directly 
and broadly with affected populations (2011, p.11). Of these five 
criteria, the need for truth commissions to engage with affected 
populations is a new addition to Hayner’s original four requirements 
(2001). This criterion is particularly significant here, as it reinforces the 
role of local engagement as a defining feature of truth commissions. 





concludes with a final report and reform recommendations, highlights 
the particular utility of a retrospective examination, limited to truth 
commissions that have completed their operations and produced such 
a report. Sierra Leone’s TRC meets all five of Hayner’s criteria, and 
can thus be considered to legitimately fall into the category of 
appropriate truth commissions suitable for an investigation into this 
particular mechanism of transitional justice.  
In selecting Sierra Leone as the case study for this thesis, regional and 
temporal restrictions were applied, through which Sierra Leone’s TRC 
emerged as particularly appropriate for examination. While truth 
commissions, as a response to periods of human rights abuses, have 
proliferated globally, they are highly concentrated across Africa in 
particular, with almost 30% of truth commissions established there 
(Hayner, 2010). South Africa’s infamous truth commission was 
established in 1995, is widely held to have changed “the entire 
approach of truth commissions” (Millar, 2011 p. 521), and has inspired 
the establishment of such commissions in other countries, thereby 
contributing to their proliferation (Hayner, 2006). Truth commissions 
established in Africa, after 1995 have therefore formed the regional 
and temporal starting points for case selection. The truth commission 
in Sierra Leone, established in 2002, meets these regional and 
temporal criteria.   
Lastly, in selecting Sierra Leone, this thesis limited case selection to a 
post-conflict truth commission in particular, due to its interest in 
perpetrator inclusion and the participation models and practices of 
such institutions. Commissions established to deal with periods of 
‘unconstitutional government’ such as for instance in Ghana are 
expected to afford a smaller role (if any) to the inclusion of perpetrator 
experiences, as guilt is already widely known and established. 
Conversely, in the case of post-conflict truth commissions, the 
perpetrator population extends beyond the state party, as armed 
conflict requires multiple armed parties (The Uppsala Conflict Data 
Programme (UCDP)). Given the multiple possible conflict experiences 





necessary to fulfil the ambitions of this research endeavour. The terms 
truth and reconciliation commission, truth commission, and 
commission are used interchangeably throughout this thesis.  
Ex-combatants and Perpetrators 
In examining the relationship between ex-combatants and the TRC in 
Sierra Leone, this thesis operationalises this population as: (i) low to 
mid-level ranking ex-combatants; (ii) defined as perpetrators by the 
TRC itself; (iii) who did not risk facing prosecution before the 
concurrently operating Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL, the 
Special Court, or the Court)3; (iv) and who did not directly participate 
within the TRC (meaning that they did not provide statements or 
testimony). The terms perpetrator and ex-combatant are used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis, for reasons elaborated below, 
in reference to this population of individuals with combat histories and 
who were designated as perpetrators by the TRC as a result.  
In a seminal study on ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, Humphreys and 
Weinstein (2004) use three criteria to define ex-combatants. According 
to them, an ex-combatant is (i) “any individual who lived or worked with 
a fighting faction” (p. 9); (ii) “for at least one month during Sierra 
Leone’s conflict” (p. 9); (iii) regardless of their participation within the 
various phases of DDR. This thesis expands this definition of ex-
combatants as individuals who; (i) participated directly in Sierra 
Leone’s civil war as low to mid-ranking members of an armed faction; 
(ii) for a minimum duration of six months; (iii) regardless of their 
participation within DDR. This thesis has elected to expand the 
criterion of duration of armed group membership used by Humphreys 
and Weinstein (2004), from one to six months, to restrict its sample of 
interviewed ex-combatants to individuals with longer fighter histories.  
The sample of ex-combatants is also restricted to low to mid-level ex-
combatants for two reasons: firstly, this constitutes the bulk of the ex-
combatant population, or the ‘everyday perpetrator’, whose TRC 
                                                          
3 The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) operated alongside the TRC, as 
a punitive ad-hoc instrument of transitional justice. The SCSL is described in 





experiences are of primary interest for this thesis. Secondly, this 
criterion excludes higher level architects of violence and enables this 
research to engage with the population of ex-combatants that fell 
within the definition of perpetrators used by the TRC but who were 
excluded from consideration as perpetrators by the concurrently 
operational SCSL.   
As outlined above, this thesis draws from the TRC’s own definition of 
perpetrators and the jurisdiction of the SCSL to identify its population 
of perpetrator ex-combatants. The TRC adopted a broad definition of 
perpetrators, encapsulating all individuals, as well as the State (the 
government), who participated in human rights and international 
humanitarian law violations during the war.  
Volume 1, Chapter 3 of the TRC Final Report in Sierra Leone (2004) 
provides the following definition of perpetrators: 
Perpetrators may be public officials or members of quasi-
governmental or private armed groups with any kind of link to 
the State or of non-governmental armed movements having the 
status of belligerents. Perpetrators may be the direct offenders, 
or they may be accomplices…the fact that the perpetrator of 
violations acted on the orders of his Government or of a 
superior does not exempt him or her from criminal or other 
responsibility (para. 45). 
According to the TRC therefore, all individuals belonging to an armed 
group were considered perpetrators4. Conversely, the SCSL adopted 
a narrow definition of perpetrators, limiting its jurisdiction and 
indictments to the primary architects of Sierra Leone’s civil war.  
Operationalising perpetrators as low to mid-level ex-combatants 
enables this thesis to focus on the population considered perpetrators 
by the TRC, but excluded from the SCSL. This allows this thesis to 
engage critically with the widely held claim that ex-combatants were 
reticent to participate within the operations of the TRC, due to their 
                                                          
4 It is relevant to note that the TRC’s broad definition of perpetrators also 
included non-combatant perpetrators. Therefore, according to the TRC, while 
all ex-combatants were perpetrators, not all perpetrators were necessarily ex-
combatants. Issues of access present obvious difficulties in expanding this 
study’s population of interest beyond that of ex-combatants as perpetrators. 
For this reason, within this thesis ‘perpetrators’ refers exclusively to the 





fears of prosecution before the Special Court (TRC Final Report, 
2004). Additionally, Hayner’s (2004) preliminary analysis of Sierra 
Leone’s truth commission treats the categories of perpetrators and ex-
combatants as synonymous. Therefore, this thesis similarly uses the 
terms perpetrator and ex-combatant interchangeably, to refer to the 
same population (see criteria above).  
Lastly, the sampling criterion of non-participation among ex-
combatants allows this thesis to address questions of participation 
deterrents, and examine the issue of inclusion through the lens of 
processes and sources of exclusion. An exclusive focus on non-
participant ex-combatants also allows this thesis to critically examine 
the claim that truth commissions exert a broader indirect or cascading 
impact, across individual, community and national levels, beyond the 
population with which this truth commissions engage with directly. 
While this sampling choice enables a critical assessment of questions 
of participation deterrents, structural exclusion and the indirect effects 
of truth commissions among the local in relation to ex-combatants, the 
focus on non-participant ex-combatants is also the result of logistical 
challenges experienced over the course of fieldwork and data 
collection. The choice to restrict primary data collection exclusively to 
non-participant ex-combatants was partly spurred by challenges faced 
in accessing participant ex-combatants during the first 12 months of 
fieldwork. This, in combination with the loss of a portion of the data 
collected during these 12 months, necessitated the amendment of this 
study’s research design, to focus on the population of ex-combatants 
with whom access could be readily facilitated through my existing 
networks, in this case, the population of non-participant ex-combatants 
in Sierra Leone. Further elaboration of the sampling criteria employed 
in relation to the population of non-participant ex-combatants for this 
study can be found in Chapter 2.  
While this research focuses on non-participant ex-combatants (defined 
as perpetrators) in relation to the TRC in Sierra Leone, it is nonetheless 
premised on the argument that perpetrator participation within truth 





(Macdonald, 2013; Nwogu, 2010). The role and significance of ex-
combatants in TRCs remains murky. More typically, transitional justice 
mechanisms are considered to be victim-oriented (Freeman, 2006). 
This viewpoint fails to recognise the necessary contribution that non-
victim participation makes to achieving the TRC aims of truth-telling, 
reconciliation, accountability, and deterrence. Perpetrators hold direct 
relevance within TRCs, which are premised on broad and direct 
engagement with affected populations (Hayner, 2010). Fulfilment of 
the core TRC aims inherently entails the meaningful participation of 
both victim and non-victim conflict experiences. Indeed, Sierra Leone’s 
TRC was explicitly established as a platform for “perpetrators to relate 
their experiences” and to foster a climate for “constructive interchange 
between victims and perpetrators” (TRC Act, 2000, Article 6(2)(b)). 
Ainley, Friedman and Mahony (2015) similarly observe ex-combatant 
engagement to be one of the TRC’s objectives. The absence of 
meaningful perpetrator participation within TRCs may contribute to “the 
establishment of a narrower truth” (Bisset, 2012, p. 97) and impedes 
the ability of TRCs to “create a forum of exchange between victims and 
perpetrators” (TRC Final Report, 2004, Chapter 6, paragraph 59). Yet, 
despite the necessary role that ex-combatant perpetrators play, as 
meaningful participants in TRCs, scholarship and practice has, to date, 
neglected to consider their expectations or experiences.  
Exploration of the truth commission experiences of ex-combatants is 
therefore necessary. TRCs currently operate under the assumption 
that the lack of punitive repercussions associated with their non-judicial 
character sufficiently incentivises ex-combatants to come forward and 
seek forgiveness or confess to their wartime atrocities within the 
platform of truth-telling and reconciliation provided thereby (Freeman, 
2006, p. 161). Policy makers, practitioners and academics alike have 
failed to investigate the appropriateness or sufficiency of this logic of 
assumed perpetrator (ex-combatant) participation. Questions of why 
and how ex-combatants participate have been restricted to institutional 
and western normative “rhetoric,” while micro-level expectations and 
the “realities” (McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012, p. 527) of transitional 





thesis empirically unveils the hitherto unexplored and largely 
normatively assumed relationship between truth commissions and the 
particular population of (non-participant) ex-combatants, through the 
illustrative case of Sierra Leone’s TRC.  
Chapter 6 demonstrates that perpetrator participation was explicitly 
required on the truth commission’s structural level, needed to fulfil its 
own mandated aims. Chapter 4 exposes neglect towards the 
complexities of lived perpetrator experiences, on the normative and 
institutional levels of truth commissions. This neglect finds expression 
in the restrictive binary identity model of participation that now 
dominates the practice of transitional justice. In exposing this 
disjuncture within the TRC, of necessary but neglected perpetrator 
participation, and focusing on the experiences of non-participant ex-
combatants this thesis both illuminates the need for perpetrator 
participation and empirically demonstrates this neglect in praxis. Three 
overarching questions guide this examination: on the institutional level 
(i) who produces the perpetrator, and (ii) how is the perpetrator 
treated? And on the micro-level, (iii) how does the perpetrator 
experience transitional justice? 
Transitional Justice Actors: entrepreneurs and participants 
The “industry” (Madlingozi, 2010, p. 208) of transitional justice is 
populated by a diverse set of actors. Disentangling these nebulous 
relationships, between the norms, institutions and practices of 
transitional justice and its population of actors is necessary in order to 
clarify what transitional justice is, what it seeks to achieve, how it does 
so, and what its impacts are. It is only through illuminating the 
constellation of relationships, within this industry (between actors and 
institutions) that questions of agency can be appropriately examined. 
In particular, this thesis’s micro-level orientation, investigating the ex-
combatant community in Sierra Leone, requires demystifying the 
positionality of this population in relation to the specific transitional 
justice mechanism of the TRC there. This can only be achieved by 
placing the TRC’s engagement with them within the context of its larger 





analyse the relationship between the TRC and the ex-combatant 
community in isolation, and relative to other relevant actors as well. 
Building on work by Madlingozi (2010) and Selim (2017), this thesis 
defines the body of transitional justice actors as comprising two groups 
that reflect the external (international and top tier national) and local 
(sub-national) dimensions of the field: transitional justice 
entrepreneurs and transitional justice participants. Building on such 
extant work on the body of transitional justice actors, this thesis adds 
nuance to this framework of actors, in particular by disaggregating the 
group of transitional justice participants.  
Madlingozi (2010) uses the term transitional justice “entrepreneurs” to 
refer to what he calls “a well-travelled international cadre of actors” 
who 
theorise the field; set the agenda; legitimise what constitute 
appropriate transitional justice norms and mechanisms; 
influence the flow of financial resources; assist governments in 
transition; invite, collaborate with and capacitate ‘relevant’ local 
NGOs and ‘grassroots organisations’; and ultimately not only 
represent and speak for victims but ‘produce’ the victim (2010, 
p. 225).  
He uses the terms ‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘experts’ interchangeably, 
though this thesis argues that it is more useful to unpack this, and 
disaggregate the body of transitional justice entrepreneurs further, as 
Selim (2017) has done. The overall category of transitional justice 
entrepreneurs encompasses the external dimension of transitional 
justice, capturing relationships at the ‘top’ level of the discourse, that 
define its normative and institutional dimensions. This external 
category, of transitional justice entrepreneurs, is not however 
exclusively international, and this distinction is important. Selim (2017) 
articulates four categories of transitional justice actors in her analysis 
of participatory programming of transitional justice in Nepal. She 
defines the transitional justice expert, the transitional justice broker, the 
transitional justice implementer and victims’ groups. As her analysis 
supports the victim-centred approach to transitional justice more 
broadly, her final category of victims’ groups is of little use within this 





(discussed below), and resultantly is omitted from incorporation. 
According to Selim (2017), transitional justice experts are those actors 
who produce the “discourse and knowledge” (p. 1132) of transitional 
justice. These actors comprise the international and normative level of 
transitional justice. Transitional justice brokers “set the transitional 
justice agenda on the ground” (Selim, 2017, p. 1132) and this thesis 
defines such actors as the ‘top’ or ‘elite’ tier of national actors involved 
in constructing, designing and implementing transitional justice 
processes in individual contexts. These can be, for instance, 
governments and civil society actors. These actors, while not 
international, are still external, since at best they represent the needs 
and views of affected populations that comprise the realm of the local, 
and at worst, manufacture these to further their particular agendas (a 
dedicated discussion on the local can be found below). Finally, 
transitional justice implementers refers to the body of actors who 
implement a transitional justice process on the ground – within the 
context of this thesis, this refers to the actors within the TRC in Sierra 
Leone itself. Transitional justice experts reflect the normative level of 
transitional justice; transitional justice brokers and implementers 
embody the institutional level of transitional justice. Together, these 
actors comprise the body of external transitional justice entrepreneurs.  
The second category of transitional justice actors are local transitional 
justice participants. Broadly speaking, this refers to the local 
populations directly affected by conflict and whose engagement is 
needed for transitional justice to achieve its goals. Macdonald (2013) 
adopts a similar conceptualisation in her treatment of the transitional 
justice “end-user,” whom she defines as “somebody at the receiving 
end of transitional justice arrangements” (p. 8). These end-users, 
according to Macdonald (2013), “can be individuals or collectives” and 
are “both the actual and potential” individuals within the local (p. 8). On 
the most localised level, this thesis puts forward that an individual (or 
group i.e. perpetrators) can be either a simple participant, a (passive) 
beneficiary or a stakeholder. A simple participant is someone whose 
participation within transitional justice is considered necessary for it to 





often treated as instrumental in character, the nature and purpose of 
which are designed according to external agendas. Consequently, 
limited agency or voice is granted to such participants.  Yet transitional 
justice does not only seek participation from affected populations, it 
strives to impart a benefit on them, at least in theory. Participants for 
whom transitional justice is designed to impart a benefit can be 
considered transitional justice beneficiaries, and hold intrinsic value 
within such processes. According to the dominant victim-focused 
transitional justice discourse, this would mean that ‘innocent victims’ 
belong to the category of transitional justice beneficiaries, while ‘guilty 
perpetrators’ are simple participants therein. Yet, the picture remains 
incomplete, and is indeed more complex, as this thesis argues that one 
final constituent category of transitional justice participants may exist: 
that of the transitional justice stakeholder. While transitional justice 
beneficiaries are privileged in their treatment by transitional justice 
over that of simple participants, beneficiaries remain the passive 
recipients of transitional justice, and may still be constrained in the 
voice and agency that is granted to them within such processes. This 
reflects “sub-optimal” (Kilroy, 2011, p. 130) models of institutional 
engagement. This thesis argues that where beneficiaries have 
formative opportunities to express their needs, they can be 
transformed into stakeholders, which stands to enhance the overall 
local legitimacy and sustainability of a transitional justice process and 
its outcomes, respectively. Stakeholders comprise those participants 
with the ability to (in)form an institution’s design. Thus, where practices 
of inclusion and ownership are formative, beneficiaries become 
stakeholders as well, allowing for the cultivation of “communities of 
practice” (Quick and Feldman, 2011, p. 273) that promote sustainable 
and self-generating outcomes. All together, the body of local 
transitional justice participants, comprising simple participants, 
beneficiaries and (potentially) stakeholders, represents the final 
dimension of transitional justice: its practical level. However, while 
disaggregation brings clarity to the fog of relationships that constitute 
the enterprise of transitional justice, it also highlights the complexity of 





Beneficiaries are also participants, and beneficiaries can become 
stakeholders.  
For the purpose of simplicity, the term transitional justice entrepreneur 
is used when referring more broadly to transitional justice actors on the 
normative and institutional levels of transitional justice under 
examination in this thesis. The term participant(s) refers to the general 
body of conflict-affected populations with whom transitional justice 
seeks engagement within the level of the local, unless otherwise 
clarified.  
The Local 
This thesis examines the relationship between ex-combatants and the 
TRC in Sierra Leone along two axes. It critically examines the 
normative (rhetoric), structural (ritual) and practical (reality) 
dimensions of transitional justice generally, and of the truth 
commission in Sierra Leone specifically. Secondly, it advances a 
micro-level understanding of localised expectations, experiences and 
impacts of transitional justice, through the lens of the ex-combatant 
community. This multi-levelled and nuanced analysis of ex-combatants 
and the TRC contributes conceptually and empirically to the 
burgeoning sub-field of localised transitional justice assessments. As 
this thesis is squarely situated within the domain of ‘the local’, and 
because this is an inherently diverse realm, it is necessary to define 
and conceptualise this term. 
Broadly speaking, the local encompasses the matrix of domestic 
processes, people and places that constitute a particular context. As 
sites of intervention and interaction, the local has become a 
cornerstone of peacebuilding studies, and more recently has begun to 
permeate the discourse of transitional justice (and in relation to the 
field’s ownership debate in particular). In reviewing seminal 
peacebuilding research Hirblinger and Simons (2015) identify three 
ways in which the local is animated: firstly, “as an attribute to a referent 
object, such as local actors, populations and institutions”; secondly, the 





employed as a scale; lastly, the local is defined as spatial and 
associated with “distinctive places where actors, institutions and 
practices to peacebuilding are located” (p. 424).  
However, despite its centrality, the local lacks an accepted definition 
(Kochanski, 2018) and is often subject to “unspoken assumptions” 
(Nyseth Brehm and Golden, 2017, p. 104) around what makes a 
particular mechanism or process local “without much interrogation of 
what makes it so” (p. 104). Increasingly, research draws attention to 
the simplistic presentation of the local against the reality of its 
complexity, and the power asymmetries that exist between what 
Kochanski (2018) distinguishes as the “national and subnational 
levels” (p.27) of the local. Richmond (2009) summarises traditional 
conceptualisations of the local as the “range of actors and terrains” (p. 
341) situated at the elite domestic level with which international actors 
typically engage in various forms of peace- and state-building. Donais 
(2009) mirrors this, presenting a broad conceptualisation of the local 
as ‘domestic actors’ but emphasising that local elites (in the form of the 
state or national government) have commonly been treated as 
synonymous with, and exclusively constituting, the local.  
Within the local, at the level of ‘elites’ (Richmond, 2009) or the ‘national’ 
(Kochanski, 2018), national governments are given primacy. 
According to Donais (2009), national governments of states 
undergoing transition or reform are “assumed to possess not only the 
authority but also the legitimacy to engage” (pp. 119-120) in effective 
and lasting reform and interventions. Yet, the assumption that national 
governments sufficiently and legitimately represent the local does not 
accommodate for the reality that the local is in fact composed of many 
actors with “disparate and at times conflicting agendas” (Kochanski, 
2018, p. 39). In particular, the representativeness of governments 
requires critical examination, as national political elite interests may 
diverge significantly from larger (subnational) societal needs and lead 
to the elite capture of processes that treat domestic elites as both 
necessary and sufficient for meeting the needs of the local. Therefore, 





“they can also be the most problematic” (Donais, 2009, p. 120). Yet, 
engagement with these local elites remains necessary, however 
problematic. Governments “retain considerable capacity to block, 
circumvent and/or undermine initiatives they oppose or which threaten” 
(Donais, 2009, pp. 124-125) them.  As such, the national level of the 
local remains a relevant and necessary tier of the local, with local elites 
playing “a pivotal role in the conduct and governance of” (Kochanski, 
2018, p. 38) transitional justice and retaining considerable power in 
determining the inclusion and exclusion of other segments of the local 
within transitional justice initiatives.  
Beyond the state, another important segment of what Richmond 
(2009) refers to as local ‘elites’ takes the form of civil society. At its 
core, civil society functions as a filter and conduit between larger 
populations and the state and/or international community. These 
actors and groups represent larger communities and populations, 
speaking for and about them (Madlingozi, 2010). Donais (2009) calls 
attention to the fact that civil society is “typically viewed as a kind of 
collective national owner, and a potentially progressive counterbalance 
to those holding formal reins of power” (p. 120). Skaar (2018) similarly 
emphasises the importance of civil society, claiming that TRCs may 
exert a great impact on society if they engage genuinely with actors 
such as the media and civil society. However, scholars also warn of 
the dangers of romanticising civil society as a legitimate representation 
of the wider local. Pouligny (2005) draws attention to the problematic 
tendency to homogenise civil society, arguing that this too is a complex 
landscape of actors, themselves not immune to politicisation and the 
effects of conflict, and warranting more nuanced examination. 
Madlingozi (2010) draws attention to the need to question how locally 
representative civil society is, and indeed can be, of the larger 
populations it claims to speak for and about. According to him, these 
actors function more as barriers to direct participation rather than as 
conduits to individual empowerment (Madlingozi, 2010). His analysis 
begs the question of how locally legitimate civil society can ever be as 
a genuine representative of the ‘truly’ local (the larger population of 





to any structure that seeks to collect and reflect the interests of a larger 
group.  Richmond (2009) similarly describes civil society as “artificial” 
elites that fail to connect or promote “the agency of the vast bulk of 
post-conflict populations” (p. 325) and remain generally removed from 
the general populations that constitute what he calls the ‘local-local’.  
This thesis, however must remain practical in its critical approach lest 
it risks abstracting criticisms to the point where they lose all heuristic 
value. Cornwall (2008) aptly notes that in reality, it is impossible to 
meaningfully give voice to the totality and diversity of all potential 
participants and beneficiaries. In order to give voice to the many, we 
must find a way to filter the noise that otherwise becomes deafening 
and consequently meaningless. So, while more critical approaches 
towards civil society that unpack the sincerity of their 
representativeness is certainly warranted, they remain a crucial 
conduit and filter for larger participant populations, without which such 
populations cannot be meaningfully accessed.  
The state and civil society belong to the cadre of local actors and 
groups within the ‘local elite’ space of the local. Yet the local contains 
“overlapping layers” (Kochanski, 2018, p. 27) that extend across 
national, subnational and micro-levels. Despite the academic tendency 
to treat subnational actors “as a unified group” (Kochanski, 2018, p. 
38), in reality actors across levels of the local exercise varying degrees 
of agency. According to Kochanski (2018), transitional justice must 
consider “local-national power asymmetries…in order to nuance our 
grasp of how (local) transitional justice processes actually operate on 
the ground” (p. 38) and recognise diversity among various local actors 
that have traditionally (and inaccurately) been treated as homogenous.  
Donais (2009) distinguishes between the state and non-state actors 
within the local. In line with this, Goodhand and Sedra (2007) separate 
regime from the broader (sub)national5, defining regime as “formal 
                                                          
5 Goodhand and Sedra (2007) use the term ‘national’ to discuss what 
Kochanski (2018) refers to as subnational and Richmond (2009) refers to as 
the local-local. To avoid confusion as a result of inconsistent application of 





institutions of government” (quoted in Donais, 2009, p. 120) and the 
(sub)national as the “much broader, societal-wide” realm of citizens 
(quoted in Donais, 2009, p. 120). According to Kochanski (2018), the 
subnational domain of the local comprises “all segments of local 
populations” (p. 27), and not merely the body of “local elites” (p. 38) to 
which engagement with the local has historically been restricted. In a 
similar vein, Macdonald (2013) removes the state or national 
component from her treatment of the local altogether. Instead, she 
animates the local as the “sub-state, the community and the individual” 
(Macdonald, 2013, p. 58). In arguing for an expanded local lens 
through which to assess transitional justice measures, Nyseth Brehm 
and Golden (2017) advocate for a broad survivor-centred definition of 
the local in transitional justice. According to Nyseth Brehm and Golden 
(2017) survivors (and therefore the local in the context of transitional 
justice) constitute “all individuals touched by violence” (p. 106) – 
everyone who experiences and perpetrates harms. This micro-level 
survivor lens of the local recognises that “communities of survivors are 
not politically and ideologically homogenous or monolithic” (Nyseth 
Brehm and Golden, 2017, p. 111). Richmond (2009) distinguishes the 
local from what he calls the ‘local-local’, whereby the former is 
“commonly deployed to depict a homogenous and disorderly Other” (p. 
325) and restricted to local elites. The “disaggregated variety” of the 
“subaltern” (otherwise referred to as ‘general populations’, ‘local 
recipients’ or ‘ordinary people’) (Richmond, 2009, p. 331) remain 
invisible within this traditional conceptualisation of the local. Richmond 
(2009) employs the term ‘local-local’ ‘to indicate the existence and 
diversity of communities and individuals that constitute political society 
beyond’ the artifice of the local (elites) as outlined above.  
This thesis adopts and extends conceptualisations of the local and the 
local-local put forward by Nyseth Brehm and Golden (2017) and 
Richmond (2009), in its treatment of ex-combatants as the focal point 
of a localised analysis of the TRC in Sierra Leone. While Shaw, 
                                                          
levels of the local, I have added (sub) when referring to Goodhand and 





Waldorf and Hazan (2010) take a “place-based approach” (p. 282) to 
conceptualising the local, this thesis takes a ‘people-based approach’. 
It examines transitional justice in relation to the very people it professes 
to save, punish or forgive. In line with Nyseth Brehm and Golden 
(2017), the local is understood as “based in perspective rather than 
place (albeit a place-based perspective)” (p. 105). This thesis treats 
the local as an individualised lens, which while never fully detached 
from ‘place’, nonetheless recognises that “a sense of place need not 
be self-closing but rather can be outward looking” (Nyseth Brehm and 
Golden, 2017, p. 105).  
As outlined above, Nyseth Brehm and Golden (2017) reconceptualise 
the local towards an inclusive standard that encompasses “affected 
people” (p. 106) which they refer to as survivors. Within transitional 
justice, they argue that a particular process is local to the extent that 
survivors exercise agency and power throughout the process and their 
experiences and outcomes are prioritised. They reject the traditional 
victim orientation of transitional justice on the grounds that 
designations of victim and perpetrator are artificial and that a victim-
centred orientation of the local limits recognition of the breadth of this 
domain (Nyseth Brehm and Golden, 2017). Richmond (2009) similarly 
problematises conventional understandings of the local, which he 
depicts as limited to “often predatory elites” and “a ‘civil society’ that 
effectively floats far above the ordinary individual and the ‘local’ where 
everyday life occurs” (p. 325). Richmond (2009) presents the ‘local-
local’ as the “local beyond the artifice of civil society” (p. 331), that 
requires “engagement with the lives of ordinary people, in their own 
everyday rather than in a static and distant state context” (p. 333).  
Work by Richmond (2009) and Nyseth Brehm and Golden (2017) 
extend conventional definitions of the local to accommodate diversity 
on the micro-level among affected populations, and foreground the 
need to assess the merits of transitional justice through the 






 This thesis expands the lens of the local to the category of ex-
combatants, defined as perpetrators by the TRC itself, as a particular 
segment of the ‘survivor’ population within the individualised lens of the 
local presented by Nyseth Brehm and Golden (2017). This thesis’s 
focus on the ex-combatant perpetrator population in relation to the 
TRC in Sierra Leone also aligns with Richmond’s (2009) 
conceptualisation of the local-local as one element of the broader 
population of citizens and identified local TRC recipients in Sierra 
Leone.  
In seeking to understand the expectations, experiences and impacts 
of the TRC in relation the local(-local) survivor population of ex-
combatants, this thesis also responds to calls for “more localised” 
(Richmond, 2009, p. 327) scholarship “assessing survivors’ 
experiences with transitional justice mechanisms” (Nyseth Brehm and 
Golden, 2017, p. 113) and centralising the ‘end-user’ (Macdonald, 
2013) within transitional justice assessments. Research highlighting 
the importance of local examinations of transitional justice has begun 
to address micro-level variation from both agency (how individuals 
affect these processes) and structural (how these processes impact 
individuals) perspectives. Work by Skaar and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 
(2013) and Sriram (2013), highlight the role of local agency in 
determining the path of transitional justice implementation. Such 
research highlights the role played by local ‘drivers’ and ‘spoilers’ of 
justice in the construction and implementation of these processes. The 
need to disaggregate the impact of transitional justice processes on 
local individuals is also growing. Acknowledgement of micro-level 
variation in the experiences of transitional justice, across the local has 
gained currency in, for instance, studies by Nussio et al. (2015), Aguilar 
et al. (2011), Samii (2013) and Millar (2011). Richmond (2009) refers 
to this approach, of locally contextualising peacebuilding assessments 
through the expectations and experiences of the “hidden but 
widespread local-local” (p. 337), as “eirenism” (p. 329). In taking such 
an eirenistic approach, and disaggregating the ‘survivor’ lens of the 
local developed by Nyseth Brehm and Golden (2017) onto the 





identity, in Sierra Leone, this thesis advances conceptually and 
empirically the “particularly important” (Nyseth Brehm and Golden, 
2017, p. 113) and emerging body of localised transitional justice 
scholarship.  However, while the relationship of interest for this thesis 
is between non-participant ex-combatants and the TRC in Sierra 
Leone, this research recognises that this relationship is nested within 
the larger social system that comprises the particular institution of the 
TRC. As such, it also engages with the wider domain of the local, as 
the myriad set of actors and levels that must be considered in order to 
generate a nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the 
personal and localised experiences of, but also structural and 
normative relationships between, ex-combatants and the TRC.  
In uncovering and analysing the localised TRC experiences of non-
participant ex-combatants, this study’s approach to the local 
challenges the black and white discourse of identity production within 
transitional justice and thereby confronts the “moral grey zone” (Shaw, 
2010, p. 114) of transitional justice on the ground. By disaggregating 
the local onto the level of the conflict-affected individual, this study 
presents an empirically fine-grained contribution to localised 
transitional justice scholarship. The findings of this thesis add depth to 
the growing field of normatively critical and locally-oriented transitional 
justice studies. This chapter has presented the research puzzle of this 
thesis, and introduced the approach adopted to shed empirical light on 
the relationship between ex-combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone. 
It has defined the central concepts of this research and contextualised 
the contributions of its work within the broader field of transitional 
justice. Chapter 2 of this thesis elaborates the research design and 
methodological choices adopted to rigorously investigate, describe 
and understand its research puzzle of the relationship between ex-
combatants and the TRC. Chapter 3 ends Part One of this thesis by 
providing a literature review of the field of transitional justice, with a 
particular focus on the history and evolution of truth commissions, and 
presenting a historical overview of the conflict and post-conflict 






Research Design and Methods 
 
This thesis presents the first in-depth and empirically grounded 
examination of perpetrator experiences of post-conflict truth 
commissions and seeks to explore and understand this. The research 
design for this investigation uses qualitative methods to achieve a 
comprehensive exploration of ex-combatants and the TRC in Sierra 
Leone. This thesis is retrospective in character, and generates 
grounded theory around its population and relationship of interest 
using an abductive approach to analysis.  
Thick description and understanding for this research on the 
relationship between ex-combatants and the TRC is achieved through 
illuminating and analysing the normative participation model within 
transitional justice (the level of transitional justice rhetoric), the 
institutional model of TRC participation in Sierra Leone (the ritual level 
of transitional justice), and most significantly, ex-combatant 
experiences of the Commission, using the justice needs and 
expectations, TRC experiences and ultimately impacts that these 
actors attach to this institution (the level of transitional justice reality). 
This thesis advances a detailed, comprehensive and localised 
examination of the relationship between the TRC and non-participant 
ex-combatants in Sierra Leone. Qualitative methods are appropriate 
for this research as they are particularly useful for in-depth exploration 
and description (Blaikie, 2010). The ‘insider’ orientation of qualitative 
data collection methods (Blaikie, 2010) makes this approach well-
suited to examining the reasons of outcomes (causes-of-effects) 
(Bennett and Elman, 2006). The flexible and reflexive character of 
qualitative research methods is also advantageous for this thesis’s 
exploratory and bottom-up approach.  
This chapter proceeds by briefly reiterating the case selection criteria 
adopted by this thesis, elaborated in the first instance in Chapter 1. It 





qualitative and retrospective strategies as uniquely appropriate for the 
research puzzle that this thesis treats. A discussion on time and recall 
bias highlights inevitable challenges that any research design faces, 
and the steps taken to acknowledge and mitigate this. The rationale 
behind the single-case case study design for this thesis is then 
presented and the analytical tools of process tracing and discourse 
analysis used in this research are presented. A detailed discussion of 
the data types and sources used by this thesis, a combination of 
primary and secondary data types, and the sampling strategies 
employed is thereafter provided. Finally, a discussion on researcher 
positionality and a word on knowledge production, based on the long-
term fieldwork conducted for this thesis is presented.  
Case Selection 
The case study for this thesis, the TRC in Sierra Leone, has been 
selected by applying Hayner’s 2011 definition of truth commissions, 
and by restricting possible cases to post-conflict truth commissions 
established in Africa after 1995, which have completed their 
operations. Case selection was drawn from Africa due to the 
prevalence of both civil war, and truth commissions, in this region. A 
temporal restriction is also necessary to limit the number of possible 
cases and increase the feasibility of conducting interviews. As 
highlighted in Chapter 1, case selection was additionally temporally 
restricted to post-conflict truth commissions established after 1995, the 
year that South Africa’s famous Truth and Reconciliation was 
established, due to the formative impact that this particular truth 
commission has had on the scholarship and practice of these bodies 
(Freeman, 2006; Hayner, 2006; Millar, 2011; Skaar, 2018). In line with 
Hayner’s definition (2011), only truth commissions that have 
completed their operations were considered as possible cases. This 
retrospective orientation also circumvents ethical challenges that could 
otherwise be posed if these processes were ongoing. Additionally, 
constructing the complete narrative of perpetrator truth commission 
experiences is only possible if such processes have been completed. 





due to the exploratory nature of this research, in order to cultivate an 
in-depth understanding of the relationship under investigation.  
Research Design 
This thesis utilises an abductive research strategy and qualitative data 
and analysis, to explore, describe and understand perpetrator 
experiences of truth commissions.  I adopt a retrospective temporal 
approach to data collection, and an in-depth single case study model 
for depth of exploration within a single, illustrative case: Sierra Leone. 
The main source of data for this thesis are primary data collected 
through semi-structured interviews in the field, using snowball 
sampling to gain access to respondents from all targeted population 
categories.  
The abductive approach is uniquely appropriate for description and 
exploration in social inquiry (Blaikie, 2010), and is therefore well-suited 
to achieve these purposes within this thesis. The abductive approach 
consists of producing new knowledge through “assembling or 
discovering, on the basis of an interpretation of collected data, such 
combinations of features for which there is no appropriate explanation 
or rule” (Reichertz, 2010, p. 6). It is a “cognitive logic of discovery” 
(Reichertz, 2010, p. 7) that makes sense of “surprising facts” (p. 9) 
through the iterative and reflexive process of “meaning-creating rules” 
(p. 9) that this thesis undertakes through a grounded theory approach. 
Exploration and description are achieved by placing ex-combatants at 
the heart of this process, in line with the localised approach adopted 
throughout this study. Abductive research constructs description from 
the bottom up, by using the meanings, interpretations, motives and 
intentions of social actors (Blaikie, 2010), which is appropriate for this 
thesis. Narrative empirical data are used to construct the experiences 
of non-participant ex-combatants in relation to Sierra Leone’s TRC, 
and thus is necessarily driven by the need to access, discover and 
understand the landscape of social meaning and values that inform 
and surround this relationship, as held by individual ex-combatants.  
Abduction is also suited for addressing ‘why’ questions and generating 





adopted by this thesis is situated within a grounded theory approach 
which iteratively develops categories of reasons surrounding 
expectations, experiences and impacts through a textured 
understanding of ex-combatant narrative experiences of the TRC as 
well as the commission’s institutional engagement with this population. 
This approach is well-aligned to the localised design of this thesis.  
This thesis employs qualitative research tools to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of the relationship between 
perpetrators and the TRC in Sierra Leone. This design relies on 
constructing narratives of this relationship, along the dimensions of 
expectations, experiences and impacts, using a ‘bottom-up’ approach 
where primary narrative data from qualitative interviews has been used 
for the purposes of exploration and thick description. This thesis 
adopts a bottom-up orientation to knowledge production, and aims to 
advance an understanding of the research puzzle through the 
collection and analysis of personal respondent narratives. This bottom-
up orientation is uniquely appropriate, as this thesis contributes to the 
burgeoning sub-field of micro-level transitional justice that seeks to 
localise investigations and assessments of such processes, within and 
against the lens of affected populations. 
Time and recall bias 
The truth commission in Sierra completed its operations in 2004. A 
retrospective approach, which is temporally backward-looking and 
used to study recent history, is therefore required. The backward-
looking orientation of this approach, in combination with this study’s 
use of oral histories, is limited by the fallible nature of memory. It must 
therefore be acknowledged that the constructed narratives will always 
be “a possible reconstruction of the past under the influence of 
subsequent experiences” (Blaikie, 2010, p.203).  
A key challenge in retrospective research is recall bias - the impact of 
subsequent experiences, and indeed time more generally, on 
recollections of the past. The power of associations and theoretical 
categories is therefore limited, as it is not possible to completely 





larger post-conflict environment) have impacted contemporary 
recollections of ex-combatant expectations towards it, gathered 
through qualitative interviews. The retrospective data gathered in this 
study is therefore introspective in character – accounts of the TRC and 
the meanings attached thereto have necessarily been filtered through 
subsequent respondent experiences and their present conditions. 
(Scott and Alwin, 1998).  
Three steps have been taken in an effort to mitigate this recall bias. 
Firstly, interview guides have been carefully constructed to probe ex-
combatant understandings of the TRC, and to separate their 
expectations of the TRC from their subsequent (non-participation) 
experiences and impacts associated with it. Secondly, where possible 
multiple interviews with ex-combatants were conducted, as a validity 
check to observe changes in the narratives provided. Where iterative 
interviews were possible interview questions were slightly reframed to 
capture any misalignments in responses. Overwhelmingly, consistent 
narratives indicate some success in mitigating the inevitable limitations 
posed by recall bias. Lastly, the high saturation point of conducting 112 
ex-combatant interviews has helped to mitigate validity errors that may 
be introduced by recall bias limitations.  
In addition to taking steps to mitigate recall bias from retrospective 
respondent interviews, TRC archival materials and official 
documentation was accessed and analysed to enhance the scope of 
this research. These materials are sources of primary data that are 
unaffected by recall bias, having been collected and produced during 
the lifespan of the TRC.  
The retrospective approach adopted by this thesis also has several 
advantages. It has allowed this research to generate a comprehensive 
account of perpetrator experiences without the high costs that 
accompany longitudinal studies, and to investigate truth commission 
experiences in their entirety, in particular including the dimensions of 
experiences and impacts. This increases the persuasiveness of 
process tracing analysis (Bennett and Elman, 2006). Furthermore, the 





for several years, often extending beyond their original mandates, 
makes it difficult to plan longitudinal studies that investigate truth 
commissions. Additionally, establishing a truth commission does not 
guarantee its successful completion, and several commissions have 
been disbanded without completion or have operated under 
controversial conditions (as in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and Kenya). It is also doubtful that this research would be 
ethically feasible in the context of an ongoing truth commission. 
However, in a retrospective context, there is no risk that interviewing 
perpetrators will impact their participation behaviour. Finally, the 
completion of transitional justice processes in Sierra Leone 
significantly decreases perpetrator security concerns, which eliminates 
ethical and practical constraints that may otherwise impede access.  
Case Study Design 
This thesis employs a single-case (within-case) case study design to 
examine perpetrator experiences of the truth commission in Sierra 
Leone. Case studies enjoy an advantage in approaching causation 
through understanding (Bennett and Elman, 2006). The use of a 
single-case study design allows depth of exploration and description, 
which is necessary to illuminate the complexity of the relationship 
between the TRC and the ex-combatant population in Sierra Leone. 
Using a single-case case study approach is necessary to generate an 
in-depth exploration of the relationship between the TRC and ex-
combatants in Sierra Leone. The single-case approach this thesis 
adopts is both revelatory and embedded. It is revelatory because it 
examines the unexplored relationship between perpetrators and truth 
commissions, using the illustrative case study of Sierra Leone. 
Embedded case studies involve conducting research at different levels 
within a given case while still treating the case as a single-case case 
study (Blaikie, 2010). The concept of ‘levels’ inherent to embedded 
case studies is applied along two dimensions within this thesis: people 
and places. In line with the previously established definition of the local 
(in Chapter 1), this thesis adopts a people-based approach to 





domestic actors together constitute the tapestry of levels that together 
comprise the local. Interviews with ex-combatants, TRC officials 
(transitional justice implementers), and civil society actors (transitional 
justice brokers) in Sierra Leone have been conducted as part of this. 
Additionally, this has been augmented by conducting research 
throughout Sierra Leone, acknowledging the geographic dimension of 
levels within embedded case studies. Interviews have been conducted 
across Sierra Leone, concentrating in its three regional capitals, of 
Freetown (Western Area – capital of Sierra Leone), Bo (Southern 
Sierra Leone) and Makeni (Northern Sierra Leone) and their 
surrounding rural areas.  
Process tracing is a key form of within-case case study analysis 
(Bennett and Elman, 2006). It connects causes with outcomes by 
identifying the causal chain and mechanism(s) that can offer 
explanation or understanding (George and Bennett, 2005).  It is an 
indispensable tool for theory development, and particularly appropriate 
for investigating social phenomena that incorporate a temporal 
dimension (George & Bennett, 2005). In identifying causation, process 
tracing focuses on the process and not the outcome, and therefore 
does not rely on covariance (Bennett and Checkel, 2014; George and 
Bennett, 2005). Process tracing uncovers causality by discovering the 
‘causes-of-effects’ (Bennett and Checkel, 2014; George and Bennett, 
2005). I employ inductive process tracing, as part of theory 
development, using “evidence from within a case to develop 
hypotheses that might explain the case” (Bennett and Checkel, 2014, 
p.8). A combination of the detailed narrative and analytical explanation 
variants of process tracing are employed (George and Bennett, 2005). 
Establishing a detailed narrative of perpetrator experiences of truth 
commissions involves constructing a highly detailed historical account 
of these experiences, without the explicit use of theory. This is later 
transformed into an analytical causal explanation (George and 






Discourse analysis has been particularly critical in identifying the 
formal incorporation and treatment of ex-combatants within the TRC 
(see Chapters 5 and 6) through the analysis of secondary data, and in 
supplementing the narrative histories provided through ex-combatant 
interviews, which lends empirical validity to primary data findings in 
subsequent participation and impacts chapters.  
Discourse analysis, as the study of “language-in-use” (Gee, 2011, p. 
ix) provides many tools with which to understand and explain the world 
through language. This thesis utilises the tools of ‘identities building’ 
and ‘situated meaning’ (also known as utterance-token meaning) 
(Gee, 2011) to explore and analyse perpetrator treatment vis-à-vis 
Sierra Leone’s TRC. Identities building involves analysing text to 
uncover contained identities and the positionality thereof. This thesis, 
with its focus on understanding the truth commission experiences of 
perpetrators, identifies the role of this group within the TRC, making 
this tool invaluable in its analytic ambitions. Secondly, this thesis relies 
on situated meaning, which tells us what words mean in particular 
contexts, to construct the relationship between perpetrators and the 
truth commission specifically. The situated meaning of perpetrators as 
actors in truth commissions allows for the development of an 
analytically constructed framework about their role and importance as 
truth commission participants. It adds necessary depth to this 
investigation. By uncovering the situated meaning of perpetrator 
experiences within the truth commission’s design this study further 
examines and assesses the relative treatment of these experiences, 
along its institutional axis of investigation. This follows the critical 
discourse analysis approach wherein situated meanings are 
associated with social practices (Gee, 2011b), in this case the practice 
of perpetrator (non)participation in post-conflict truth commissions. 
Furthermore, according to van Dijk (2008), examinations of inequality 
lie at the heart of critical discourse analysis. This study’s exploration of 
the relative treatment of perpetrators in truth commissions highlights 





design of local engagement in truth commissions. The relative 
treatment of conflict experiences in truth commissions is integral to 
understanding the treatment of perpetrators in this study, making 
critical discourse analysis an inherent part of this investigation. This 
thesis employs discourse analysis to develop a framework for 
institutional engagement in the TRC, to establish the role and 
relevance accorded to this population on the institutional level, and to 
supplement primary narrative data through the analysis of TRC 
statements. The following section details the data types, sources and 
sampling techniques employed for this research. 
Data Types, Sources and Sampling  
This thesis uses multiple data types and sources to develop a multi-
dimensional understanding of the relationship between ex-combatants 
and the TRC in Sierra Leone. It relies predominantly on primary data, 
in the form of interviews with several populations. The main population 
of interest is the ex-combatant community in Sierra Leone, and this 
comprises the bulk of interviews undertaken (112 of 147 interviews). 
Interviews with members of civil society and TRC officials have also 
been undertaken (32 interviews), to shed empirical light on the 
institutional realities of the TRC and its relationship with the ex-
combatant community. Secondary data, in the form of official truth 
commission documentation, is additionally used to illuminate the 
institutional design and operations of the TRC, and to supplement 
primary interview data from the ex-combatant population. The TRC 
Statement archives and the TRC’s mandate and Final Report 
documents have been examined for these purposes.  
Primary Data 
The empirical data gathered for this thesis comprises predominantly 
primary narrative data that has been collected through semi-structured 
informal interviews from different segments of the local across Sierra 
Leone. Primary data, in the form of in-depth interviews, has been 






A total of 147 interviews were conducted for this thesis and constitute 
the primary data used for analysis. Populations sampled were ex-
combatants from a cross-section of different warring factions; 
members of civil society, involved in the advocacy, establishment and 
operations of the TRC; and TRC officials. Fieldwork and data collection 
began in November 2016, and lasted for just over two years, ending in 
January 2019. Ten interviews were conducted in 2016, 55 in 2017 and 
82 in 2018 and the beginning of 2019. The average interview length 
varied between 45 to 55 minutes, with some interviews lasting over 90 
minutes. An additional 7 ex-combatant interviews were also held, but 
due to their short length (a maximum of 10 minutes) have been omitted 
from the analysis. Twenty-one members of civil society were 
interviewed, 11 TRC officials, 112 ex-combatants, and 3 additional 
individuals, who self-identified as victims of the war.  
Sampled populations 
Civil Society Actors (TRC Brokers) 21 












The overrepresentation of interviews in Freetown is largely due to the 
concentration of civil society and TRC officials there. The following 
sections disaggregate the primary data collection strategy of this 





comprehensive understanding of the relationship between ex-
combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone.  
Ex-Combatants 
The primary population of interest for this thesis is the low to mid-level 
ex-combatant community, that did not directly participate in the TRC in 
Sierra Leone. This is reflected in the high number of ex-combatant 
interviews conducted throughout the course of this study (112). Below 
are the factional and regional distributions of the ex-combatant 
population sampled for this thesis, which include ex-combatants from 
across the main domestic groups that participated in the civil war in 
Sierra Leone, and drawn from across the country’s three regional 
capitals of Freetown, Bo and Makeni. A description of each of these 
warring factions can be found in Chapter 3’s historical overview of the 










Regional Ex-Combatant Distribution 
 (ex)Military 
(SLA) 
RUF CDF/Kamajors Other 
Freetown 15 19 5 0 
Bo 8 5 26 2 
Makeni 9 22 0 1 
Total 32 46 31 3 
                                                          
6 As Chapter 3 points out, the armed forces of Sierra Leone (its military) has 
undergone a name change since the civil war, from the Sierra Leone Army 
(SLA) to the Republic of Sierra Leone’s Armed Forces (RSLAF). Throughout 






Thirty-six out of 112 interviewed ex-combatants reported being under 
the age of 18 at the time they joined an armed group. Overwhelmingly, 
under-age ex-combatants reported being forcibly conscripted into the 
war, (28 of 36), and the majority of under-aged ex-combatants were 
part of the RUF (27 of 36). The youngest ex-combatant respondent 
was eight years old when he was abducted and forced to join the RUF, 
and was only 23 years old at the time of being interviewed for this 
research. Of the eight under-aged ex-combatants that joined the war 
voluntarily, all were between the ages of 15 and 17. Five of eight 
voluntarily joined the Kamajor and CDF movement, two joined the 
RUF, and one joined the Army (SLA). Generally, former Kamajor 
members were older at the time of joining than respondents who 
participated with the RUF and military forces. Kamajor ex-combatants 
also reported the highest levels of voluntary armed group membership, 
with 28 of 31 reporting to have joined voluntarily. Former RUF 
members reported the highest level of forced recruitment. Out of 31 
Kamajor interviews, 20 identify as both Kamajor and CDF. Forty-one 
interviewed ex-combatants participated in the Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process in Sierra Leone 
(described in Chapter 3). Important to note is that no (ex)military (SLA) 
respondents participated in DDR. Out of the 41 RUF and CDF ex-
combatants that participated in DDR, 25 were former RUF and 16 were 
CDF. 
Sampling Techniques: Accessing Ex-Combatants  
Using probability sampling methods to identify an appropriate sample 
of the ex-combatant population, in order to build descriptive and 
categorical statements about them, is clearly not possible. 
Comprehensive data on this population simply do not exist. This is 
unsurprising, given the obvious difficulties this would entail. This 
expectation has been amply evidenced throughout the course of over 
two years of fieldwork in Sierra Leone. Non-probability snowball 
sampling is best suited for research that addresses a population that 





clearly falls within these parameters, utilising snowball sampling is the 
necessary, most appropriate, and indeed the only viable sampling 
method suited for this study. Accessing this population was achieved 
through a diverse network of gatekeepers that I cultivated over the 
course of extended fieldwork in Sierra Leone (a further discussion on 
access and gatekeepers can be found below). The strength of social 
networks observed throughout Sierra Leone throughout the course of 
this research greatly facilitated purposive snowball sampling among 
this population.  
At the micro-level, non-participant ex-combatant expectations, 
experiences and impacts of the TRC are empirically investigated within 
this thesis. Primary narrative data has focused on engagement with 
the ex-combatant population in Sierra Leone that did not directly 
participate within the TRC, as this population forms the object of 
investigation for this larger thesis.  
Chapter 1 has presented the definition of ex-combatants used within 
this thesis. For the purpose of illuminating the ex-combatant sampling 
strategy and criteria employed throughout the research process, it is 
useful to summarise this once more. Within this thesis, perpetrators 
are understood to be all individuals who committed crimes during 
Sierra Leone’s civil war, as per the definition put forward by the TRC 
itself. Importantly, this refers predominantly, although not necessarily 
exclusively, to the ex-combatant population, and includes all warring 
factions active during the war. While not all perpetrators are therefore 
ex-combatants, according to the TRC’s definition of perpetrators, all 
ex-combatants are perpetrators. The population of primary interest for 
this thesis is the low to mid-level ex-combatant population in Sierra 
Leone.  
This thesis relies exclusively on primary respondent data collected 
from ex-combatants who did not participate directly in Sierra Leone’s 
TRC. This lends robustness to a discussion on non-participation and 
exclusion between the Commission and this population, but does not 
allow for comparison between participant and non-participant groups, 





to mitigate this, TRC archival analysis has been conducted, on a 
random sample of TRC perpetrator statements, publicly available in 
the TRC Archives in Freetown, Sierra Leone. The use of this 
secondary data source is further elaborated below.  
Ex-combatant sampling criteria 
In accessing the ex-combatant population of interest for gathering 
primary narrative data for this thesis, eight sampling criteria were used 
(and amended, as necessary, throughout the course of this study, to 
ensure the feasibility of generating an appropriate sample): ex-
combatant status, rank, warring group affiliation, nature of entry into an 
armed group, duration of armed group participation, age, TRC non-
participation, and lastly, (non)participation in DDR.  
Ex-combatant status: Due to the obvious difficulties in identifying and 
accessing non-combatant perpetrators, the sample of perpetrators for 
this thesis is restricted to the ex-combatant perpetrator population. 
Rank: Within the ex-combatant population, sampling has been 
confined to low and mid-level ex-combatants, as this forms the largest 
segment of this population, which did not face the prospect of SCSL 
indictment. This criterion and larger orientation has allowed for the 
gathering of empirics among a large, relevant and neglected 
population of identified local transitional justice participants (see 
Chapter 1) in the transitional justice discourse and within the 
transitional justice participant framework defined by the TRC in Sierra 
Leone specifically.  
Warring Group Affiliation: This research is cross-sectional, and has 
aimed to capture variance in ex-combatant experiences. To this end, 
interviews were conducted with ex-combatants from all warring 
factions active during the civil war in Sierra Leone. As highlighted 
above, 112 ex-combatants were interviewed, over the course of a little 
more than two years of fieldwork. Thirty-two (ex)members of the SLA 
(the Sierra Leone Army), 46 members of the RUF, 31 members of the 





groups comprise the total population of sampled ex-combatants for the 
purposes of primary data collection within this study.  
Nature of Entry into Armed Groups: Originally, the intention was to 
restrict sampling to only include ex-combatants who voluntarily joined 
an armed group. The ambition to originally avoid including conscripted 
or forcibly recruited ex-combatants was undertaken to add to the 
homogeneity of the sample, to learn the most about this population 
who could be considered as most ‘responsible’ for their own 
participation, through its voluntary nature. However, recognition of the 
reality of the complexity of wartime participation warranted withdrawing 
this restriction in the early stages of fieldwork. The majority of 
interviewed ex-combatants express not having “any choice but to 
fight”7, and describe the experience of becoming ex-combatants as 
forcibly caused by either people or circumstance. The amended 
sampling criterion therefore includes ex-combatants who were both 
forcibly conscripted and who joined the fighting voluntarily. This has 
been a particularly enriching adaption to this thesis’s original research 
design, as it has enabled an expanded understanding around the 
language of participation among ex-combatants, and the particular 
significance of motivations in the narrative histories provided 
throughout the course of this study. 
Duration of participation: A minimum duration of armed group 
participation of six months was set for this research. The logic 
underlying this criterion is that longer duration of armed group 
participation increases the likelihood of individual respondent 
participation in ‘active’ conflict (i.e. in committing abuses). In reality, all 
ex-combatants interviewed participated as active combatants for at 
least 12 months, and the majority were active combatants for longer. 
Age: The original sampling strategy for this thesis was restricted to 
respondents who were adults (18 years or older) at the time of joining 
the war, to avoid the population of child soldiers. This choice was made 
because the population of child soldiers is recognised as having a 
                                                          





special status in the discourse of transitional justice, as a category of 
‘victim perpetrators’. However, given the exploratory character of my 
research and therefore the lack of empirics surrounding the 
relationship between TRCs and ex-combatants, this decision was 
amended in 2017, to no longer restrict sampling to a particular age 
group, and no longer actively avoid this sub-set of the ex-combatant 
population. Expanding the age criterion of this sampling strategy 
significantly increased the sample size of ex-combatants for this 
research. This is largely attributable to two factors: the pervasive use 
of child soldiers within the civil war, and the low life expectancy of 
adults in Sierra Leone. Together, this means that a large portion of the 
ex-combatant population in Sierra Leone today is composed of former 
child soldiers. The majority of interviewed ex-combatants (76 of 112 
ex-combatants) were nonetheless over the age of 18 at the time of 
joining an armed group.  
TRC non-participation: Arguably the most significant sampling criterion 
for this thesis has been that of TRC non-participation among ex-
combatants. Primary data from the ex-combatant population is 
therefore exclusively drawn from a sample of this population who did 
not participate within the TRC in Sierra Leone. This has significant 
implications for this research. Firstly, it is uniquely informative of the 
lack of ex-combatant participation within the TRC in Sierra Leone, 
whereby questions of inclusion, experiences and impacts are 
examined through the lens of multiple processes and sources of 
exclusion, throughout Part Three of this thesis. This expands the scope 
of findings and analysis, to the important issue of non-participation and 
participation deterrence, which form the locus of analysis in Chapters 
8 and 9.  As highlighted in Chapter 1, this advances an empirical 
critique towards the broader claim within truth commission studies on 
the cascading effects of this mechanism of transitional justice, which 
are claimed to exert an impact on populations and contexts beyond 
their direct participants (as highlighted in the analysis presented in 
Chapter 11 on TRC impact in relation to the population of non-
participant ex-combatants in Sierra Leone). Secondly, used in 





findings around the relationship between the TRC and the ex-
combatant population, which then cannot speak to, or on behalf of, nor 
represent the expectations, experiences or impacts of the Commission 
on ex-combatants who did participate within it. The use of secondary 
data, in particular the random sampling of perpetrator statements 
provided to the TRC, addresses this to a degree, and allows for some 
comparison and generalisability towards the larger ex-combatant 
population in Sierra Leone, across the dimension of TRC participation 
and non-participation. This is addressed in the subsequent section of 
secondary data within this chapter. Thus, while the generalisability of 
findings remains restricted, the knowledge produced within these 
limitations nonetheless contributes significantly to glaring empirical 
gaps in current truth commission and transitional justice scholarship 
that require illumination.  
DDR participation: the sample of ex-combatants for this thesis 
comprise both individuals who did, and those who did not, participate 
within the DDR programme in Sierra Leone. Forty-one out of 112 
interviewed ex-combatants report participating in the DDR programme 
in Sierra Leone, and 71 report they did not participate. Important to 
note is that no members of the military (SLA) report participating in the 
DDR programme in Sierra Leone. When controlling for this sub-set of 
sampled ex-combatants, the figure then dramatically changes, with 41 
out of 80 (exclusively non-SLA ex-combatants), participating to some 
degree within the DDR programme in Sierra Leone, or 51.3%. Among 
the 41 ex-combatant respondents that did participate within DDR, 37 
state they either did not (17), or only partially (20), received the 
reintegration assistance promised within the auspices of this 
programme. Verification of participation within DDR was not requested 
from ex-combatants who reported to have participated (through 
provision of their DDR identification cards), though several (25) chose 
to show their DDR cards without prompting.  
Unintentional sampling restrictions 
While the above outlined active sampling criteria were used for primary 





one unintended sampling restriction has emerged throughout the 
course of fieldwork and data collection for this thesis that merits 
elaboration: gender.  This thesis did not adopt a gender requirement 
as part of its sampling requirements. Nonetheless, all ex-combatants 
interviewed have been male. This has introduced an unintended 
gender restriction within the overall research design.  
Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs in Sierra Leone’s TRC 
While primary data collection for this thesis engaged heavily with the 
population of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, and accounts for 112 of 
147 respondents interviewed, this is not the only population from which 
primary data, in the form of semi-structured interviews, were collected. 
To develop a multi-level and comprehensive understanding of the 
relationship between the TRC and ex-combatant population in Sierra 
Leone, this thesis undertook both an institutional and micro-level 
analysis of this relationship, investigating both the institutional 
treatment of ex-combatants in the TRC, and their own experiences of 
this mechanism of transitional justice. In order to pursue the 
institutional axis of this research, interviews with actors belonging to 
the body of transitional justice entrepreneurs (defined in Chapter 1) 
were also conducted. Twenty-one members of civil society who directly 
engaged with the process of establishing and/or the operations of the 
TRC, as part of the TRC Working Group, were interviewed. This 
population comprises a sample of the population of TRC brokers in 
Sierra Leone. Eleven TRC officials were also interviewed, to sample 
the population of TRC implementers. The following discussion details 
the sampling strategy employed to identify and access these 
populations, from which narrative data has contributed to the 
construction of the institutional axis of the relationship between the 
TRC and ex-combatants in Sierra Leone.  
TRC Brokers (civil society) 
Primary data collection for this research began with a one-month 
scoping visit to Sierra Leone that focused on accessing and 
interviewing transitional justice brokers involved with the TRC. As 





of the larger body of transitional justice entrepreneurs that function as 
a conduit between wider local populations whose interests and needs 
they assert to represent, and the transitional justice landscape of a 
given domestic context. They are civil society actors who are 
recognised to play an important role in calling for, and facilitating the 
implementation of, truth commissions in particular, within transitional 
justice scholarship (Skaar, 2018). As Chapter 8 demonstrates, within 
Sierra Leone, civil society played an instrumental role as transitional 
justice brokers, calling for the establishment of a TRC during peace 
negotiations, and throughout the Commission’s work, through the 
formation of the TRC Working Group. The choice to begin data 
collection with this particular population was underpinned by the 
following motivations: ease of access, and cultural acclimatisation. 
Prior to beginning this doctoral investigation, I had no antecedent 
history of travelling to, or conducting research on, Sierra Leone. As 
such, the ability to identify, contact and organise meetings with 
members of civil society remotely, and prior to my first fieldwork visit to 
Sierra Leone was attractive, for obvious reasons. Civil society contacts 
provided by a colleague, Simeon Koroma, who himself co-founded the 
oldest and largest legal aid non-profit organisation in Sierra Leone, 
facilitated such contact immensely as well. Additionally, during this first 
field visit to Sierra Leone, I participated in a peace research conference 
held in Freetown, widely attended by local scholars, policy makers and 
civil society representations, which further afforded an opportunity to 
establish contacts, and subsequently interviews, with transitional 
justice brokers there. Secondly, I also felt ethically compelled to 
approach the primary data collection of this study, interviewing ex-
combatants, cautiously and with consideration. The combination of my 
primary population of interest (ex-combatants) being a vulnerable one, 
having no prior research or travel experience in Sierra Leone, and 
significantly also no prior primary data collection experience led to the 
decision to begin data collection among the population of transitional 
justice entrepreneurs in Sierra Leone. As a result, I ultimately felt more 
adequately informed and ethically prepared to conduct the remaining 





primary data collection through in-depth interviews demands. Over the 
course of what was ultimately more than two years of fieldwork and 
data collection, accruing some basic local language skills has also 
been a significant advantage in both collecting and understanding the 
narrative experiences gathered through this research.  
Furthermore, this decision to begin data collection with the population 
of transitional justice brokers in Sierra Leone was particularly beneficial 
as it led to cross-sectional snowballing, by facilitating access to TRC 
officials (transitional justice implementers) and ex-combatants within 
Sierra Leone through contacts provided by interviewed TRC brokers.  
Transitional Justice Implementers (TRC Officials) 
An important component of understanding the TRC’s engagement with 
the perpetrator population involved interviewing individuals who 
worked for the TRC directly. These TRC officials comprise the body of 
transitional justice implementers within the transitional justice 
entrepreneur population in Sierra Leone’s TRC. Identifying and 
accessing this population was mainly achieved through snowball 
sampling emanating from contacts I established among TRC brokers 
in Sierra Leone. This thesis adopted a broad approach to sampling 
TRC implementers, with a particular interest in accessing and 
interviewing TRC statement takers, commissioners and international 
consultants involved in the TRC.  
In practice, I was able to interview a total of 11 TRC officials: seven 
statement-takers, one TRC Commissioner, six TRC officials involved 
in the research and outreach work of the TRC (four respondents within 
this population occupied multiple positions in the course of their 
employment within the TRC, thus accounting for the difference 
between number of officials and positions occupied), and one former 
government official that was directly involved in the Lomé peace 
agreement negotiations which officially called for the establishment of 
the TRC.  Repeated efforts to contact international actors and 
consultants who largely designed the TRC’s institutional framework 
were unfortunately wholly unfruitful. A second challenge in attempting 





combatants has been the lack of concrete or secondary data on the 
operations (particularly on outreach and sensitisation) of the TRC. This 
issue, of institutional memory, is particularly problematic, as it would 
be extremely useful to gain an understanding of the measures taken 
by the TRC in training its statement takers as well as accessing details 
on its outreach and sensitisation activities, beyond what is briefly 
contained within its Final Report. Illustrative of this challenge is an 
interview I conducted with the TRC’s Regional Coordinator and Head 
of Reconciliation in the Northern District, who, when asked about the 
availability of records on TRC activities, responded by saying that they 
“didn’t write anything down”8. The TRC archives have also proven to 
be similarly inadequate in this respect, as all administrative files are 
kept together with no semblance of organisation, and their sheer 
number makes this impossible to navigate. 
The high number of individuals interviewed (147 in total) for this thesis 
has a significant advantage that lends empirical confidence to analysis. 
While inductive thematic saturation, as the comprehensive 
identification of relevant ‘themes’ or ‘categories’ (Saunders et al., 
2018) was quickly achieved through interviews, further data collection 
and concurrent analysis (in line with a grounded theory approach), has 
enabled theoretical saturation. Theoretical saturation, as the degree of 
development of identified themes within the sampled populations, was 
sought through this study’s cross-sectional population and broadly 
inclusive sampling strategy. This ensures a maximum range of 
diversity of data (Glaser and Strauss, 2017) which lends empirical 
confidence to the theoretical categories of both the institutional and 
micro-level axes of the relationship between the TRC and ex-
combatant population in Sierra Leone developed as a result.  
Secondary Data 
The bulk of the empirical data used for this thesis comprises primary 
data in the form of interviews with a cross-section of populations, 
described in detail above. However, this is not the only type of data 
                                                          





that has been used within this thesis. Several sources of secondary 
data in the form of TRC perpetrator statements and official TRC 
documentation have been used as sources of data, which underpin 
the institutional axis of examination within this thesis.  
In the Spring of 2017, I spent three months in the TRC archives, and 
was able to generate a sample of over 300 perpetrator statements (321 
statements) submitted to the TRC by ‘perpetrators’ from across the 
country. This perpetrator statement data enables secondary analysis 
of ex-combatant participation experiences of the TRC, through 
discourse analysis of the structure and content of the statements they 
gave to the TRC. A degree of comparison and generalisation beyond 
merely the TRC expectations, experiences and impacts on non-
participating ex-combatants was therefore made possible through the 
use of this secondary data source. This enhances the validity and 
bounded generalisability of findings from this research. Discourse 
analysis was used to identify language patterns and discern the nature 
of ex-combatant participation through these statements. Research 
approval for use of these statements was provided by the Human 
Rights Commission for Sierra Leone (HRCSL), who oversee and 
safeguard the TRC archives. 
Official TRC documentation is the second type of secondary data used 
to investigate and illuminate the institutional relationship between ex-
combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone. In particular, the 
foundational and operational documentation of the TRC, enshrined 
within its mandate documents and Final Report, have been analysed. 
Discourse analysis of this secondary data, has enabled a detailed 
empirical examination of both the institutional and micro-level axes of 
the relationship between ex-combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone. 
Through a qualitative assessment of the mandates and final reports of 
Sierra Leone’s truth commission, this thesis uses critical discourse 
analysis to analyse the observed role of perpetrators in this institution. 
Discourse analysis is used to develop a framework for, and 
subsequently test, the formal incorporation of perpetrators within the 





degree of explicit consideration given to the participation of 
perpetrators within the truth commission. The framework of formal 
participation incorporation presented in Chapter 5 comprises the 
following three dimensions: the formal incorporation of perpetrators, 
their operational treatment, and finally the incentives identified to 
promote their substantive participation.  
Researcher Positionality  
By positionality I refer to my particular experience of conducting the 
extensive fieldwork for this thesis and the questions of population 
access and trust building in light of my own ‘outsider-ness’. While my 
identity as an ‘outsider’ in relation to this research is multi-facetted, the 
following section confines itself to discussing my outsider-ness identity 
along the two dimensions that I experienced as most significant: i) the 
absence of any antecedent relationship to Sierra Leone and ii) the 
absence of any direct experience of the relationship under examination 
within this thesis. Other components of my outsider-ness include my 
gender and nationality9, which I have elected not to discuss here, as 
elements of my researcher positionality which, though present and 
indeed permanent, I did not experience as saliently affecting my ability 
to engage with my research environment or populations of interest. I 
have therefore opted instead to focus this discussion about my 
positionality around the experiences and elements of my outsider 
researcher identity that most directly and significantly affected my 
primary research engagement.  It is within these elements of my 
researcher identity that this discussion can make the most genuine 
contribution to the larger and increasingly nuanced discourse on 
positionality within social science research. I have never lived through 
conflict, let alone participated in war as a combatant. Neither have I 
ever had any direct or personal experience with any mechanism of 
transitional justice. As an outsider researcher I have therefore sought 
to explore and understand a question for which I cannot know the 
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answers. Consequently, I have been fundamentally reliant on the 
willingness and openness of my respondents to participate in my 
research in order to accomplish this. 
Access 
Throughout my fieldwork I interacted with two levels of gatekeepers: 
outsider gatekeepers and embedded gatekeepers. Outsider 
gatekeepers are individuals with networks among particular 
populations (including embedded gatekeepers), but who remain, like 
myself, outsiders – removed from personal experiences of those 
particular populations. They include academics who have conducted 
research on (ex-combatants in) Sierra Leone and members of civil 
society. Embedded gatekeepers are individuals localised within 
networks of populations of interest, who through their own direct 
belonging to such populations or status as trusted community 
members, can facilitate direct access to these populations. They 
include for instance members of the ex-combatant community, 
community leaders and trusted community members.  
During the initial stages of my research I engaged primarily with 
outsider gatekeepers to access embedded gatekeepers and ex-
combatants in Sierra Leone. Through this engagement I experienced 
the challenge of navigating access as both enabled through, but also 
blocked by, outsider gatekeepers. As a result of my own outsider-ness, 
initial access to embedded gatekeepers through outsider gatekeepers 
was particularly useful, as it created an entry point for engaging with 
ex-combatants and gatekeepers with familiarity working with outsider 
researchers. Conversely, outsider gatekeepers who shielded their own 
networks and obstructed engagement therein showcase the 
importance of being mindful of the dangers of relying on such modes 
of access. Fortunately, the long duration of my fieldwork and the 
breadth of my gatekeeper network meant that I was not dependent on 
outsider gatekeepers to conduct my research, and allowed me to 
mitigate these unfortunate blockages. The diverse network of 
embedded gatekeepers that I cultivated stemmed from the 





through outsider gatekeepers, and my own shifting positionality as a 
result of working with two local civil society organisations in Sierra 
Leone. 
Trust 
Establishing access does not ensure trust. By conducting over two 
years of fieldwork I was able to engage in long-term and repeated 
interactions with gatekeepers and respondents, and develop personal 
relationships with them. I spent time in every community I conducted 
fieldwork in and spoke openly about the details of my thesis before 
beginning my research, always starting the process of conducting 
interviews after spending at least two days in a particular community. 
My consent protocol involved ensuring that every respondent was 
given my contact details, and I returned to every community I 
conducted fieldwork in, for further interviews, follow up interviews and 
to provide updates on the progress of my research. I also returned to 
communities for events that respondents extended invitations for. On 
one occasion I returned to Makeni to attend the secondary school 
graduation and baptism celebrations of the children of two ex-
combatant respondents, Harold and Gregory, whom I had interviewed 
twice before. In expressing his pride over his daughter’s graduation, 
Harold shared “by the time I was her age I was already with the RUF, 
and now my daughter has completed her schooling. She wants to go 
to university – this was an impossible dream for me”10. While holding 
his infant son Gregory shared that “my biggest wish for him is that he 
never knows the pain of war and what I endured”11. In sharing their 
family celebrations with them and the opportunities they provide to 
reflect on their own lives, neither Harold nor Gregory romanticise their 
RUF pasts. It is clear that for both of them the war meant experiencing 
suffering and not only inflicting it.  On another occasion, I attended the 
wedding of a TRC official in Freetown. In a lengthy conversation, the 
groom’s father shared how proud he was of his son’s work with the 
TRC and stressed the continued relevance of the historical record the 
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TRC produced. Conversations with other former TRC officials and 
current TRC archival staff in attendance reinforced the salience of this 
sentiment, and the shared sense of disappointment over the waning 
interest in both implementing the TRC’s recommendations and in the 
digitisation of its archives. These opportunities to contextualise the 
TRC experiences of respondents within the larger framework of their 
current lives added richness to the relationships built throughout this 
research.  
I also learned some basic Krio, the local language in Sierra Leone, and 
used the timing of my fieldwork, as coinciding with the 2018 
presidential elections, as trust-building tools. These tools helped to 
ameliorate my outsider-ness with respondents by signalling an interest 
in my research environment that extended beyond the limitations of my 
research project and demonstrated both my understanding of, and 
commitment to understanding, the local context in which I was working.  
As noted above, I experienced differences in trust relationships, 
between those built through outsider gatekeeper networks and those 
emanating from embedded gatekeepers. Many respondents accessed 
through outsider gatekeepers had prior experience participating in 
research projects and were quickly comfortable with providing 
informed consent and expressing a confident understanding of the 
purposes of my research and their participation therein. Conversely, 
establishing trust with respondents through embedded gatekeepers 
with no history of research engagement required more time and 
explanation. My presence was at times met with initial wariness and I 
often had to give lengthy explanations around who I was, where I came 
from, what I was doing, and why. However, while establishing initial 
trust through outsider gatekeepers was facilitated through respondent 
and gatekeeper histories of research engagement, these very histories 
of research engagement also formed barriers to building long-term 
trust. Researcher engagement is generally short-term, superficial and 
largely extractive in character (van den Berg, 2019), which has created 





time and then they leave and we hear nothing”12 from them. 
Conversely, respondents accessed through embedded gatekeepers 
with no prior research exposure did not display this scepticism around 
the sincerity of my engagement, which facilitated the process of 
building long-term trust. Cultivating trust among respondents was also 
greatly facilitated by my work with two local civil society organisations, 
which shifted my positionality and enhanced perceptions of my 
legitimacy as a researcher, through my attachment to local 
organisations that were well-known by respondents and communities 
and highly positively regarded among them.   
As introduced earlier, alongside conducting fieldwork, I worked as a 
researcher with two local civil society organisations in Sierra Leone. 
My shifting positionality as a result of this work facilitated access to, 
and trust building among, populations of interest for my thesis. I worked 
with a local paralegal non-governmental organisation in Sierra Leone, 
and combined travelling throughout Sierra Leone for research projects 
with them with data collection for my thesis. Secondly, I worked with a 
local research think tank, and led two research projects with them: on 
electoral violence and social cohesion after the 2018 presidential 
elections, and on access to justice throughout Sierra Leone in 2019. 
Chapter 10 of this thesis, on the impacts of the TRC on ex-combatants 
in Sierra Leone, draws attention to persistent references to the TRC’s 
recommendations as part of the (largely empty) political rhetoric in 
Sierra Leone today - an insight that this research was partly able to 
glean through the independent research on electoral violence and 
social cohesion that I conducted. In this discussion, I draw attention to 
recent calls made by the current President of Sierra Leone, Julius 
Maada Bio, for the establishment of an Independent Commission for 
Peace and Social Cohesion, to address the root causes of poverty and 
war identified in the TRC’s Final Report (2004). I highlight that such a 
Commission remains a promise on paper only, and (at the time of 
writing) has not yet been established. This research project on 
electoral violence and social cohesion was tasked with providing policy 
                                                          





recommendations to the Government of Sierra Leone in establishing 
this Commission. Working with civil society has uniquely enriched my 
knowledge and understanding of Sierra Leone – its justice landscape, 
its post-conflict peacebuilding and development challenges, and the 
complex, intersecting and evolving identities of citizens who have had 
to navigate the challenges of both war and peace. 
A Word on Knowledge Production: lessons learned from the field 
One final implication of the length of my fieldwork experience in Sierra 
Leone has been on the issue of research ethics and knowledge 
production. Sierra Leone is a popular research environment for peace 
and conflict research generally, and ex-combatant studies specifically. 
It is also home to many post-conflict development programmes, whose 
interventions mirror research engagement among their participants 
and beneficiaries. This saturation has very real though 
unacknowledged effects among the ex-combatant community in 
particular, many of whom have instrumentalised their combatant pasts 
into an industry of research participation, from which they are able to 
earn a sporadic living from short-term researchers. Discussions on 
extractive practices of knowledge production in academia are 
important and growing, though many problematic practices remain 
unacknowledged or unchanged in praxis. In line with the degree of 
research saturation that I have observed throughout my fieldwork in 
Sierra Leone, and the consequences this has had, however 
unintended, on spurring an industry of research participation among 
local populations there, I would therefore urge researchers to consider 
these elements as part of the calculus of their case study selection for 
future research that considers Sierra Leone as a potential case study 
for examination. In summary, I would caution against future research 
among this population in Sierra Leone that does not actively consider 
these elements, and encourage future ex-combatant research to 
consider engaging with less saturated ex-combatant populations in 
other countries, as well as to put into practice active measures to 






This chapter has detailed the research design and methods used to 
explore the research puzzle that this thesis addresses: the relationship 
between ex-combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone. It has presented 
the rationale for the use of a qualitative approach to the in-depth single 
case study examination of this relationship, which seeks to illuminate, 
describe and understand both the institutional and micro-level axes of 
ex-combatants in relation to the TRC.  
As presented in Chapter 1, this thesis’s examination of the relationship 
between ex-combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone is pursued along 
two axes, and is guided by several sub-questions. Along its macro-
level of investigation (the institutional axis of this research), institutional 
engagement with, and treatment of, ex-combatants within the TRC is 
analysed in Part 3 of this thesis. Uncovering the institutional axis of the 
TRC’s relationship with the ‘perpetrator’ population entails elucidating 
its institutional commitment to this population, as well as the 
operational measures implemented to fulfil its participatory mandate. 
within the dimension of transitional justice rhetoric, qualitative analysis 
of current strands of transitional justice research and critiques around 
the normative foundations of the field are used to highlight both the 
binary identity framework that pervades transitional justice discourse, 
and identify the problematic normative assumptions that underlie this 
framework. This addresses the three questions of (i) why is there a 
need for transitional justice, (ii) what is the identity framework produced 
by this discourse, and (iii) what space do perpetrators occupy in this 
identity framework? Along the institutional dimension of transitional 
justice ritual, discourse analysis tools are used to answer the questions 
of (i) whose justice agendas determined the design and goals of the 
TRC, (ii) what was the participation framework of the TRC, (iii) did this 
privilege certain transitional justice actors, and (iv) how inclusive (or 
exclusive) were the TRC’s designs and ambitions? This has 
illuminated the formally mandated role and relevance of perpetrators 
in the design of the TRC. Along the dimension of reality, discourse 





of primary narrative data collected from interviews with TRC 
entrepreneurs informs findings around the questions of (i) how did the 
TRC implement its local participation framework, (ii) how inclusive (or 
exclusive) were its operations in reality, and (iii) what was the practice 
of justice-seeking implemented by the TRC in relation to its identified 
local TRC participants? This produces an in-depth empirical 
understanding of institutional engagement within the TRC, and in 
relation to ex-combatants specifically. 
Along its second axis, a localised understanding of ex-combatant 
expectations, experiences and impacts in relation to the TRC is also 
undertaken in Part 3 of this thesis. A qualitative research design has 
been adopted to collect ex-combatant narratives in relation to the TRC. 
This is done through the use of primary narrative data collected from 
112 semi-structured and in-depth ex-combatant interviews, among 
non-participant ex-combatants, and employing the sampling criteria 
outlined above. Qualitative analysis of this primary data, using an 
abductive strategy, is used to construct an in-depth understanding of 
this relationship, through a localised lens. Additionally, secondary data 
in the form of TRC perpetrator statements allows for some comparison 
and generalisation beyond exclusively non-participant ex-combatants. 
These data collection and analytical tools are used to answer the sub-
questions (presented in Chapter 1) that together generate a detailed 
understanding of ex-combatant expectations, experiences and 
impacts in relation to the TRC. Chapter 3 is the final chapter of Part 1 
of this thesis, and provides a literature review of the field of transitional 
justice, the core discipline within which this thesis is situated, and to 
which its conceptual and empirical contributions speak most directly, 
as well as a historical background of Sierra Leone. It details the actors 
and events of the civil war that lasted over a decade, and the post-







Literature Review and Historical Case 
Background 
A Literature Review of Transitional Justice 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis have defined the research puzzle of 
this research, and the research design it has adopted in order to do so. 
This chapter, the final of Part One of this thesis, comprises two 
components. Firstly, it proceeds with a literature review of the field of 
transitional justice that contextualises the contributions of this thesis to 
the broader discourse in which it is principally housed. Secondly, a 
brief historical background of Sierra Leone is provided, focusing on the 
civil war that lasted from 1991 to 2002, and the contours of the post-
conflict peace-making, peacebuilding and transitional justice 
landscape in Sierra Leone. Together, this literature review of 
transitional justice and historical background of Sierra Leone provide 
the necessary theoretical and historical context within which this 
thesis’s examination of transitional justice in Sierra Leone, through the 
lens of ex-combatants, is situated. 
Transitional justice refers to the range of processes designed to 
address widespread violations of human rights committed in periods of 
state repression or conflict (Grodsky, 2009; Lessa, Olsen, Payne, 
Pereira and Reiter, 2014). The field of transitional justice arose as a 
response to histories of violence and abuse. Despite significant 
differences across transitional contexts, “there is one feature that 
unites all these contexts: the legacy of widespread violence and 
repression” (Freeman, 2006, p. 5). It is this feature, the common 
denominator of abuse, that has borne transitional justice into the world. 
Mechanisms of transitional justice include trials; truth commissions; 
reparations; and lustration policies (Thoms et al., 2008), and all aim to 
provide some degree of accountability for gross violations of human 
rights of the past (Lambourne, 2009). They aim to promote healing and 





provide retribution for perpetrators of gross human rights abuses, and, 
more generally, promote institutional and democratic reform (Thoms et 
al., 2008). Gready refers to the “metagoals” (Skaar, 2018, p. 409) of 
“truth, justice, and reconciliation” (p. 409) as the ‘triumvirate’ (Gready, 
2010, p. 15) of transitional justice. In sum, transitional justice 
mechanisms, according to their supporters, have the potential to 
achieve both deterrence and reconciliation (Olsen, Payne and Reiter, 
2010; McAuliffe, 2010).  
However, as highlighted previously, transitional justice is often 
criticised for being built on “faith” and not “fact” (Thoms et al., 2010, p. 
331). Causal analysis on the individual and community impact of these 
processes against their purported society-wide benefits is largely 
missing (Thoms et al., 2008, p. 5) and research directly evaluating local 
experiences of, and public opinions towards, these mechanisms 
remains sparse (Aguilar et al., 2011; Millar, 2011). Transitional justice 
research therefore suffers from both the ecological fallacy that 
assumes the translation of societal benefits onto the individual, and 
lacks bottom-up engagement. This thesis builds grounded theory 
precisely through adopting a bottom-up research strategy, using data 
collected from perpetrators to empirically reveal localised 
expectations, experiences and impacts of truth commissions for this 
component of the local. In so doing, a critical examination of the 
normative foundations of transitional justice, its institutional 
participation limitations and finally the practice of justice-seeking within 
a particular truth commission, contributes to important critiques of the 
problematic binaries that inhibit the effective implementation of this 
discourse. This thesis thereby advances the field of transitional justice 
by contributing novel micro-level analysis of perpetrator experiences, 
a neglected but necessary participant category within truth 
commissions, against their macro-level institutional treatment therein. 
Understanding these experiences sheds new critical light on truth 
commissions as locally responsive, inclusive or restorative. The 
remaining first half of this chapter dedicates itself to a literature review 
of the field of transitional justice. The next section provides an overview 





that have permeated the field (that of amnesty versus trials; retributive 
versus restorative justice; and local versus international ownership in 
transitional justice) and positions the contributions of this thesis 
therein. Finally, a genealogical discussion around the particular 
transitional justice mechanism of truth commissions is provided, as this 
is the mechanism of transitional justice under examination within this 
thesis. The second half of this chapter presents an historical 
background of Sierra Leone, its civil war and post-war landscape, and 
its transitional justice history in particular.  
The History of Transitional Justice  
The field of transitional justice has undergone a rapid crystallisation 
since its emergence. Its foundations are largely normative (Bell, 2009), 
and the need for accountability originally informed transitional justice 
in the 1940s as a backward-looking, retributive and inherently punitive 
undertaking. After a period of stagnation during the Cold War, 
transitional justice re-emerged in the 1980s, with the “justice cascade” 
in Central and Latin America (Lutz and Sikkink, 2001, p. 4), and 
Eastern Europe. The 1990s saw a broadening of the discourse in two 
directions (Roht-Arriaza, 2006). Firstly, the ambit of international legal 
responses to atrocities expanded significantly, with the establishment 
of ad hoc international criminal tribunals for former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, and culminating in the creation of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). Secondly, alternative mechanisms came to the forefront 
of the transitional political bargaining landscape. The establishment of 
South Africa’s TRC in 1995 “pushed to centre stage consideration of 
alternative legal mechanisms for dealing with the past” (Bell, 2009, 
p.8).  
The consolidation of this “incredibly fast field” (Roht-Arriaza, 2006, p. 
8) came about sometime after 2000, and transitional justice is now 
understood as an essential response to systematic human rights 
violations. The paradigm shift that broadened the need for, and 
ambitions of, transitional justice is illustrated in the 2004 UN report on 
The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 





a tool for broader political and social goals and change, beyond its 
narrow and backward-oriented origins, has been echoed by diplomats, 
lawyers, politicians and scholars alike. Today practitioners confront 
issues of transitional justice daily, and “mediators can no longer 
escape the call for accountability processes to be included in peace 
negotiations” (Macdonald, 2013, p. 6).  
Teitel (2003) describes the evolution of transitional justice as 
comprising (to date) three phases. Phase one captures the period 
between the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, and 
was defined by “interstate cooperation, war crimes trials, and 
sanctions” (Skaar, 2018, p. 408). The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials are 
illustrative of transitional justice during this phase, as is the absence of 
truth commissions, as this period prioritised prosecution (Teitel, 2003). 
After a period of stagnation (of almost four decades), phase two began 
in the post-Cold War period. This phase saw an expansion of 
transitional justice to a “more diverse focus on ‘truth’ and ‘justice,’ with 
‘reconciliation’ as a desired outcome” (Skaar, 2018, p. 408). Formal 
mechanisms of transitional justice during phase two were diversified to 
include non-legal mechanisms including truth commissions. According 
to Teitel (2003) and Skaar (2018), we are currently in phase three, 
wherein transitional justice has embedded itself as part of the desired 
and indeed required post-conflict infrastructure, deemed both 
necessary and unavoidable for the successful transition from conflict 
to peace. Considerations of the local are a particularly salient feature 
within the current phase of transitional justice, with criticisms of 
transitional justice’s traditionally top-down orientation and calls for 
locally inclusive, responsive and led processes gaining swift currency 
among scholars and practitioners. This reflects a larger shift in favour 
of localisation among peace and development discourses more 
broadly, where the necessity of participatory approaches has achieved 
unchallenged consensus.  
Scholarship has correspondingly also evolved, along the lines of both 
discourse and debate. Originally dominated by legal scholars and 





“become truly interdisciplinary” (p. 409). Growing recognition of the 
vast universe of justice and the equally diverse paths to justice-seeking 
as well as the interplay between transitional justice and the broader 
peacebuilding landscape within which it operates have given rise to 
rich interdisciplinary scholarship. For instance, work examining the 
socio-economic potential of transitional justice is gaining currency (see 
for instance Schmid and Nolan, 2014), and more recently, efforts to 
link transitional justice to the urgently emerging climate change 
discourse evidence the ever expanding and intersecting world of 
transitional justice (see Klinksky, 2018). Skaar (2018) emphasises that 
this growth has also prompted a shift in scholarly debates, “from a 
principal focus on normative claims to an increasing concern with their 
empirical verification” (p. 409). This thesis engages with both such 
axes of the debates in transitional justice, using thorough empirical 
data to critically examine the normative identity and participation 
structures put in place by the field of transitional justice, and the 
practice of truth commissions specifically.  
Debates 
As introduced above, the genesis and development of the field of 
transitional justice has engendered a number of debates within the 
discourse. An overview of the three core debates within the field 
situates the contributions of this thesis within transitional justice, 
achieved through its holistic exploration of the relationship between ex-
combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone.  
The imperfect conditions within which transitional justice operates is 
captured in Bell’s (2009) characterisation of the field as a “range of 
particularised bargains on the past” (p. 15). The most significant of 
these bargains or trade-offs are captured in the three core debates that 
have permeated the discourse and haunted its development. Firstly, 
the overall contributions and desirability of transitional justice have 
been challenged in the amnesty versus trials debate. Secondly, trials 
and truth commissions have been pitted against one another in the 
retributive versus restorative justice debate. Finally, as the issue of 





discourses, a debate on local versus international ownership of these 
processes has unfolded. While the contributions of this thesis are 
concentrated in the latter two debates, an outline of all three is central 
to an understanding of the field.  
Amnesty versus Trials 
The earliest and most obstinate debate within transitional justice is that 
of amnesty versus trials (also known as the peace versus justice 
debate) (Szablewska and Bachman, 2015).  Advocates of trials (pro-
justice position) have been historically met with the pro-amnesty 
rebuttal (pro-peace position) highlighting the dangerous trade off that 
this involves (Vinjamuri, 2010). At the heart of this debate is a temporal 
trade-off between the short-term dangers that justice poses to peace 
and stability, against its long-term utility for deterrence and rule of law 
(Jarstad, 2008).  
The pragmatic pro-amnesty position is premised on a utilitarian logic 
of consequences, stemming from rational choice theory. This dictates 
that individuals are self-interested and their behaviour is determined 
through cost-benefit calculations. For transitional justice this means 
that the “consequences of trials for the consolidation of peace and 
democracy trump the goal of justice per se” (Vinjamuri and Snyder, 
2004, p. 353).  Pragmatists oppose the use of trials by positing that 
post-transition states lack the appropriate and necessary infrastructure 
to hold legitimate trials, and caution against “overwhelm(ing) newly 
installed, fragile civilian governments with demands for criminal 
prosecution” (Roht-Arriaza, 2006, p. 3). There is also the fear that trials 
may create spoilers that destabilise the fragile peace, by preventing 
parties from approaching the negotiating table or incentivising renewed 
violence (Vinjamuri and Snyder, 2004). Amnesties have thus 
traditionally been advocated as an “inevitable concession” (Roht-
Arriaza, 2006, p. 3) sacrificing justice in order to achieve peace. While 
amnesties have historically been considered an acceptable sacrifice in 
exchange for peace and stability, the re-emergence of justice concerns 





enlivened this debate surrounding the proper strategy for dealing with 
the past.  
The pro-trials position, conversely, highlights the important role that 
prosecutions play in post-transition societies. This legalist approach is 
premised on a normative logic of appropriateness which dictates that 
actors’ behaviour is guided by norms that are considered appropriate 
(Vinjamuri and Snyder, 2004). Formal prosecution is argued to provide 
the most “authoritative rendering of the truth” (Orentlicher, 1991, p. 
2546). The widespread benefits of trials lie in their dual ability to 
individualise guilt and affect larger societal change. Illustrative of this 
are the two dimensions of deterrence that trials accomplish. According 
to Thoms et al. (2008), trials achieve both special (direct) deterrence 
by punishing and thus preventing identified perpetrators from re-
offending, and generalised deterrence by shifting the cost-benefit 
calculations of future potential offenders. In sum, the pro-justice 
position argues that transitional justice prosecutions are the 
incontestable obligation of the state, providing a significant punitive 
and deterrent function for societies emerging from conflict and/or 
repression. The right to truth is also commonly asserted to underpin 
the need for transitional justice, expanding the argument from merely 
justice as required to punish and prevent, but also the need for justice 
as an unchallengeable duty of states towards the victims of abuses, 
who have an inalienable right to truth and redress.  
The pitting of peace against justice speaks to the larger oppositional 
identity framework imposed by transitional justice of perpetrators 
versus victims, thus highlighting the pervasiveness of the binary 
identity model adopted within the field. The pro-peace position 
foregrounds a need to pacify perpetrators to ensure a genuine peace, 
while the pro-justice position is premised on a need to provide redress 
for victims. The presentation of these priorities as oppositional and 
mutually exclusive emphasises the normative assumptions that victims 
and perpetrators can be neatly separated, and that the interests and 
needs of the one are incompatible with those of the other. As this thesis 





populations vastly over simplifies the complexities of lived experiences 
of war, and assumptions around these needs as mutually exclusive do 
not reflect shared experiences of suffering, nor the widespread desire 
for peace.  
It is worth noting that this debate has not remained stagnant. As 
outlined earlier, the concept of amnesties within transitional justice has 
developed. The normalisation of international criminal justice 
(Macdonald, 2013b) and proliferation of transitional justice 
mechanisms have resulted in the widespread consensus that blanket 
amnesties are no longer permissible. Indeed, promises of amnesty at 
the national level “cannot be airtight and are subject to both 
international revision and domestic re-evaluation” (Roht-Arriaza, 2006, 
p. 11). Similarly, the recognition of transitional justice as a long-term 
process (Macdonald, 2013), and the expansion of its aims and 
mechanisms mean that these mechanisms are increasingly seen as 
complementary. Work by scholars such as Olsen et al. (2010) on the 
timing and combination of transitional justice mechanisms highlights 
this shift away from short-term polarising discussions around this 
debate.  
Ultimately, the pro-amnesty position is characterised by its short-term 
focus, privileging peace immediately after transition, over justice in the 
long-term. The pro-trials position, on the other hand, highlights the 
need for accountability and redress for past abuses. According to 
Roht-Arriaza (2006) “the past, unaccounted for, does not lie quiet” (p. 
1).  It is against this backdrop of the original debate between the 
importance of trials and the need for amnesties, that the advent of truth 
commissions, as a ‘second-best’ approach to transitional justice, 
emerged in the 1980s and 1990s.  
It is not the ambition of this thesis to engage with the question of the 
external validity of transitional justice as a broader enterprise. As a 
starting point, this research accepts the existence of transitional justice 
processes in the pursuit of post-conflict peacebuilding, and the 
criticisms and challenges that accompany them. The focus within this 





evaluations of experiences of transitional justice, in particular that of 
ex-combatants in relation to post-conflict truth commissions.  
Retributive versus Restorative Justice 
The retributive versus restorative justice debate (also known as the 
truth versus justice debate) is characterised by the division between 
proponents of truth commissions and those of trials as contrasting 
mechanisms of transitional justice. The rise of truth commissions in the 
1990s, as an alternative to trials when prosecution was not possible, 
quickly engendered a heated debate on the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of each. While efforts to reconcile this debate have 
highlighted complementarity between these mechanisms (Roht-
Arriaza, 2006), traditionally trials are considered retributive, while truth 
commissions are regarded as restorative or reconciliatory (Aiken, 
2008).  
The logic of appropriateness once again underlies legalist support for 
trials, as a retributive instrument of transitional justice. Legalists uphold 
the robust obligation of states to punish perpetrators and provide 
redress for victims, for which trials are uniquely appropriate 
(Orentlicher, 1991). The two dimensions of deterrence that trials 
promote further underscore the advantages of prosecutions over 
alternative processes. According to Orentlicher (1991), criminal 
prosecution provides the “most effective insurance against future 
repression” (p. 2540). 
The restorative approach typically advocates for the use of truth 
commissions, in what Vinjamuri and Snyder (2004) have termed the 
“emotional psychology approach” to transitional justice (p. 357), which 
promotes an understanding of justice that is locally derived, and 
heavily centred around victim needs. The cathartic process of truth 
telling prioritises the restoration of relationships and reconciliation at 
the community level. Accountability and a rich narrative of the past is 
achieved through the non-punitive participation of perpetrators, which 
also closes the gap between knowledge and acknowledgement. The 





matched by criminal prosecutions, which are necessarily limited in their 
prosecutorial scope.  
The retributive versus restorative justice debate in transitional justice 
has historically pitted trials and truth commissions against each other, 
and typically characterises the former as backward-looking, concerned 
with individualising guilt and promoting accountability for past abuses. 
The latter is traditionally presented as a forward-looking non-judicial 
alternative that promotes reconciliation through truth-telling. The 
oppositional classification of these transitional justice mechanisms has 
however been challenged, and efforts to reconcile this debate have 
highlighted complementarity across these mechanisms. According to 
Roht-Arriaza (2006), the increasing use of both trials and truth 
commissions has shifted the debate from truth versus justice towards 
an integrated approach that recognises them as complementary. Calls 
for a holistic or ‘ecological’ approach to transitional justice and 
research investigating the timing, combinations and sequencing of 
different mechanisms reinforce this evolution in the scholarship (see 
Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002). Recognition of the ongoing expansion 
of transitional justice aims also highlights the complementarity 
between these mechanisms, and adds weight to Daly’s debunking of 
the myth that restorative justice is the opposite of retributive justice 
(2005).  
This thesis contributes to this debate by critically evaluating the 
restorative character of Sierra Leone’s truth commission, through the 
lens of its ex-combatant population. Perpetrator participation in truth 
commissions is both necessary for the fulfilment of TRC objectives, but 
also severely restricted by its unforgiving normative and institutional 
narrative framework. The problematic binary participation model 
implemented within Sierra Leone’s TRC, with its broader normative 
underpinnings, calls into question the restorative and reconciliatory 
potential of this mechanism of transitional justice. Moreover, it 
introduces the danger that, contrary to its restorative promises, this 
form of justice may in fact further retributive outcomes, when 





experiences of ex-combatants. Reconciling and restoring social 
relationships inherently requires interaction across conflict 
experiences (elaborated in more detail below), thereby necessitating 
the active participation of perpetrators. By uncovering the necessary 
but neglected role and relevance of perpetrators in truth commissions, 
and through a comprehensive investigation of their TRC expectations, 
experiences and impacts, this thesis challenges the restorative claims 
and capacities of the TRC.  
Ownership: local versus international 
The importance of the ‘local’ has come to the forefront of peacebuilding 
discussions (see Chapter 1). Within transitional justice, questions of 
ownership and the debate around the necessary and appropriate role 
for international and local actors takes on special significance. As a 
normatively driven enterprise, the need for transitional justice, as a 
prerequisite for successful peacebuilding, strongly reflects the Western 
justice paradigm, and it is the international community that continues 
to actively demand, design and impose the need for, and nature of, 
transitional justice in reforming states (Madlingozi, 2010; McEvoy, 
2007). Within the current phase (three) of transitional justice, interest 
in “local or traditional processes of justice and reconciliation” have 
become squarely mainstreamed (Skaar, 2018, p. 409). Local 
engagement as a measure of legitimacy has come to include the 
degree of responsiveness, accessibility and participation of affected 
communities in not only the implementation of transitional justice 
processes, but in their design, relevance and impact more broadly. The 
debate on ownership is not unique to transitional justice, and has 
permeated the larger discourses of peacebuilding and development 
policy and scholarship. Discussions on defining the local and the logic 
of participation that stem from these discourses and are vital to this 
thesis can be found in Chapters 1, 4 and 5. As a localised analysis of 
transitional justice, this debate is of central significance within this 
thesis.  
Early experiments with truth commissions and prosecutions were 





completely international (such as in El Salvador) (Roht-Arriaza, 2006). 
The emergence of the universal human rights and humanitarian law 
regime, and the ensuing rise of criminal prosecutions under 
international law, brought forth the sentiment that international 
ownership, most commonly associated with trials, was advantageous 
for these processes. The legitimacy, impartiality, resources and 
visibility of international ownership underpinned the design of the 
international ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. 
These merits of international ownership in transitional justice catalysed 
the rise of international ad hoc tribunals in the 1990s, and the 
establishment of permanent international criminal courts. Proponents 
of international ownership stress the need for transitional justice to be 
implemented ‘from above’ in transitional societies, due to the lack of 
legitimate national infrastructure available in such contexts. Advocacy 
around international ownership of transitional justice is premised in the 
universality of the human rights regime, which has created an active 
obligation to seek justice for crimes under international law, and the 
argument that international ownership enjoys high levels of external 
legitimacy, impartiality, visibility, expertise and resources (Dougherty, 
2004). 
However, mixed reviews about the success of the ad hoc tribunals, 
and the need to avoid a “one size fits all” approach (Alvarez, 1999, p. 
370) to criminal justice created a demand for alternative mechanisms, 
designed from ‘below’. The question of whose justice is being delivered 
and concerns over the appropriateness of an externally-determined 
justice agenda takes on three dimensions. Firstly, according to Donais 
(2009), privileging external knowledge and agendas over local ones 
represents a contemporary form of normative imperialism, as the 
international community retains a monopoly of agency over matters 
that directly affect reforming states and their populace. Madlingozi 
(2010) reiterates this, labelling the discourse of transitional justice as 
a practice of “cultural imperialism” (p. 211). Secondly, the argument 
that international actors enjoy high levels of external legitimacy, 
impartiality and expertise assumes an altruistic agenda on the part of 





“international capacity and political will” (Donais, 2009, p. 124) in 
matters of transitional justice. In recent years, concerns over the 
legitimacy of international ownership in matters of international law has 
culminated in heated debates spurring the potential exodus of several 
African states from the ICC, bringing to the fore again the question of 
whether the international community is “always (or ever) benignly 
altruistic” (Donais, 2009. p. 119) as an appropriate custodian of justice. 
Finally, there are concerns over the local legitimacy and resultantly the 
sustainability, of ‘top-down’ or ‘outside-in’ transitional justice, driven by 
evidence that externally-driven processes, no matter how well-
intentioned, are ultimately self-defeating, as they lack local resonance 
and legitimacy (Donais, 2009). 
Local ownership in transitional justice as the role of domestic actors to 
design, as well as manage and implement justice processes, has 
emerged as the solution to rigid and imperialist international 
transitional justice measures. The domain of the local is itself a 
complex territory, inhabited by myriad actors and levels, as 
conceptualised in Chapter 1. Broadly speaking, it refers to the body of 
domestic levels and actors that comprise the site of transitional justice 
implementation. The first scholars to highlight the need for transitional 
justice to incorporate the local questioned the responsiveness of these 
processes to the contexts within which they were being transplanted 
(Macdonald, 2013). According to supporters, local ownership of 
transitional justice processes provides a more understandable 
process, can have a greater impact on the preservation of collective 
memory, and can contribute more meaningfully to long-term 
reconciliation and rule of law than prosecutions that are perceived as 
distant (Roht-Arriaza, 2006; Vinjamuri and Snyder, 2004). Local 
ownership is thereby understood to achieve more sustainable justice 
and reconciliation outcomes than externally-driven international 
processes (Donais, 2009). This argumentation forms the backbone of 
the logic of participation developed within this thesis in Chapter 5.  
As with the other debates, here too there is evidence of some 





practices. In its 2004 report on transitional justice, the UN recognised 
the important role that “indigenous and informal traditions” (p. 12) play 
as part of the larger transitional justice framework. The ICC is founded 
on the notion of complementarity, and the establishment of hybrid 
courts in places such as East Timor, Sierra Leone (The Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, discussed in the second half of this chapter) and 
Cambodia demonstrate a willingness for the international to engage 
with the local (Roht-Arriaza, 2006).   
The History of Truth Commissions 
The specific history and evolution of truth commissions warrants 
description. In essence, truth commissions are fact-finding bodies, 
established to investigate and document violations and contribute to 
their non-recurrence. According to Skaar (2018), non-recurrence is 
primarily achieved through the body of recommendations produced by 
this mechanism of transitional justice, and accordingly, it is within this 
element of truth commission work where their real transformative 
potential lies. Skaar (2018) summarises the “most fundamental 
undertakings of truth commissions” (p. 407) as threefold: investigating 
abuses, documenting abuses, and producing recommendations to 
address abuses and prevent their recurrence. While truth commissions 
may additionally be established to pursue a variety of other objectives, 
truth-telling and non-recurrence remain the core enterprise of their 
work. Truth commissions are understood as synonymous with 
restorative justice (Aiken 2008). Reconciliation, defined as the 
(re)construction of positive and durable relationships between different 
groups through the mutual acknowledgement of past suffering 
(Brounéus, 2008), is another common feature of these bodies. This 
requires the participation of both victims and perpetrators to be 
successful. This is apparent in the definition of reconciliation, which is 
inherently interactive. According to Aiken (2008), there is a “need to 
involve both victims and perpetrators as cooperative partners” (p. 19) 
in restorative justice processes, which emphasise the worth of both 





therefore “contrary to restorative justice’s promise to aid the repair of 
social relations in post-conflict societies” (Nwogu, 2010, p. 283).  
Unlike trials, truth commissions have no prosecutorial powers (Skaar, 
2018), and are non-judicial (Freeman, 2006). Freeman (2006) 
centralises the right to truth as the primary task of truth commissions. 
This is reinforced by Skaar (2018), who argues that revealing, 
documenting and recording the truth are the critical objectives of this 
mechanism of transitional justice. Chapter 1 has already laid out the 
definition of truth commissions used for the case selection of this 
thesis, following the dominant framework provided by Hayner (2001; 
2011), “the leading authority on the subject” (Freeman, 2006, p. 12). 
However, as Skaar (2018) notes “there is no single, widely accepted 
definition of what a truth commission is” (p. 403). Three central 
definitions dominate truth commission scholarship, provided in work by 
Hayner (2001; 2011) and Freeman (2006) (Hayner provides two 
definitions, a result of adapting her original definition). For the 
purposes of this thesis it is appropriate to apply Hayner’s definition of 
a truth commission, due to one significant difference between the 
frameworks offered by Hayner (2011) and Freeman (2006): the 
treatment of victims. Freeman’s truth commission definition demands 
that these bodies be victim-centred. As this thesis seeks to critically 
examine this particular aspect of truth commissions, adopting 
Freeman’s definition presents obvious difficulties, as it stands in 
contrast with the overriding argument within this thesis in favour of the 
significance of perpetrators within such bodies. Freeman (2006) 
describes the terminology of truth commissions as “Orwellian” (p. 11) 
in name. He goes on to develop what he claims is a descriptive 
definition of truth commissions that is “not normative” (2006, p. 19). Yet 
the simultaneous emphasis on the right to truth and the pursuit of an 
impartial truth against the need for these bodies to be victim-centred 
present an inherent contradiction that betrays serious normative 
assumptions around what constitutes truth and whose truth counts. 
The definition he presents, when unpacked, is in fact Orwellian in 
nature as well. Regarding the composition of truth commissions, 





enterprises” (p. 37), and the role of the state in their establishment and 
operations brings with it high risks of politicisation. Such involvement 
is however unavoidable. As such they may be created with “diverse 
motives” which can be “cynical or laudable”, self-serving or 
democratically underpinned (Freeman, 2006, pp. 37 - 38).  
The first truth commission was established in Uganda in the 1970s, 
followed by Bolivia in the early 1980s (Hayner, 2011). Since the 1980s, 
truth commissions have proliferated (Freeman, 2006). The majority of 
truth commissions established since the 1980s have been in Latin 
America (where its idea and model were “perfected” (Skaar, 2018, p. 
402)) and sub-Saharan Africa (Freeman, 2006). While experts agree 
that the Argentinian Commission of the early 1980s ushered in global 
attention for the first time, South Africa’s TRC in 1995 remains the most 
well-known truth commission (Freeman, 2006). In fact, Freeman 
(2006) argues that we can consequently divide the history of truth 
commissions into two periods: before South Africa, and after. A 
particular shift in the practice of truth commissions that the South 
African experience has inspired has been the holding of public 
hearings. Prior to South Africa, truth commissions “did not conduct 
victim-centred public hearings” (Freeman, 2006, p. 26). However, such 
hearings have become a staple among these bodies since that time. 
Freeman (2006) distinguishes between the contemporary model of 
TRCs, that conduct hearings, and the early model of truth 
commissions, which do not. Truth commissions have become the 
“preferred fixture” of transitional justice (Freeman, 2006, p. 11).  
Sierra Leone: A Historical Background 
The first half of this chapter has provided an overview of the history 
and state of the field of transitional justice, its core debates and the 
history of the particular mechanism of truth commissions. The second 
half of this chapter dedicates itself to providing an historical overview 
and background of Sierra Leone, the case study for this thesis, to 
situate the subsequent in-depth empirical analysis of ex-combatants in 
relation to the TRC there. This historical overview proceeds in two 





elaborated, as the backdrop against which the TRC (and other 
transitional justice processes) was established. Secondly, the 
immediate post-war landscape in Sierra Leone is detailed. In 
particular, the landscape of transitional justice processes established 
in Sierra Leone, encompassing the TRC and SCSL, are briefly 
described. These institutions are of central significance within this 
thesis’s subsequent empirical examination, due to its focus on the TRC 
specifically. The unavoidable interplay between the TRC and SCSL, 
as separate but co-existing mechanisms of transitional justice, also 
necessitates an understanding of the SCSL as part of this thesis’s 
broader research agenda. Additionally, the DDR programme that 
operated from 1998 to 2002 is introduced. Chapter 7 of this thesis links 
the DDR programme in Sierra Leone to the relationship between ex-
combatants and the TRC, along the dimension of ex-combatant 
expectations. The nexus constructed between DDR and transitional 
justice in Sierra Leone within this thesis contributes to a nascent strand 
of research that acknowledges and examines the interactions and 
effects of each field on the other. The DDR programme in Sierra Leone 
therefore holds direct relevance for this thesis’s particular research 
question, and uncovering these links between DDR and transitional 
justice forms part of its overall contributions. 
Civil War in Sierra Leone 
The civil war in Sierra Leone began in 1991, on the 23rd of March, when 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), an armed insurgency group, 
entered Kailahun District in Eastern Sierra Leone, from Liberia. The 
war, described by Harris (2014) as “a particularly nasty conflict” (p. 81) 
lasted for 11 years, and was officially declared to have ended in 
January 2002.  
The civil war was characterised by shifting constellations of armed 
groups and alliances. The main domestic armed groups of the war 
were the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Sierra Leone Army 
(SLA – later transformed into the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed 
Forces or RSLAF), the Kamajors and Civil Defense Forces (CDF), and 





highlighted below, these groups converged and intersected in shifting 
ways throughout the conflict, and thus do not lend themselves to clear 
or neat distinctions. Additionally, the “internationalisation” (Harris, 
2014, p. 85) of the war in Sierra Leone is commonly held to have not 
only contributed to its duration, but also offered as a popular 
explanation for its onset. International actors, in particular Former 
Liberian President Charles Taylor and his rebel group, the National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Former Libyan President Gaddafi, the 
United Kingdom, The UN, the Economic Community of West African 
States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) (and in particular Nigeria) troops, 
and international mercenary actors (i.e. Executive Outcomes and 
Branch Heritage) all played significant roles as participants within the 
conflict.  
In a detailed genealogy of the war and its causes, Harris (2014) 
distinguishes three phases of conflict: the initial phase of 1991-1996, 
the second phase from 1996-1999, and finally the third phase between 
1991-2001 which he describes as “the beginning of the end” (Harris, 
2014, p. 110). The following brief historical summary of Sierra Leone’s 
devastating civil war follows the three-phase construction provided by 
Harris. A particular focus is given to the domestic armed groups and 
their roles and histories within the conflict, as these populations are the 
focal point of this thesis13.  
Phase 1: 1991-1996 
The civil war began in March 1991, when RUF rebels, led by Foday 
Sankoh, and with support and training from Charles Taylor in Liberia 
                                                          
13 The historical overview provided within this thesis is restricted to the events 
and phases of the civil war in Sierra Leone. Detailed writings on its 
antecedents and the war itself can be found in works by, for instance: L. 
Gberie (2005) A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of 
Sierra Leone (London: Hurst); D. Harris (2013) Sierra Leone: A Political 
History (London: Hurst); M. D. Jackson (2004) In Sierra Leone (Durham: Duke 
University Press); K. Manson and J. Knight (2009) Sierra Leone (Chalfont St 
Peter: Bradt Travel Guides); W. Reno (1995) Corruption and State Politics in 
Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); P. Richards (1996) 
Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone 






and Gaddafi in Libya, entered the eastern province of Kailahun from 
the Liberian border. While the RUF strongly opposed the ruling All 
People’s Congress (APC) government at the time (Harris, 2014), the 
group’s origins have strong regional and international dimensions. A 
group of “perhaps 35-50” (Harris, 2014, p. 83) Sierra Leoneans, 
together with Liberians, received insurgency training in Libya in the late 
1980s, sponsored by then-president Gaddafi. In 1991, with support 
from Taylor, known as the “puppet-master in this corner of West Africa” 
(Harris, 2014, p. 84), and his NPFL rebel forces, RUF rebel forces 
crossed the border from Liberia into Sierra Leone’s Eastern Kailahun 
province. Despite previous NPFL cross-border incursions, a radio 
announcement shortly after the March incursion, by RUF leader Foday 
Sankoh, declared this the “start of the RUF rebellion in Sierra Leone” 
(Harris, 2014, p. 85). The RUF were able to quickly capture Kailahun 
and expand their movement to Pujehun district (crossing once again 
from Liberia).  
In 1992, discontent among SLA soldiers about “their lack of wages and 
corruption within the APC government” (Ainley, Friedman and Mahony, 
2015, p. 9) culminated in a military coup, under the leadership of 
Valentine Strasser. The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) 
was established, led by Strasser, just 27 years old at the time. Despite 
the looting, arbitrary military rule and summary executions that 
followed, the coup itself is described by Harris as “initially very popular” 
(2014, p. 91). It ousted the unpopular President Momoh, presented a 
possible hope for the end of war, ended shortages caused by APC 
hoarding and offered “a new beginning” (Harris, 2014, p. 91). However, 
a progressive return to the “APC political modus operandi” (Harris, 
2014, p. 91) kept the fires of conflict stoked. Late 1992 and onwards 
saw the emergence of “self-defence” (Harris, 2014, p. 97) militias 
around the country. Of particular significance is the formation of the 
Kamajors in 1994, formed by Mendes (an ethnic group) in Southern 
Sierra Leone and led by Sam Hinga Norman, a Mende chief in Bo 
District. Hinga Norman formed the Kamajors in response to SLA and 
RUF attacks and encroachment in the south. The Kamajors were “the 





on mythology, charms and psychological weapons in the ritual and 
practice of their movement.  
RUF forces made significant gains in 1995, when they captured the 
NPRC’s “greatest source of domestic revenue, the Sierra Leone Ore 
and Metal Company (SIERMCO) and the Sierra Rutile mine” (Ainley, 
Friedman and Mahony, 2015, p. 9). This led to a rapid deployment of 
a British military force in support of the SLA, and signalled the 
emergence of the United Kingdom as a serious actor within the war 
(Ainley, Friedman and Mahony, 2015). The failure to recapture these 
rebel-controlled assets further led to the arrival of Executive Outcomes 
(EO), a South African mercenary outfit, contracted to secure Freetown 
and the captured mining assets under RUF control. Alongside the SLA 
and Kamajors (who were also trained under Strasser’s leadership), 
“the war was swiftly brought under control” (Harris, 2014, p. 100).  
Phase 2: 1996-1999 
In 1996, after EO, with help from the SLA and the Kamajors, was able 
to successfully drive back the RUF once more, presidential elections 
were held in February and March. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, a stalwart of 
Sierra Leone’s second major political party, the Sierra Leone People’s 
Party (SLPP), won, despite widespread electoral irregularities. 
Notwithstanding claims over electoral misconduct, Kabbah’s runoff 
opponent, United National People’s Party (UNPP) candidate Karefa-
Smart, publicly acceded to Kabbah’s presidential victory. Kabbah 
installed Kamajor leader Hinga Norman as Deputy Minister of Defence, 
and institutionalised support for the Kamajors, as the Civil Defence 
Forces (CDF). With no trust in the SLA, Kabbah’s SLPP government 
looked to the CDF as its security force. This “lull in the war in 1996” 
(Harris, 2014, p. 100) also resulted in peace negotiations (under Julius 
Maada Bio – current SLPP president of Sierra Leone), that culminated 
in the Abidjan Accord signed by Foday Sankoh. The Abidjan Accord 
was signed in November, and contained a ceasefire agreement, 
blanket amnesty provision, and provisions for demobilisation. 
Significantly, it did “not specify any governmental positions for the 





105). The sincerity of Sankoh’s commitment to peace is often 
questioned (Harris, 2014), with many claiming his participation in 
Abidjan to be a “strategy of buying time for his rebellion in retreat” 
(Harris, 2014, p. 104).  
Relations between the SLA and CDF forces worsened, and by March 
of 1997 armed clashes resulted in the arrest of RUF leader Sankoh. 
An emerging alliance between RUF rebels and SLA soldiers who “felt 
marginalised by Kabbah’s engagement of the CDF” (Ainley, Friedman 
and Mahony, 2015, p. 10) prompted an SLA coup in May. This “chaotic 
and brutal” (Harris, 2014, p. 90) coup brought Major Johnny Paul 
Koroma to power and gave rise to the Armed Forces Ruling Council 
(AFRC), composed of soldiers who “had been cut out of the patronage 
system” (Harris, 2014, p. 106) imposed by Kabbah’s preferential 
treatment towards the CDF. Almost immediately, the AFRC invited 
RUF to share power, and Sankoh was declared AFRC Vice Chairman 
and Vice President of Sierra Leone in absentia (he was in Nigeria in 
detention at the time), and RUF forces joined the AFRC to become part 
of the “People’s Army” (Harris, 2014, p. 106). The AFRC ruled 
“arbitrarily and with terror” (Harris, 2014, p. 106) and faced both 
domestic and international enemies. An ECOMOG deployment was 
sent, at the persuasion of the UK and the US. Despite a second 
attempted peace process, in the form of the Conakry Peace 
Agreement, signed by Koroma, peace nonetheless disintegrated. 
Together with the CDF, ECOMOG forces were able to quickly gain 
control in Freetown in early February 1998. By March 10th, Kabbah and 
his government had returned and ECOMOG swiftly secured the 
majority of the country. Distrust between the AFRC, RUF and CDF 
forces continued and culminated in the “catastrophic” (Harris, 2014, p. 
110) AFRC invasion of Freetown on the 6th of January, 1999. 
According to Ainley, Friedman and Mahony (2015), this invasion 
entailed “numerous atrocities” (p. 10) and the murders of “thousands 
of civilians” (p. 10). According to Harris (2014), “the scale of the 
extreme violence in a crowded capital eclipsed all previous violence in 
Sierra Leone” (p. 111). ECOMOG forces drove the AFRC out of 





Freetown and renewed efforts, with international support, for a 
negotiated peace deal began.  
Phase 3: 1999-2002 
The Lomé Accord was signed between Kabbah’s government and the 
RUF forces, in July of 1999. The Agreement provided a blanket 
amnesty, established a power-sharing government and called for the 
establishment of a TRC. However, infractions on both sides impeded 
peace from taking root once more. Ultimately, Kabbah’s regime 
benefitted from military assistance of the AFRC, CDF and foreign 
troops, and gained a definitive advantage over the RUF. The RUF 
kidnapping of 500 Zambian peacekeepers pushed Kabbah to seek 
assistance from the UN and he wrote a letter to the UN Security 
Council seeking assistance to bring the RUF to justice – it is against 
this background that the SCSL was later established. International 
response to the kidnapping of peacekeepers in May was swift, and 
RUF, weakened by its military defeats and under the “seemingly more 
conciliatory” (Harris, 2014, p. 116) leadership of Issa Sesay, re-entered 
peace negotiations and began disarmament in earnest in April 2001. 
By January 2002, President Kabbah declared the war officially over, 
and within the same month an agreement was reached between the 
government and the UN to establish the SCSL.  
Eleven years of civil war in Sierra Leone, characterised by horrific 
abuses, chameleonic allegiances, fragile hope and persistent brutality, 
killed tens of thousands of Sierra Leoneans, displaced millions and left 
close to 400,000 amputated. It disseminated the already weak 
economy and state infrastructure inherited from a legacy of 
colonialism, patronage and corruption. According to Ainley, Friedman 
and Mahony (2015) “bringing about justice in the transition from conflict 
to peace was therefore a formidable task” (p. 11). 
Post-War Sierra Leone 
This final section describes the immediate post-war landscape in 
Sierra Leone, and details the establishment of three post-war 





the war and cement peace, and which are critical to this thesis’s 
subsequent empirical investigation of the relationship between the 
TRC and ex-combatant community: the TRC, the SCSL, and the DDR 
process in Sierra Leone. While each institution and programme is 
introduced and described below, an analytical assessment of the 
challenges of their implementation and the interplay between them is 
reserved for Part Three of this thesis.  
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
The need for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone 
was first formally laid out in the Lomé Agreement. The TRC ultimately 
came into operation in 2002, alongside the SCSL, which was 
established after the Commission. The official mandate of the truth 
commission can be found within the TRC Act of February 2000. The 
Lomé Agreement (1999) called for a TRC that would “provide a forum 
for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell 
their story, get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine 
healing and reconciliation” (Article XXVI). The TRC Act of 2000 
established the objects of the Commission, mandating it to “create an 
impartial historical record” (Part III, Article 6) of the war. A final 
summary of the TRC’s purposes is housed within the Commission’s 
own Final Report of 2004 which reemphasised the TRC’s mandate to 
“promote reconciliation by providing an opportunity for victims to give 
an account of the violations and abuses suffered and for perpetrators 
to relate their experiences, and by creating a climate which fosters 
constructive interchange between victims and perpetrators” (Vol. 1, 
Ch. 1, p. 25). Despite the enactment of the TRC Act in 2000, the 
Commission itself was not formally established until July 2002, and 
operated between 2002 and 2004. Its Final Report was published in 
October 2004.  
While the Lomé Agreement forms the formal genesis of the TRC, the 
seed of its germination can be traced back to two human rights 
organisations: Article 19, an international human rights organisation, 
and Forum of Conscience, a local human rights organisation. First calls 





by Article 19, which called for “the establishment of a Truth 
Commission in order to ascertain the true facts of the conflict and to 
assist efforts to find the right balance between the twin requirements 
of justice and reconciliation” (Lunn and Caulker, 2000, Appendix A). 
National consultations continued through 1998 and 1999 between 
members of civil society and international actors, notably the UN, to 
help develop a viable path to peace in Sierra Leone, and the role of 
transitional justice therein. The TRC Working Group, a constellation of 
local civil society actors, was established in August 1999, with Forum 
of Conscience’s John Caulker at its helm (TRC Report, 2004). The 
TRC Report (2004) describes the purpose of the Working Group as  
to involve Sierra Leonean civil society in the TRC process and 
to ensure that civil society’s concerns would be addressed in 
the design of the TRC Act and in the ways in which the 
Commission was going to undertake its task (Vol. 1, Ch. 5, p. 
157).  
Both local and international members of civil society therefore played 
an instrumental role in the pursuit of restorative transitional justice in 
Sierra Leone. 
Broadly speaking, the TRC had two phases: its preparatory phase, and 
its operational phase. The preparatory phase of the TRC focused 
primarily on public education and awareness raising efforts. The 
operational phase of the TRC comprised its deployment and report 
writing phases, between November 2002 and October 2004 (Williams 
and Opdam, 2017).  Statement collecting took place over four months, 
and was completed in March 2003. The TRC collected 7,706 “human 
rights narratives” (TRC Report, 2004, Appendix 1, p. 3) during its 
statement-taking work. Hearings began in April 2003 (after a one-week 
delay) and ended in early August. During the hearings phase of the 
TRC, one week was devoted to each district for public hearings. This 
included one day of closed hearings. These hearings were held in 
district headquarter towns. Lastly, towards the end of its mandate, the 
TRC launched a National Vision Campaign “calling for contributions 
from the people of Sierra Leone on their ideas and inspirations on the 





The TRC had a hybrid composition comprising seven Commissioners, 
three of whom were international and four Sierra Leonean nationals. 
The three international Commissioners were selected by The Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The Commission 
was chaired by Bishop Dr. Joseph Humper, a staunch SLPP supporter, 
despite OHCHR’s recommendation to appoint Italian Bishop George 
Biguzzi (Mahony and Sooka, 2015).  
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
Ultimately, the TRC operated alongside the Special Court, a hybrid ad 
hoc tribunal, set up after the Truth Commission was proposed and its 
mandate was enacted. It was designed to bring to justice those bearing 
the greatest responsibility for Sierra Leone’s civil war. The composite 
character of Sierra Leone’s transitional justice landscape warrants a 
brief description of the SCSL, and the implications of this are further 
treated within the analysis of this thesis, in Part Three. As highlighted 
above, the Court was established after the Government of Sierra 
Leone requested assistance from the UN to create the world’s first 
hybrid tribunal, when renewed fighting threatened to derail the Lomé 
Peace process. In August 2000, the UN Security Council passed a 
resolution requesting the Secretary General to negotiate the 
establishment of an independent special court (Harris, 2014). On the 
16th of January 2002, an agreement between the Government and the 
UN was reached, for the establishment of the SCSL. Thirteen 
indictments were made by the SCSL, against leaders of the RUF, 
AFRC, CDF and Charles Taylor from Liberia. Indicted CDF leaders 
were Allieu Kondewa, Moinina Fofana and Samuel Hinga Norman. 
RUF indictees were Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay, Morris 
Kallon and Augustine Gbao. Lastly, from the AFRC Alex Brima, Brima 
Kamara, Santigie Kanu and Johnny Paul Koroma were subject to 
SCSL indictment. The indictments of both Samuel Hinga Norman and 
Issa Sesay has been characterised by some as unfair due to their 
participation in efforts to end the war (Harris, 2014). The first of these 
thirteen indictments was brought before the Court in March 2003. By 





indictees, two died prior to prosecution, and the third, AFRC leader 
Johnny Paul Koroma remains missing (and may also have died, 
though this remains unverified). The most famous of the Court’s 
indictments remains, however, that of then-president of Liberia, 
Charles Taylor. The Special Court was the first modern international 
tribunal to indict, try and convict a sitting head of state. This set one of 
many precedents during the work of the Court, including forming the 
first international tribunal to prosecute and convict persons for the use 
of child soldiers, for attacks directed against UN Peacekeepers and for 
establishing acknowledgement of coerced consent by recognising 
forced marriage as a crime against humanity. In 2013 the SCSL 
completed its mandate and transitioned to a residual mechanism, the 
Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone (RSCSL).  
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) 
Lastly, a brief summary of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) process in Sierra Leone deserves attention. 
Analysis in Part Three of this thesis, in particular Chapter 7, reveals 
the impact of the pre-existing, and concurrently operational DDR 
programme in Sierra Leone, on the justice expectations and 
experiences of ex-combatants. Additionally, as highlighted above, 
initial attempts at DDR during the civil war were not only unsuccessful, 
but are held to have contributed to the war’s resurgence. An 
understanding of this component of peace-making in Sierra Leone 
therefore holds relevance within this larger examination of ex-
combatants and transitional justice. DDR in Sierra Leone occurred in 
three phases, and was significantly interrupted by episodes of violence 
and renewed war during phases one and two.  While phase one began 
in 1998, the first provisions for a demobilisation programme were 
included in the Abidjan Accord of 1996, which called for the 
demobilisation of many combatants, including part of the SLA. 
Significantly, it did not include the Kamajors within its ambit of targeted 
demobilisation (Harris, 2014). Harris argues that this was a reflection 
of the distrust between Kabbah and the SLA, and a move to further 





of DDR hanging over the SLA” (Harris, 2014, p. 106) tensions between 
the CDF and SLA quickly rose, and ultimately culminated in the 1997 
military coup. Phase one of DDR began in 1998 and was largely 
unsuccessful, with only 3,000 combatants registering for the process, 
which was subsequently brought to a halt with the resumption of 
hostilities in December. The Lomé Peace Agreement called for a DDR 
programme once again, and though more successful than phase one 
(demobilising just under 20,000 combatants), was once again thwarted 
by the kidnapping of peacekeepers in May 2000. Finally, DDR 
proceeded in earnest in its third phase, in 2001, and was completed in 
2002, disarming approximately 50,000 combatants. Funding shortfalls 
have left a bitter legacy in relation to DDR’s longer term reintegration 
component in Sierra Leone, with this particular component commonly 
held to have been poorly and only partially implemented. Research on 
DDR in Sierra Leone additionally fails to identify a concrete correlation 
between DDR participation and subsequent reintegration outcomes 
among ex-combatants (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007; Sesay and 
Suma, 2009). A small but growing sub-field of research, calling 
attention to the nexus between DDR and transitional justice, has 
started to take root (see for instance Kilroy, 2014; Sriram and Herman, 
2009; and Sriram, 2013). Such work highlights the ways in which these 
processes interact with and affect one another, and brings to light the 
various complementarities and frictions between them. This thesis 
contributes to the crystallisation of this sub-field, uncovering 
empirically the ways in which DDR and the TRC in Sierra Leone 
intersected, among the ex-combatant population, despite the absence 
of a formal relationship between them.  
Conclusion 
Part One of this thesis provides the backbone of this investigation – it 
has detailed the research puzzle under examination in this study, that 
of the relationship between ex-combatants and the TRC in Sierra 
Leone, and the two axes along which this relationship is explored 
(outlined in Chapter 1). Chapter 2 has elaborated the research design 





Chapter 3 has situated the work of this thesis within the larger 
discourse of transitional justice and the case of Sierra Leone, to 
provide necessary theoretical and contextual background. Part Two of 
this thesis articulates the theoretical and conceptual frameworks that 
underpin the empirical analysis within Part Three of this thesis. Part 
Two comprises two chapters (Chapters 4 and 5), the first of which 
elaborates the theoretical frameworks along the dimensions of 
transitional justice rhetoric, ritual and reality, that this thesis critically 
applies. Chapter 5 then goes on to construct two frameworks, on 
institutional engagement and localised impact evaluation, which are 
empirically applied to Sierra Leone’s TRC, through the lens of ex-






Part Two: Theoretical Frameworks 
Part Two of this thesis presents the theoretical underpinnings that 
inform this thesis’s critical examination of the rhetoric, rituals and reality 
of transitional justice which it applies through a localised investigation 
of the expectations, experiences and impacts on, ex-combatants in the 
case of Sierra Leone’s TRC. It contains two chapters (Chapters 4 and 
5), the first of which (Chapter 4) forms the critical theoretical scaffolding 
of this thesis, dedicated to elaborating the dimensions of transitional 
justice rhetoric, rituals and realities. This illuminates the problematic 
normative foundations of transitional justice that produce unforgiving 
binary identities for its local participants, based on external and 
Western conceptualisations of justice. It engages with the questions of 
whose justice underpins transitional justice and how this is translated 
onto the field’s practice. The second chapter in part two (Chapter 5) 
constructs two frameworks which are subsequently empirically applied 
to the case of Sierra Leone’s TRC, through the localised lens of ex-
combatants. The first framework presented is one of institutional 
engagement, and is heavily informed by the discourse of participatory 
approaches from within the field of development studies, and which 
has only recently begun to see expression in transitional justice 
scholarship. It separates local institutional engagement between the 
TRC and its local participant populations along three dimensions: 
ownership, inclusion and participation, and seeks to unpack some of 
the pervasive shortcomings within the nebulous discourse of 
participatory programming. The need for participatory programming in 
post-conflict and development processes has become mainstreamed, 
yet criticisms around what participation is, how it can and should be 
achieved, and questions around its formal and formative application 
have grown. Chapter 5 of this thesis advances conceptual clarity 
towards the nebulous character of participatory programming, through 
the development of a framework of institutional engagement. Chapter 
8, within Part Three of this thesis, highlights the gap between the 
prescription and practice of participatory programming rhetoric with its 
empirical analysis of ex-combatant non-participation in the TRC, 





developed in Chapter 5. Secondly, a localised framework for 
evaluating impact is constructed in Chapter 5, arguing for the 
assessment of transitional justice effects on the level of the local. The 
argument is that impact is more meaningfully assessed when the 
success or failures of transitional justice are situated among the levels 







Rhetoric, Ritual and Reality 
 
Introduction 
Chapter 4 details the theoretical framework of this thesis, and 
underpins the normative critique of the transitional justice and truth 
commission identity framework at the core of this research. It 
problematises the static, unforgiving and unaccommodating binary 
identity framework of transitional justice, normatively constructed at the 
level of rhetoric, institutionally expressed at the level of ritual, and 
practically implemented at the level of reality. These identities, of 
victims versus perpetrators, constrict the scope and potential impacts 
of transitional justice on the ground, the implementation of which 
remains fundamentally straightjacketed by this binary identity 
framework. The empirical investigation of the relationship between 
perpetrators and the TRC in Sierra Leone, in Part Three of this thesis 
showcases the practical challenges and shortcomings of this static 
identity framework, theoretically developed within this chapter. This 
chapter proceeds in the following parts: firstly, a discussion on the 
terms ‘identities’ and ‘experiences’ advances one of the contributions 
of this thesis, through acknowledging the complex and shifting nature 
of lived conflict actions and experiences, through the considered terms 
introduced and applied throughout this research. Thereafter the 
normative plane of transitional justice and the question of whose 
justice has constructed this field which has become an integral and 
inevitable component for societies transitioning away from periods of 
conflict or repression is highlighted. Criticisms around the Western 
paradigm of transitional justice have come to dominate the discourse. 
The binary construction of identities within the field however, have 
received far less critical examination, and it is this subsequent 
discussion that anchors the core argumentation and contributions of 
this thesis. As will be argued in this chapter, transitional justice does 
not only demand accountability according to a particular (Western) 





categorises its participants into the rigid identity framework of either 
evil perpetrators or innocent victims. A critique of this binary and 
hierarchical identity framework, that not only pits victims against 
perpetrators, but privileges victims in the process, calls attention to the 
reality of blurred lines in the case of lived conflict experiences by 
individuals. It also highlights the logic of assumed perpetrator 
participation within the particular transitional justice mechanism of truth 
commissions, which this thesis constructs and subsequently 
empirically examines in Chapter 7. The role of innocence, blame, 
acknowledgement and motivations within this binary identity 
framework is subsequently addressed. The issues of guilt and 
punishment within the structure of truth commissions is thereafter 
interrogated and an argument is made for a broader understanding of 
punishment that is empirically explored in Chapter 9. Lastly, both the 
positive and negative implications of a nuanced conceptualisation and 
application of victimhood in truth commissions are laid out. The 
theoretical framework developed in this chapter, building on seminal 
critical work that has begun to emerge around complex identities in 
transitional justice, advances this emerging branch of transitional 
justice scholarship. It underpins the empirical examination of ex-
combatants in relation to the TRC in Part Three of this thesis, and in 
particular the multiple sources and processes of exclusion this 
population was confronted with, by precisely the mechanism of 
transitional justice implemented in order to heal, restore and reconcile 
Sierra Leoneans in a broadly inclusive manner.  
Identities versus Experiences 
Throughout this thesis, the perpetrator identity is distinguished from 
the perpetrator experience. This distinction is employed as a discursive 
tool to draw clear and consistent attention to the problematic 
disjuncture between the construction of identity for ex-combatants by 
transitional justice, against the constellation of identities experienced 
by ex-combatants.  
In line with Arthur’s (2010) definition, this thesis treats identity as an 





neither “timeless” nor “unchanging” (Arthur, 2010, p. 5) and can be 
chosen by the individual or “ascribed to them by others” (p. 4). Arthur 
(2010) further describes identities as “social categories that rely on 
rules of membership that determine who is included” and stresses that 
“identity groups are probably infinite” (p. 4).   
Ex-combatants and perpetrators are the two focal (and intersecting) 
identities under examination in this thesis. Previous sections have 
already defined both these social categories and highlighted the TRC’s 
treatment of ex-combatants as belonging to its considered perpetrator 
population. According to Aiken (2008), “one’s identity as a perpetrator 
(or victim) depends upon one’s inclusion within a particular group 
rather than upon individual characteristics or conduct” (p. 11). In Sierra 
Leone’s TRC, armed group membership was used as a significant 
criterion to assign the identity of perpetrator onto individuals. However, 
as shown throughout this thesis, the binary identity framework of 
transitional justice, of victims and perpetrators, fails to accommodate 
the diverse and intersecting universe of identities experienced by 
conflict-affected individuals (and ex-combatants in particular) in reality. 
To distinguish between the prescribed and personal identities of ex-
combatants and to highlight the problematic impacts of the mismatch 
revealed between them throughout this thesis, the terms identity and 
experience are employed. This distinction is used to capture the 
limitations of recognition within the industry of transitional justice, and 
of the TRC in Sierra Leone specifically.  
One of the overall contributions of this thesis is the argument that there 
is the need to accommodate the complex identities of the individual 
within transitional justice. The industry of transitional justice recognises 
only a limited number of identities and prescribes them in absolutes. 
The personal fabric of an individual’s (inter)actions is designated in 
singular terms. This oversimplifies conflict experiences, which in 
reality, are not so neat. In her critique of the normative participatory 
limitations placed on perpetrators in truth commissions, Nwogu (2010) 
showcases this by suggesting that “truth commissions are more likely 





and perpetrator not as a status” “but as a temporary state that any 
person could enter and from which such a person can exit” (p. 286). 
She uses the terms status and state to refer to what this thesis frames 
as identity and experience, respectively. However, while these terms 
embody the same critique of the binary participant identities prescribed 
by truth commissions, the terms identity and experience are better 
suited to capture this distinction. For the sake of simplicity, the 
distinction between identity, as static and mono-dimensional, and 
experience, as shifting and multi-dimensional, is readily apparent. The 
terms status and state do not lend themselves as readily to these 
distinctions – status, discursively, has strong relative associations, 
which shift over time. This may cause conceptual confusion in practice, 
which the terms identity and experience aptly overcome. To best 
capture the very same critique and distinction that Nwogu (2010) 
draws on, this thesis therefore uses the terms identity and experience. 
The use of the term experiences within this thesis advances its core 
argumentation around both the absence of, and consequently the need 
for, meaningful accommodation of diversity among conflict-affected 
transitional justice participants. The term experiences enjoys 
conceptual flexibility that captures the possibility and reality of complex 
conflict histories contained within the individual. 
This thesis argues that to designate a solely perpetrator identity onto 
an individual based on their armed group membership restricts the 
universe of what constitutes injustice to the experiences of designated 
victims only. This evidences the primacy given to this (similarly 
constructed) identity category (of victims), and fails to recognise the 
injustices that may have led, or forced, many ex-combatants to take up 
arms in the first place (a reality that is amply empirically demonstrated 
in Chapters 7, 9 and 10). This restricted application of justice, and 
definition of injustice, does not acknowledge the underlying grievances 
that caused the war, and instead takes conflict as the starting point for 
truth reclamation. Put simply, it fails to acknowledge the motivations 
that led to war in the first place. This narrow definition of justice, 
stemming from the unaccommodating binary identity framework 





population, whose own experiences do not receive meaningful 
inclusion in the conceptualisation of justice propagated by transitional 
justice in general, or truth commissions in reality. Reframing personal 
histories of war away from static identities, to complex experiences, is 
a necessary step in the meaningful expansion and local 
accommodation of transitional justice towards the populations and 
contexts with which this discourse engages and affects. This thesis 
argues that the industry of transitional justice needs to be more 
responsive to the intersecting identities among its participants rather 
than limited by a set menu of static identities to be occupied and to 
which participation is constrained to fit. These issues of transitional 
justice hierarchies along the dimension of constructed identities and 
motivations, are analytically interrogated in subsequent sections of this 
chapter.  
This thesis interrogates the normative foundations of transitional 
justice in several ways. It exposes, through the personal narratives of 
ex-combatants, the disjuncture between the macro-level model of 
globalised transitional justice against the micro-level realities of local 
justice needs, and experiences of injustice. The disparities between 
rhetoric and reality are stark, and reveal problematic binaries on the 
normative and institutional levels that constrain the meaningful 
contributions that truth commissions seek to achieve in practice.  
The next section of this chapter begins the critical examination of the 
normative foundations within the field of transitional justice in this 
thesis, by highlighting the ubiquitous space that transitional justice has 
come to occupy as a necessary tool for transition, against its particular 
Western normative foundations. The contrast between transitional 
justice as a universalised need against its narrow and externally 
constructed agenda has become a dominant strand of criticism within 
the field.  
A Western Paradigm of Transitional Justice 
Assumptions around why transitional justice is both necessary and 





repression have invaded the field (Dube,2011; Lutz, 2006; Mutua, 
2015; Teitel, 2003). Transitional justice has come to be “regarded as 
inevitable and commonplace for anyone wishing to address the issue 
of past violations” (Dube, 2011, p. 177). According to Mutua (2015) 
“transitional justice has become an article of faith as a catalyst for 
reclaiming societies in political and social imbalance and dysfunction” 
(p. 1). The need for transitional justice, with its underpinnings in the 
broader human rights movement, has become universalised (Lutz, 
2006; Mutua, 2015; Skaar, 2018). The doctrine of transitional justice 
has strong normative foundations stemming from the broader human 
rights movement in which the field is anchored (Mutua, 2015; 
Madlingozi, 2010), that squarely dictate the necessary measures for 
transitioning from conflict to liberal democracy. Yet, while “the concept 
of transitional justice has operated on the principle that transitional 
justice and its underlying goals are by definition good” (Dube, 2011, 
p.181), these normative underpinnings are increasingly challenged by 
critics who highlight the practical limitations of such universalising 
practices (Brudholm, 2008; Dube, 2011; Lutz, 2006; Sikkink and 
Walling, 2006). One dominant strand of criticism towards the normative 
deficits in transitional justice challenges the universality of the 
conceptualisation and demands of transitional justice (Mutua, 2015, 
Lutz, 2006; Sikkink and Walling, 2006). The language of rights and 
obligations inherent to transitional justice are critiqued as “particularly 
liberal and a western construct” (Mutua, 2015, p. 3). According to Lutz 
(2006) “external intervention has contributed to the standardisation of 
transitional justice goals and methods. An understanding of what it 
takes to achieve accountability for past violations permeates the 
international community” (p. 333), which has produced a “normative 
milieu” (p. 332) predicated on the necessity of accountability. McEvoy 
(2007) describes the field of transitional justice as “overdominated by 
a narrow legalistic lens” (p. 413) that is “both state-centric and ‘top-
down’” (p. 421). This is echoed by Madlingozi (2010) in his description 
of transitional justice as one component of the broader human rights 
discourse, whose “operation is, despite rhetoric to the contrary, 





more than a choice or right, transitional justice has become the state’s 
duty and responsibility, to be pursued in a particular way - in line with 
the normatively constructed definition of what justice is and how it is to 
be achieved. To be clear, within this thesis, I am not arguing against 
the need for (transitional) justice, but rather contributing to the critique 
of treating the definition of justice as a universal standard. While the 
need for justice, and transitional justice in particular, has solidified, 
flexibility in understanding what justice is, and a contextually-driven 
understanding of the justice needs among the local, stands to advance 
the contributions of this discourse away from empirical ambivalence, 
and towards meaningful and positive impact. Mutua (2015) elegantly 
posits that “dogmatic universality is a drawback to an imaginative 
understanding of transitional justice” (p. 5).  
Such criticisms of the western and normative assumptions within 
transitional justice usefully call into question what transitional justice 
achieves and why it is deemed desirable, necessary or even inevitable. 
In essence, the problem with justice is that who defines it and how, 
dictates and limits the universe of possible injustice accordingly.  
Despite increasing recognition and criticism of the western paradigm 
that has universalised transitional justice, and prompted responses 
pulling towards ‘local’ approaches, one normative dimension remains 
under-examined – the normative production of transitional justice 
participant identities. Overwhelmingly, transitional justice research and 
advocacy is steeped in binary presentations of affected populations as 
either simple victims or perpetrators. The discourse is replete with such 
archetypal assumptions, and following from this, an unchallenged 
need for forgiveness or repentance, which transitional justice is 
designated as uniquely suited to deliver. It is to this question, of the 
normatively produced binary identity framework in transitional justice, 





Producing Perpetrators: binary identities in transitional 
justice 
The doctrine of transitional justice not only prescribes what is good and 
necessary for societies emerging from violence to achieve repair and 
progress; it also diagnoses those populations, defining who is good 
and deserving of justice, as well as who is bad and in need of 
punishment or forgiveness. 
Two identity categories dominate the transitional justice participation 
discourse: victims and perpetrators. These constructed identities are 
the focal point of transitional justice local engagement, around which it 
defines both its participants, beneficiaries and overall ambitions. 
According to Borer (2003), most of the human rights literature, within 
which transitional justice is situated, “refers almost solely to victims and 
perpetrators” (p. 1116). This binary focus is true for truth commissions 
in particular, empirically established in Chapter 6, which demonstrates 
that in the case of Sierra Leone, the truth commission focused almost 
exclusively, within its institutional rhetoric, on these two categories.  
Distinct, Homogeneous and Diametrically Opposed Identities 
Within the restricted conceptual treatment of conflict experiences as 
binaries of victim and perpetrator identities, these categories are 
generally referred to as: distinct (victims and perpetrators), 
homogenous (the victims and the perpetrators), and diametrically 
opposed (victims versus perpetrators) (Borer, 2003).  
Borer (2003) conceptualises the institutional treatment of victims and 
perpetrators in transitional justice as two “concentric circles” (p. 1089) 
(see Figure 1 below). McEvoy and McConnachie (2012) reinforce this, 
showcasing that the treatment of these binaries as “distinct categories” 
(p. 532) reflects one of several problematic identity assumptions that 
transitional justice has inherited from the discourse of western 
democratic victimology. Bernath’s work (2016), examining practices of 
formal inclusion against the realities of participatory exclusion in 
Cambodia highlights the institutional preference for an “either-or 





are treated as “either innocent victims or complicit actors” (p. 60). Borer 
(2003) emphasises the treatment of victims and perpetrators as 
distinct in transitional justice, in her examination of South Africa’s TRC, 
where she argues that the TRC “almost always employed the binary 
approach of victims and perpetrators” (p. 1100). Madlingozi (2010) 
describes this presentation of affected populations as a “theft” (p. 211) 
of agency, wherein “entire post-war populations (are viewed) either as 
traumatised victims, lacking the ability to make decisions about the 
future, or as people driven by a destructive psychosis that renders 
them incapable or morally unworthy of positive contributions to peace-
building” (Lundy and McGovern, 2008, p. 278).  
The critical literature on identity construction in transitional justice 
highlights that the individual experiences of those affected by conflict 
within the realm of the local “often become homogenised through 
dominant narratives” (Humphrey, 2002, p. 116). These binary 
categories are perceived of as not only entirely separate, but internally 
identical, whereby all victims and all perpetrators are the same (Borer, 
2003). This homogenisation abstracts the complexity of individual 
experiences into an idealised group identity, of good and evil. The 
tendency within transitional justice and the broader human rights 
movement, “to articulate good and evil in abstract terms is extremely 
limiting” (Madlingozi, 2010, p. 212) as it homogenises experiences 
under an “internationally sanctified vocabulary” (Kennedy, 2002, p. 
112) of binary identities. This homogenisation “corresponds to a 
narrowing vision of complex phenomena” that remains largely 
unchallenged (Bernath, 2016, p. 51).  
Idealised Identities 
The homogenisation of experiences, within the binary framework of 
victims and perpetrators disregards the possibility for complexity, 
ambiguity or nuance among conflict-affected individuals. The absence 
of complexity within this binary identity structure also idealises these 
categories. Victims and perpetrators are “reified” (McEvoy and 
McConnachie, 2012, p. 527), “essentialised” (Nwogu, 2010, p. 286) 





innocent and guilty. This significantly restrains their individual voices 
within the truth-telling space offered by truth commissions (Nwogu, 
2010). This shortcoming is further expanded below.  
Finally, in constructing and limiting participation and benefits to this 
binary (of victims and perpetrators), transitional justice presents these 
identities as diametrically opposed (Borer, 2003; McEvoy and 
McConnachie, 2012; Moffett, 2016). According to McEvoy and 
McConnachie (2012), the presentation of victims as the “mirror” (p. 
527) or “binary opposite” (p. 528) of the criminal or perpetrator is even 
“more pronounced” (p. 532) in transitional contexts than in domestic 
justice, due to the moral superiority that victims are imbibed with, and 
around which the integrity of a successful transition is constructed 
(McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012; Moffett, 2016). The tension 
inherent to this binary identity construction permeates core debates in 
transitional justice on truth versus justice, amnesty versus prosecution, 
and perpetrators versus victims (Borer, 2003).  
Transposing conflict experiences into simple binary identities that are 
treated as distinct, homogenous, archetypal and diametrically opposed 
has several implications, which are discussed in more detail in 
subsequent sections. In particular, their treatment as diametrically-
opposed identities “narrows the notion of victims’ rights or needs so 
they become intrinsically linked to the punishment of perpetrators” 
(McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012, p. 527). In other words, by 
constructing them as mirror opposites, honouring victims necessarily 
requires punishing perpetrators (McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012). 
The dispensation of justice, within transitional justice, is therefore 
constructed as a zero-sum game, between the idealised categories of 
victims and perpetrators. Defining victims and perpetrators as binary 
opposites additionally risks (re)producing power asymmetries through 
a continuation of processes of ‘othering’ that are widely understood to 
cause conflict in the first place (Bernath, 2016; Nwogu, 2010).  
Power Asymmetries 
Bernath (2016) describes the diametric treatment of victims and 





(p. 62) that promotes exclusive group identities anchored in 
antagonism; of us versus them. Nwogu (2010) elaborates the power 
asymmetries that transitional justice, and truth commissions 
specifically, produce as a “reversal of the power dynamic” (inverting 
prior power imbalances that disadvantaged the ‘victim’) which 
“undermines the objective of truth commissions to help prevent 
repetition of the past” (p. 282). According to Nwogu (2010), it is the 
combination of the primacy placed on victims in transitional justice, as 
the starting point for truth reclamation and the moral anchor for societal 
repair (McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012), and the failure of truth 
commissions to acknowledge perpetrator suffering or motivations 
(elaborated below), that (re)produce such power asymmetries. She 
argues that despite the “aim to integrate rather than alienate” (Nwogu, 
2010, p. 281), truth commissions, in practice, privilege victim 
participation and narratives. This structural participation shortcoming 
means that the “elevation of one community over another…is 
replicated rather than dissolved” (Nwogu, 2010, p. 283). This is 
dangerous and means that the type of truth and identities produced by 
these bodies “potentially serves as a weapon of oppression” (Nwogu, 
2010, p. 282) that may “enable (future) political violence and mass 
victimisation” (Bernath, 2016, p. 47) along new fault lines of inequality. 
By constructing a “discourse that presents two distinct homogenous 
groups as mutually exclusive: perpetrators versus victims or 
combatants versus victims” (Skaar, 2018, p. 412), truth commissions 
can in fact exacerbate “the negative relationship” between these 
constructed groups, and compound the “structural factors that may 
have contributed to violence” in the first place (Skaar, 2018, p. 412).  
Transitional justice as victim-centred  
Madlingozi (2010) also draws attention to the production of power 
asymmetries in transitional justice, albeit unintentionally. In his critique 
of the externalised representation of victims by transitional justice 
entrepreneurs, he argues that the burden of transitional justice 
requires “more than being nice to victims or adhering to rigorous 





about redistribution of resources and power” (Madlingozi, 2010, p. 
225). Madlingozi clearly belongs to the dominant cadre of transitional 
justice scholars that endorses victim centrality in transitional justice 
endeavours, and explicitly acknowledges that, in order for transitional 
justice to truly be victim-centred, it not only should, but must, 
redistribute power and resources in their favour. In his support for 
expanding the victim agenda of transitional justice, Madlingozi (2010) 
highlights the centrality of victimhood within the field, but fails to 
recognise the problematic implications this has on questions of 
victimhood inclusion, and the possibly detrimental consequences of 
producing new power asymmetries that arise from this privilege. He 
fails to consider the issue of what the “genuine empowerment of the 
victim” (Madlingozi, 2010, p. 208) means for the perpetrator. This 
thesis, in examining the TRC experiences of ex-combatants, advances 
some empirical answers to this necessary but neglected line of 
questioning.  
The binary infrastructure of conflict experiences in transitional justice, 
producing archetypal victims and perpetrators, raises the important 
question of privilege – how are these dichotomised categories treated? 
In Borer’s (2003) critique of South Africa’s TRC, she raises the point 
that the binary identity structure of the TRC there led to “much 
discussion about whether the TRC was victim friendly or perpetrator 
friendly” (p. 1089).  
Transitional justice is advanced as a victim-centred enterprise 
(Bernath, 2016; Freeman, 2006; McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012; 
Moffett, 2016; Skaar, 2018). Humphrey (2003) highlights that “the 
victim has been put at the centre of the states’ post-atrocity strategies 
to reform governance, rehabilitate state authority and promote 
reconciliation” (p. 171). According to Skaar (2018), the focus on victims 
within truth commissions specifically “reflects the trend toward more 
focus on victims of human rights violations around the turn of the 
century” (Skaar, 2018, p. 404). McEvoy and McConnachie (2012) 
reinforce the primacy of victim needs in transitional justice, highlighting 





perhaps the key rationale for the existence of” (pp. 527-528) 
transitional justice processes. Furthermore, according to Nwogu 
(2010), the “produced victim” is the “starting point for truth reclamation” 
within truth commissions (p. 280). The victim is the protagonist, and 
the perpetrator merely a supporting character within the hegemonic 
narrative of conflict that truth commissions write. Madlingozi’s (2010) 
critique of the Western normative underpinnings of transitional justice 
aptly showcases the hegemonic position of victims, within transitional 
justice scholarship and practice, as the necessary and appropriate 
beneficiaries of transitional justice. Madlingozi (2010) asserts that 
“transitional justice experts legitimise their existence on the basis of 
speaking about and for victims” (p. 208). According to Madlingozi 
(2010), the “core task” (p. 210) and “ultimate goal” (p. 218) of 
transitional justice is to “contribute to the transformation of the political 
subjectivity of victims in ways that enable them to engage as active 
citizens” (p. 209)). Madlingozi’s (2010) work showcases the dominant 
trend in transitional justice scholarship to focus on examining 
“divergences between rhetorical and genuine commitments to victims 
in transitional justice processes” (Bernath, 2016, p. 47). The “victim-
centredness” of transitional justice itself receives far less critical 
attention (Bernath, 2016, p. 47).  
The centrality of victims within transitional justice highlighted above 
“raises questions as to who is recognised as a victim and which voices 
are prioritised” (Moffett, 2016, p. 148). Yet, critical examinations 
around the “political and social construction of victimhood is only 
tentatively emerging’ (McEvoy & McConnachie, 2012, p. 527). A small 
body of scholarship has begun to critically examine the production and 
practice of the binary identities inherent to transitional justice, and the 
challenges that emerge from the centrality of victims within this 
discourse (Bernath, 2016; Borer, 2003; McEvoy and McConnachie, 
2012; Moffett, 2016; Nwogu, 2010). The next section of this chapter 
provides an analytical overview of this emerging body of critical 





Breaking the Transitional Justice Binary 
A sub-field of critical transitional justice studies is beginning to 
crystallise. This work unpacks and problematises the normative 
production of binary participation in transitional justice, and the 
hierarchies this imposes on its structures, processes, impacts and 
effectiveness (Bernath, 2016; McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012; 
Moffett, 2016; Nwogu, 2010). According to McEvoy and McConnachie 
(2012) there is a “mismatch between the rhetoric and reality” (p. 528) 
of affected population experiences in transitional justice. This thesis 
contributes directly to this growing critical discourse, examining the 
rhetoric and reality of perpetrator experiences through the lens of the 
restrictive and hierarchical binaries imposed by the TRC in Sierra 
Leone.   
This critical scholarship coalesces around one crucial transitional 
justice shortcoming; the reality of lived conflict experiences does not 
conform to the simple binary identity structure imposed by transitional 
justice. In constructing the group, the individual has been lost, 
subsumed into the static rhetoric of the innocent victim, in need of 
saving, at the cost of the guilty perpetrator, in need of punishment.  
Figure 1 (below) in this thesis is taken from Borer’s (2003) presentation 
of the victim and perpetrator identities in transitional justice. It is 
composed of three figures (Figures 1a-1c) and taken directly from her 
work (Borer, 2003). Borer (2003) contrasts the presentation of victims 
and perpetrators as distinct, homogenous and diametrically opposed 







Figure 1 (taken from Borer, 2003): 
 
The first of Borer’s (2003) visualisations, Figure 1a, reflects the 
normative construction of the victim and perpetrator identities within 
transitional justice. Though he speaks exclusively on behalf of victims, 
Madlingozi (2010) nonetheless highlights the practice of transitional 
justice to externally categorise, define, theorise and package its local 
participants and beneficiaries. The normative construction of victim 
and perpetrator identities put in place by the “transitional justice 
industry” (Madlingozi, 2010, p. 225) has its roots in the broader human 
rights movement, which, according to Moffett (2016), “by itself fails to 
capture the larger complex web of victimisation and responsibility that 
characterises collective violence” (p. 162).  
Figure 1b (Borer, 2003) depicts the institutional treatment of these 





South Africa’s TRC. Bernath’s (2016) analysis of “complex political 
victims” in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC) validates this institutional model of participation in transitional 
justice. In her analysis, Bernath (2016) reveals that formal recognition 
of victimhood for certain perpetrators was not met with practices of 
meaningful participation for them (formal inclusion versus practical 
exclusion).  she contrasts the formal inclusion of “complex political 
victims” (Bernath, 2016, p. 46) against their practical exclusion within 
the ECCC.  
Finally, Figure 1c (Borer, 2003) reflects more closely the lived complex 
realities of individual conflict experiences. The uneven lines in figure 
three indicate “that these groups are not as homogenous as we might 
think…not all victims are the same, nor are all perpetrators the same” 
(Borer, 2003, p. 2002). According to Borer, Figure 1c differs from 
Figures 1a and 1b in two significant ways, and in so doing, more 
adequately visualises the complexity of conflict experiences. Firstly, 
the uneven lines of Figure 1c acknowledge heterogeneity within both 
groups. Secondly, the groups are no longer seen as “separate and 
distinct” but rather their overlap is recognised (Borer, 2003, p. 2003). 
Building from Borer’s visual depiction of conflict experiences presented 
in Figure 1, this thesis constructs a fourth visualisation (Figure 5) of 
conflict experiences, using empirical data from Sierra Leone. Figure 5 
can be found in Chapter 9. It highlights that in the case of Sierra Leone 
one consistent limitation to Borer’s (2003) representations of conflict 
experiences within transitional justice, is that they do not adequately 
reflect the degree of overlap between experiences of victimhood as 
shared by ex-combatants. This has been strongly and consistently 
revealed in the empirical data collected throughout this research.  
Blurred Lines 
In contrast to the “easy assumption” (McEvoy and McConnachie, 
2012, p. 531) of transitional justice that positions victims and 
perpetrators as static, separate and homogenous, scholars such as 
McEvoy and McConnachie (2012) highlight that, in reality, individuals 





victims or perpetrators at different times – these are not static 
categories” (McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012, p. 531). Some 
perpetrators are also victims, though, of course, not all victims are also 
perpetrators. The assumption of “black and white distinctions between 
these categories” (McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012, p. 531) 
disregards the vast “grey zones of ambiguity” (Primo Levi, 1989, cited 
in Bernath, 2016, p. 46) that colours the everyday experiences of 
individuals during conflict. McEvoy and McConnachie (2012) elegantly 
capture the fluidity of these intersecting experiences in describing the 
human condition in periods of conflict as one wherein people “can 
move between kindness and wickedness in a single day, never mind 
across a lifetime lived in a society experiencing political or ethnic 
violence” (p. 534).  
In unveiling the “messy reality” (Moffett, 2016, p. 146) of individual 
conflict experiences, McEvoy and McConnachie (2012, p. 533) further 
highlight the role of victimisation in constituting the victimiser on the 
individual level: 
The circularity in such claims-making – of people who become 
involved in violence because of their own or their communities’ 
experience of violence – has been a constant refrain repeated 
to us in literally hundreds of interviews with combatants and ex-
combatants over the years. 
McEvoy and McConnachie (2012) introduce two important themes to 
the challenge of nuancing conflict experiences: the role of motivations 
(Moffett (2016) calls this ‘context’) in constructing the perpetrator, and 
that of innocence in constructing the victim. Each of these challenges, 
and their accompanying implications, are elaborated below.  
Bernath (2016) further describes the dichotomised production and 
treatment of victims and perpetrators, captured in Figure 1a, as 
“simplistic” (p. 47) and dangerous. Simplistic because it “obscures 
critical aspects of political violence and mass atrocity” (Bernath, 2016, 
p. 47) and dangerous because it contributes to problematic processes 
of ‘othering’ that (re)produce antagonistic in and out, us and them, 
good and bad, group identities which “often constitutes the first step in 





Introducing the Complex Victim 
Many of these critiques of binary identity labels propose expanding or 
reframing the treatment of identities in transitional justice to illuminate 
the muddy waters (Borer, 2003) of individuals’ conflict experiences. It 
is through such an expansion of the (currently) binary identity 
framework within transitional justice that a layered understanding of 
the past can be constructed, and the transformative potential of truth 
commissions in particular, can be realised (Nwogu, 2010). The 
following section provides an overview of expansions to the traditional 
victim and perpetrator labels offered by seminal critical works in a 
concerted effort to break the binaries of transitional justice. The limiting 
effects of the binary identity framework in Sierra Leone’s TRC are 
subsequently empirically exposed throughout Part Three of this thesis, 
whose findings provided grounded support for the conceptual 
arguments outlined below that advance the need to break this binary 
identity framework.  
Moffett (2016) critiques the binary construction of victims and 
perpetrators in transitional justice in relation to the use of reparations 
specifically. While all victims experience suffering, he distinguishes 
between ‘innocent’ and ‘complex’ victims within his broadened 
definition of victimhood. “’Innocent’ victims refers to those who are not 
members of armed groups (i.e. civilians)” and “complex victims 
denotes those who have been victimised but are responsible for 
victimising others” (Moffett, 2016, p. 148). Moffett (2016) further 
defines complex victims as “individuals who are members of non-state 
armed, paramilitary or terrorist groups, or state forces who commit 
political violence but have been victimised through identifiable 
international crimes” (p. 151). Temporality is another significant 
criterion in Moffett’s (2016) disaggregated definition of complex 
victims. “Complex victims are perpetrators first then victims” (Moffett, 
2016, p. 152). In Moffett’s (2016) framework for expanding 
acknowledgement of suffering and victimhood then, the label of 
complex victim is reserved for those who “end up suffering…as a result 





between the issues of temporality and motivations in determining who 
can qualify for recognition as a complex victim. These will be 
addressed in subsequent sections. Moffett (2016) argues that a 
nuanced understanding of victimhood is necessary because victims 
are “never a simple, unidimensional category, either in terms of their 
own complex needs or in terms of the fluidity of identities that 
characterise” (p. 154) conflict. The “multiple and conflicting views” held 
on both the collective and individual levels present challenges that 
“transitional justice is ill equipped to address” (Moffett, 2016, p. 154) 
through the binary construction of these identities that has 
characterised the field. Complex victims remain “unseen and unheard 
as their suffering does not fit into socially accepted values of ‘innocent’ 
and ‘lawabiding’” (Moffett, 2016, p. 154). This denies the dignity of 
complex victims that requires a more contextualised approach in order 
to reconcile “their responsibility with acknowledging their victimisation” 
(Moffett, 2016, p. 156). Acknowledgement and responsibility are 
critical to Moffett’s (2016) proposed expanded framework of 
victimhood in transitional justice. He argues that a more ‘inclusive’ or 
‘composite’ (Moffett, 2016) approach that recognises victimisation 
experienced by ‘complex perpetrators’ does not inherently have to 
reduce or obfuscate their responsibility for victimising others, if such 
inclusiveness is appropriately limited. The problematic zero-sum 
justice game of transitional justice can therefore be reframed into one 
of relative gains, whereby “all those who suffered would at least have 
their harm acknowledged and access to some form of remedy” 
(Moffett, 2016, p. 165). Nwogu (2010) supports such a re-
conceptualisation within transitional justice, emphasising that victim 
dignity does not have to come at the cost of perpetrator agency. 
Instead she argues that victim dignity can be restored through 
recognition of perpetrator humanity, how it was lost and subsequently 
the redemption of his/her humanity (Nwogu. 2010). Expanding the 
scope of acknowledgement within truth commissions and transitional 
justice can thereby amplify its redemptive ambitions. This is 
demonstrated in Chapter 7 of Part Three of this thesis, wherein the 





narratives among ex-combatants is empirically constructed. A limited 
space for acknowledgement in Sierra Leone’s TRC, restricted to 
treating ex-combatants as simple perpetrators, emerges strongly as a 
core deterrent to TRC participation among this population, as explored 
throughout the empirical analysis of this thesis, in Part Three.   
Bernath (2016) adopts similar terminology to Moffett (2016) in her 
disaggregation of the problematic victim and perpetrator binaries of 
transitional justice. She refers to ‘complex political victims’ as “victims 
who simultaneously or successively experienced harm and 
participated in systems of oppression and political violence” (p. 47). 
One difference between Bernath (2016) and Moffett’s (2016) 
expansion of victimhood in transitional justice is the treatment of 
(ex)combatants as either passively or explicitly belonging to such a 
nuanced identity structure, respectively. Bernath (2016) identifies the 
incorporation of (ex)combatants within the ECCC’s formal structure by 
virtue of its definition of victims which refers to “any person who has 
suffered a physical, material or psychological injury in direct 
consequences of at least one of the crimes committed in Cambodia by 
the Democratic Kampuchea regime ...that is of the competence of the 
ECCC” (p. 53). According to Bernath (2016) this 
does not exclude those victims who were responsible for 
victimising others (and) it allows for all direct or indirect victims 
of relevant Khmer Rouge crimes to be recognised as victims in 
the proceedings without consideration of their acts and 
responsibilities under Democratic Kampuchea, as long as they 
do not fall under its personal jurisdiction (p. 53).  
This approach towards complex political victims can be considered 
passively inclusive, broadly inclusive of certain perpetrators by nature 
of the absence of their explicit exclusion.  
Despite the formally-passive inclusive approach towards complex 
political victims adopted by the ECCC, Bernath (2016) demonstrates 
the limited space for their meaningful participation as recognised 
victims therein. Drawing on work from Bouris, she highlights that the 
“legitimate victim subject position” is reserved for the “ideal victim”, 





responsibility” (Bernath, 2016, p. 60). Formal inclusion of ‘complexity’ 
among victims, therefore does not guarantee meaningful participation 
within transitional justice, wherein a “norm of the ‘ideal victim’” 
(Bernath, 2016, p. 61) continues to determine the ‘legitimacy’ of the 
victim subject position, constructed around the “moral criterion of 
innocence” (p. 61). Despite formal inclusion, “the simultaneous 
dynamic of exclusion, which is subtler…significantly limits the space 
given to complex political victims” (Bernath, 2016, p. 66). Chapter 6 
illuminates the formal (or prescribed) space accorded to ex-
combatants, as perpetrator participants, and thereby establishes their 
legitimate subject position within the TRC. Together, Chapters 8, 9 and 
10 go on to reveal the multiple processes and sources of exclusion 
that, in reality, marginalised ex-combatants from participating in the 
TRC, stemming from the TRC’s failure to acknowledge the multitudes 
that exist within the universe of individual perpetrator experiences.  
According to Borer (2003), the “clear-cut” (p. 1091) approach to 
defining victims and perpetrators, as “discrete and binary” terms and 
concepts, becomes “uncomfortable” (p. 1089) when one recognises 
the complexity of lived experiences during conflict. Using South 
Africa’s TRC, she articulates a taxonomy of victims and perpetrators 
to highlight the myriad compound perpetrator experiences on the 
ground. She distinguishes, among others, between direct and indirect 
perpetrators; individual and group perpetrators; active and passive 
perpetrators; beneficiaries; bystanders; and perpetrators by 
commission and perpetrators by omission (Borer, 2003). Through this 
typology Borer (2003) demonstrates that “not all victims are the same, 
nor are all perpetrators the same” (p. 1090), and “some victims are 
also perpetrators” (p. 2003). In unpacking experiences of suffering and 
perpetration Borer’s (2003) typology reveals that victimisation and 
perpetration occur as a matter of degrees, and not in absolutes. This 
reinforces the appropriateness of distinguishing between experiences 
and identities, articulated earlier. This reframing has several 





Borer (2003) draws attention to the difference between the group 
perpetrator and the individual perpetrator, and the problem of 
translating group labels to individual experiences. When a group is 
designated as a perpetrator, this automatically translates onto its 
individual members, evidencing significantly the problematic practice 
of homogenising individual experiences within neatly constructed and 
idealised categories. The individual becomes demonstrative of the 
group, though in reality, the group may not be representative of the 
individual’s experience(s) within the group.  Kilroy (2014) reiterates this 
problematic implication of transferring group labels onto individual 
identities. He argues that while “it is indeed appropriate to make 
judgements about the overall nature of a fighting group or its 
leadership,” “transferring this generalised assessment to every 
individual member of the group is a different matter entirely” (Kilroy, 
2014, p. 280). He further reinforces Borer (2003) in stating that “great 
care should be taken when applying the labels of ‘victim’ and 
‘perpetrator’, especially at the level of a group of people” because “in 
reality, these categories can be too simplistic; people may fall into both 
of them” (Kilroy, 2014, pp. 280-281). This speaks to a key theme within 
this thesis, which examines the TRC experiences of low to mid-level 
ex-combatants in Sierra Leone precisely because their armed group 
membership formally designated their conflict experiences as 
perpetrators therein. As this thesis empirically demonstrates in Part 
Three, ex-combatants do not self-identify as exclusively perpetrators 
(or even as perpetrators at all, in many cases), and separate their 
individual actions and experiences from that of the warring groups they 
belonged to.  
A further conceptual implication of recognising the complexity of 
perpetrator experiences, and one which permeates Borer’s (2003) 
entire discussion on reconciling experiential complexity with structural 
binary identities in transitional justice, is the question of scope. The 
issue of scope boils down to two questions: “how far do we want to 
extend the concepts of victims and perpetrators” (Borer, 2003, p. 1109) 
and “how far can we stretch these concepts before they lose their 





disregards the complexity of individual experiences, and excludes the 
recognition of perpetrator suffering. However, too wide a definition of 
victimhood “serves to hide the unequal distribution of human rights 
abuses” (Borer, 2003, p. 1111). Moffett (2016) exposes this dilemma 
more explicitly in his analysis of the trade-off between 
acknowledgement and responsibility. We all suffer, but we do not all 
suffer equally. Widening the definition of victimhood grants 
acknowledgement to the suffering of those otherwise considered 
simple perpetrators, but also risks ignoring the responsibility of these 
complex victims and may promote “a culture of powerlessness and 
undifferentiated chaos” (Morrissey and Smyth, 2002, cited in Moffett, 
2016, p.  151). However, Borer (2003), again in line with Moffett’s 
(2016) later argumentation, rejects the incompatibility of 
acknowledgement and responsibility. She argues that “recognising 
that some perpetrators can also be seen as victims does not absolve 
or exonerate them, of course. It does, however, acknowledge that they, 
too, are in need of reconciliation, and not demonisation” (Borer, 2003, 
p. 1114).   
Lastly, in extending individual conflict experiences beyond the static 
binary of victim and perpetrator, Borer (2003) draws attention to the 
restricted space for participation that is created in transitional justice 
when individuals do not self-identify with these simplistic and 
dichotomised labels. The role of self-identity in participation in 
transitional justice adds complexity to Bernath’s (2016) discussion on 
the ‘subject position’ of victims (and perpetrators) therein. Bernath 
(2016) discusses the “legitimate subject position” (p. 66) of (complex 
political) victims, which forms the institutional dimension of participant 
subjectivity in transitional justice. Borer (2003) articulates the individual 
(micro or localised) dimension, which introduces the appropriate 
subject position into this framework. The institution of transitional 
justice may hold a monopoly over who is considered a ‘legitimate’ 
victim or perpetrator, but it is the individual him/her-self that determines 
the appropriateness of these labels in relation to themselves. Borer 
(2003) illustrates that, in South Africa, “many would-be applicants for 





process” (p. 1115), since they did not consider themselves 
perpetrators. This has significant implications for participation within 
truth commissions particularly, which are built on a foundation of 
voluntary participation, and are therefore reliant on the dimension of 
self-identification with its structural participant categories in order to 
effectively achieve its participation goals. Where participation is 
voluntary, a restricted space for participation emerges if the legitimate 
subject position of institutionally-constructed participant categories 
diverges significantly from what is individually understood as 
appropriately belonging to those constructed categories. Put simply, 
individuals who are institutionally defined as perpetrators, but who do 
not consider themselves perpetrators, are unlikely to see themselves 
as the appropriate subjects of a transitional justice process, and 
consequently, are unlikely to voluntarily participate. This introduces 
another problematic feature that the binary identity participation 
structure of transitional justice has produced, and one which affects 
truth commissions in particular: the logic of assumed perpetrator 
participation therein.  
The Logic of Assumed Perpetrator Participation in TRCs 
The binary identity participation model of transitional justice, and the 
voluntary participation structure of truth commissions, together have 
engendered a logic of assumed perpetrator participation. Firstly, the 
problematic binary identity framework of transitional justice, constrains 
participation by transitional justice participants into the static 
categories of either innocent victims or guilty perpetrators. Secondly, 
truth commissions are premised on an inherently voluntary 
participation structure. The vast majority of its local transitional justice 
participants do so freely and voluntarily. Indeed, this voluntary 
participation structure lies at the heart of its non-punitive and 
reconciliatory foundations, which cannot be achieved through 
coercion. This voluntary participation structure has its roots in the 
restorative and reconciliatory model of transitional justice that truth 
commissions attempt to implement. Reconciliation is an inherently 





participation in truth commissions, largely takes place voluntarily. 
TRCs commonly rely on “incentives” to ensure perpetrator 
participation, which is comparatively rare (Freeman, 2006, p. 161). 
Incentives, particularly in the form of the absence of punitive measures 
attached to participation, either through the granting of amnesty or 
through the inherently (alleged) non-punitive and non-judicial (or quasi-
judicial) character of truth commissions, showcase that participation is 
not guaranteed. Its voluntary foundation requires incentives to promote 
participation, particularly among perpetrators (ex-combatants). Skaar 
(2018) reiterates the appeal of the absence of punitive measures in 
truth commissions by advancing that truth commissions are often 
perceived as “less threatening than trials because they do not have 
prosecutorial power” (p. 416). 
Neither the binary identity framework of transitional justice nor the 
voluntary participation structure of TRCs consider the messy reality of 
lived conflict experiences that intersect along experiences of being 
victimised and victimising others. In particular, these constituent 
elements at the heart of the logic of assumed perpetrator participation 
do not account for divergence: the constructed legitimate subject 
position of participants may not align with self-perceptions of who 
belongs to the appropriate body of participants, thereby deterring 
participation. Rather, the voluntary participation structure of truth 
commissions, with possibilities for participation limited to the victim and 
perpetrator categories inherently requires transitional justice 
participants to self-identify with these binary identities for participation 
to effectively occur. A justice platform that demands guilt and 
confession (and promises forgiveness and healing) will only elicit 
perpetrator participation if such designated individuals correspondingly 
see themselves as guilty and have a desire to apologise and be 
forgiven. The question remains whether this rhetoric, and normatively 
derived logic, reflects the realities of individual conflict experiences and 
justice expectations. Detailed analysis of the problematic binary 
production of victims and perpetrators strongly indicates that this logic 
of assumed perpetrator participation is severely flawed, and this 





community there, lends strong empirical support to the inadequacy of 
this assumed participation logic.  
In summary, the logic of assumed perpetrator participation in TRCs 
has normative roots stemming from its binary identity framework, 
which manifests institutionally through a voluntary participation 
structure, and consequently (potentially) constrains subsequent 
participation significantly. This logic falls apart when faced with the 
very likely possibility that the conflict-affected individuals upon whom 
such static labels are cast, do not self-identify with such designations. 
What happens to participation, TRC effectiveness and impacts, when 
transitional justice participants do not consider themselves its 
appropriate participants? This thesis unearths the empirical answers 
to this question of the problematic effects of the logic of assumed 
perpetrator participation through the illustrative relationship between 
ex-combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone. The perpetrator subject 
position within transitional justice is anchored around the assumption 
of individualised guilt and the treatment of victimhood and victimisation 
as mutually exclusive experiences. Conversely, the subject position of 
victims centralises innocence and involves a calibration of suffering, 
built around a politics of blame. The next two sections critically discuss 
the role of innocence in constructing the legitimate victim, the politics 
of blame this engenders and the restrictive implications this has on the 
acknowledgement of suffering.  
Innocence 
Seminal studies on the disaggregation of victimhood converge along 
one particularly significant dimension: the role of innocence and 
suffering in defining victimhood. McEvoy and McConnachie (2012) 
foreground the need to break the binaries of the ‘deserving’ victim and 
‘wicked’ perpetrator on the basis of the problematic role that innocence 
plays in the construction of victim identities. In excluding complexity 
from the definition of victimhood, and constructing the victim as the 
binary opposite of the perpetrator, a narrow victim identity is produced, 
with the requirement of complete innocence, at its centre. Innocence, 





victimising others, makes the victim morally superior to the perpetrator, 
and uniquely deserving of the benefits of transitional justice.  
LaPlante (2007) articulates the significance of innocence in 
constructing victimhood by referring to the tension between the “clean 
hands doctrine” and the “principle of non-discrimination” (p. 53) within 
international law. The ‘clean hands’ doctrine is a “general principle of 
equity” which “recognises that a person ‘who asks for redress must 
present himself with clean hands’” (LaPlante, 2007, p. 60). It holds that 
“’no polluted hand shall touch the pure foundations of justice’” 
(LaPlante, 2007, p. 60). The principle of non-discrimination instructs 
that victimhood be applied and interpreted “’without any discrimination 
of any kind or on any ground, without exception’” (LaPlante, 2007, p. 
59). LaPlante (2007) argues against the appropriateness of the clean 
hands doctrine in the context of human rights, precisely because it 
contravenes the principle of non-discrimination. 
LaPlante (2007) and others highlight a critical point: suffering is not the 
same as innocence, and argue that the absence of the latter should 
not disentitle acknowledgement or treatment of the former. While 
suffering is inherent to any accepted definition of victimhood on the 
normative and institutional levels of transitional justice, in practice it 
has become a necessary but insufficient criterion for victimhood. 
Bernath (2016) argues that the “competing criteria of suffering and 
innocence” (p. 52) excludes meaningful consideration of ‘complex 
political victims’ because “the construction of a victim’s legitimate 
subject position…revolves around the moral criterion of innocence” 
(Bernath, 2016, p. 61). Innocence marks an individual as a ‘deserving’ 
victim, which becomes an “easy shorthand for blaming those deemed 
responsible for past horrors” (McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012, 
p.533). Narrowing the victim category to require innocence in order to 
be considered a legitimate or deserving subject of transitional justice, 
“by definition, entail(s) a calibration of suffering” (McEvoy and 
McConnachie, 2012, p. 532). This produces what McEvoy and 
McConnachie (2012) refer to as a “hierarchy of victimhood” with the 





becomes the exclusive right of the innocent victim, which necessarily 
prevents the possibility for similar acknowledgement of suffering 
among individuals designated as perpetrators. Thus, the body of 
critical transitional justice identity scholarship converges around the 
problematic role of innocence in the construction of hierarchies of 
victimhood. Arguments to dismantle the simple dichotomies of 
essentialised victims and perpetrators similarly converge around the 
need to expand acknowledgement for individual suffering, in order for 
transitional justice to better accommodate the complexity of lived 
conflict experiences. 
Blame 
This hierarchy of victimhood, wherein suffering is graded and 
innocence (or clean hands) is paramount to legitimacy, equally 
produces a politics of blame. In calibrating suffering and defining 
victims’ needs as inversely proportional to perpetrator punishment, 
blame too is necessarily designated. The innocent victim in need of 
saving is constructed, and so too the guilty perpetrator, upon whom 
blame is assigned.  
When the definition of a victim requires the existence of a perpetrator, 
a politics of blame takes root, which produces a hierarchy of victimhood 
(McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012). Who gets to distribute blame, who 
is blamed, and who is considered blameless are invariably politically 
and normatively constructed when we understand the reality of 
suffering in conflict as ubiquitous, but the designation of blame and 
innocence as socially (re)produced, contoured by post-conflict power 
dynamics, and international norms. McEvoy and McConnachie (2012) 
describe the moral criterion of innocence in legitimising victimhood as 
a “politically invidious approach to victimhood that factors blame in the 
calibration of human suffering and inevitably results in the morally 
corrosive language of victim hierarchies” (McEvoy and McConnachie, 
2012, p. 535). According to them (McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012), 
recognising that perpetrators “are also victims, either simultaneously 
or at other stages of their lives, challenges the impermeability of” (p. 





This normative and structural impermeability fails to acknowledge their 
own experiences of suffering and designates them “unworthy citizens” 
(Tilly, 2008, p. 11). Essentially, limiting justice to the universe of the 
designated victims’ experiences neglects the injustices experienced by 
perpetrators.  
Recasting the definition of victimhood to acknowledge complex 
experiences of suffering and dismantling the primacy placed on 
innocence as the paramount criterion of victimhood “expand(s) the 
potential for human empathy to both victims and perpetrators” 
(McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012, p. 534) and the complex 
constellation of intersecting experiences that characterise lived 
experiences of conflict. Such a layered understanding of complex 
conflict experiences removes the innocent victim from its hegemonic 
position within a corrosive victim hierarchy (McEvoy and 
McConnachie, 2012) and allows transitional justice to recognise the 
victim “who is no longer chained to characteristics of complete 
innocence and purity, but remains a victim nonetheless” (Bouris, 2007, 
p. 10). An expanded acknowledgement of suffering is therefore critical 
to the meaningful inclusion of complex conflict experiences within 
transitional justice. Expanding the scope of empathy through greater 
acknowledgement of experiences of suffering among perpetrators is 
particularly significant for truth commissions, given that restorative 
justice “demands empathy and the reintegration of perpetrators in the 
community” (Nwogu, 2010, p. 282). According to Moffett (2016), the 
expanded acknowledgement of suffering, to include experiences of 
victimisation experienced by perpetrators, does not replace or negate 
responsibility for abuses committed by such ‘complex victims’. McEvoy 
and McConnachie (2012) similarly posit that acknowledging the reality 
of perpetrator experiences of victimisation “does not obfuscate 
individual or collective culpability” (p. 534). Bernath (2016) lends 
empirical validation to these arguments, highlighting that ex-
combatants who participated in the ECCC were able to receive some 
understanding for their own experiences of victimisation from within 






As highlighted earlier, the motivations that underlie some perpetrator 
experiences hold relevance within this broader discussion of 
innocence, suffering, blame and acknowledgment.  When victimising 
others emanates from one’s own experiences of victimisation – this 
contextual expansion of suffering expands the possible universe of 
injustice that transitional justice can seek to uncover, through 
acknowledging the role of motivations in subsequent acts of violence 
or abuse. In critiquing the simple construction of the perpetrator label 
in South Africa’s TRC, Borer (2003) draws attention to the fact that the 
perpetrator category was defined with no consideration of motivations 
for, or the context and consequences of, acts committed by those 
within this group. The perpetrator identity “was neither nuanced nor 
contextual” (Borer, 2003, p. 1092). Nwogu (2010) emphasises that 
TRCs, especially in Africa, focus too much on “memory-making 
marked by the narration of events, paying little or no attention to the 
motivations behind events” (p. 277). She argues that to expose the 
roots of abuses, transitional justice needs to locate itself within “the 
mental universe of its most humble perpetrators” (Nwogu, 2010, p. 
277, quoting Osiel, 2001, p. 2).  
In her nuanced critique of the rigid participation model (the practice of 
justice-seeking) of truth commissions, Nwogu (2010) draws attention 
to the “disproportionate focus on the what, where and how of particular 
violations” in truth commissions, which ignore “measured investigation 
into the ‘why’ of violations” (p. 276). The collective memory project of 
truth commissions, one of their paramount purposes, is severely 
restrained by their superficial focus on uncovering a narrative centred 
around the idealised victims’ experiences. At best, within this binary 
and hierarchical model of participation that ignores the relevance of 
motivations, a superficial explanation of a limited universe of injustice 
is uncovered, instead of revealing a textured understanding of the 
violent past and its root causes. According to Nwogu (2010), 
consideration of motivations behind acts and histories of abuse not 





contributes to the “repair of social relations” (p.281) and deterrence, 
moreover. McEvoy and McConnachie (2012) echo the limiting impact 
of the absence of motivations within the victim-centred framework of 
transitional justice. They argue that transitional justice’s narrow focus 
on a limited explanation, constructed around the ideal victim, places 
primacy on condemning the past, rather than seeking to understand 
the root causes of it. In other words, while the identity structure of truth 
commissions (and transitional justice more broadly) constricts the 
complexity of messy conflict experiences into essentialised categories, 
the memory structure of such processes impedes achieving a 
democratic and transformative understanding of the past. Unearthing 
the past condemns the perpetrator; failing to unearth its motivations 
may serve to further condemn the future. 
The issue of motivations raises the question of the morality of violence. 
According to Borer (2003), rejection of the simple perpetrator label can 
stem additionally from (self) perceptions of righteousness attached to 
acts perpetrated by a group or individual. She highlights the ANC’s 
anger with the TRC for “not properly distinguishing between the 
morality of the violence perpetrated by the state versus that 
perpetrated by those fighting against the state” (Borer, 2003, p. 2003). 
Motivations can therefore take on two dimensions: they can illuminate 
why someone fought, but also what they were fighting for. Determining 
what constitutes moral in the context of violence is, of course, 
inherently socially and politically driven, defined by the power 
structures and asymmetries that take root from, and after, conflict. 
Recognition of the politically and socially constructed morality of 
violence means that transitional justice has the power not only to 
designate identities, but also to redesign them. The politics of 
transitional justice allows it to reframe actions and identities so that a 
crime by one makes him/her a hero, and that very same crime by 
another makes him/her a perpetrator.  
While most of the critical literature argues for the relevance of 
motivations within the appropriate universe of consideration in 





indicate a rejection of this, on the grounds of equality and temporal 
restrictiveness, respectively.  
As previously established, LaPlante (2007) argues against the 
applicability of the clean hands doctrine within the context of 
transitional justice, due to its incompatibility with the principle of non-
discrimination. She does so on the grounds that suffering should be 
considered in isolation of the individual’s status (their identity – whether 
they are a perpetrator or not). The argument that a person’s “character” 
or status is “irrelevant” to their acknowledgment for harms suffered 
removes consideration of context or motivations from the calculus of 
victimhood (LaPlante, 2007, p. 53). She highlights that consideration 
of a person’s ‘character’ (their identity) in determining their actions 
(being victimised or victimising others) “implies a value judgement on 
the worth of an individual that has nothing to do with” (LaPlante, 2007, 
p. 65) the action itself. Rather than expanding the potential for 
empathy, LaPlante (2007) implies that factoring in motivations 
produces its own politically and socially constructed hierarchies of 
transitional justice subjectivity, which contravene fundamentally the 
equality of standing enshrined within the principle of non-
discrimination.  
As introduced earlier, Moffett’s (2016) nuanced framework of ‘complex 
victims’ includes a temporality criterion. Within his proposed 
transitional justice identity framework “complex victims are 
perpetrators first then victims” (Moffett, 2016, p. 152). They “end up 
suffering unlawful force as a result of belonging to an armed group” 
(Moffett, 2016, p. 152). This necessarily limits the temporal scope of 
transitional justice and prevents the consideration of experiences of 
suffering that may precede, and indeed lead to, or motivate, entry into 
an armed group in the first place. This stands in contrast to demands 
for nuance and complexity by McEvoy and McConnachie (2012), who 
recognise that perpetrators can “either simultaneously or at other 
stages of their lives” (p. 531) be victims as well. LaPlante (2007) and 
Moffett (2016) highlight the need for boundaries around the treatment 





While boundaries are indeed necessary for the field and practice of 
transitional justice to remain meaningful, and to prevent the stretching 
of identity frameworks to the point where they risk losing practical 
application, I nonetheless argue that the inherent complexity of 
individual conflict experiences merits greater elasticity within the 
identity framework of transitional justice. In particular, the temporal 
criterion put forward by Moffett (2016) is problematic as it introduces 
another source of exclusion by rejecting acknowledgement of 
preceding histories of suffering that do not conform to the chronology 
of permissible suffering that he presents. LaPlante (2007) argues for 
the consideration of experience in the absence of identity, which fails 
to incorporate motivations. Moffett (2016) argues for consideration of 
experience linked to identity, but restricts the possibility for the 
acknowledgment of victimhood to a particular chronology of suffering. 
This thesis argues for the expansion of victimhood that acknowledges 
motivations and does not require a particular sequence of perpetrating 
and experiencing suffering, that better reflects the complex and diverse 
histories of individual conflict experiences, and neither erases context 
nor demands a restricted chronology of suffering to merit application.  
Guilt and Punishment in TRCs 
The politics of blame inherent to the binary identity framework of 
transitional justice has already been established. The issue of blame 
(or guilt) and consequently punishment, has special significance within 
considerations of truth commissions specifically, due to their 
restorative and non-punitive foundations.  
The absence of prosecutorial powers in the TRC, its separation from 
the SCSL, and the blanket amnesty applied in Sierra Leone, together 
eliminated culpability for ex-combatants as perpetrators before the 
TRC. According to Nwogu (2010), “the key distinction between 
restorative and retributive justice mechanisms lies in their treatment of 
the perpetrator” (p. 284). However, this is not to say that perpetrators 
are advantaged in TRCs. While culpability within non-judicial 
restorative mechanisms is indeed removed, so too is perpetrator 





absence of prosecutorial powers also lowers the threshold for 
important accompanying legal protections, such as the evidentiary 
burden and the presumption of innocence. As shall be empirically 
demonstrated in Chapters 7 and 9 of this thesis, in Sierra Leone, the 
TRC still operated under a presumption of guilt towards this 
community. By imposing the identity of perpetrator onto all ex-
combatants, their conflict experiences were treated in a vacuum, 
omitting consideration of the larger context of their wartime actions (the 
motivations underlying atrocities), and forcing a static identity onto 
these actions. Reggie, a former RUF fighter emphasised that “I am not 
a perpetrator. I fought, I killed in the war, and these are crimes. But I 
am not a criminal for doing these things”14. The distinction between 
perpetrating crimes and being a perpetrator underpins the 
inappropriateness of the TRC’s imposed identity structure in relation to 
the majority of interviewed ex-combatants’ understandings (self-
identity) of their wartime experiences.  
Despite the absence of legal prosecution attached to truth 
commissions, and their non or ‘quasi’ judicial structure, it would be a 
mistake to conflate the absence of culpability with an absence of guilt, 
blame, responsibility or punishment in these structures. The idea that 
TRCs are non-punitive is a normative fallacy, flimsily constructed on a 
severely restricted definition of punishment as prosecution. According 
to Tilly “truth commissions are designed to assign blame to 
perpetrators” (2008, cited in McEvoy and McConnachie, 2012, p. 533). 
Despite claims of holding restorative foundations, Nwogu (2010) 
argues that, in practice, TRCs apply a retributive logic of addressing 
victim needs through perpetrator blame. Thus, while TRCs generally 
do not enact punishment through prosecution, the role of blame in 
order to address the needs of victims requires acknowledging 
alternative forms of punishment that may nonetheless be enacted by 
such commissions. In particular punishment along social, economic 
and political dimensions may be enforced by TRCs, through 
(re)producing power asymmetries and redistributing resources and 
                                                          





social capital unevenly. Therefore, if we accept that victim primacy is 
the centrepiece of transitional justice (which this thesis fundamentally 
challenges), and truth commissions specifically, this then requires 
acknowledging that truth commissions may not in fact seek to 
dismantle pre-existing power asymmetries, but rather to reconstruct 
them. This subsequently entails accepting that the ambitions of TRCs 
may not be to reconcile the local, but rather to redistribute it, and in so 
doing may in fact entrench or produce inequalities. Reconciliation then 
no longer seems a justifiable anchor for this enterprise, but rather 
punishment. This thesis critically engages with this assumption, that 
equates the absence of prosecution with the absence of punishment, 
in TRCs, through the illustrative case of Sierra Leone. It empirically 
unpacks the problematic implications of this flawed premise in 
Chapters 9 and 10. In particular, Chapter 10, on the impact of the TRC 
on non-participating ex-combatants, highlights the impact of the TRC 
on entrenching conflict identities beyond the war as a form of 
punishment.  
Ultimately, the claim that TRCs are ‘non-punitive’ is, at best, 
misrepresentative (Sirleaf, 2013), and at worst, false. The absence of 
conventionally retributive prosecutorial powers is not synonymous with 
the absence of punishment entirely, and it would be a mistake to 
characterise this form of transitional justice as non-punitive when 
considering the myriad forms which punishment can take.  
Implications of Complex Victimhood 
As highlighted previously, Nwogu (2010) argues that truth 
commissions fail in their fundamental truth telling ambition, due to the 
rigid participation model they apply. Normative and institutional biases 
that ‘essentialise’ victims and perpetrators and “elevate” (Nwogu, 
2010, p. 283) victim voices in transitional justice produce a limited and 
hegemonic conflict narrative.  An expanded framework of complex 
participation, incorporating acknowledgment, motivations and 
recognising the complexity of individual conflict experiences, would 
enable truth commissions to locate the “underlying grievances” 





them to produce a “democratising” (Nwogu, 2010, p. 279) and 
transformative truth. Greater nuance within the structural participation 
framework of truth commissions is therefore key to achieving the truth 
commission goals of generating a comprehensive and meaningful 
truth, repairing social relations and deterring future abuses. Bernath 
(2016) reiterates this, highlighting that the failure of transitional justice 
to accommodate individual complexity “impoverishes history” (p. 50) 
and produces, at best, an impoverished truth.  In failing to address the 
motivations that underlie abuses committed by the complex victim (i.e. 
the every-day perpetrator), this rigid and unforgiving model of 
perpetrator participation limits “the perpetrator’s story to the timeline of 
the victim’s story” (Nwogu, 2010, p. 279). A nuanced framework of 
victimhood, and consideration of motivations behind violence within 
truth commissions, expands not only the universe of possible injustice 
which they can address, but equally magnifies the universe of justice 
to which they can contribute.  
Resentment 
The implications of a more complex victim typology and nuanced 
model of participation within transitional justice are not exclusively 
positive, and the costs of complexity warrant consideration. In 
particular, authors such as Bernath (2016), and Sesay and Suma 
(2009), draw attention to the risk of resentment.  Bernath (2016) 
illustrates that while inclusion of ‘complex political victims’ amplifies 
transitional justice’s understandings of suffering, this inclusion can be 
harmful too, towards the “real victims” (p. 58) (i.e. the innocent victims), 
who may respond to this inclusion with resentment. In critiquing 
advocacy for a “universal definition” of victimhood Smyth (1998, 
quoted in Borer, 2003, pp. 1110-1111) holds that such a nuanced 
framework is counterproductive because it implies “universal needs” 
(pp. 1110-1111) that do not reflect the uneven distribution of suffering. 
Bernath (2016) highlights that, in the case of Cambodia’s ECCC, the 
ability for former Khmer Rouge members to seek civil party eligibility 
(complex political victim status) was considered unfair by some of the 
‘innocent’ victims in this group for two reasons. ‘Innocent’ victims felt 





made them undeserving of sharing their same victimhood position. 
Additionally, this was experienced to dilute the superiority of their own 
suffering. Sesay and Suma (2009), introduce another potential way in 
which inclusion may result in resentment towards perpetrators. In their 
analysis of the DDR programme in Sierra Leone, Sesay and Suma 
(2009) point to the widely held “perception that reintegration benefits 
were rewards for the perpetrators of the war” (p. 31), which 
“compromised deeply held beliefs of fairness and justice” (p. 28). It 
then stands to reason that disaggregating victimhood to be more 
inclusive of perpetrator experiences of suffering and the motivations 
that underlie their participation in abuses may be viewed by those 
victims who suffered and remained innocent, as rewarding these 
perpetrator actions. Bernath (2016) maintains the need for the 
expansion of conventional understandings of victimhood, but 
concedes that acknowledgment of perpetrator suffering “cannot be at 
the expense of another victim” (p. 58).  
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the theoretical framework of this thesis, 
and the basis for its critique of the normatively constructed and 
institutionally expressed binary identity framework in transitional 
justice. This binary identity framework homogenises, simplifies and pits 
victims against perpetrators in ways that are static, unforgiving and 
ultimately unaccommodating of the reality of complex lived war 
experiences. This will be empirically demonstrated in the analysis of 
this thesis throughout Part Three. The privileged position of victims 
within this identity framework further disadvantages ‘perpetrators’ 
within the transitional justice mechanism of truth commissions in 
particular, through the primacy placed on innocence, which prevents 
acknowledgement of suffering among those designated as guilty. The 
politics of blame also disregards the role and significance of 
motivations that underlie acts of victimisation among designated 
perpetrators. This in turn constricts the truth-telling ambitions of truth 
commissions, without consideration of which, only a narrow truth can 





and perpetrators in transitional justice paints the landscape of justice 
in vivid technicolour. This is the overall ambition of this thesis – to 
empirically demonstrate the issues and challenges that accompany the 
problematic binary identity framework produced and applied by 
transitional justice, and to assert that the transformative potential of 
these bodies requires breaking such binaries in order to be 
meaningfully unlocked. This thesis’s critical examination of identities in 
transitional justice, and their treatment within truth commissions 
through the case of Sierra Leone, calls for transitional justice to 
consider the full palette of conflict experiences among the local, the 
diversity of which, it has, hitherto, failed to register.  
The second chapter of Part Two of this thesis, Chapter 5, develops the 
two frameworks on TRC institutional engagement and localised impact 
evaluation, that are subsequently applied to the empirical examination 
of the relationship between ex-combatants and the TRC in Part Three. 
The development and application of these frameworks is used to both 
interrogate and address the challenges of the dominant identity 











Chapter 5 develops the two frameworks that are empirically applied to 
the case of Sierra Leone’s TRC through the lens of its non-participant 
ex-combatant population in Part Three of this thesis (in Chapters 8 and 
10). Building on work and gaps in the literature around participatory 
programming, a framework of institutional engagement is firstly 
constructed, comprising the dimensions of ownership, inclusion and 
participation. Within this framework, this thesis develops the logic of 
participation inherent to discussions on local participation and 
foregrounds an important discussion around the distinction between 
local engagement as a formal (or prescriptive) and largely empty 
practice, and local engagement as formative. The second framework 
constructed within this chapter, and subsequently applied in Chapter 
10, is a localised framework for evaluating TRC impact. This thesis 
centralises a localised analysis of transitional justice, foregrounding a 
particular segment within the local. This contribution to growing calls 
for, and research on, the micro-level (the local) within transitional 
justice extends this burgeoning sub-strand of scholarship to the 
dimension of transitional justice impact. It argues that while research 
acknowledging micro-level variation along the dimensions of 
transitional justice expectations and experiences has emerged, 
similarly localised evaluations of transitional justice impact remain 
absent. This thesis argues that there is a need to localise impact 
evaluations of transitional justice as well, as it is precisely among the 
myriad realm of the local that transitional justice seeks to impart a 
benefit and impact, and as a result, localising impact evaluations offers 
a uniquely meaningful avenue for assessing transitional justice effects. 
The first half of this chapter develops this thesis’s framework of 
institutional engagement, which is empirically applied to the case of 





in Chapter 8. The second half of this chapter constructs a localised 
framework of TRC impact evaluation, which is applied through the lens 
of Sierra Leone’s non-participant ex-combatant community in Chapter 
10.  
A Framework of Institutional Engagement 
Truth commissions are celebrated for being a highly locally engaging 
model of transitional justice (Hayner, 2011), but what does this actually 
mean? A clear conceptualisation of institutional engagement, as the 
relationship between those who affect, and those affected by, an 
institution, within TRC scholarship is currently absent, despite the 
critical role that engagement generally, and participation specifically, 
plays in both the advocacy and (purported) effectiveness of this 
mechanism of transitional justice.  
The concept of institutional engagement as articulated throughout this 
thesis is drawn from the subset of participatory programming literature 
that originated within the development discourse and has spread to the 
broader peacebuilding research agenda. To clarify, within this thesis, 
engagement is operationalised as synonymous with the broader thrust 
of what is considered participatory programming (or approaches), 
while participation is conceptualised as one particular dimension 
thereof. Engagement therefore refers to the broader domain of 
opportunities for various (transitional justice) actors to interact with and 
influence an institution, in this case the TRC in Sierra Leone. As 
subsequent sections demonstrate, the elastic treatment of 
participatory programming in research and praxis has rendered it 
difficult to define, even harder to observe, but simultaneously 
necessary to incorporate. The framework of institutional engagement 
developed and applied in this thesis seeks to contribute operational 
clarity to the necessary but nebulous discourse around participatory 
programming. It does so by disaggregating the opportunities for the 
involvement of actors within an institution (what is considered 
institutional engagement moreover) along the dimensions of 





Fundamentally, this discussion on engagement, and the practices of 
inclusion and exclusion (Bernath, 2016) that this entails, centre(s) 
around the question of agency (Donais, 2009). Authors such as 
Cornwall (2008), Donais (2009) and Kilroy (2014) recognise the 
problematic binary of participation, as largely empty rhetoric (formal or 
prescriptive engagement) against the formative promises and benefits 
enshrined within the discourse of participatory programming. Building 
from their work and drawing from discussions on participation and 
engagement from the larger development discourse, this framework of 
institutional engagement provides conceptual clarity around 
institutional engagement and its constituent dimensions of ownership, 
inclusion and participation. The subsequent application of this 
framework to the TRC in Sierra Leone in Chapter 8 sheds empirical 
light on questions of ex-combatant agency and exclusion through the 
lens of their engagement experiences.  
Importantly this framework distinguishes participation from inclusion 
and ownership, as separate but complementary dimensions of TRC 
engagement. This discussion and development of a framework of 
institutional engagement in TRCs engages with the normative, 
structural and practical (operational) levels of truth commissions. In 
particular, the dimension of ownership constructed here interacts with 
the normative plane of transitional justice, while the dimension of 
inclusion captures the institutional level, and participation 
encompasses the operational or practical level of transitional justice 
engagement. Together, this framework is a tool by which to observe 
the formal treatment of perpetrators within Sierra Leone’s TRC, and to 
compare this to their practical treatment therein, as well as to their own 
expectations and experiences of the TRC. 
A Theory of TRC Institutional Engagement  
A clear conceptualisation of TRC engagement allows us to understand 
where engagement occurs (levels), how it occurs (forms), and what it 
achieves (impact). Institutional engagement comprises the 
opportunities for interaction between (groups of) actors and a process, 





can be opportunities to influence a process (as transitional justice 
entrepreneurs or as stakeholders) as well as the possibility to 
participate in and/or benefit from such a process (as participants and 
beneficiaries). Engagement takes place at several levels, in many 
forms, with many potential (groups of) actors, and with varying degrees 
of sincerity, all of which have an impact on the success and 
sustainability of such processes, when measured against their own 
purported aims – of truth-telling, reintegration, reconciliation, 
transformation and development.   
Ownership, Inclusion and Participation 
Engagement refers to the relationship between those who affect a 
process, programme, intervention or institution, and those who are 
affected by it. It encapsulates the components of ownership, inclusion 
and participation. Engagement is therefore an umbrella term. 
Ownership refers to the transitional justice entrepreneurs who create 
an institution and set its agenda. Inclusion comprises the actors who 
inform an institution’s subsequent design and content. Lastly, 
participation captures engagement within the actual content or 
programmes implemented by an institution, referring to the local 
participant population(s). Figure 2 shows institutional engagement as 
an umbrella term and disaggregates its constituent elements of 







Actors and Institutional Engagement 
Chapter 1 has already defined the population of transitional justice 
actors that comprise transitional justice engagement. On the normative 
and institutional levels, transitional justice entrepreneurs comprise the 
external dimension of transitional justice. Transitional justice 
engagement on its practical level (and local dimension) comprises the 
body of local transitional justice participants. These terms are not 
mutually exclusive or static. Figure 3 summarises the populations that 
together comprise transitional justice actors. 
Figure 3: 
Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs Transitional Justice Participants 
1. Transitional Justice Experts 
2. Transitional Justice Brokers 
3. Transitional Justice 
Implementers 
1. Simple Participants 
2. Passive Beneficiaries 
3. Stakeholders  
 
Institutional Engagement and TRCs 
Developing a framework of TRC engagement is necessary for two 
reasons. Firstly, (local) participation is the fulcrum of TRC advocacy. 
Secondly conceptual clarity around this term within TRC scholarship 
or practice does not currently exist; the terms participation, inclusion 
and ownership are used interchangeably. This discussion will 
demonstrate it is useful to distinguish between them, as separate 
dimensions of TRC engagement. Therefore, despite the fundamental 
role that participation plays as underpinning the unique position that 
TRCs hold as a mechanism of transitional justice, we lack clarity on 
what this term means, how it is achieved, and why it is necessary. This 
framework and its subsequent application in Chapter 8, thereby 
contribute to filling important conceptual and empirical lacunae within 
TRC scholarship, with its empirical examination of engagement 





Participation is the fulcrum of TRC advocacy  
Ultimately, the key strength of truth commissions is participation. 
Advocates of truth commissions as a mechanism of transitional justice 
rely on the inherently participatory framework of such bodies as both a 
critical defining feature of truth commissions, and as the unique 
advantage that they enjoy over other mechanisms of transitional 
justice. Truth commission advocacy celebrates the high levels of 
participation among affected populations that this mechanism is 
advertised to promote and enjoy. In her revised definition of what 
constitutes a truth commission, Hayner (2011) puts forward that a truth 
commission “engages directly and broadly with the affected 
population, gathering information on their experiences” (p. 12). 
Macdonald (2013) reinforces the significance of local participation in 
truth commissions, highlighting that these bodies enjoy a “significant 
advantage” by producing a “broad perspective” on the causes and 
patterns of violence investigated, through local participation (p. 23). 
Local participation is a necessary requirement for the fulfilment of TRC 
aims. For truth-telling and the establishment of a historical record, 
advocates argue that the participatory model of TRCs provides a 
‘narrative’ truth rather than a “forensic” (Macdonald, 2013, p. 23) one, 
built from the experiences gathered through the “great number of 
interviews” and the “detail and breadth of information collected” 
(Hayner, 2011, p. 20) from affected populations. Similarly, the aims of 
promoting reconciliation, accountability and deterrence in TRCs 
requires participation by those who were affected by, and participated 
in, abuses under examination, as introduced in Chapter 1 and 
discussed in Chapters 4, 6, 8, 9 and 10. However, empirical evidence 
on the role and impact of participation in TRCs remains largely absent 
and existing results are mixed (Brahm, 2007; Kaminski, 2006). 
Additionally, participation as one form of engagement is not in and of 
itself a sufficient condition for all TRC aims to be achieved; in some 
areas inclusion and ownership play an important role too, as shall be 
discussed later.  
Given that TRCs rely on high levels of local engagement, this 





developing a more nuanced and concrete framework for institutional 
engagement. The terms inclusion, ownership and participation are 
often used interchangeably, contributing to the nebulous character and 
insincere application of engagement practices. This framework of 
institutional engagement distinguishes ownership, inclusion and 
participation as separate dimensions of engagement in order to better 
observe where and how entrepreneurs and participants interact, and 
the implications of this on questions of power and agency that lie at the 
core of engagement. A growing criticism of transitional justice is its 
external formulation and implementation, transposing western norms 
of justice onto local contexts. This has given rise to a robust debate 
within the field around the issue of ownership. In response to the 
importation critique of transitional justice there has been increasing 
momentum to learn from participatory approaches in the development 
discourse (Selim, 2017).   
Ex-combatant engagement  
This thesis focuses on the relationship between the TRC in Sierra 
Leone and the ex-combatant community specifically. It challenges the 
conventional approach to TRCs as ‘victim focused’ and sheds 
empirical light on a neglected but necessary population of conflict-
affected people, whose participation in TRCs has long been assumed 
without investigating their actual experiences therein. Chapter 6 
establishes the role and relevance of ex-combatants as necessary 
‘perpetrator’ participants in the TRC in Sierra Leone.  
The issue of ex-combatant engagement in Sierra Leone’s TRC is 
underpinned by the view that this population should be considered 
relevant participants and indeed stakeholders therein. On the surface 
this may appear to challenge the conventional ‘victim-centric’ 
orientation of such bodies and begs the question of whether ex-
combatants deserve to be treated as beneficiaries or stakeholders in 
TRCs and resultantly is engagement with them a necessary or even 
appropriate or desirable consideration? Work by authors such as 
Dougherty (2004) and Kilroy (2014) explicitly recognise the important 





plays. Chapter 6 of this thesis also empirically and conceptually 
establishes the relevance of, and need for, ex-combatant participation 
in Sierra Leone’s TRC to fulfil its truth-telling, conflict deterrence and 
reconciliatory aims. While opinions differ on the value and merit of ex-
combatant participation, as carrying merely instrumental (functional) or 
intrinsic value, their status as transitional justice participants is 
concretely established (for more on this discussion see chapters 6 and 
7).  
The Logic of Participation 
Issues of ownership, legitimacy, participation and broader questions of 
agency and power are shared by transitional and peacebuilding 
processes generally, all of which aim to engender locally legitimate and 
sustainable outcomes. Any process or institution that seeks to achieve 
an impact among a local population, inherently involves engagement 
with that population in some form. Drawing from research on 
engagement practices from the processes designed to contribute to 
the effective and sustainable transition of states from periods of conflict 
or repression can therefore usefully inform the conceptualisation of 
engagement in TRCs. As such, this study’s framework of institutional 
engagement and the definitions presented of participation, inclusion 
and ownership are drawn from research in development studies as 
well as of participatory approaches towards DDR, SSR and transitional 
justice elsewhere (Donais, 2009; Kilroy, 2014; Vinck and Pham, 2008).  
Within the development discourse, practices of engagement between 
institutions and their beneficiaries are commonly referred to as 
participatory approaches, and have “gained a mantra-like quality in 
development” (Selim, 2017, p. 1125) where it has become 
mainstreamed as necessary for sustainable and positive outcomes. 
The term participatory approaches (also referred to as participatory 
programming) is synonymous with this thesis’s conceptualisation of 
engagement more broadly, as practices whose purpose is to bridge 
the divide between those who define, design and implement 
institutional activities and processes on the one hand, and those who 





approaches refer to measures that aim to enhance not only direct 
participation within an institution, but also to increasing the agency, 
ownership and inclusion of those affected by it. The purported benefits 
of participatory approaches rest on the logic of participation, inherent 
to its advocacy. Figure 4 visualises the logic of participation in the 
following way: 
Figure 4:  
The Logic of Participation 
Local Ownership    Legitimacy    Participation    
Sustainability  
 
The logic of participation holds that institutional engagement with local 
actors ultimately results in more sustainable outcomes. This is 
achieved in three steps. Firstly, engaging with local or affected 
populations creates local ownership. Ownership, in turn, is understood 
to enhance the legitimacy of the process in question, generating wider 
societal buy-in and support. Legitimacy is widely held to underpin 
popular participation in both short and long-term ways; promoting high 
levels of direct participation as well as longer-term sustainability of 
practices cultivated through these institutions or processes. The term 
‘participatory approaches’ is widely accepted and used within 
development, and increasingly in post-conflict and peacebuilding 
discourses. However, I argue that it is useful to view such approaches 
as engagement practices, in order to distinguish and clarify the various 
types of engagement that can be sought, and the associated 
challenges and opportunities therein.  
According to Selim (2017) “participatory approaches emphasise that 
people are central to development” (p. 1123). Such approaches are 
premised on the logic that people “marginalised in decision-making 
should be given a space to identify and express their needs and how 
to address them” (Selim, 2017, p. 1125). At the heart of these 





p. 1123). Vinck and Pham (2008) argue that practices of engagement 
are central to the “philosophy and practice of sustainable human 
development” (p. 398). The sustainability of a process, institution or 
intervention therefore relies on actively involving the body of local 
participants in both planning and implementation (Vinck and Pham, 
2008).  
The benefits of participatory approaches are held to be two-fold: 
efficiency and empowerment.   The efficiency argument holds that 
participation provides “a means” to achieve “better project outcomes 
including increased effectiveness, sustainability” (Selim, 2017, p. 
1125) and reductions in time and money in the long run. The 
empowerment argument sees participation as “an end” (Selim, 2017, 
p. 1125). When affected peoples are involved (participate), “when they 
take charge, organise and take action, then they are seen not as 
subjects but enabled to become agents of change” (Selim, 2017, p. 
1125).  Cornwall (2008) reiterates this dual benefit of institutional 
engagement, underpinned by the logic of participation, framing 
engagement as either instrumental (reflecting Selim’s efficiency 
argument) and/or transformative (in line with Selim’s empowerment 
position, which treats participation as holding intrinsic value).  
In evaluating SSR practices, Donais (2009) describes ownership as a 
concept that “remains both elastic and elusive” (p. 119). Kilroy (2014) 
reinforces the point that participation is still seen as “an emerging and 
nebulous concept” (p. 278) in much transitional programming. 
Similarly, in evaluating the spaces for engagement in Nepal’s TRC 
Selim (2017) highlights that “participation is practiced by a range of 
actors and is employed in a variety of ways so a definitive revision of 
the concept remains elusive” (p. 1127). This is true for engagement 
modalities more broadly, wherein “considerable ambiguity persists” 
(Donais, 2009, p. 119) around where, when and with whom 
engagement practices can, should and do take place; the conflation of 
the different elements of engagement; and the varying degrees of 
sincerity that exist for each dimension. Within this thesis’s discussion 





these practices. This thesis conceptualises engagement practices as 
either formal or formative (understood as a spectrum and not a binary). 
Formal engagement is merely prescriptive and largely an empty box-
ticking exercise in the pursuit of externally constructed agendas by the 
body of entrepreneurs in a particular process or institution. Formative 
engagement, on the other hand, uses local engagement to inform and 
affect the design and/or operations of a process or institution. Greater 
detail on engagement practices as either formal or formative is 
presented in subsequent sections of this chapter. The lack of 
conceptual clarity around the formal or formative character of 
engagement practices has made it “an infinitely malleable 
concept…mired in a morass of competing referents” (Kilroy, 2014, p. 
278). The conflation of participation, ownership and inclusion as 
interchangeable terms to denote practices of institutional engagement 
is evident in assessments of transitional and developmental 
programming, and in the discourse around public engagement more 
broadly (Quick and Feldman, 2011). In their analysis of transitional 
justice attitudes in the DRC, Vinck and Pham (2008) rely on the 
concepts of ownership and participation to highlight the glaring 
absence of affected population involvement in considerations of 
transitional justice. However, these terms are not meaningfully 
distinguished from one another. According to Cornwall (2008), while 
“vagueness about participation means may have helped the promise 
of public involvement gain purchase” (p. 269) more “clarity through 
specificity” (Cohen and Uphoff, 1980, cited in Cornwall, 2008, p. 269) 
is needed “if the call for more participation is to realise its 
democratising promise” (Cornwall, 2008, p. 269).  
Differentiating between these terms and clarifying what exactly is being 
treated in evaluations of engagement will allow research to pinpoint 
more accurately where power asymmetries between stakeholders and 
beneficiaries exist, the impact of such asymmetries on questions of 
local legitimacy, norm diffusion and sustainability, and to identify the 
realities and possibilities of agency and power relations between these 
actors more concretely. Ultimately, this study’s conceptualisation of 





contributes to what Cornwall (2008) identifies as the need to dispel 
“some of the ‘clouds of cosmetic rhetoric’ that began to gather 
overhead when participation hit the mainstream in the 1980s” (p. 281, 
citing Cernea, 1991).  
Institutional engagement provides a framework for assessing the 
relationship between actors within, and their experiences of, TRCs. 
Distinguishing participation, inclusion and ownership as separate 
components of engagement allows for the examination of engagement 
in all parts of the TRC – from its formation, to its design, and finally to 
its implementation and impact. Failing to disaggregate engagement 
into its constituent parts risks not only conflating its various 
components but also over-simplifying a complex and important aspect 
of TRCs, namely the sincerity (the formative potential) with which these 
institutions engage with local and affected populations. Kilroy (2011) 
highlights the “gap between aspiration and reality” and the “significant 
power imbalances between stakeholders” (pp. 129-130) as 
fundamental features of both advocacy for, and criticism against, 
institutional engagement. A thorough conceptualisation of 
engagement can therefore illuminate possible gaps between intent and 
reality regarding these actors, as well as bring to the fore power 
asymmetries between them, which in turn helps to ground evaluations 
of impact, success and effectiveness. A clear, comprehensive and 
multi-facetted understanding of engagement, its separate dimensions 
and their relationships to one another, allows for a deeper 
understanding of engagement and the formative degree of these 
practices, across normative, institutional, and local levels.  
Engagement Breadth 
Central to the practice of institutional engagement is the question of 
with whom to engage. Chapter 1 disaggregates ‘the local’ and draws 
attention to the fact that this is in fact a complex domain populated by 
myriad actors with their own agendas, needs and priorities. So while 
the logic of participation demands local engagement, this entails more 
than merely the box-ticking exercise of engaging with local actors 





local actors. Identifying who the TRC in Sierra Leone engaged with 
delineates the breadth of this institutional engagement. Ascertaining 
this breadth is the first necessary step in subsequently uncovering both 
the relative depth and formative degree of such engagement 
relationships, which informs us significantly and uniquely of the agency 
and power relationships present among actors that comprise the TRC 
entrepreneur population and allows for a textured subsequent analysis 
and understanding of TRC participation and impact, through the lens 
of relative local participant agency. Important to note is that while large 
institutional engagement breadth certainly carries much intrinsic 
appeal, in reality “participatory processes do not and literally cannot 
involve everyone” (Cornwall, 2008, p. 276). Identifying the necessary 
interest groups whose engagement is required to achieve the 
purpose(s) of a particular institution or process and focusing on 
ensuring their formative involvement underlies Cornwall’s (2008) 
conceptualisation of “optimum participation”, wherein the focus is 
placed on “getting the balance between depth and inclusion right for 
the purpose at hand” (p. 276).  
Engagement Depth: Formal and Formative Engagement  
As highlighted previously, the term sincerity within this discussion on 
engagement practices refers to the formative character (or conversely, 
formal character, when sincerity is absent) of these practices. 
Understanding the formal or formative character of engagement is 
critical. According to Kilroy (2011), institutional engagement means 
formatively involving intended beneficiaries in the process. The 
presence of engagement practices, along any dimension, can be 
applied with varying degrees of sincerity, as Chapter 8 demonstrates 
empirically. Selim (2017) points to the difference between the “ritual of” 
engagement “and ‘real power’ that can affect the outcome” highlighting 
that engagement “without redistribution of power is an empty and 
frustrating process for the powerless” (p. 1126, quoting Arnstein, 1969, 
p. 216). Similarly, Kilroy (2014) highlights that engagement practices 
“must be dealt with as a matter of degree, distinguishing between 





‘ritual’ or ‘pretence’ of engagement highlighted by Selim (2017) and 
Kilroy (2014) constitute formal engagement practices, that apply a 
prescriptive practice of engagement, without the ability to inform or 
affect an institution’s design or operations. Formative engagement, on 
the other hand, reflects engagement practices that Selim (2017) and 
Kilroy (2014) describe as empowering for local and affected 
populations.  
Various participation models have been developed, notably those by 
authors such as Chambers (1997), Arnstein (1969; 2011), Pretty 
(1995), and White (1996; 2011), that catalogue the various rungs of 
participant involvement. According to Selim (2017), a common theme 
among these models is the recognition that “information sharing and 
consultation are tokenistic attempts” (p. 1126) that apply the ritual of 
engagement without granting agency to those involved. This is 
mirrored by Kilroy (2014) who highlights that while engagement 
practices are a core aspiration of transitional programming, in reality 
this is rarely achieved. While the rhetoric and significance of 
participatory approaches has become widely recognised as necessary 
within development, it is often “only the language that has changed, 
and not the actions” (Selim, 2017, p. 1126).  
Cornwall (2008) frames the distinction between voice and agency as 
the translation “from involvement to influence” (p. 278). Formative 
engagement cannot “be achieved by waving a magic participation 
wand and hey presto there is empowerment!” (Cornwall, 2008, p. 278) 
It requires “investment, time and persistence” (Cornwall, 2008, p. 278). 
Formative engagement practices are evidenced in two ways: impact 
and sustainability. Formative local engagement as impact refers to the 
contribution that engagement practices make to the process or 
institution in question. According to Triponel and Pearson (2010), 
meaningful participation requires “integrating feedback received from 
the public into the transitional justice mechanism” (p. 104). At the core 
of this measure of local engagement are questions of agency, 
ownership and power. When engagement practices do not contribute 





without influence (Cornwall). Tokenistic or formal (prescriptive) 
engagement practices risk granting a voice, but not agency, to affected 
populations. Voice may also involve only a limited space for expression 
and raise expectations around institutional outcomes (Selim, 2017). 
Donais (2009) emphasises the significance of impact as necessary for 
engagement to be formative in his treatment of the concepts of agency 
and ownership. Similarly, Selim (2017) and Kilroy (2014) address 
impact as necessary for engagement to be formative by highlighting 
the relationship between decision-making and power in transitional 
programming. According to Kilroy (2014) and Selim (2017), when 
engagement has impact (affects decision-making) it empowers 
affected populations, redistributes power, initiates knowledge transfer 
between institutional actors and participants and results in more locally 
relevant programming. Conversely, the “charade” (Kilroy, 2014, p. 281) 
of institutional engagement without impact can serve to “legitimise (a) 
predetermined and externally driven” agendas (Selim, 2017, p. 1126). 
Engagement that lacks impact “is a sham as it offers no assurance that 
citizen concerns and ideas will be incorporated” (Arnstein, 1969, cited 
in Selim, 2017, p. 1142).  
Secondly, for engagement to be formative it must be continuous. 
According to Selim (2017), formative engagement “requires a 
sustained attempt to include local voices” (p. 1130). A “fully 
participatory process takes part at every stage of the transitional justice 
process” (Selim, 2017, p. 1130) and covers “the full project cycle” 
(Kilroy, 2014, p. 277). Formative engagement cannot be achieved by 
practices limited to one part or phase of the process (Kilroy 2014; 
Selim, 2017; Triponel and Pearson, 2010). Formative engagement as 
sustainability reflects Farrington and Bebbington’s (1993) participatory 
depth axis in assessing participation. “A deep participatory process 
engages participants in all stages of a given activity” (Farrington and 
Bebbington, 1993, cited in Cornwall, 2008, p. 276). Engagement 
should begin at the initiation stage of transitional justice, by asking 
whether communities want transitional justice (Selim, 2017). 
Engagement with local populations in the creation of a transitional 





“subsequent design and operations” by creating a more responsive, 
diversely informed and locally legitimate transitional justice system 
(Triponel and Pearson, 2010, p. 105; p. 111). However, engagement 
does not and should not end with the creation of a transitional justice 
mechanism (Triponel and Pearson, 2010). Triponel and Pearson 
define ownership as a “continuum” (2010, p. 117) that requires 
sustained and affective engagement throughout the lifespan of a 
transitional justice mechanism.  
Engagement Practices and Timing 
This thesis builds its conceptual framework of institutional engagement 
in two ways; the practices of engagement (practice-oriented); and the 
relationships (and timing) of engagement (actor-oriented). 
Engagement practices, depending on their timing and character (as 
either formal or formative) can have varying effects on the (power) 
relationships and agency of those involved.   
Outreach and input  
This thesis argues that engagement practices fall in one of two 
categories: engagement that is outreach-oriented, and engagement 
that is input-oriented. What distinguishes these activities from one 
another is the direction of possible knowledge transfer between 
transitional justice entrepreneurs and participants. Outreach-oriented 
engagement activities encompass all public education activities, such 
as information sharing and sensitisation, that aim to inform (potential) 
participants about the scope, content and objectives of a process to 
promote participation in institutional activities. Knowledge transfer 
moves in a top-down direction, wherein transitional justice participants 
are educated about a particular transitional justice process with the aim 
of enhancing local support for, and participation in, the process. Such 
activities do not offer an opportunity for voice or agency within the 
design or operations of a transitional justice process, thereby treating 
target audiences as simple participants and/or passive beneficiaries. 
Outreach engagement practices generally take place after the 





encouraging higher participation in the content of a transitional justice 
mechanism (in the case of TRCs, statement-taking and hearings).    
Input-oriented engagement practices encompass activities that, in 
theory, provide an opportunity for local input into the transitional justice 
process. They include consultations, surveys, participatory action 
research and collaborative oral history projects (Selim, 2017). When 
applied formatively, such input-oriented practices offer an opportunity 
for bottom-up knowledge transfer that can redistribute traditional power 
asymmetries between institutional actors and participants, 
transforming them into stakeholders and agents of change.  
Consultations 
Consultations dominate institutional engagement in transitional justice. 
According to the UN the “most successful transitional justice 
experiences owe a large part of their success to the quality and 
quantity of public…consultation carried out” (UN Secretary General, 
2004, p. 7). National consultations provide a platform to “identify needs 
and entitlements of affected communities, ensure strong local 
ownership, promote respectful dialogue and stakeholder articulation in 
the transitional justice process, reignite peace processes, trigger 
debates in communities, and help develop ownership of transitional 
justice” (Selim, 2017, p. 1128). Such consultations seek input from 
actors and groups on the local level about their needs and priorities 
around transitional justice, and present an opportunity for transitional 
justice to incorporate and adapt to local needs, agendas and contexts. 
When consultations are formative they create the space for shared 
“decision making and authentic partnerships” (Selim, 2017, p. 1128). 
Conversely, when formal they are merely prescriptive, and may breed 
distrust between institutional actors and participants (Kilroy, 2014). 
Formal (or prescriptive) consultations do not only dismiss local voices 
and needs but actively devalue their contributions, designating them 
“unworthy” of consideration or incorporation (Selim, 2017, p. 1128).  As 
frustrations mounted between civil society and the TRC in Sierra 





Group shared that “asking us to express the needs of Sierra Leoneans 
and not listening was worse than not asking us at all”15. 
Drawing from Kilroy’s (2014) adaptations of various typologies or 
ladders of participation, prescriptive consultations best reflect Pretty’s 
(1995) category of functional participation, and nominal participation 
according to White (1996; 2011). According to Pretty (1995, quoted in 
Kilroy, 2014), functional participation denotes local population 
involvement that “may be interactive and involve shared decision-
making, but tends to arise only after major decisions have been made 
by external agents. At worst, local people may still only be co-opted to 
serve external goals” (cited in Kilroy, 2011, p. 131). Similarly, White 
(1996;2011) describes nominal participation as a form of participation 
that is used as a legitimisation exercise by external stakeholders (what 
this thesis defines as transitional justice entrepreneurs). Prescriptive 
consultations can therefore be defined as a form of engagement 
between transitional justice entrepreneurs and participants that lacks 
affective power as major decisions or decision-making powers remain 
concentrated in the hands of external stakeholders. A display of 
engagement is achieved without granting agency to those whose 
voices have been sought. Prescriptive consultations are evidenced 
when subsequent institutional programming does not incorporate or 
reflect consultative input and feedback, or reflect the views and needs 
expressed by those actors with whom consultations have taken place. 
This strongly evidences that consultation outcomes are pre-
determined, and supports the supremacy of external transitional justice 
entrepreneur interests.   
Consultations are formative, and may engender communities of 
practice (and enhance inclusion as well as local ownership) when the 
actors involved play a constitutive role in subsequent institutional 
programme planning, design and implementation. Unlike prescriptive 
consultations, outcomes are not pre-determined, but rather informed 
by the input and feedback gathered during consultations. Vinck and 
                                                          






Pham (2008) highlight that formative consultations mobilise “civil 
society, and, more broadly, the population” (p. 399) (widening the local 
community of stakeholders), which democratises the process or 
institution within which such consultations occur. This democratisation, 
through the “active involvement of affected population(s) in the 
planning” (Vinck and Pham, 2008, p. 398) of transitional programming 
secures “legitimacy and public accountability for policies put forward” 
(p. 399), which can foster a “sense of (local) ownership and 
participation” (p. 399), that is in turn necessary for achieving 
sustainable outcomes, according to the logic of participation. 
Formative input through the genuine engagement of “citizens in 
decisions that affect their lives distinguishes substantive democracy 
from formal or procedural democracy” (Caparini, 2004, p. 56). Such 
consultations thereby evidence formative engagement practices in the 
designing of policies, practices and content. This may in turn cultivate 
a sense of local ownership around a process or institution, regardless 
of the composition of entrepreneurs at the normative or institutional 
ownership levels, meaning that an actor does not necessarily have to 
be involved in the establishment of an institution to be a stakeholder in 
its design and implementation, if consultations are formative.  
Consultations can therefore affect both the ownership and inclusion 
dimensions of engagement, depending on their timing and affective 
nature.  
Drawing once again from Kilroy’s (2014) adaption of Pretty’s (1995) 
ladder of participation, the rung of interactive participation best reflects 
the constitutive communities of practice and character of formative 
consultations as a practice of engagement. According to Pretty, within 
a framework of interactive participation, “participation is seen as a 
right, not just a means to achieve project goals” (1995, quoted in Kilroy, 
2014, p. 279).  Multiple perspectives are sought and (affected) people 
participate in joint analysis, developing action plans and forming or 
strengthening local institutions. Decision-making and resource 
distribution becomes localised and participants and beneficiaries 
thereby become stakeholders with a vested interest in maintaining the 





Beyond granting a voice to affected populations (or beneficiaries), 
formative consultations grant agency to participants, transforming 
them into stakeholders. The difference between consultations as either 








 A legitimisation exercise by external 
entrepreneurs without sincere engagement 
with local participants  
 Participants are granted voice but not 
agency in the design or outcomes/outputs of 
a programme 
 External goals and entrepreneur interests 










 Underpinned by the logic of participation  
 Creates communities of practice 
 Agency is achieved through the 
implementation of consultation outcomes in 
subsequent institutional design and 
operations  
 Empowers affected populations/participants 
 Fosters inclusion 
 Engenders local ownership 
 Promotes locally sustainable outcomes and 
participation 
 Participants become stakeholders by being 
granted both voice and agency within a 
process or institution 
 
 
Three Dimensions of Institutional Engagement  
Engagement practices cultivate relationships between transitional 





ownership, inclusion and participation. At the highest level of 
engagement, ownership denotes those actors responsible for 
identifying and setting the agenda that engenders the existence of an 
institution. The need for transitional justice in societies emerging from 
periods of conflict or repression has strong normative underpinnings, 
and so ownership too is strongly embedded within the external and 
normative dimension of transitional justice.  
Ownership and Inclusion 
The distinction between ownership and inclusion is a difficult one to 
fully define, and it is more appropriate to conceptualise these 
dimensions of engagement as lateral, rather than hierarchical. Both 
dimensions are predominantly characterised by relationships with 
transitional justice entrepreneurs. Formative inclusion practices that 
grant both voice and agency to a wider range of participants (who 
thereby become stakeholders) have the potential to foster ownership 
through such inclusion, and therefore can intersect with actors from the 
category of local transitional justice participants. 
Within this thesis, what differentiates ownership from inclusion is the 
timing of institutional engagement, whereby ownership refers to those 
actors who contribute to establishing an institution and its core agenda. 
However, this level of engagement is not restricted to institutional 
establishment and the (external) actors who engender this. Given the 
constitutive role that transitional justice entrepreneurs play in both 
creating an institution and setting its agenda, ownership also denotes 
influence over the design and content of an institutional, and so can 
overlap significantly with inclusion. The dimensions of inclusion and 
ownership intersect where practices of inclusion are formative, as this 
type of inclusion can foster ownership by granting actors agency in the 
design and implementation of an institution, even without being part of 
the original agenda-setting group of entrepreneurs. Ownership and 
inclusion therefore intersect when both these dimensions of 
engagement are formatively applied. Yet they occupy distinct spaces 
where one or the other is superficial (formal or prescriptive) in 





character of engagement varies across each of its dimensions. It also 
highlights that engagement, within any dimension, is not a guarantee 
of (sustained) agency. It is possible for ownership of a process to be 
achieved through formative inclusion, without belonging to the group 
of entrepreneurs responsible for the original establishment of that 
process. Similarly, engaging in the creation of a process, does not 
guarantee a determinative voice, or agency, within its subsequent 
operations and outcomes.  In Sierra Leone’s TRC, this study observes 
the decline of formative engagement, in relation to local civil society 
actors (TRC brokers), between the ownership and inclusion 
dimensions of institutional engagement, discussed in detail in Chapter 
8. 
Ownership Debate 
Central to any discussion of ownership in transitional justice is the 
question of local ownership and the debate between international 
versus local ownership. This debate foregrounds the necessary and 
appropriate role that different actors, and segments of the local, play 
in the establishment, design and implementation of transitional justice 
initiatives. As highlighted in Chapter 4, criticisms of the normatively 
driven, top-down Western paradigm of transitional justice have 
heralded increasing attention to, and calls for, more locally led, driven 
and inclusive justice processes. According to Ainley (2015), public 
engagement and inclusivity within transitional justice has received 
increasing attention among academics and policy-makers. The logic of 
participation articulates the benefits of local ownership that underpin 
its advocacy. The importance of local ownership, and engagement 
more broadly, together with the messy reality of needing to reconcile 
the demands of justice with the need for peace, have given rise to 
TRCs as a particularly attractive, locally-owned, mechanism of 
transitional justice (see Chapter 3 for a detailed genealogical 
discussion on TRCs). Increased attention to the need for “public 
engagement” in transitional justice has made the concept of localising 
justice a “normative standard” within transitional justice, though its 






Ownership comprises the community of transitional justice 
entrepreneurs that establish an institution. Inclusion captures the role 
given to actors in the design of an institution’s operations and mandate. 
Actors within this dimension are tasked with answering the question of 
how to address the (previously, and normatively) identified needs and 
priorities of an institution. As highlighted previously, inclusion and 
ownership can intersect where practices of inclusion are formative and 
thereby cultivate ownership among transitional justice actors.  
In differentiating inclusion from participation within public engagement, 
Quick and Feldman (2011) define inclusion as practices that 
“continuously creat(e) a community involved in coproducing 
processes, policies and programmes for defining and addressing 
public issues” (p. 272). The active and affective (formative) 
involvement of participants as stakeholders through formative 
engagement creates community capacity to implement decisions and 
tackle issues and builds connections among people over time. Such 
formative inclusion engenders “communities of practice” (Quick and 
Feldman, 2011, p. 273) whereby practices play a constitutive role in 
creating community. Communities of practice “learn and change 
through the practices they enact, as long as people are engaged in 
practices, community is being created” (Quick and Feldman, 2011, p. 
273). Significantly, formatively inclusive practices also produce 
“communities of participation” (Quick and Feldman, 2011, p. 274), 
highlighting the determinative role that institutional inclusion plays in 
fostering subsequent participation on the practical or substantive level, 
and once again evidencing the primacy of the logic of participation.  
Quick and Feldman’s (2011) characterisation of inclusion as building 
communities of practice mirrors White’s (1996; 2011) typology of 
participation, specifically that of transformative participation. 
Transformative participation is anchored in empowerment, where 
engagement is both a “means and an end” (1996, quoted in Cornwall, 
2008, p. 273). White’s (1996; 2011) treatment of transformative 





defined by this study’s framework of institutional engagement. 
Inclusion that is transformative strengthens people’s capabilities to 
take decisions and act for themselves (White, 1996, referenced in 
Cornwall, 2008). This localises ownership through the creation of a 
continuing and constitutive dynamic, as captured in Quick and 
Feldman’s (2011) “communities of practice” (p. 285) wherein 
participants become stakeholders through their formative inclusion in 
the design and implementation of an institution.  The notion of 
communities of practice is of particular significance to the TRC 
engagement, given that their critical aim, of contributing to 
reconciliation, requires long-term community engagement, and 
ultimately must take place within and among communities, to be 
successful. Inclusion therefore takes on paramount significance within 
transitional programming whose aims are to achieve sustainable and 
locally-driven outcomes. Inclusion is a powerful tool to achieve local 
legitimacy, participation and ultimately sustainable outcomes, but only 
where it is implemented formatively. Asymmetries in formative 
inclusion practices evidence power imbalances among transitional 
justice entrepreneurs, and can serve to privilege particular agendas 
and exclude or devalue the voices and contributions of other 
necessary actors.  
Local Engagement 
As previously highlighted, the logic of participation argues for 
increased local involvement in different phases of a peacebuilding 
process. Local inclusion is widely assumed to sufficiently equate to the 
adequate incorporation of locally representative voices and needs. 
However, such engagement is not a magic participatory antidote to 
externally imposed, top-down, processes. It is fraught with practical 
challenges that require critical assessment if such engagement is to 
fulfil its promise of providing a formative space for local engagement, 
and thereby secure local legitimacy, robust participation and 
sustainable outcomes.  Skaar (2018) argues that TRCs may have a 
larger effect on society if they engage “more purposefully” (p. 407) with 
different levels of the local. Local involvement, particularly in the design 





characterises the dimension of inclusion) can enhance the 
responsiveness and relevance of a particular institution or programme. 
However, it can also highlight power asymmetries when agency is 
unevenly distributed among transitional justice entrepreneurs, thereby 
constituting exclusive inclusion. Put simply, local inclusion in its 
broadest sense does not magically transform a top-down transitional 
justice mechanism into a formative and representative bottom-up one.  
Participation 
The final dimension of institutional engagement is participation. 
Participation denotes engagement in the implementation of an 
institution’s activities or programmes. While ownership and inclusion 
comprise the normative and institutional components of engagement, 
participation reflects engagement within the content of an institution, 
within the practice of transitional justice activities. Within TRCs this 
refers to participation within the statement-collecting and hearings 
activities of such bodies. It is within the dimension of participation that 
engagement with affected populations is most highly sought, as these 
actors form the participants and beneficiaries of these programmes. 
The fact that the term ‘participatory approaches’ has been so widely 
adopted is testament to the significance awarded to this element of 
engagement. Success measured as the number of beneficiaries within 
the content of a programme or institution has become commonplace. 
For instance, DDR programmes conventionally measure their success 
in terms of the number of demobilised combatants (Muggah, 2005). In 
Sierra Leone, interviews with TRC implementers showcase that high 
turnout for public hearings was widely seen as indicative of the TRC’s 
success16. Engagement along all other dimensions is traditionally 
geared towards increasing participation outcomes.  
Conceptualising participation as a component of institutional 
engagement takes on special character within the context of TRCs, as 
participation means the act of participating in the TRC’s statement-
taking and/or hearings. Participation within a TRC is therefore limited 
                                                          





in scope (to one or two of its activities), while its impact aims to be 
much broader. The space to generate communities of practice is 
therefore inherently limited within the framework of TRCs, wherein the 
possibility for direct participation is small, yet which aims precisely to 
foster and empower ongoing and sustainable constitutive community 
outcomes.  
Conclusion 
The first half of this chapter has developed a framework of institutional 
engagement that contributes conceptual clarity to the nebulous 
discourse of participatory programming. By disaggregating institutional 
engagement into its constituent dimensions of ownership, inclusion 
and participation, a concrete and comprehensive examination of what 
engagement is, and where, when and how it takes place, is made 
possible. Chapter 8 applies this framework of institutional engagement 
to the TRC in Sierra Leone, through the lens of the ex-combatant 
population. Chapter 8’s empirical examination highlights the 
diminishing space for formative engagement with TRC brokers and the 
overall absence of local engagement with ex-combatants specifically. 
It reveals empirically that ex-combatants, despite being identified as 
explicit local TRC participants (in Chapters 4 and 6), were given neither 
voice nor agency within the establishment, design or operations of the 
TRC. The second half of this chapter develops the localised framework 
of TRC impact evaluation that is applied in Chapter 10.  
A Localised Framework for Evaluating TRC 
Impact 
Evaluations of transitional justice, and TRC impact, commonly 
measure success through externally derived or ‘top-down’ 
assessments of outcomes, mandate achievement and inclusivity. To 
date, such evaluations paint a bleak and fragmented picture of 
transitional justice effectiveness. Simultaneously, there is growing 
recognition of micro-level variance in transitional justice experiences 
across the local, and the concepts of local ownership and inclusivity 
have been mainstreamed as necessary for transitional justice to be 





local in transitional justice, localised (or bottom-up) evaluations of 
transitional justice impact is only beginning to emerge (Sirleaf, 2013). 
Additionally, Chapter 1 has already established that the local is a 
complex domain. As such, disaggregation is necessary in order to 
unearth the ‘bottom’ level impacts of transitional justice, and the 
variation therein. This thesis takes empirical steps to fill this lacuna, 
presenting an argument in favour of localised impact evaluations of 
transitional justice. The framework of localised impact evaluation 
presented here is subsequently applied in Chapter 10 wherein the 
application of this framework is disaggregated onto the ex-combatant 
population in Sierra Leone. 
An Argument for the Local 
According to Ainley (2015), defining success in transitional justice is 
impossible, rather she advocates for research to reconsider “what 
should count as transitional justice success and how it should be 
evaluated” (Ainley, 2015, p. 241).  
Friedman (2017) calls attention to the “importance of endogeneity in 
evaluating transitional justice” (p. 106). Similarly, Sirleaf (2013) argues 
in favour of localising transitional justice impact evaluations because 
“the justice that people (within the local) see and experience shapes 
the reality of what is” (p. 228). Localising understandings of transitional 
justice success, by measuring impact and effectiveness according to 
local expectations and experiences of transitional justice, provides a 
more meaningful context-driven measure of success. It asks: what is 
the impact of transitional justice on precisely the local populations it 
addresses? This can only be discerned through a localised approach, 
and requires understanding the justice needs of these populations, 
their expectations of transitional justice in a particular context, and 
whether transitional justice measures have been successful in meeting 
these needs and expectations. Localising impact and evaluating 
success according to affected population expectations and 
experiences is particularly necessary within the contexts of TRCs, as 





for having an intrinsically high degree of local engagement, and 
subsequently, impact.  
Ainley (2015) outlines the six factors commonly claimed to 
demonstrate transitional justice success or failure within research: 
outcomes; mandates; processes of establishment and functioning, 
local engagement (victims in particular) (treated together to constitute 
institutional engagement); adherence to universal normative 
standards; and cost-effectiveness. She further identifies five 
challenges that accompany attempts at judging the success of 
transitional justice: possibility; causality; temporality; aggregation; and 
generalisability. Lastly, she suggests four tools to aid in the 
development of impact research within transitional justice: deep 
engagement with contexts; mixed methods; reflexivity; and political 
judgement. A localised approach to assessing TRC impact draws on 
several of these factors, addresses many of the challenges that Ainley 
(2015) identifies and incorporates some of the tools she proposes to 
aid in the journey forward. Specifically, this framework builds on the 
identified factors of outcomes, mandates and institutional engagement 
foregrounded by Ainley (2015). Additionally, it incorporates TRC 
recommendations, local expectations and the concept of identities.  
This localised approach provides both a deeper (through a 
disaggregated focus on a particular affected population on the level of 
the local – ex-combatants) and holistic framework for understanding 
impact and measuring success. The localised framework for 
evaluating TRC impact developed in this chapter is subsequently 
empirically applied in Chapter 10. This framework enables this thesis 
to accomplish analysis along the final dimension of its localised (micro-
level) axis of investigation: uncovering the impacts of the TRC on its 
non-participant ex-combatant population in Sierra Leone.  
A localised and disaggregated approach to transitional justice impact 
foregrounds local expectations and experiences.  Demands for greater 
‘bottom-up’ engagement have swarmed transitional justice. Therefore, 
given increasing recognition that for transitional justice to be effective 





measurements of impact and definitions of success in line with this 
push for the local are both necessary and currently absent. Despite 
increasing attention to the need for local ownership and localisation in 
the design and operations of transitional justice, this has not similarly 
taken root in approaches to evaluating the impact or success of these 
mechanisms. Sirleaf (2013) posits that local “perceptions of transitional 
justice mechanisms matter” in arguing for greater localisation of impact 
evaluation (p. 228). Localising impact evaluations therefore contributes 
to the necessary expansion of the larger call for increased attention to 
local expectations and experiences of transitional justice, and 
completes the picture of localisation by incorporating micro-level and 
perceived impacts.  
Challenging conventional measurements of impact and success can 
usefully add depth to evaluating transitional justice, but brings with it a 
risk of conceptual stretching. In her discussion on the ever expanding 
universe of what constitutes a truth commission Skaar (2018) cautions 
“against diluting the definition (of a truth commission) so much that the 
core functions of truth commissions disappear among too many other 
broad aims and visions” (p. 405). Recognising this risk, I nonetheless 
argue in favour of a localised approach to conceptualising success and 
impact in TRCs, because such a framework grants agency to affected 
populations within a field that has been increasingly criticised as 
‘externally imposed’. Localising conceptualisations of impact and 
success is an important step in the larger move to enhancing local 
ownership of transitional justice, and applies several of the tools 
identified by Ainley (2015) to aid in the challenging though inevitable 
journey towards finding “ways to judge the past” (p. 257). 
Expectations 
Localising impact evaluations of truth commissions centralises local 
expectations in defining success. Authors such as Ainley (2015) Sirleaf 
(2013) and Skaar (2018) highlight the significance of local expectations 
as both an important factor in determining truth commission success, 





Skaar (2018) highlights that the success of truth commissions 
“depends on a range of factors, which may be very context specific. 
One such important factor (which statistical work certainly fails to take 
into account) is the expectations tied to commissions” (p. 417). Local 
expectations of truth commissions are therefore important, though 
under-researched, concepts in transitional justice evaluation studies. 
She further asserts that “where public expectations are high, the 
‘success’ of truth commissions is harder to achieve than in contexts 
where public expectations are low – simply because there is a 
mismatch between expectations and delivered results” (Skaar, 2018, 
p. 417). However, while’s Skaar’s (2018) argument certainly buttresses 
the importance of a localised framework for evaluating TRC impact and 
the role of local expectations therein, this research argues that it is far 
from complete, and replete with unexplained assumptions. What does 
she mean by success?  How does she define expectations as ‘high’ or 
‘low’? It appears that her argument rests on the alignment between 
institutional mandates and local justice needs. The apparent 
assumption that ‘low’ expectations inherently align better with 
institutional objectives and the odds of success are neither compelling 
nor evidenced, borders on tautological, and calls into question the 
overall utility of truth commissions, which then logically are only 
successful when local expectations of them are low. This research 
questions Skaar’s implicit assumption that expectations for processes 
deemed necessary to repair ruptured societies must be low in order for 
success to be achievable.  Perhaps the problem is merely one of 
framing, and her point is better captured by Ainley (2015), who asserts 
that transitional justice is “often invested with unrealistic expectations” 
(p. 254) and agreement over what is realistically possible for these 
processes to achieve and facilitate is lacking. Failure, then, as the 
mismatch between local expectations and deliverable results is not 
about whether expectations are ‘high’ or ‘low’ but lies rather in the 
mismatch between them itself. This mismatch, the result of the 
unrealistic expectations tied to transitional justice limits meaningful 





always measured against someone’s ideal concept of justice” (Ainley, 
2015, p. 254).  
A localised framework for evaluating TRC impact requires drawing the 
definition of what is possible for TRCs to achieve from the justice needs 
and TRC expectations of affected populations within the domain of the 
local. Correspondingly, measuring success then involves evaluating 
the degree to which these mechanisms achieve this. While reframing 
success in localised terms adds local legitimacy and arguably 
enhances the positive impacts that transitional justice stands to make, 
it does not in and of itself overcome the possibility of unrealistic 
expectations, or the need to manage them. When expectations and 
realistic outcomes are mismatched, where does the fault of failure then 
lie? Does it lie with affected populations (the local), for having too ‘high’ 
expectations of transitional justice, as Skaar (2018) would seem to 
suggest? Or does it lie with the institutions themselves, for failing to 
accommodate or deliver the justice needs of its purported 
beneficiaries? Should truth commissions do a better job of 
communicating their objectives and limitations in order to manage and 
lower expectations? Or should we push for truth commissions to adapt, 
to shift away further still from their current Western normative structure, 
towards incorporating the justice expectations and needs of the local 
and to work towards actualising impacts that reflect them? Chapter 11 
provides insights into these (and other) questions that have been 
formed from this thesis’s overall empirical examination of the 
relationship between ex-combatants and the TRC.  
Outcomes 
According to Ainley (2015), outcomes are, by far, “the most prevalent 
focus of transitional justice success research” (p. 242). Transitional 
justice mechanisms are predominantly judged “according to universal 
standards” (Ainley, p. 243). Skaar (2018) reinforces the primacy placed 
on such outcome evaluations of transitional justice impact, in a detailed 
discussion on the legacy of truth commissions in relation to the 
common outcome measurements of their contributions to peace, 





dominant body of transitional justice evaluation research as mixed “at 
best” (Skaar, 2018, p. 410) and “inconclusive” regarding the 
“contribution of truth commissions to larger societal goals” (p. 413). 
Similarly, Ainley (2015) points out that within such universal outcome 
studies, results are “contradictory” (p. 243). She goes on to conclude 
that “it is in fact striking that so many commentators have expressed 
such strong positions (about outcomes) on the basis of so little reliable 
evidence” (Ainley, 2015, p. 246).  Given that the links between truth 
commissions and their contributions to such normative and universal 
outcomes are “at best, tenuous” Skaar (2018) argues that it is “more 
useful to look at the more concrete impacts of truth commissions” (p. 
416). Localising impact evaluations of truth commissions presents 
precisely such a concrete framework for conceptualising impact and 
evaluating outcomes. The primacy placed on truth-telling as an integral 
aim and outcome among truth commissions makes truth-telling a 
uniquely appropriate outcome against which to evaluate TRC impact. 
Chapter 10 of this thesis analyses the truth-telling work of the TRC in 
Sierra Leone in direct relation to its engagement practices with ex-
combatants and their own micro-level experiences of non-participation, 
to reveal the narrow truth and unrealised transformative potential of the 
TRC, along this impact evaluation standard.   
Mandate 
A second common measurement of transitional justice success is 
through the use of mandates (Ainley, 2015). This is an attractive option 
because it narrows the outcome range to the examination of objectives 
listed in the founding documents of transitional justice mechanisms 
(Ainley, 2015). According to Ainley (2015), “looking at mandates 
makes sense as it is likely to be easier to judge whether a transitional 
justice institution has succeeded in achieving its mandate than it would 
be to prove, for instance, that it has achieved peace” (p. 246). Yet even 
mandates ascribe lofty ambitions to these institutions, and truth 
commissions in particular, whose mandates commonly call upon them 
to contribute to achieving larger societal goals such as peace and 





evaluations is further limited by Ainley’s (2015) argument that these 
foundational documents are in themselves “political 
documents…subject to negotiation, and as important for what they 
leave out as what they include” (p. 247).  
A localised approach to impact offers an alternative approach to the 
role of mandates in defining TRC success and impact. Rather than 
asking whether a TRC has achieved its mandated aims, a localised 
evaluation framework asks whether its mandate sufficiently reflected 
the justice needs of its local participants? This brings local 
expectations and justice needs to the centre.  
Institutional Engagement and Impact 
Ainley (2015) separates research that looks to processes of 
establishment and functioning from work that focuses on local 
engagement as separate factors in transitional justice impact 
evaluations. However, these can be usefully combined to capture the 
concept of institutional engagement, operationalised in detail in the first 
half of this chapter. Together, this category of outcome variables 
assesses impact along the lines of institutional legitimacy, local 
engagement, and coordination between mechanisms.  
Ainley’s (2015) discussion on the legitimacy of institutional 
establishment and the role of local engagement within transitional 
justice highlights concepts central to this thesis, though she gives them 
inadequate consideration. No definition of legitimacy is provided, and 
her claim that the legitimacy of the TRC’s establishment in Sierra 
Leone is “rarely questioned” (Ainley, 2015, pp. 247-248) is in fact 
critically examined in Part Three of this very thesis. She holds that 
there is “no evidence…that supports the claim that public participation 
is essential” (Ainley, 2015, p. 248). However, she offers no clarity on 
what she considers ‘essential’, and leaves us with the unanswered 
question of: essential for what? This neglects the possible intrinsic 
value that local participation may have within transitional justice in 
general, and truth commissions in particular. Moreover, given that 





the participatory programming literature, it is surprising not to see any 
engagement with this discourse. Despite these gaps, Ainley (2015) 
nonetheless draws attention to a number of important points that lend 
support for localising impact evaluations of transitional justice, and 
truth commissions in particular. She highlights that detailed 
examinations of transitional justice have criticised these processes for 
failing to “speak to local understandings of justice and reconciliation” 
(Ainley, 2015, p. 249). She further reinforces the primacy that local 
“demand for transitional justice” (Ainley, 2015, p. 250) should be given 
in the calculus to establish such processes in the first place. This begs 
the necessary but neglected question that localised impact 
measurements can uniquely answer: should transitional justice be 
considered successful when it does not meet the justice needs or 
expectations of its local participants?  
Recommendations 
A severely under-researched topic in the area of truth commission 
impact evaluations is that of recommendations (Skaar, 2018). The 
important legacy of truth commissions embodied in the 
recommendations these bodies produce, and what is and is not 
implemented, remains largely unexplored (Skaar, 2018). According to 
Skaar (2018), the “transformative potential (impact) of truth 
commissions arguably lies most directly in the body of 
recommendations put forward in their final reports” (p. 407). Much of 
the long-term legitimacy of these bodies is also determined by what is 
done, or not done, with the recommendations produced by truth 
commissions. As an avenue for impact measurement, 
recommendations and their implementation trajectories, therefore 
deserve greater consideration. This takes on special significance when 
viewed through a localised framework of impact evaluation by looking 
at whose needs are incorporated and privileged within the body of TRC 
recommendations in the first place, and the effects of implementation 






Both Ainley (2015) and Skaar (2018) draw attention to the problem of 
establishing causality for transitional justice impacts.  Greater attention 
to localising understandings of transitional justice experiences, among 
the local populations they directly affect, may offer pathways to 
revealing causal mechanisms on the micro-level. Even if isolating 
transitional justice impact is inappropriate, given the argument by 
some that transitional justice success can only be appreciated by 
acknowledging “interactions” and viewing transitional justice as 
“nested in social systems” (Ainley, 2015, p. 255), localised evaluations 
can still unveil such interactions. For instance, Chapter 7 shows that 
the concurrently operating DDR process significantly informed the 
justice and TRC expectations of ex-combatants. Additionally, 
interaction across transitional justice processes in Sierra Leone, also 
uncovered in Chapter 7, dispels conventional academic wisdom that 
has sought to explain ex-combatant non-participation within the TRC 
as stemming from fears of prosecution within the SCSL.  
Isolating causality on the micro-level, through localised evaluations of 
transitional justice is only one possible contribution that such 
evaluations can make to the issue of causality in transitional justice. A 
localised approach to understanding transitional justice impact can 
also identify how the academic dilemma of isolating causality plays out 
on the local level of perceiving causality. Perceived causality cannot 
overcome the challenge of isolating causality, but nonetheless stands 
to illuminate local experiences of transitional justice, and holds value 
as it amplifies an understanding of transitional justice among actors 
that inhabit the domain of the local, and who directly experience these 
processes of justice-seeking (Sirleaf, 2013).  
 
Finally, Ainley (2015) identifies a number of tools which she argues will 
aid in the development of approaches by which to judge the impact 
and success of transitional justice. A localised framework for 





and therefore offers a holistic and nuanced approach to developing 
meaningful evaluation standards. In the first instance Ainley (2015) 
calls for deeper engagement with contexts in research, which localised 
evaluation approaches, measuring impact through its alignment with 
local expectations and experiences, uniquely provides. She also calls 
for greater variation in methodologies and research questions to add 
breadth to the current landscape of views in evaluation studies. 
Localised impact evaluation is well-suited to bottom-up knowledge 
production methods, which lends depth to findings and necessarily 
broadens the landscape of views when it centralises the experiences 
and needs of local populations. Finally, Ainley (2015) argues for 
greater reflexivity within impact research, which a localised approach 
usefully provides. At its core, foregrounding local justice expectations 
and experiences of transitional justice inherently acknowledges the 
limitations currently provided by the universalising and normative 
framework under which the bulk of impact evaluations operate. It 
presents an alternative approach, one that helps to shift away from 
external measurements of transitional justice processes and toward 
internal (local) measurements of success in the places where impact 
is most acutely felt (or absent) - within the contexts and communities 
in which they are implemented.  
Conclusion 
The second half of this chapter has constructed a localised framework 
of TRC impact evaluation, to extend emerging calls within transitional 
justice scholarship around the need for increased attention to the realm 
of the local. Micro-level research in transitional justice has gained 
traction within the field, though such work has yet to extend itself to 
impact evaluations. The field of impact evaluation in transitional justice 
has been revealed to contain severe shortcomings, stemming from the 
externalised and universalised normative roots of the field. A turn to 
the local, as foregrounded by this framework, presents a conceptual 
avenue to offer redress for these challenges. Chapter 10 empirically 
applies this framework to the TRC in Sierra Leone through the lens of 





whose TRC experiences are demonstrated throughout this thesis as 
both necessary for demystifying the effects and success of this 
institution, but remain equally unexplored. Chapter 10 highlights the 
unaccommodating design and implementation of the TRC in Sierra 
Leone, among at least one segment of its identified population of local 
transitional justice participants. This begs the question of what such a 
new localised evaluation standard may mean for the future of truth 
commissions moreover. This question is addressed in Chapter 11, 
which synthesises the findings and contributions of this study and 
presents some recommendations for future truth commission 










Part Three: Analysis 
Part Three of this thesis dedicates itself to empirically analysing the 
relationship between ex-combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone. It is 
divided into six chapters, along the three dimensions of expectations, 
experiences and impacts. The dimension of expectations examines 
the normative element of transitional justice in the context of this in 
depth case study examination. It comprises two chapters, of which the 
first (chapter 6) establishes the formal relevance and treatment of ex-
combatants, as perpetrators, within the TRC’s structure. Chapter 7 
unearths both the institutional expectations of ex-combatant 
participation and compares and contrasts this against actual ex-
combatant expectations of the TRC. In so doing it illuminates 
significant disparities between anticipated institutional expectations 
relating to the need for, and participation of ex-combatants in the TRC, 
as well as highlighting the justice needs and expectations held towards 
the TRC among this population. Two chapters address the dimension 
of experiences assess the structural application of transitional justice 
through the TRC in relation to ex-combatants in Sierra Leone 
(Chapters 8 and 9). In Chapter 8 the framework of institutional 
engagement developed in Chapter 5 is empirically applied to Sierra 
Leone’s TRC to reveal multiple processes of exclusion faced by ex-
combatants within this transitional justice process. Chapter 8 focuses 
on the institutional engagement dimension of participation, specifically 
non-participation, and illuminates the myriad sources of exclusion that 
led many ex-combatants not to participate within the TRC. Lastly 
Chapter 10 looks to impacts and analyses the practical effects of the 
TRC on the localised and individual level of the ex-combatant 
community. However, this division does not mean that these 
dimensions operate wholly in isolation of one another – indeed, 
expectations influence experiences, and experiences contour impacts. 
Additionally, experiences intersect with both the structural and 





























Establishing the Prescribed Relevance of Ex-
Combatants in the TRC 
 
Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the technical, formal or 
prescribed relevance of ex-combatants within the TRC in Sierra Leone. 
The terms ‘technical’, ‘formal’ and ‘prescribed’ are used throughout this 
thesis to describe the explicit institutional role accorded to TRC 
participants within the design of the TRC itself – housed within its 
foundational mandate and Final Report documents. This chapter 
uncovers whether ex-combatants belong to the population of local 
transitional justice participants within the context of the TRC in Sierra 
Leone. It answers the question of why we should consider ex-
combatants within truth commission examinations. It further illuminates 
the prescribed role of ex-combatants as local TRC participants, 
establishing whether, on the institutional (or formal) level, this 
population was treated as simple participants or beneficiaries. This 
formal assessment establishes the appropriateness of this thesis’s 
subsequent examination of the broader relationship between ex-
combatants and the TRC. By examining whether, and to what extent, 
the TRC was designed to engage with ex-combatants, as transitional 
justice participants in its activities, and as subjects of its mandated 
aims (beneficiaries), this chapter clearly establishes empirically the 
need to recognise ex-combatants as necessary TRC participants (and 
beneficiaries). Ex-combatants play a significant role in shaping 
violence and are crucial to the success of peace-making and 
peacebuilding. Truth commissions are commonly understood to be 
“victim-centred” (Freeman, 2006, p 17) bodies that provide a platform 
for victim and larger societal healing and reconciliation. The role of ex-
combatants specifically, and non-victims generally, has hitherto 
remained largely absent from the loci of truth commission practice and 
research. Through a qualitative analysis of the mandate and final 





steps in revealing the explicit and institutional relevance of this 
necessary but neglected category of truth commission participants and 
beneficiaries. While the empirical analysis of this chapter expands the 
universe of the traditionally limited and victim-centred focus of TRC 
scholarship and practice, it only achieves the elucidation of their 
prescribed relevance. It establishes the significance of ex-combatants 
as TRC participants at the level of ritual (the TRC’s structural level). 
However, it tells us little of the practice of engagement by this 
institution, or of the experiences of ex-combatants towards the TRC. 
The remaining chapters of this thesis examine, and criticise the 
treatment, and experiences, of ex-combatants within the TRC, in 
praxis. 
For the purposes of uncovering their prescribed institutional relevance, 
the treatment of ex-combatants within the TRC in Sierra Leone refers 
to the roles specified for them within its design. Truth commission 
mandates and final reports form the blueprints of these institutions and 
define the body of experiences which constitute the population of their 
participants and beneficiaries. Assessing these foundational 
documents therefore usefully identifies the various categories of 
conflict experiences that these bodies mandate themselves to interact 
with. It additionally allows for analysis of the differential treatment of 
such categories of conflict experiences, to establish participation 
hierarchies. Uncovering the categories of relevant participants within 
the TRC, and squarely establishing the relevance of ex-combatants as 
belonging to the body of defined perpetrators identified within the 
TRC’s participation structure, answers the question of with whom the 
TRC was designed to engage. This juxtaposes critically the normative 
participation model put forward by TRCs, as traditionally ‘victim-
centred’ against the reality of the cross-cutting institutional participation 
requirements of such bodies, and forms the starting point of this 
thesis’s critique of the binary justice model practiced by restoratively-
oriented truth commissions. The remainder of this thesis dedicates 
itself to an in-depth examination of how the TRC pursued engagement 
with ex-combatants specifically, in practice, and builds a multi-level 





relation to ex-combatants in Sierra Leone. The remaining chapters of 
Part Three critically engage with questions of whose justice is sought 
in practice by truth commissions, and how such justice-seeking is 
practiced.  
Truth commissions, while prioritising victim needs and participation 
over that of other experiences, nonetheless are built on the premise of 
local participation, inclusivity, and accessibility, and claim to have 
larger societal impacts. Investigating the space accorded to non-victim 
(ex-combatant) conflict experiences therefore forms a critical 
examination of the validity of these broader foundations, and the 
institutional measures laid out to achieve them. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 4, victim conflict experiences dominate transitional 
scholarship generally, and truth commission research particularly. This 
is problematic, as it assumes homogenous conflict experiences, as 
well as post-conflict needs and attitudes (Nussio et al., 2015). Given 
the scarcity of research acknowledging the role that perpetrators play 
in transitional justice processes generally, and truth commissions 
specifically (Leiby, 2009; Payne, 2008; Skjelsbæk, 2015) this chapter 
sheds empirical light on the institutional treatment of perpetrator 
experiences. Perpetrator conflict experiences are critical to truth 
commission effectiveness, as necessary participants therein. This is 
clearly evidenced in the design of Sierra Leone’s TRC, in its mandate 
and Final Report. This empirical finding reinforces the need for 
transitional justice scholarship to engage robustly with non-victim 
conflict experiences, an enterprise, which has, to date, remained 
absent from its research agenda. It forms the starting point for this 
thesis’s broader illumination of the complexity inherent to the spectrum 
of conflict identities currently misrepresented as neat binaries in 
research and practice, as shown in Chapter 4. 
Through the application of discourse analysis tools, (see Chapter 2) on 
the TRC mandate and Final Report documents in Sierra Leone, a 
framework of institutional participation requirements has been 
developed, comprising three dimensions: formal participant categories 





(identified) participants, and finally institutional incentives to promote 
participation within the Commission’s substantive activities. The 
dimension of formal participant categories answers the question of 
whether perpetrators were relevant, as necessary participants, within 
the TRC. Identifying their operational treatment, through the second 
dimension of this framework answers the question of where their 
participation within the TRC’s operations was sought. Lastly, an 
examination of prescribed participation incentives answers the 
questions of how this participation was sought, and what priority 
perpetrator participation specifically was given, within the TRC.  
Mandates and Final Reports 
Mandates are a crucial component of truth commissions. A mandate 
legally establishes a commission’s functions, powers, parameters and 
ambitions and gives them legal standing (González, 2013). According 
to the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), three general 
components are necessary for truth commission mandates to be 
effective and productive (González, 2013). This includes firstly their 
normative and policy orientations, which outlines their principles, 
objectives and functions. Secondly a truth commission mandate must 
specify its object of inquiry – the facts and crimes to be established 
and treated by the commission. Thirdly, it must specify its operational 
aspects – the powers, prerogatives and procedures that the 
commission will need in order to achieve its objectives. The first and 
third components are of particular value here – whether perpetrators 
form part of the objectives and functions of the commission, and if so, 
how they are treated in its operational procedures. 
In addition to the full analysis of the truth commission’s mandate, the 
TRC’s final report has been selectively analysed to uncover the 
prescribed role of perpetrator participation therein. While mandates 
define the overall scope and objectives of truth commissions, they 
often lack procedural depth and detail. As such, they are not very 
telling of the full picture regarding perpetrator participation. This is not 
surprising, given that there is often a significant time lapse between the 





mandate, its formal establishment, and the different phases of its 
implementation17. Given the common temporal gap between the 
different phases of a truth commission, mandate documents are often 
confined to outlining their objectives and functions, thereby 
establishing the legal scope of these bodies. Procedural elements are 
generally only broadly laid out, and further elaborated in reports that 
are produced once a commission has actually been set up. This 
chapter examines the full breadth of relevant operational designs 
through an analysis of the Final Report issued by the TRC in Sierra 
Leone. 
Institutional Participation Requirements of the TRC 
Uncovering the role accorded to perpetrator experiences in truth 
commissions informs us of the current state of truth commission 
practice, and illustrates the need to dedicate further scholarly attention 
to this neglected category of conflict experiences. Conceptualising the 
relevance and treatment of perpetrators in truth commissions is 
particularly pertinent, as this transitional justice mechanism is lauded 
for its high levels of local inclusivity and participation. This chapter 
responds to increasing calls for the localisation of transitional justice 
research, by shedding empirical light on the treatment and significance 
of perpetrators in truth commissions. This institutional participation 
framework expands our understanding of the measures taken by truth 
commissions to accommodate diverse local experiences. This informs 
us uniquely of the extent and priority to which inclusivity and diversity 
in the work of truth commissions was present (at least at the normative 
and institutional levels), and can serve to highlight structural areas of 
improvement in the design of future ones (discussed in Chapter 11). 
Together, the formal incorporation of perpetrators as explicitly 
recognised TRC participants; their operational treatment; and the 
incentives established to encourage their participation constitute the 
framework of prescribed perpetrator treatment and relevance.  
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Formal Perpetrator Incorporation 
Establishing the explicit need for perpetrator participation as part of the 
objectives of the truth commission’s mandate is the first contribution of 
this institutional framework. This falls under the first necessary 
component of truth commissions – their norms and policy orientations. 
Identifying perpetrator experiences and their participation within the 
functions and objectives of the Commission’s mandate establishes 
their primary relevance therein. Evidence of perpetrator incorporation 
in the functions and objectives of the truth commission’s mandate 
therefore constitutes their formal incorporation as necessary 
participants within the TRC. While this does accord the perpetrator 
experience a role, it does little more than recognise that both the 
processes of reconciliation and establishing a full historical record 
requires engagement with different conflict experiences. Formal 
incorporation is limited in that it only establishes a prescribed space for 
perpetrators in truth commissions, but does not inform us fully of the 
size or scope of this participatory space. The question of how these 
commissions, in their operations, set out to engage with these 
necessary experiences is answered in the subsequent two dimensions 
of this framework. 
Operational Treatment 
The second dimension of this framework addresses perpetrator 
treatment in the operational aspects of the truth commission. By 
examining the operational guidelines within the mandate and Final 
Report of the TRC, this study unearths how perpetrators were able to 
participate in Sierra Leone’s truth commission’s process. Truth 
commission activities fall into four general categories. Firstly, these 
bodies conduct investigations and fact-finding activities. Secondly they 
collect statements from people with relevant (the term ‘relevant’ here 
refers to explicitly defined TRC participant identities) conflict 
experiences (statement-taking), and thirdly they hold hearings, which 
may be public or closed. Finally, truth commissions usually produce 
reports detailing their practices, findings and recommendations (Skaar, 





Report of Sierra Leone’s truth commission has been selectively 
analysed. The statement-taking and hearings procedures have been 
assessed for the existence and character of perpetrator incorporation. 
It is within these two categories of activities that truth commissions 
engage most directly and significantly with conflict-affected 
populations. Analysing the institutional requirements set forth around 
local engagement obligations and practices within statement-taking 
and hearings thereby reveals the commission’s formal operational 
engagement ambitions with categories of local conflict experiences. 
Lastly, perpetrator treatment in the body of recommendations 
contained within the Final Report is examined. This assessment 
reveals the relative space accorded to perpetrators as possible 
beneficiaries of the TRC and of the legacy it hoped to impart. Specific 
consideration of perpetrators within the substantive operations of 
statement-taking and hearings, together with their relative treatment as 
recipients in the Commission’s recommendations therefore 
demonstrates their operational treatment, at least on paper.  
Participation Incentives  
Prescribed incentives to encourage perpetrator participation forms the 
third and final dimension of truth commission design wherein 
perpetrator incorporation is observable. Beyond the explicit 
requirement for the participation of perpetrators in the TRC, 
established by the previous two dimensions, participation incentives 
inform us about the degree of participation sought from identified 
participant categories. The dimensions of formal incorporation and 
operational treatment indicate the necessity and location of perpetrator 
participation, while incentives reveal how much perpetrator 
participation was sought. Incentives can include amnesties in 
exchange for participation, confidentiality for participation and targeted 
sensitisation campaigns to promote participation.  
Together, the formal incorporation and operational treatment of ex-
combatants, as perpetrators, within the truth commission establishes 
the prescribed need for their participation. The inclusion and extent of 





ex-combatant participation, and informs us of the prescribed priority 
placed on achieving such participation. Bernath (2016) points to the 
divergence that can exist between formal processes of inclusion and 
practical processes of exclusion in her examination of ‘complex 
political victims’ in Cambodia’s ECCC. It is therefore necessary to be 
mindful of this potential gap between the ritual of participation, against 
the reality of participation, addressed in Chapters 8 and 9. Together, 
this generates a comprehensive understanding of the relationship 
between ex-combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone.  
Formal Incorporation of Perpetrators in the TRC 
The formal incorporation of perpetrators is evident when this category 
of conflict experiences is explicitly included in the objectives and 
functions of a truth commission’s mandate. This establishes their 
explicit relevance as necessary truth commission participants. The 
formal incorporation of perpetrators encompasses the ex-combatant 
population when this population is defined to belong to this category of 
conflict experiences. Ex-combatants, as falling within the definition of 
perpetrators set forth in the TRC in Sierra Leone, has already been 
established, in Chapter 1. 
The formal incorporation of perpetrators in Sierra Leone’s TRC is 
undeniable. This incorporation is most clearly evident in part III of the 
commission’s mandate, which establishes its functions and objectives. 
Here, article 6b. specifies a role for “perpetrators to relate their 
experiences” in the commission and its objective to create a “climate 
which fosters constructive interchange between victims and 
perpetrators” (TRC Act, 2000, Art. 6(2b)). An explicit role for 
perpetrators within the commission’s functions and objectives is 
evidenced as early as the Lomé Agreement of 1999, which calls upon 
the (proposed) commission to “provide a forum for both the victims and 
perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story” (Lomé Peace 
Agreement, 1999, Art. XXVI). 
The role and relevance of perpetrators is additionally repeated 





functions18, which further highlights their formal inclusion as a 
consistent feature in the TRC’s design.   Within the larger non-victim 
category, perpetrator experiences are given the greatest degree of 
prescribed consideration in the truth commission’s design. References 
to perpetrators significantly outnumber references to other non-victim 
experience categories (in particular witnesses, bystanders and third-
parties) contained within the TRC’s mandate and Final Report. As 
such, a particular focus on this group is warranted.  
Additionally, the Commission’s Final Report (2004) defines 
reconciliation, one of its central objectives (TRC Act, 2000, Art. 6(1)), 
as requiring perpetrator participation. Reconciliation is recognised as 
evolving from restorative justice, which “focuses on restoring relations, 
as far as possible, between victims and perpetrators and between 
perpetrators and the communities to which they belong” (TRC Final 
Report, 2004, p. 19). According to the TRC, perpetrator participation 
was therefore necessary in order to achieve both micro and macro-
level reconciliation. Community (macro-level) reconciliation is defined 
as the restoration of “relations between the community and the 
perpetrator” that requires “understanding and sharing experiences”, 
and individual (micro-level) reconciliation requires “that the victim and 
perpetrator meet” (TRC Final Report, 2004, p. 19).  
Ultimately, the prescribed significance of perpetrators in Sierra Leone 
is clear. The commission’s mandate explicitly identifies perpetrator 
participation as part of its objectives and functions, and this is 
reinforced throughout its Final Report. The clear and consistent 
observation of the formal incorporation of perpetrators in Sierra Leone 
highlights the explicit and necessary participation of perpetrators within 
the TRC.  The persistent requirement for perpetrator participation 
resoundingly establishes their relevance as TRC participants.  
Operational Treatment of Perpetrators in the TRC 
Perpetrators play a clear role in Sierra Leone’s TRC. This has been 
empirically demonstrated through their formal incorporation within the 
                                                          





Commission’s mandate. While this establishes their relevance, it does 
not reveal where their participation is sought. Their prescribed 
operational treatment reveals the measures laid out by the 
Commission to formally enable perpetrator participation in its activities. 
The following section assesses the operational treatment of 
perpetrators, as participants, within the statement-taking and hearings 
procedures of the TRC, and their treatment within the Commission’s 
Final Report recommendations.  
Statement-taking 
In Sierra Leone, a significant measure of the operational treatment of 
perpetrators resides in the Commission’s statement form. Four 
categories of statement-givers were identified as necessary to the 
statement-taking work of the TRC – victims, perpetrators, witnesses 
and third-party statement-givers. To accommodate this, the 
Commission’s statement-taking form contained four sections, one for 
each conflict experience (TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, p. 
164). Effectively the TRC thereby created a perpetrator-specific 
statement-taking form (this also holds true for the other categories). 
This showcases an operational relevance for perpetrators within the 
statement-taking work of the Commission, as this experience was 
specifically incorporated into the design of the statement-taking form. 
Notably, the statement-takers manual in the Commission’s Final 
Report (2004, Vol. 1, Appendix 1) emphasises another strength of its 
multiple-experience statement forms: it allowed for individual 
statement-givers to fill in several statement-form sections, thereby 
recognising the complexity of individual conflict experiences. The 
statement-takers’ manual specifies that it was “crucial for statement-
takers to understand that the statement-giver can belong to more than 
one category” and allowed individual statement-givers to fill in multiple 
sections to accommodate their multiple conflict experiences (TRC 
Final Report, 2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, p. 186). The ability for statement-
givers to provide ‘complex’ or ‘composite’ statements importantly 
reflects a prescribed recognition of the complexity of individual conflict 





took a significant step to break the traditional binary of guilt versus 
victimhood, by allowing statements collected to reflect multiple conflict 
experiences on the individual statement-giver level.  
Hearings 
Neither the Commission’s mandate nor Final Report specify 
operational measures targeting perpetrators specifically in its hearings 
operations. While perpetrator participation was desirable, as discussed 
in participation incentives (below), perpetrators were not explicitly 
named within the operational guidelines of the Commission’s hearings 
activities. 
Recommendations 
According to Skaar (2018), producing recommendations that address 
abuses “and make similar abuses less likely to be repeated” 
constitutes one of the “most fundamental undertakings of truth 
commissions” (p. 407). She further asserts the significance of truth 
commission recommendations by arguing that the “transformative 
potential of truth commissions” as a tool for deterrence “lies most 
directly in the body of recommendations put forward in their final 
reports” (Skaar, 2018, p. 407).  
Calls for the TRC within the Lomé Peace Agreement laid out the 
obligation of the (proposed) TRC to submit a report containing 
recommendations “for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights 
violations” (Lomé Peace Agreement, 1999, Art. XXVI; TRC Final 
Report, 2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 24). The TRC’s obligation to produce a 
report containing recommendations is further contained within Part III 
of the TRC Act of 2000, which specifies that the TRC was to 
“investigate and report on the causes, nature, and extent of the 
violations and abuses” under its purview (Art. 6(2)). Part V of the TRC 
Act (2000) establishes most concretely the Commission’s obligation to 
produce a report with: 
recommendations concerning the reforms and other 
measures…needed to achieve the object of the Commission, 
namely the object of providing impartial historical record, 





addressing impunity, responding to the needs of victims and 
promoting healing and reconciliation (Art. 15(2)).  
The TRC was therefore clearly obligated to produce a report containing 
recommendations, the nature of which were considered necessary to 
the fulfilment of its core aims.  
An examination of the treatment of perpetrators within the TRC’s 
recommendations, and in particular its reparations framework, reveals 
the relative space allotted to perpetrators as beneficiaries of the TRC, 
beyond constituting simply participants within its activities. Chapter 1 
has presented a typology of local transitional justice participants, 
comprising participants, beneficiaries and stakeholders. This 
distinction between participants on the one hand, and beneficiaries 
and stakeholders on the other, is one of instrumental and intrinsic 
treatment, respectively. The relative treatment of ex-combatants as 
part of the recommendations produced by the TRC, informs us, on the 
prescriptive level at minimum, of their institutional relevance as either 
instrumental or intrinsic in character. Their participatory significance 
can be considered instrumental when they are largely absent from the 
recommendations agenda, which instead reinforces the primacy of 
victims. However, their participation takes on intrinsic value when they 
are meaningfully incorporated into a TRC’s recommendations; a 
recognition that ex-combatants belong not only to the TRC’s 
population of necessary participants, but also to its body of 
beneficiaries. This recognition of perpetrator justice needs indicates a 
breaking of conventional truth commission binaries that privilege 
(constructed) victim experiences.  
The TRC’s Final Report recommendations (2004) were “designed to 
facilitate the building of a new Sierra Leone based on the values of 
human dignity, tolerance and respect” (Vol. 2, Ch. 3, p. 117). In line 
with the TRC’s original mandate, recommendations were aimed at 
“preventing the repetition of the conflict, addressing impunity, 
responding to the needs of victims and the promoting of healing and 
reconciliation” (TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 2, Ch. 3, p. 117). The 





category of the local contained within the overall summary of the 
Commission’s recommendations.  
The TRC’s recommendations were divided into three main categories; 
imperative, work towards and seriously consider (TRC Final Report, 
Vol. 2, Ch. 3). Imperative recommendations comprised the 
Commission’s most urgent and necessary recommendations. 
Secondly, ‘work towards’ recommendations required putting in place 
the building blocks for their actualisation. Finally, ‘seriously consider’ 
recommendations required only that the government ‘seriously 
evaluate’ the possibility of their implementation without attached 
timelines.  
The recommendations produced by the TRC fall into the following 
categories: the protection of human rights, establishing the rule of law, 
the security services, promoting good governance, fighting corruption, 
youth, women, children, external actors, mineral resources, the TRC 
and the SCSL, reparations, reconciliation, the national vision for Sierra 
Leone, archiving of Commission documentation, dissemination of the 
TRC Report, and the follow-up committee (TRC Final Report, 2004, 
Vol. 2, Ch. 3).  
Reparations significantly reveal the TRC’s body of intended 
beneficiaries, as individuals and groups whose wartime experiences of 
suffering required redress in the form of reparations. In designating 
beneficiaries, the TRC’s reparations programme legitimises the 
suffering of its designated beneficiaries, while simultaneously 
invalidating potential experiences of suffering among those that fall 
outside this framework of explicitly defined beneficiaries, as ‘unworthy’ 
of receiving repair. In Sierra Leone’s TRC, reparations fall into the 
category of ‘work towards’ recommendations (TRC Final Report, 2004, 
Vol. 2, Ch. 3). Reparations are given special consideration as part of 
the TRC’s recommendations framework. While the TRC was not 
explicitly mandated to produce a reparations programme, as part of its 
recommendations, within the Final Report, the provision of reparations 
was nonetheless considered to fall within its “enabling legislation” 





instrumental to addressing ‘the needs of’ victims (TRC Final Report, 
2004, Vol. 2, Ch. 4; Williams and Opdam, 2017). The TRC’s 
reparations programme was designed to address victims specifically 
and exclusively. The wide-reaching reparations programme proposed 
by the TRC was constructed primarily around ensuring the 
“rehabilitation of the victims through the distribution of service 
packages and symbolic measures” (TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 2, 
Ch. 4, p. 232). Reparations were proposed in the following areas: 
health, pensions, education, skills training and micro credit, community 
reparations, and symbolic reparations.  
The Final Report (2004) clarifies that the Commission “did not make a 
distinction between civilians and ex-combatants for the purpose of their 
eligibility as beneficiaries of the reparations programme” (Vol. 2, Ch. 4, 
p. 245). It goes on to stipulate that “a reparations programme is not 
based on a person’s past actions but rather on what violations have 
been suffered by him or her” (TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 2, Ch. 4, p. 
245). Together, this inclusive approach towards eligibility and 
acknowledgement of suffering among ex-combatants indicates 
acknowledgement of their complex victimhood and their eligibility as 
possible beneficiaries within the TRC. However, the value of this 
inclusive approach is diminished when considering that the TRC’s 
reparation programme goes on to qualify that “ex-combatants have 
already benefitted from several programmes” (TRC Final Report, 
2004, Vol. 2, Ch. 4, p. 245). Furthermore, the TRC, recognising the 
practical limitations of any reparations programme, put in place a 
hierarchy of needs underpinning eligibility for reparations among 
victims, with “vulnerability” at its base (TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 2, 
Ch. 4, p. 234). Together, prior access to peacebuilding benefits, and 
the pragmatically necessary hierarchy of needs imposed on the 
reparations programme, serve to significantly reduce access to such 
benefits among the ex-combatant population in particular. This is 
compounded when considering references to perceptions of ex-
combatants and perpetrators as being ‘rewarded’ or better taken care 
of than victims, and the TRC’s duty to provide an important 





need to counterbalance rewards received by perpetrators through 
other programmes, notably the DDR programme, is further highlighted 
in the Report’s (2004) emphasis that monthly pension needs for victims 
should take into account “the amounts provided to ex-combatants on 
a monthly basis under the NCDDR programme and the pensions 
received by the war wounded SLA soldiers” (Vol. 2, Ch. 3, p. 195). 
Lastly, ex-combatants who received benefits from other programmes, 
i.e. DDR, were excluded from consideration of TRC reparations, to 
avoid “providing double benefits” (TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 2, Ch. 
4, p. 245). This further reinforces the perception that benefits for ex-
combatants constitute ‘rewards’ for wartime participation, but are 
measures of necessary ‘rehabilitation’ for victims. The logic 
underpinning this pragmatic hierarchy of needs for accessing 
reparations also failed to account for significant implementation 
failures in DDR (described in Chapters 3 and 7). Participation in DDR 
did not guarantee the provision of its reintegration benefits, as 
highlighted by interviewed ex-combatants in Chapter 7. DDR’s broken 
promises not only prevented successful ex-combatant participation 
therein, but also institutionally marginalised them from being 
considered legitimate beneficiaries within the TRC’s reparations 
framework. Ultimately this diminished legitimate access to such 
benefits among ex-combatants, moving them further down the 
hierarchy of presumed vulnerability through which these benefits were 
to be distributed.  
Ultimately, the reparations programme put forward by the TRC did not 
explicitly exclude ex-combatant participation, and established 
concretely their eligibility for reparations, on the basis of the recognition 
of their experiences of suffering. This recognition of complex 
victimhood lends some support for the designation of ex-combatants 
as potential beneficiaries of the TRC. However, the role of vulnerability 
in determining eligibility nonetheless creates a hierarchy of needs, and 
persistent reference to the rewards ex-combatants were given by other 
programmes, without consideration of their implementation deficits, 
indicates their practical disadvantage within this reparations structure. 





combatants to constitute part of the genuine body of local TRC 
beneficiaries in Sierra Leone. The primacy placed on victims persists. 
The treatment of ex-combatant perpetrators, as either holding intrinsic 
or instrumental value therefore requires investigation of the TRC’s 
work along its practical dimension, and the subsequent (non-
)implementation of its recommendations and reparations programme 
in particular. This is undertaken in Chapter 10.  
Participation Incentives in the TRC 
Identifying incentives for perpetrator participation reveals the degree 
to which the TRC desired their engagement, and therefore informs us 
of both how operational participation (within the substantive statement-
taking and hearings activities) was to be sought, and how important 
perpetrator participation was formally considered (i.e. the priority given 
to garnering ex-combatant participation). Participation incentives can 
take the form of targeted outreach programmes, the use of amnesties, 
and incentives related to statement-taking and hearings.  
Outreach and Sensitisation 
Sierra Leone’s TRC operated alongside the Special Court. The 
concurrent operation of transitional justice mechanisms is considered 
to have impacted perceptions and expectations of the Commission, by 
the perpetrator community specifically. According to the TRC’s Final 
Report (2004) the co-existence of the Special Court alongside the TRC 
“raised the fears of many witnesses concerned about the relationship 
between the TRC and the Special Court” (Vol. 1, Ch. 5, p. 160). 
According to the TRC itself, perpetrators were concerned over the 
concurrent operation of the two institutions (Shaw, 2007) and were 
“reticent to talk to the Commission” as they feared “being indicted by 
the Special Court” (TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 167). The 
validity of these (anticipated) perpetrator fears are called into question 
in Chapter 7 of this thesis, which illuminates ex-combatant justice 
needs and their expectations towards the TRC, as well as the 
anticipated (institutional) expectations around ex-combatant attitudes 





To promote perpetrator participation and address assumed fears 
around participation, the Commission implemented “targeted 
sensitisation” campaigns “specifically designed” and “aimed at 
particular audiences such as combatants and ex-combatants” (TRC 
Final Report, 2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, p. 158).  Local NGOs and ICTJ were 
heavily involved in these targeted sensitisation efforts to promote 
perpetrator participation and education around the work and aims of 
the TRC in relation to the Special Court (TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 
1, Ch. 5). A study on ex-combatant attitudes towards the work of the 
Commission (PRIDE and ICTJ, 2002) revealed that ex-combatants 
from all sides generally supported the Commission and that this 
support grew the more they understood its mandate (Hayner, 2004; 
PRIDE and ICTJ, 2002).  
Amnesty  
The TRC operated under a blanket amnesty for ex-combatants, 
enacted by the Lomé Peace Agreement (1999). It therefore was not 
imbued with the power to grant perpetrators amnesty in exchange for 
their participation. The existence of a broader amnesty could be 
considered a TRC participation incentive as it removed the threat of 
prosecution more generally for ex-combatants. However, the fact that 
this was not enacted by the TRC itself limits the ability to view this as 
an institutional participation incentive. Rather, it can, at best, be 
considered as part of the broader post-conflict framework to remove 
barriers to ex-combatant participation in peace, and not as a TRC 
participation incentive specifically. The relationship between amnesty 
(as the absence of punishment) and TRC participation is discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 7, where the logic of assumed perpetrator 
participation practiced by the TRC is empirically interrogated.  
Collecting Perpetrator Statements 
Incentives to promote the participation of perpetrators in a truth 
commission’s statement-taking work can include confidentiality, the 
guarantee of non-incrimination, as well as sensitisation training for 
statement-takers to reduce possible social stigmatisation that could 





In Sierra Leone, all individual statement-givers, including perpetrators, 
had the right to request confidentiality for their statements (TRC Final 
Report, 2004, volume 1 appendix 1, pp 194-195). The ability to request 
confidentiality for statement-takers has further significance for 
perpetrators, as “no information given to the Commission on a 
confidential basis will be provided to the Special Court” (TRC Final 
Report, 2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 5). The effort to clearly separate the work of 
the TRC from that of the Special Court reinforces the special utility of 
confidentiality for perpetrators, due to their purported unique security 
concerns about perceived ties between the Commission and the 
Special Court. Further emphasis on the separation of the Special Court 
and the TRC can be found in the Final Report’s statement-takers 
manual (2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 5). The manual specifies the Commission’s 
obligation to uphold the right of statement-givers to avoid self-
incrimination. No court of law, including the Special Court, was allowed 
to use the testimony or statements provided by any person at the 
Commission, and perpetrators specifically, to prosecute participants. 
While this right was granted automatically to all statement-givers, 
specific reference is made to perpetrators’ right to avoid self-
incrimination (TRC Final Report, 2004).  
In addition to the establishment of a perpetrator-specific statement-
taking form, the TRC took steps in its statement-takers manual to 
encourage perpetrator participation. (TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 1, 
Ch. 5). Specifically, the manual (TRC Final Report, Vol. 1, Ch. 5) 
outlines the need for statement-takers to be considerate towards 
perpetrators, to “avoid judging” the perpetrator, “whatever the 
violations committed” and to “keep in mind that a lot of 
perpetrators…are also victims as well” (p. 190). Recognition of the 
complexity of individual conflict experiences is once again evidenced, 
within the institutional framework of the TRC.  Incentives to promote 
perpetrator participation in the statement-taking work of the TRC 
thereby comprise the ability to provide confidential statements, the 
accompanying guarantee of non-incrimination, and the sensitisation 
measures put in place to educate statement-takers on collecting 





of complex conflict experiences among statement givers. 
Hearings 
Incentives to promote perpetrator participation within the hearings 
activities of a truth commission may take on the form of private 
hearings, the Commission’s obligation to corroborate victim and 
witness testimony with named perpetrators, and measures aimed at 
ensuring procedural fairness for perpetrator participants.  
The TRC’s Final Report (2004) provides details on the nature of its 
hearings. While public hearings were held, private or closed hearings 
were also an integral part of the hearings. Closed hearings were 
designed first and foremost to “allow children and victims of sexual 
abuse to testify in a private setting” (TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 1, 
Ch. 1, p. 180). “Closed hearings were also arranged for alleged 
perpetrators or ex-combatants who were reluctant to speak before the 
public for security or other reasons” (TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 1, 
Ch. 5, p. 180). While perpetrator participation was therefore not the 
primary concern of the hearings, their participation was considered 
necessary enough to warrant consideration of their specific security (or 
other) concerns in order to promote their participation.  
Secondly, the TRC was obligated to make “all reasonable efforts to 
locate alleged perpetrators and invite them to make statements or to 
participate in a hearing and relay their own version of events” (TRC 
Final Report, 2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, p. 182) in cases where victims named 
perpetrators. This promotes perpetrator participation, as it required the 
Commission to make a good faith effort to corroborate the testimonies 
of persons and reinforces the fact that an accurate and impartial 
historical record requires both victims and perpetrators to share their 
experiences. Encouraging alleged perpetrators to share their ‘side’ of 
events reinforces the position of the truth commission as an impartial, 
non-prosecutorial body, and validates the significance of perpetrator 
experiences as part of the grander conflict narrative, instead of treating 





Measures to ensure procedural fairness for perpetrators in hearings 
largely echo the participation incentives previously discussed, but also 
reinforce the Commission’s desire to encourage voluntary perpetrator 
participation. Specifically, counsel was made available for perpetrators 
and they were not compelled to answer questions.  
Sierra Leone’s TRC enacted three types of incentives to encourage 
perpetrator participation in its hearings. Firstly, through holding private 
hearings, in recognition of the security concerns of perpetrators. 
Secondly, the Commission was obligated to (attempt to) corroborate 
victim testimony with named perpetrators, reinforcing the role that this 
conflict experience plays in the establishment of an accurate and 
impartial historical record. Finally, the TRC adopted specific measures 
to ensure procedural fairness for perpetrators in hearings by 
guaranteeing them access to counsel and clarifying that they could not 
be compelled to answer questions.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has uncovered the prescribed treatment of ex-
combatants within the design of Sierra Leone’s TRC. The central role 
that ex-combatants play in both the making of war and peace logically 
establishes a role for them within transitional justice. Yet, examinations 
of transitional justice in relation to ex-combatants remain sparse. This 
chapter has begun to address this empirical gap in transitional justice 
scholarship. Chapters 1 and 4 have established the theoretical need 
for examining the transitional justice experiences of perpetrators. This 
chapter has empirically revealed an explicit role for perpetrators within 
Sierra Leone’s TRC. In so doing, this study has empirically 
established, for the first time, the prescribed significance of 
perpetrators as necessary participants in a post-conflict truth 
commission.  
Along the dimension of formal incorporation, which establishes 
whether or not perpetrators are defined as necessary participants for 
a truth commission to fulfil its objectives and functions, perpetrator 





establishes empirically, for the first time, an explicit relevance for 
perpetrators within the ambit of post-conflict truth commissions. Claims 
that post-conflict truth commissions solely address victims and their 
experiences are therefore incorrect and do not reflect the breadth of 
formal incorporation and cross-cutting participation requirements that 
have been revealed through this analysis of Sierra Leone’s TRC. 
Selective analysis of the TRC’s Final Report (2004) reveals the 
operational treatment of perpetrators within the Commission’s design. 
Operational treatment encompasses the exact truth commission 
activities wherein perpetrator participation was formally specified, 
enabling an examination of the activities requiring perpetrator 
participation. Specifically, truth commission statement-taking, 
hearings, and the body of the TRC’s Final Report recommendations 
have been analysed. In Sierra Leone, the use of multiple-section 
statement forms particularly highlights the Commission’s commitment 
to perpetrator participation as an effort to break away from the binaries 
of simple perpetrators and victims as participants. However, despite 
breaking conflict experience binaries in the composition of its 
statement form, and its mandate to form a platform for the “constructive 
interchange between victims and perpetrators” (TRC Final Report, 
2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 25) the TRC’s recommendations reveal 
perpetrator participation to be largely instrumental in design. This 
reinforces the persistent primacy placed on addressing the needs of 
‘victims’. The possibility for providing ‘complex’ statements that 
signalled an institutional breaking of simple identity binaries is 
contradicted by the simultaneous reassertion of a binary justice-
seeking model that privileged victims and disadvantaged perpetrator 
participation in the TRC’s reparations framework.  
Finally, incentives to promote the participation of perpetrators within 
the TRC’s activities reveals the priority accorded to their engagement 
within the TRC’s design. Targeted outreach programmes to educate 
perpetrators on truth commission activities and objectives were 
undertaken as a participation incentive. Additionally, confidentiality and 





statement-takers to the experiences of perpetrators in the statement-
taking work of the Commission reveals formal efforts to promote 
perpetrator participation. In the case of hearings, incentives to promote 
perpetrator participation included private hearings, the TRC’s 
obligation to corroborate victim and witness testimony, and measures 
to ensure the fair procedural treatment of perpetrator participants.  
Establishing the prescribed relevance of ex-combatants as part of the 
population of necessary truth commission participants is the first 
necessary step in this thesis’s larger exploration of the relationship 
between ex-combatants and the TRC. Perpetrators are a recognised 
and relevant category of conflict experiences within Sierra Leone’s 
TRC. However, the gap between prescription and practice can be 
immense, and while this institutional mapping clearly establishes 
perpetrator relevance, it does not illuminate their actual treatment by 
the commission in practice. Bernath’s (2016) analysis of the ECCC in 
Cambodia has already demonstrated that formal incorporation does 
not guarantee meaningful participation opportunities. The remaining 
chapters in Part Three of this thesis examine the practical treatment of 
ex-combatants against their prescribed incorporation in the TRC, as 
established in this chapter. The ritual of prescribed possibilities for ex-
combatant participation, as perpetrators, within the structure of the 
TRC are clear; the reality of their participation will be explored and 





Chapter 7  
Managing Expectations: understanding ex-
combatant perceptions of the TRC in Sierra Leone 
 
When the TRC came I was happy because it came to bring us 
peace and to fix the problems from the war. The TRC was for 
helping us rebuild Salone (Sierra Leone) together, so that we 
could all prosper19. 
Introduction 
This chapter examines local expectations of the TRC, among non-
participant ex-combatants in Sierra Leone. It contextualises these 
expectations within the broader framework of concurrent 
peacebuilding efforts, in particular the SCSL (or the Court) and the 
DDR process. Non-participant ex-combatant expectations are treated 
in context, placing the meanings that they attach to the TRC at the core 
of this investigation. Examining ex-combatant expectations of the TRC 
involves unearthing the views held by this population with regards to 
the purposes and aims of the TRC. It captures the question of what the 
TRC was understood to do in Sierra Leone by this population of 
identified local participants (see Chapter 6) who chose not to 
participate therein. Analysing ex-combatant expectations of the TRC 
brings affected populations to the centre of this study. This is 
distinguished from subsequent explorations of ex-combatant 
experiences of the TRC. Chapter 8 analyses their exclusion from 
institutional engagement; Chapter 9 uncovers the problematic and 
restricted model of participation which both limited and deterred their 
participation; and Chapter 10 examines the impacts of the TRC on this 
category of transitional justice participants. In analysing the 
relationship between ex-combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone, this 
thesis therefore identifies the full breadth and depth of this relationship, 
through the micro-level lens of ex-combatants. This lends a 
longitudinal character to this exploratory research, despite its 
retrospective approach. This disaggregation to the level of the local 
                                                          





transitional justice participant (ex-combatants) examines their 
relationship with the TRC along the dimensions of expectations, 
experiences and impacts against the normative (rhetoric), structural 
(ritual) and practical (reality) dimensions of the TRC, thereby 
engendering an analysis that situates TRC evaluation in relation to the 
populations they are designed to directly affect.  
Chapter 5 shows that definitions and measurements of success in 
transitional justice vary. Evaluations commonly look to the factors of 
outcomes; mandates; processes; affected population involvement 
(inclusivity); adherence to universal normative standards; and cost-
effectiveness (Ainley, 2015). This thesis opens the door to new bottom-
up measurements of transitional justice impact, by placing affected 
population (specifically ex-combatant) understandings of these 
processes at the fore. Mandate-driven assessments of transitional 
justice follow a matching process, whereby identified mandates and 
aims are evaluated against their subsequent achievement or absence, 
as a measure of success. However, such work does not recognise the 
discrepancies between objective aims and locally perceived ones. It 
also fails to consider diversity in priorities among affected populations, 
which invariably inform micro-level understandings of justice, and 
consequently post-conflict needs. Understanding expectations held by 
local transitional justice participants themselves, within the domain of 
the local, therefore provides a new empirical avenue for evaluations of 
inclusivity, success and effectiveness, through the lens of affected 
population experiences. An empirical examination of TRC 
expectations among ex-combatants is also used as a basis for 
comparison against their experiences of the TRC (Chapter 9) and the 
perceived impacts of this mechanism of transitional justice on this 
population (Chapter 10). The question of localising assessments of 
success and impact in relation to transitional justice is addressed in 
detail, in Chapter 10 of this thesis.  
While this chapter takes as its locus non-participant ex-combatant 
expectations held towards the TRC in Sierra Leone, empirical work for 





involved in the advocacy and establishment of the TRC, and TRC 
officials (as actors belonging to the wider body of TRC entrepreneurs). 
These interviews highlight the normative assumptions around the 
nature of participation that pervade the discourse and practice of 
transitional justice. An analysis across these two levels reveals 
significant deviation in expected ex-combatant attitudes (‘anticipated 
expectations’) towards the TRC held by TRC entrepreneurs 
responsible for its establishment and in charge of its operations, 
compared with actual ex-combatant attitudes. This demonstrates 
empirically the need to question the normative assumptions 
underpinning anticipated expectations held by conflict-affected 
individuals whose participation is necessary for TRC effectiveness. 
Transitional justice has come to be “regarded as inevitable and 
commonplace for anyone wishing to address the issue of past 
violations” (Dube, 2011, p. 178). According to Mutua (2015) 
“transitional justice has become an article of faith as a catalyst for 
reclaiming societies in political and social imbalance and dysfunction” 
(p. 1). Chapter 4 has already shown that the need for transitional 
justice, with its underpinnings in the broader human rights movement, 
has become universalised (Lutz, 2006). The normative foundations of 
transitional justice as a Western paradigm are also increasingly 
challenged by critics who highlight the practical limitations of such 
universalising practices20. Such criticisms of the Western and 
normative assumptions within transitional justice usefully call into 
question what transitional justice achieves and why it is deemed 
desirable, necessary or even inevitable. However, as Chapter 4 has 
highlighted, the normative assumptions intrinsic to transitional justice 
extend beyond this, and have engendered a binary identity framework 
of transitional justice participation. The doctrine of transitional justice 
doesn’t just dictate to us what is considered good (or necessary), but 
also who is good, and deserving of its benefits, and correspondingly 
who is bad, and in need of punishment, or forgiveness. It is this second 
normative limitation in particular that this chapter addresses. Despite 
                                                          





the traditional emphasis placed on the innocent victim within the 
discourse, critical voices that challenge the problematic binaries of 
victim and perpetrator participant identities are getting louder (see 
Chapter 4). The mismatch between normative and institutional rhetoric 
(‘anticipated expectations’) against the realities of individual conflict 
experiences and justice needs (‘actual expectations’) within the 
domain of the local are starkly revealed in this chapter. Highlighting 
these discrepancies contributes empirical depth to the emerging 
scholarship around the problematic normative assumptions that define 
and privilege inflexible, archetypal, and binary conflict identities and 
transitional justice beneficiaries.  
Ex-combatant interviews conducted across Sierra Leone highlight that 
expectations towards the TRC did not emerge in isolation. Rather, they 
were informed by the larger post-war environment. According to 
Mansaray, “DDR, the Court (SCSL) and the TRC were here to repair 
the country after the war. The government brought them to make 
peace”21. In particular, the processes of DDR (which was nearing 
completion at the time of the TRC’s establishment) and the SCSL 
(which operated alongside the TRC) strongly influenced ex-combatant 
perceptions of the TRC, its purposes and their receptiveness towards 
it.  Additionally, interviews conducted on the institutional level among 
TRC implementers and brokers, adds breadth to uncovering the 
relationship between the TRC and ex-combatants. In an interview in 
Freetown, one former TRC official explained that, “we sought the 
engagement of the ex-combatants in the TRC. We needed them to 
come forward and confess for the Commission to be effective. We 
needed their participation”22. Institutional-level data reveal the 
recognised need for ex-combatant inclusion, while highlighting 
discrepancies across institutional and micro-levels, in the challenges 
understood around their participation. Additionally, this chapter sheds 
empirical light on the origins and substance of these expectations. It 
further highlights the impact of concurrent peacebuilding operations on 
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local understandings of the TRC, and contributes to the nascent sub-
field of transitional justice scholarship that highlights both the need for 
contextualised, micro-level understandings of transitional justice, and 
the local variance in attitudes held towards these processes23.  
Chapter 2 has clarified the necessarily retrospective character of this 
study, which must contend with the challenges posed by recall bias. 
This has particular implications for the examination of expectations, the 
focal point of this chapter. While this broader research is interested in 
constructing a comprehensive understanding of the relationship 
between ex-combatants and the TRC, it is also interested in treating 
TRC expectations as distinct from TRC experiences and impact, which 
is more problematic. To overcome this, interview questions were 
carefully formulated, to probe respondents’ memories of not only what 
they expected the TRC to do, but also why they held such 
expectations, how they expected the TRC to fulfil them, what their 
experiences of other transitional processes were, and whether and 
how they perceived such processes as linked. Differences revealed 
between respondent expectations and experiences, in interviews, 
validates this research’s relative isolation of expectations as distinct 
from experiences, though this cannot be fully disentangled. Jonah 
describes his expectations of the TRC as an institution “to help people 
understand what happened to us (ex-combatants) in the war; to 
provide benefits for all of us who suffered”24. Jonah contrasts this 
against his subsequent experience of the TRC, as a non-participant 
ex-combatant, sharing that: 
But when the TRC came they (the statement-takers) told us we 
were perpetrators for fighting in the war and that it was our job 
to confess, so that the victims who did not fight could receive 
reconciliation. I thought the TRC was for all of us, and to help 
everyone. But when it came it only chose a few to help, not the 
fighters, and it did not bring the benefits it had to, for anybody25.  
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Ex-combatants and the TRC 
Chapter 4 has argued that truth commissions currently operate under 
a problematic logic of assumed perpetrator participation. This logic 
holds that the non-judicial character of truth commissions sufficiently 
incentivises ex-combatants to come forward and seek forgiveness or 
confess to their wartime atrocities within the reconciliatory platform of 
truth-telling and societal healing they provide (Freeman, 2006, p. 161). 
Additionally, the presumption that the nature of ex-combatant 
participation, as perpetrators, in TRCs, takes the form of apologies and 
regret (Shaw, 2007), fails to recognise the possibility that they may not 
self-identify as perpetrators nor have a desire to participate in a justice 
forum that reinforces such a simplistic binary of conflict experiences 
(victims or perpetrators). The normatively constructed position of ex-
combatants as legitimate perpetrator participants (see Chapter 4 for a 
discussion of their legitimate subject position within the identity 
framework of truth commissions) within truth commissions fails to 
recognise that self-identification may prevent ex-combatants from 
considering themselves appropriate participants (see Chapter 4 for a 
discussion of their appropriate subject position) within this restricted 
participation model. Current perceptions of ex-combatant conflict 
experiences (and expectations around their post-conflict attitudes) are 
replete with external assumptions that showcase the normative 
construction of archetypal and mutually exclusive conflict identities (of 
victim versus perpetrator) within transitional justice26. Mitton (2013) 
aptly captures the problematic impact of such assumptions in his 
discussion on the post-conflict political integration of ex-combatants in 
Sierra Leone. He illustrates that the “assumption that former fighters 
are more prone to violence, though understandable, is simplistic, not 
least because for many the reverse is true” (Mitton, 2013, p. 325). He 
emphasises that “ex-combatants are poorly understood as a mob of 
angry and violence-prone youth” (Mitton, 2013, p. 333) whose wartime 
participation is inaccurately premised on assumptions of choice and 
agency that do not reflect their lived experiences. “Many ex-
                                                          





combatants exercised little choice in originally taking arms, and their 
transformation into ruthless fighters was the result of systematic 
brutalisation and conditioning rather than an innate lust for loot and 
power” (Mitton, 2013, p. 333). In line with Mitton’s work, this study finds 
that TRC entrepreneurs applied problematic assumptions regarding 
ex-combatant experiences of the war, and consequently ex-combatant 
justice needs, without grounded consideration of their actual conflict 
experiences and post-conflict justice expectations. One TRC official 
described the role of ex-combatants in the TRC as “to confess and gain 
forgiveness from their victims and communities through the TRC”27. 
Another TRC official reiterated the TRC’s binary treatment of ex-
combatants as simple perpetrators by stating that “the ex-combatants 
needed a place to express their guilt, and the TRC gave them this 
opportunity for atonement”28. In describing the non-punitive advantage 
that the TRC enjoyed over the SCSL, a member of civil society and 
TRC broker highlighted that “the TRC offered a unique chance for ex-
combatants to repent and show their regret without fear of 
punishment”29. This reinforces widespread institutional anticipated 
expectations of ex-combatants as guilty perpetrators without 
consideration or accommodation of the complexity of actual ex-
combatant experiences, and of ex-combatant experiences of suffering. 
In contrast, the universality of suffering has emerged strongly among 
interviewed ex-combatants. According to Jeffrey, a former RUF fighter, 
“we were all victims of the war”30. Anthony, described his forcible 
recruitment into the RUF in 1995 by recounting, “I was kidnapped and 
forced to join. They made me leave my woman (wife) and told me I had 
to fight”31. Francis, a long-standing member of the Kamajors, noted that 
he joined the group after “they (the SLA) came and destroyed my 
home. My sister was burned badly in the fire, and there was no 
treatment for her. So then I felt the suffering I had already seen”32. 
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30 RUF ex-combatant interview, Freetown, February 20, 2017 
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These experiences of suffering among interviewed ex-combatants 
highlight the complexity of lived conflict experiences shared among this 
interviewed population, and the inappropriateness of a simple and 
universalising perpetrator identity imposed upon them. 
Anticipated Expectations 
Significant inconsistencies are evidenced in a comparison of 
institutional-level, anticipated expectations held by TRC entrepreneurs 
around ex-combatant attitudes, against actual ex-combatant 
expectations. On the institutional level, ex-combatant participation in 
Sierra Leone’s TRC was widely held to be necessary in the fulfilment 
of the institution’s aims. Qualitative interviews with TRC entrepreneurs 
reinforce the explicit relevance of ex-combatants as TRC participants, 
outlined in the mandate and operating documents of the TRC. In an 
interview, one TRC official emphasised, “to find the truth we needed to 
hear from the ex-combatants. They needed to come forward so that 
the victims could forgive them”33. Another TRC official working as a 
statement-taker reiterated, “the TRC was for everyone”34. On this 
institutional level, ex-combatant participation is broadly held as 
necessary for the successful achievement of all four TRC aims, though 
variation in the need for their participation, as either intrinsic or 
instrumental, exists. Predominantly the need for ex-combatant 
participation is seen as intrinsic, necessary for the fulfilment of each of 
the TRC’s objectives by virtue of the inherent relevance that ex-
combatants held within its restorative justice model. One civil society 
(TRC broker) respondent reported, “the TRC was paralysed without 
the ex-combatants, what could we know if we didn’t hear from them? 
What could we do without their participation? Nothing”35. Similarly, 
another TRC official (TRC implementer) defined the core purpose of 
restoration within the TRC as “about restoring dignity for the victims, 
and humanity for the ex-combatants”36. Ex-combatants as TRC 
participants, in this light, are the legitimate subjects of TRC 
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participation, and part of the broader population of its beneficiaries. 
Conversely, and less common, are institutional understandings of 
instrumental ex-combatant participation, whereby ex-combatant 
participation was only considered necessary in order to address the 
needs of victims in the TRC. A TRC official in Makeni reported, “the 
TRC was for the victims, and for the country, to heal. The ex-
combatants had a role to play, for sure. They needed to confess so 
that the victims could get closure. They served a purpose”37 by 
facilitating victim healing. Within such an understanding, ex-combatant 
participants are not granted the same agency as above, and constitute 
objects of TRC goals, rather than autonomous subjects. Despite this 
variation, the role of ex-combatants as necessary participants is clear.  
TRC awareness and sources of information 
Despite the TRC having completed its operations well over a decade 
ago, the legacy of its existence lives on. Moreover, some elements of 
its work (most notably the body of recommendations produced in the 
TRC’s Final Report, 2004) continue to resonate within contemporary 
Sierra Leone. This is particularly evident among members of civil 
society that continue to refer to the Report’s Recommendations as a 
crucial “roadmap for development”38 for the country. Regardless of 
age, warring party affiliation(s) and location, all 112 ex-combatant 
interviewees had, at the very least, heard of Sierra Leone’s TRC. Their 
expectations and understandings of the TRC, however, reveal a new 
dimension of inter-connectivity between concurrent peace processes.  
While all ex-combatant respondents reported being aware of the TRC 
at the time of its operations, very few (seven of 112) were able to trace 
and confirm their first or primary source of knowledge of the TRC. Most 
(105 of 112) cited a combination of sources, predominantly local media 
(the radio) and community members. Ex-combatant respondents were 
largely unable to distinguish between the TRC and the SCSL as their 
primary TRC education sources, for two reasons. Firstly, time has had 
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a corrosive impact on memories of this. Secondly, persistent 
perceptions of the inter-connectedness of the TRC and the SCSL have 
meant that in practice, the two bodies are not meaningfully 
distinguished by this population. Saidu, a former member of the 
CDF/Kamajors in Bo described the TRC and Special Court as “the 
same. The TRC helped the Court. They worked together to bring to 
justice those who bore the greatest responsibility of the war”39. When 
interviewed about which institution was established first in Sierra 
Leone, Saidu held, “both – they came together. The Special Court 
needed the TRC to collect the facts for its work”40. Outreach activities 
undertaken by the SCSL were much more robust and organised than 
those of the TRC, a reflection of the high allocation of resources that 
the Court enjoyed. It is therefore likely that SCSL outreach activities 
served as a primary source of information on the TRC for ex-
combatants, evidenced in both the clarity with which ex-combatants 
understood the scope and aims of the SCSL41, and the conflation of 
the Court’s mandate with that of the TRC’s mandate. It is clear, 
however, that discussions around the TRC permeated society widely. 
Alie voluntarily joined the RUF in 1996 and settled in his hometown of 
Makeni after the war. He recounted that: 
All of us (in the community) knew the TRC was here, that it had 
come to make peace for the whole country. I spoke with my 
neighbours about it; at the ataya base (makeshift cafes popular 
throughout Sierra Leone); in church the pastor talked about it 
too..many people talked about it42.  
 Respondents described their expectations of the TRC with 
confidence, and gave no indication of deficits in their awareness of this 
institution. Only three interviewed ex-combatants expressed having 
heard of the TRC but not knowing, or being unsure of, what its 
purposes were. Among them is Gibril, 33 years old when I first met him 
in 2018, and working as a security guard in Bo after his wartime 
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40 Ibid.  
41 96 out of 112 interviewed ex-combatants repeated the official mandate of 
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experience as a forcibly recruited child soldier with the RUF in 1997 
right before his 12th birthday. Gibril shared that: 
Yes I know about the TRC, the commission for truth that came 
after the war. They brought it from outside because of the war 
but I don’t know what it was for. Maybe it came to tell us about 
the war? I already knew about the war, so the TRC was not for 
me43.  
While Gibril and a small number of other ex-combatant respondents 
(three in total) describe a poor or unclear understanding of the TRC 
and its aims, the vast majority of ex-combatant interviewees report a 
high quantity and quality of education regarding the purposes of the 
TRC. They stated they felt they “understood”44 the process and did not 
find its aims confusing or unclear. Yet, their understandings of the TRC 
do not fully align with the institution’s actual mandate, and reveal the 
impact of concurrent transitional processes on informing expectations 
towards the TRC. Barry joined the RUF rebels in 1995 after “soldiers 
destroyed my home and (tailoring) business”45 in Freetown, leaving 
him homeless and unemployed. Barry’s explanation of the TRC’s 
purposes reflects a shared understanding of the hopes held for the 
TRC among ex-combatants, which he described as follows: “the TRC 
came to bring peace and justice. we needed those things because of 
the war. It was supposed to help us, all of us, to help rebuild what was 
lost”46.  
Ex-Combatant Expectations 
Ex-combatants were asked why the TRC had been established in 
Sierra Leone. All respondents reported that the TRC was introduced 
either as a measure to help end the war, or as a process to help cement 
the fragile peace (including the three respondents who expressed not 
understanding the purposes of the TRC). In Makeni, former RUF 
fighter Amadu described the purpose of the TRC as to “end the war”47, 
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44 109 out of 112 ex-combatant interviewees, across all factions in Freetown, 
Bo and Makeni, between 2017 and 2019. 
45 RUF Ex-combatant interview, Freetown, January 5, 2019.  
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while Emanuel, a former CDF/Kamajor fighter in Bo, looked to the TRC 
to “make sure that the peace would last…by healing the war wounds 
for good”48. Although ex-combatant understandings of the TRC’s 
reason for establishment varied (either a function of peace-making or 
peacebuilding), the TRC’s connection to the transitional peace process 
was clear among all respondents. Ex-combatant expectations in 
relation to the TRC can be grouped into three categories: truth-telling 
and expression; reintegration and development benefits; and justice 
and accountability. By and large, expectations of the TRC did not 
exhibit variation across age, factional affiliation, duration of conflict 
participation, location or DDR process participation, with one 
exception. DDR participation exerts a degree of influence over TRC 
purpose rankings. Ex-combatants who did not participate in the DDR 
process (71 of 112, or 71 of 80 when controlling for the SLA sample) 
rank justice and accountability more highly, as an associated TRC 
purpose, than those that did participate in DDR. However, reintegration 
and development benefits still outranked justice expectations among 
all interviewees as the primary expectation associated with the TRC.    
The TRC’s mandate endowed it with the responsibility to establish an 
impartial historical record (through truth-telling), address impunity (as 
an alternative accountability mechanism), foster healing and 
reconciliation (by providing a platform for victims and perpetrators to 
come together) and prevent the repetition of conflict (through 
deterrence) (TRC Act, 2000; TRC Final Report, 2004). While there is 
some overlap between the TRC’s actual mandate and ex-combatant 
understandings thereof, substantial deviation has also been 
uncovered. Additionally, discrepancies between institutional 
expectations towards ex-combatants and actual ex-combatant 
expectations is significantly revealed, in particular in relation to the 
expectations of truth telling and expression, and justice and 
accountability.  
                                                          





Truth-Telling and Expression 
Ex-combatants strongly understood the TRC to have prominent truth-
telling and expression aims. All 109 interviewed ex-combatants who 
reported a ‘clear’ understanding of the TRC express this associated 
TRC expectation. This matches the TRC’s official mandate and is 
therefore unsurprising, though important differences between 
institutional and ex-combatant understandings around expression are 
also uncovered. Truth telling, or the establishment of a comprehensive 
historical record of the war, is widely held to be a significant element 
of the TRC’s work. The TRC came “for us to know what happened and 
why”49 and to distribute this record throughout Sierra Leone, and 
beyond. Omar, a former SLA soldier, described truth-telling as 
essential in the TRC “so that (we and) other countries can learn from 
the mistakes in our past”50. The value of such a historical record is 
understood as both intrinsic and instrumental, on both national and 
international levels. The expectation of the TRC to establish this 
historical record emerges from the perceived relationship between 
such truth telling and peace. It is widely held that “to have real peace 
we must know what happened, so that we do not repeat those 
actions”51.  
The need for truth-telling may appear to challenge earlier findings by 
Shaw (2007) that point to a wider cultural practice of “directed 
forgetting” (p. 194) in Sierra Leone. However, this apparent 
contradiction is reconciled when considering the associated TRC 
expectation of expression that this research has highlighted. According 
to Shaw (2007) the culturally embedded art of forgetting in Sierra 
Leone “did not mean the erasure of personal memories, but their 
containment in a form that would enable them to recover their lives” (p. 
194). Time and again, ex-combatant respondents emphasise the 
TRC’s role as a forum for people to “blow their minds”52, a Krio 
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expression that ex-combatants use to relay the cathartic process of 
sharing individual conflict experiences for the purposes of healing and 
acknowledgement. This stands in contrast to elite understandings of 
the very same expression (‘blow your mind’) and TRC purpose 
(expression), which connotes a process of sharing and externalisation 
rooted in binary understandings of conflict experiences, of victims 
versus perpetrators, wherein ex-combatants who come to “blow their 
minds”53 convey their actions in the rubric of confession and apologies. 
Ex-combatant expression is seen on the institutional level as 
necessary for this group of perpetrators to “release the evil bottled 
within”54 through confession. According to one TRC official the TRC 
was an opportunity for ex-combatants “to gain forgiveness”55. Another 
member of civil society, part of the TRC Working Group, echoed this 
anticipated institutional expectation, describing the TRC as a place for 
ex-combatants to “apologise and admit their wrongdoings”56. 
Conversely the ex-combatant use of this Krio expression is one of 
contextualised narratives and the significance thereof. Sharing or 
expressing their conflict experiences in the TRC should have offered 
an opportunity for others (e.g., communities, the government) to 
understand the complexity of their (ex-combatant) experiences 
through their own recounting, as well as the factors that led to their 
war-time actions, its wider context, and the struggles they faced in the 
new post-conflict setting. Peter, who joined the RUF rebels in 1997 
said: 
I joined the RUF to get justice for my family and my country. 
When the TRC came they said this was our chance to tell our 
story, but they didn’t want to know why I fought, they only 
wanted to know what I did57.  
The TRC is seen by interviewed ex-combatants as an institution that 
should have offered a channel for individuals to take control of their 
conflict experience narratives, and to express the context of those 
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experiences, thereby moving away from the binary labels of 
perpetrator or victim. The aim of truth-telling can be summarised as 
explanatory, with a strong deterrent function, while expression existed 
in order to generate understanding, and through this, catharsis and 
healing. This reinforces Nwogu’s (2010) critique identifying the 
disproportionate focus in truth commissions on uncovering the facts of 
previous periods of violence or repression, without adequate 
consideration of its motivations. In so doing, the “collective memory 
project” (Nwogu, 2010, p. 276) of truth commissions places a 
normative narrative constraint on their participants that not only 
privileges certain actors (victims) but also actions, over motivations. 
Such a constrained framework for expression “undermines the repair 
of social relations in the long term” by failing to “investigate the 
foundations of violence” (Nwogu, 2010, p. 276). 
While the aim of truth-telling mirrors the objective mandate of the TRC, 
ex-combatant expectations of expression deviate from anticipated 
expectations held for them on the institutional level by transitional 
justice entrepreneurs. This deviation is reflected more broadly in 
transitional justice scholarship that reinforces the ‘simple perpetrator’ 
role of ex-combatants in TRC. For instance, in his critical examination 
of the TRC Kelsall (2005) recounts how TRC Commissioners called 
upon ex-combatants to come forward to confess and repent for their 
actions in the Commission’s public hearings. Shaw (2007) further 
points to the TRC’s imposed model of redemptive memory that failed 
to give meaningful voice to those who participated. Mitton (2013) 
similarly expands the remit of the inappropriate application of simple 
external assumptions around ex-combatants in Sierra Leone; he 
unpacks problematic external assumptions around this population’s 
inclination towards violence. Importantly, this illustrates that on the 
institutional level ex-combatants were looked at as perpetrators, which 
informed anticipated expectations around this population and the 
construction of their legitimate subject position as TRC participants. 
However, on the micro-level, actual ex-combatant expectations of 
expression through contextualised narratives reveal that this 





therefore did not self-identify as appropriate perpetrator subjects 
before the TRC. The binary of victim or perpetrator, imposed on the 
institutional level, failed to accommodate the complexity of ex-
combatants’ lived conflict experiences, and resultantly, a significant 
difference between institutional and ex-combatant understandings of 
expression, as a pathway to healing and reconciliation, through 
understanding, is evident.  
Ex-combatant expectations of truth-telling and expression within the 
TRC overlaps partially with the Commission’s actual objectives. This 
expectation reflects an understanding of the TRC as a forum for justice, 
established to achieve deterrence through historical record-setting and 
community restoration through contextualised narrative expression. 
The remaining ex-combatant expectations, of reintegration and 
development, and justice and accountability, were strongly determined 
by the concurrently operating DDR process and the SCSL.  
Reintegration and Development 
Ex-combatants strongly expected the TRC to provide reintegration and 
development opportunities58. Specifically, the TRC was understood as 
designed to provide education, vocational training, jobs, housing and 
healthcare.  According to Peter, a former RUF member, “the TRC 
came to help us rebuild our communities”59. According to Francis, a 
former member of the Kamajors/CDF, the TRC was established “to 
give me my reintegration benefits”60. Thomas, who was injured in a 
battle during his time with the RUF, looked to the TRC “to help me find 
medical treatment”61 and Richard, a former CDF member, describes 
the role of the TRC as “to bring jobs so we could have better 
opportunities after the war”62. This reinforces work by Shaw (2007) who 
found that TRC participants engaged with the TRC with the 
expectation that this would “bring them material benefit” (p. 197). 
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Understanding the impact of Sierra Leone’s DDR process on ex-
combatant understandings and expectations of the TRC requires 
elucidating the links between these fields more broadly as well as their 
impacts on one another.  
Linking DDR and Transitional Justice 
According to Sriram and Herman (2009), while DDR programmes and 
transitional justice measures are often implemented simultaneously, 
neither “has traditionally been designed with the other in mind” (p. 455). 
Yet this coexistence “has implications for the success of both” (Patel, 
2010, p. 2) as these processes do not operate in isolation, necessarily 
interacting with each other and other transition processes (Kilroy, 
2014; Sriram, 2013). While a burgeoning literature on the nexus 
between DDR and transitional justice has begun to crystallise, this 
research is heavily biased towards DDR, emphasising predominantly 
the ways in which transitional justice does, can, and could impact DDR 
processes (Sriram and Herman, 2009). The impact of DDR on 
transitional justice has not been explored to the same extent.  Indeed, 
Sriram and Herman (2009) highlight the asymmetric accommodation 
of transitional justice to the presence of DDR processes, while DDR 
processes themselves have, by comparison, only recently “begun to 
take account of the demands and practice of transitional justice” (p. 
455). Empirical evidence of the micro-level impacts these processes 
have on one another remains limited, and skewed towards DDR. This 
study takes empirical steps to fill this lacuna by unearthing ex-
combatant understandings of the TRC, the origins thereof, and the 
significance of DDR on these understandings.   
DDR 
DDR refers to the three-part process of disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration that has become an integral part of post-conflict 
transitions. The primary aim of DDR programmes is to deter the return 
to violence among (ex)-combatants (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007; 
Nilsson, 2005) by ensuring their transition to civilian life (Muggah, 
2005). DDR as an instrument of post-conflict reconstruction took root 





and by 1998 it was decreed to be one of the priorities of post-conflict 
transitions (Muggah, 2005). DDR has since become a fundamental 
component of peace processes (Berdal and Ucko, 2013), generally 
“introduced early on in the post-conflict period and geared towards 
building confidence between parties and neutralising potential 
spoilers” (Muggah, 2005, p. 243). At a minimum disarmament involves 
the collection and disposal of weapons from combatants (and often 
civilians) in a conflict zone (Knight, 2008). Demobilisation entails the 
process by which armed groups are “induced to disband their military 
organisation and structure and shift from combatant to civilian status” 
(Knight, 2008, p. 28). Reintegration is the final and most problematic 
component of DDR (Kilroy, 2011). It comprises assistance measures 
for ex-combatants to increase their potential for “economic and social 
reintegration into civil society” (Jennings, 2007, p. 205). It is a “longer-
term social and economic process” (Knight, 2008, p. 29) that often 
involves vocational training, sustainable income-generation projects, 
repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and the establishment 
a process for truth and reconciliation. Reintegration therefore, as the 
final element of post-war DDR, refers to measures designed and 
implemented to facilitate the lasting and sustainable (re)entry into 
civilian life by former combatants. 
As a three-part process, DDR has historically focused greater attention 
on its disarmament and demobilisation components, while 
reintegration receives far less attention63. According to Garcia-Godos 
and Sriram (2013) “while numerous DDR processes have been 
reasonably successful in disarmament and demobilisation of former 
combatants, reintegration…is far more challenging” (p. 9).  It is 
commonly accepted to contain economic, political and social 
dimensions (Nilsson, 2005).  
Economic reintegration entails the ability of ex-combatants to “earn a 
livelihood through legitimate means” (International Peace Academy, 
2002, p. 2). The elements of political and social reintegration are less 
                                                          






easily quantified in comparison to economic reintegration. Political 
reintegration refers to ex-combatant participation in legitimate 
democratic governance structures and reflects the “confidence ex-
combatants express in the democratic system” (Humphreys and 
Weinstein, 2007, p. 541). Finally, social reintegration denotes the 
acceptance of ex-combatants by their (new or home) settlement 
communities. Acceptance underpins the necessary and intended 
outcome that social reintegration seeks to achieve. This too, lies at the 
heart of the reconciliatory aims of transitional justice. It is therefore 
within social reintegration that transitional justice intersects most 
directly with the overall reintegration component of DDR. A space for 
complementarity between DDR and transitional justice along this 
intersection therefore exists. Social reintegration requires the 
participation of the communities being asked to accept (returning) ex-
combatants (Garcia-Godos and Sriram, 2013; Kilroy, 2014). This is a 
long-term and challenging endeavor, as these communities may have 
been directly affected by abuses committed by ex-combatants, and 
one in which transitional justice efforts may offer meaningful mitigating 
assistance (Garcia-Godos and Sriram, 2013; Kilroy, 2014). According 
to Waldorf (2009) it is precisely within reintegration in DDR where the 
“more promising arena for cooperation with transitional justice” exists 
(p. 18). The long-term objectives of both processes to “rebuild(ing) 
social trust and social capital” (Waldorf, 2009, p. 23) require 
engagement beyond merely ex-combatants in the case of DDR (which 
needs wider community buy-in for social cohesion and reintegration to 
be achieved (Waldorf, 2009)), and victims in the case of transitional 
justice (where reconciliation involves the necessary participation of 
‘non-victims’). The short-term tensions between DDR and transitional 
justice, captured in the peace versus justice debate (discussed in 
Chapter 3), might thereby be mitigated by their potential long-term 
complementarities, through greater “institutional linkages and 
coordination” (Waldorf, 2009, p. 23).   
In addition to complementarity between these processes, there also 
exists the possibility for competition. While both DDR and transitional 





war to peace, they seek to achieve this in different ways (Sriram and 
Herman, 2009). DDR, with its historic emphasis on disarmament and 
demobilisation, forms part of the peace-making toolkit. DDR, broadly 
speaking, therefore prioritises the immediate peace-making goal of 
getting fighters to lay down their guns, through the promise of 
reintegration benefits that are meant, at least in theory, to provide a 
better long-term alternative to the gains of war. Transitional justice 
measures, conversely have a longer-term peacebuilding focus through 
their emphasis on accountability. The understanding of DDR as sitting 
within the framework of peace-making, and transitional justice as part 
of peacebuilding, was particularly evident in Sierra Leone where the 
TRC was incorporated into the Lomé Peace Agreement to “ensure (the 
long-term process of) peacebuilding”64.   
DDR and transitional justice are often pitted against each other as 
occupying opposing sides of the peace (DDR) versus justice 
(transitional justice) debate. Competition between DDR and 
transitional justice holds that fears of (transitional) justice will prevent 
ex-combatant participation in peace (i.e. DDR). This position assumes 
ex-combatant understandings of their own conflict experiences as 
premised on guilt and culpability, reinforcing the simple victim versus 
perpetrator conflict narrative structure put forward by the conventional 
transitional justice discourse (see Chapter 4). Waldorf (2009) argues 
that claims of competition between DDR and transitional justice are 
over-inflated, and argues that in reality these processes “do not clash 
as often or as much as commonly supposed” (p. 17). Claims of 
competition also discounts the impact that DDR (and other) processes 
have on informing ex-combatant expectations towards transitional 
justice, highlighting again the privilege that DDR enjoys in evaluations 
of the interplay between these fields. Through empirically uncovering 
ex-combatant expectations of the TRC, this chapter challenges the 
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foundations of this presumed polarisation of DDR and transitional 
justice. Not only do ex-combatants reject the simple perpetrator 
category within which transitional justice places them, but DDR 
influenced expectations around the TRC, revealing a bi-directionality 
of impacts across these processes, beyond the traditional view that 
favours DDR.  
Finally, DDR and transitional justice also intersect along the axis of 
their necessary participants. The centrality of ex-combatants to the 
effectiveness of DDR is uncontested, indeed these processes are set 
up to address exactly that segment of society – the combatants, and 
the measures needed to ensure their successful transition to civilian 
life. However, the role and significance of ex-combatants in TRCs 
remains largely unrecognised. The prevailing position that transitional 
justice mechanisms are ‘victim oriented’ (Freeman, 2006) has been put 
forward as a possible reason for competition between DDR and 
transitional justice – their “rather different” intended beneficiaries 
(Sriram and Herman, 2009, p. 462). Yet, as previously established, in 
Chapters 4 and 6, ex-combatants are important and meaningful 
participants within TRCs. The realisation of all TRC aims requires 
substantive ex-combatant participation. The presentation of 
transitional justice and DDR beneficiaries as incompatible and 
mutually exclusive (Waldorf, 2009) therefore reflects and reinforces a 
false dichotomy of participation.  
DDR in Sierra Leone 
As described in Chapter 3, DDR in Sierra Leone proceeded in three 
phases, and faced “innumerable hiccups in its implementation” 
(Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007, p. 539) as a result of outbreaks of 
violence and a return to war which disrupted phases one and two. 
Ultimately, approximately 76,000 combatants were disarmed (Sesay 
and Suma, 2009). This far exceeded the anticipated 45,000 for which 
the process was originally designed. According to traditional 
measurements of disarmament and demobilisation DDR was a 
success. The process however “had very little impact on” (Sesay and 





is widely understood to have been the most problematic, and least 
successful, element of DDR efforts in Sierra Leone (Knight, 2008). This 
has been attributed to a combination of funding shortfalls and the 
difficulties of prioritising a long-term outcome with visibility problems 
(Knight, 2008). The reintegration assistance that was provided is 
heavily criticised as lacking in requisite robustness, and unresponsive 
to the particular needs of vulnerable groups (Knight, 2008; Sesay and 
Suma, 2009). Problems with “delays in payment of stipends, or non-
payment”, “missing start-up toolkits” and the poor “duration and quality 
of” training are reported to be among the biggest failings of this 
programme among ex-combatants themselves (Kilroy, 2011, p. 135). 
Interviewees referred to the term “DDR drivers”65 which emerged in the 
post-war context to refer to motorcycle taxi (commonly known as 
‘okada’) drivers with poor driving skills, to highlight the inadequate level 
of training that many disarmed combatants received. According to 
Knight (2008), “the inability of the DDR process in Sierra Leone to give 
ex-combatants the capacity to continue with the process is testament 
to the weakness of this portion (reintegration) of the DDR programme” 
(p. 42).  
DDR and the TRC in Sierra Leone  
No formal links existed between the DDR and TRC frameworks (or 
between DDR and the SCSL). However, despite the absence of a 
formal relationship, officials from the TRC and the National Committee 
for DDR (NCDDR) understood the processes as linked by virtue of the 
contributions that each sought to make to the country’s broader 
transition from war to peace (Sesay and Suma, 2009). DDR was 
nearing the end of its final phase when the TRC began its operations, 
and one senior-level meeting between TRC officials and the NCDDR 
was held to discuss possible inter-relationships and exchange 
information (Sesay and Suma, 2009). However, no operational 
linkages were established, and the two processes continued to operate 
largely independently of one another (Waldorf, 2009). Even 
                                                          






submissions from the NCDDR to the TRC (a total of three, in 2003) 
have been described as “fairly superficial” (Waldorf, 2009, p. 121) and 
a missed opportunity for information sharing. In discussing the 
absence of a relationship between DDR and the TRC in Sierra Leone, 
one TRC official shared that:  
At the time we (the TRC) did not see the relevance of a deeper 
cooperation with DDR – it (DDR) was nearing its end anyway. 
The TRC was about truth, justice and reconciliation for the 
victims, it was to build a lasting peace for Sierra Leone on the 
foundation that Lomé and DDR provided by appeasing the ex-
combatants and reintegrating them. We saw DDR for the ex-
combatants and the TRC as mostly for the victims. Of course 
now we look back and see how we (the TRC) could have 
benefitted from working together (with DDR), because we 
needed the ex-combatants at the TRC too – the TRC should 
have been a more inclusive space for them. In DDR the ex-
combatants were like heroes, but in the TRC they were the 
villains. It’s no wonder they did not participate much in the TRC, 
the whole peace process was confusing and inconsistent for 
them66.   
 
Despite the timing of the TRC (as beginning when DDR was ending) 
and the lack of official links between the two, the DDR process was still 
affected by the establishment of the TRC (and the introduction of a 
transitional justice framework more broadly) (Sesay and Suma, 2009). 
This occurred primarily through the simultaneous establishment of the 
SCSL, which, as the punitive avenue of transitional justice, created the 
widespread local perception that the TRC formed the investigative arm 
of the Court. Siaka’s characterisation of the TRC reflects the broader 
consensus among interviewed ex-combatants on perceived links 
between the TRC and Special Court, which is further expanded in 
sections below. According to Siaka, a former sergeant in the SLA, “the 
TRC was part of the Special Court. It conducted investigations for the 
Special Court to publicly bring justice to the perpetrators of the war”67. 
Concerns among DDR officials that these misperceptions would 
prevent combatant participation in DDR, out of fear of prosecution 
before the SCSL, showcase conventional assumptions underlying the 
peace versus justice debate. Additionally, the fact that DDR, 
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reportedly, was affected by the TRC only insofar as the TRC was 
widely seen to be connected to the SCSL, is significant. Pervasive 
misunderstandings around the relationship between the SCSL and the 
TRC are once again highlighted. NCDDR officials worried that 
misperceived links between the TRC and SCSL would prevent ex-
combatant participation in DDR, highlighting the wide reach of these 
misperceptions, extending beyond the range of transitional justice, and 
affecting transitional processes more broadly. This evidences that the 
TRC itself was not considered to be very meaningful in relation to DDR 
directly, and may have contributed to the absence of operational links 
between the two processes. This showcases the primacy placed on 
the relevance and significance of trials over truth-seeking (Nesbitt, 
2007).  
Ex-combatant expectations of tangible peace dividends in the form of 
reintegration and development opportunities emerged from 
understandings of the TRC as providing the same benefits as DDR, or 
of the TRC as filling in the gaps of the DDR process where it had failed 
to deliver fully (the reintegration component). Similar to research 
undertaken by Kilroy (2011; 2014), several ex-combatant interviewees 
who participated in DDR referred to (or in some cases even showed) 
their DDR Reintegration ID cards, as proof of promises left unfulfilled68 
(Kilroy, 2011). Kevin held out his ID card during our first interview and 
said “look at my ID card, look where they should have given me my 
benefits and did not. DDR did not fill its promises, and the TRC did not 
either. I am still waiting, to this day”69. Individual experiences with the 
DDR programme also had wider impacts on ex-combatant perceptions 
of the TRC. Ex-combatants expressed an active rejection of the TRC 
based on their negative DDR experiences. Simon shared, “DDR failed, 
so why should I have trusted the TRC?”70 Similarly, Timothy recounted, 
“when the TRC came, I did not talk to them. I did not attend anything, 
and I warned others not to be fooled” because “DDR was a lie. It did 
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not give what it owed us, and what it promised. The TRC was the 
same, the same people promising the same lies”71. The failure to 
provide reintegration benefits in the DDR programme, was “clearly 
seen as a broken promise” by participating ex-combatants, and this 
“breach of trust” had wider implications for ex-combatant 
receptiveness towards peacebuilding processes more generally 
(Kilroy, 2011, p. 135).  Interestingly, while those with positive DDR 
experiences generally express a positive understanding of the TRC’s 
aims, the bi-directionality of this correlation is limited when considering 
participation outcomes. Negative experiences of DDR strongly 
influenced ex-combatant decisions not to participate in the TRC, while 
positive experiences of DDR did not have the same influence on TRC 
participation. Sallieu participated in DDR after being a forcibly recruited 
member of the RUF at age 17. Sallieu was a member of the RUF for 
four years, and had his left arm amputated by a commanding officer 
after a failed escape attempt in 1996. He is “glad for DDR, it allowed 
me to escape from fighting and gave me a future”72 outside of the war. 
Sallieu now runs a small tailoring business in Freetown, and employs 
two other war-wounded ex-combatants whom he has trained. “You 
see, even with only one arm, we can make fine cloths”73 Sallieu shared 
proudly. Yet, despite his positive experience with DDR, Sallieu did not 
participate in the TRC. According to him: 
For me DDR was a great success, I know it failed many people, 
but I got my training, and my compensation (reintegration 
package), and now I have my business. When the TRC came 
no one asked me for my statement. When the hearings came I 
went to go watch and I knew the TRC was not for me…I was 
not a combatant anymore. The war for me was done, and I only 
want to move on peacefully, so the TRC was not for me74.  
Waldorf (2009) attributes ex-combatant conflation of DDR and 
transitional justice more broadly as “the same thing” to their often 
concurrent operation, the fact that they are often managed and 
implemented by the same actors (governments), and work with the 
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same civil society organisations (p. 16). However, this explanation of 
conflation stops short of recognising the role that ex-combatants play 
as beneficiaries of both DDR and TRCs in particular. Using the case 
of Sierra Leone, Waldorf’s (2009) explanation on the impact of DDR 
on informing ex-combatant TRC expectations can be expanded to 
include the space that ex-combatants occupy as necessary to both. 
DDR, having been introduced before the TRC, formed the basis of ex-
combatant understandings of peace interventions and what to expect 
from them.  
The conflation of DDR purposes with TRC aims among ex-
combatants, and the expectation of the provision of tangible peace 
dividends, evidences several other problems. Firstly, it reinforces the 
poor level and quality of outreach undertaken by the TRC. Secondly, it 
draws attention to the lack of coordination between the TRC and DDR 
processes, in exactly the component where it may have benefitted the 
most from strategic cooperation (Sesay and Suma, 2009). While work 
by Sesay and Suma (2009) highlights the NCDDR’s keen desire to 
dispel myths surrounding the relationship between the TRC and the 
SCSL (2009), this thesis evidences unsuccessful TRC outreach during 
this process, as these two institutions were, and still are, widely seen 
to be linked. Lastly, the ubiquitous expectation of tangible peace 
dividends reveals ex-combatants’ immediate post-conflict needs and 
priorities, and showcases variation in local understandings of justice 
(Macdonald, 2013).  
Justice and Accountability 
The final associated ex-combatant expectation with the TRC is that of 
providing justice and accountability. Among interviewed ex-
combatants, the expectation that the TRC would provide reintegration 
and development opportunities does not stand in contrast with the 
understanding of this process as one of justice and accountability. In 
fact, these expectations not only co-exist but inform one another. 
When asked why ex-combatants expected the TRC to provide 
reintegration and development opportunities and benefits, they 





that led to the war in the first place. Nigel, a former RUF fighter, and 
current RUFP chairperson and school headmaster, highlights that:  
poverty, corruption and inequality were the greatest injustices 
we suffered. We all have our own reasons for fighting, some of 
us had no choice, but all of our stories come from these 
injustices. For justice we need development. We still suffer 
today, the injustices from before the war are still strong 
today”75.  
Therefore, redress necessarily meant providing such opportunities. 
Justice is clearly understood to have a strong socioeconomic focus by 
this population. When asked what justice meant to him, Josef, a former 
CDF fighter, said “to me justice is feeling safe – knowing that my family 
can eat, that my grandson can go to school”76. Ex-combatant justice 
understandings in the immediate post-conflict setting were “needs-
driven”77, evidencing the failure of micro-level conceptualisations of 
justice to conform to a universal standard. The TRC’s Final Report 
(2004) itself recognises the socio-economic nature of post-conflict 
needs among the local in Sierra Leone, and highlights the salience of 
“socio economic rights issues” as “primary” concerns among victims 
(p. 235). 
SCSL 
Ex-combatant expectations of justice and accountability from the TRC 
indicate the influence of the simultaneous operation of the SCSL. As 
stated in Chapter 3, Sierra Leone’s TRC operated alongside the SCSL, 
resulting in a composite transitional justice landscape. Both 
mechanisms were established in 2002, though calls for the TRC 
predate the SCSL. As concurrently operating mechanisms of 
transitional justice, with overlapping mandates (Bisset, 2012), but 
distinct orientations (restorative on the part of the TRC, and retributive 
on the part of the SCSL), it is necessary to consider the impact of the 
SCSL on local expectations towards the TRC.  
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Calls for the establishment of a TRC in Sierra Leone date back to the 
Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999. Interviews with TRC entrepreneurs 
(civil society and TRC officials) reveal that calls for the TRC were seen 
as both “necessary”78 and a “compromise of justice”79 within an 
environment that would not allow for more punitive transitional justice 
options. The tenuous state of peace, exemplified by the war’s 
resumption and continuation until 2001, made discussions around 
retributive justice “impossible at the negotiations table”80. Ultimately 
however, the TRC shared the transitional justice stage with the SCSL. 
The SCSL came into existence after the government of Sierra Leone 
“sought the assistance of the UN in setting up the world’s first hybrid 
tribunal” in 2000 (Nesbitt, 2007, p. 977), when renewed fighting caused 
the government to “reassess its position regarding the Lomé amnesty” 
(Bisset, 2012, p. 90). The Court was mandated to bring to justice those 
bearing the greatest responsibility for Sierra Leone’s civil war. From 
the outset, challenges of the concurrent operation of two very different 
mechanisms of transitional justice were evident, and persistent. Extant 
research on Sierra Leone’s combined approach to transitional justice 
identifies several problems that emerged as a result, and points to the 
detrimental impact that the SCSL had on the TRC’s ability to function 
effectively81.  
The failure to establish a working relationship between the TRC and 
the SCSL, and coordinate their operations, is cited by Bisset (2012) as 
the most problematic aspect of Sierra Leone’s model of transitional 
justice. This created tensions between the two in which ultimately trials 
were privileged over truth-seeking, setting a precedent in international 
criminal law permitting the restriction of truth-seeking operations in 
favour of prosecutorial proceedings. According to Bisset (2012), the 
understanding of trials as superior to truth-seeking is “not based on 
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empirical evidence but reflects the prevailing rhetoric on the superiority 
of trials in traditional transitional justice discourse” (p. 97).  
Moreover, despite their independence, rumours of collaboration and 
collusion between the TRC and SCSL became quickly embedded, and 
persist today. Lahai, a former RUF and AFRC fighter says “The TRC 
and the Special Court worked together”82. According to Osman, who 
joined the CDF forces in 1996, “the TRC helped the Court”83. Ibrahim, 
forcibly recruited into the RUF similarly emphasised that “they were not 
separate, the TRC gave information to the Special Court”84. Public 
confusion around the distinction between the TRC and the SCSL led 
to the common understanding of the TRC as the “investigative arm”85 
of the SCSL. This has been identified in previous research (see Bisset, 
2012; Nesbitt, 2007; TRC Final Report, 2004) as generating fears 
among ex-combatants towards the TRC, which inhibited their 
participation. Such work holds that ex-combatants did not participate 
in the TRC for fear of being subsequently indicted by the SCSL, or out 
of fear that their participation would lead to the indictment of their 
former commanders. This is held to be a primary explanation for the 
low percentage of ex-combatant (or perpetrator) testimony received by 
the TRC. Furthermore, low ex-combatant participation within the TRC, 
attributed to fear of cooperation between the Court and the TRC is 
claimed to have impeded the TRC’s ability to fulfil its reconciliatory and 
historical record-setting mandate, and eroded local ownership of the 
process (Bisset, 2012; Nesbitt, 2007).  
These challenges indicate that local understandings of the TRC in 
Sierra Leone were both strongly and negatively influenced by the 
emergence of the SCSL. This study corroborates that the 
establishment of the SCSL had a formative impact on local 
expectations towards the TRC, and adds micro-level depth to this 
observation with its focus on the TRC’s non-participant ex-combatant 
community specifically, a population highlighted to have been 
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particularly affected by the co-existence of restorative and retributive 
mechanisms of transitional justice. However, this thesis reveals this 
impact to be deeper and more complex than originally understood, and 
calls into question the claim that ex-combatant participation in the TRC 
was limited by fears associated with the SCSL’s concurrent operation.  
As stated earlier, the TRC is widely understood to be a process of 
justice and accountability, though expectations of how this was to be 
achieved reveal an entrenched misunderstanding of this institution. 
While conceptualisations of justice were strongly informed by 
socioeconomic grievances, they remain rooted in punitive associations 
between crime and punishment. Universally, despite efforts at 
education through outreach, interviewed ex-combatants understood 
there to be a relationship between the SCSL and the TRC. However, 
this does not mean that such outreach was wholly unsuccessful. 
Outreach efforts by the SCSL to communicate its limited jurisdiction to 
“those who (bore) the greatest responsibility” (SCSL Statute, 2000, Art. 
1, p.1) in the war were widely effective, and respondents parrot this 
understanding of the SCSL’s limited prosecutorial powers widely. 
Sensitisation did, however, fail to dispel myths of the relationship 
between the SCSL and the TRC, or adequately educate people on the 
restorative foundations of the TRC. Indicative of this is the widespread 
“tunnel myth”86 whereby the close geographic proximity of the SCSL 
and TRC in the country’s capital gave rise to the rumour that the two 
were linked by an underground tunnel through which TRC officials 
ferried information to the SCSL. This rumour spread and was never 
successfully dispelled, despite the SCSL’s efforts.  
On the institutional level, TRC entrepreneurs assumed the TRC would 
be perceived as a punitive and retributive mechanism of transitional 
justice by ex-combatants, who would then decline to participate. 
assumptions that ex-combatant fears of prosecution as a result of TRC 
participation, would deter their participation in the TRC, widely 
informed anticipated expectations around justice and accountability. 
                                                          






This mirrors more broadly the concern in post-conflict research that 
punitive justice measures may hinder participation in, and thereby the 
effectiveness of, concurrent transitional processes, including DDR, 
captured in the peace versus justice debate (Patel and Waldorf, 2009; 
Sriram, 2013). However, the micro-level examination of actual ex-
combatant justice expectations within the TRC paint an altogether 
different picture. 
Ex-combatants did widely understand the TRC and SCSL to be linked 
justice institutions. However, this was not considered a negative 
attribute of the TRC, or one to be feared, by the majority of interviewed 
ex-combatants. In fact, the sentiment that the TRC, as the investigative 
arm of the SCSL, contributed to the pursuit of retributive justice in 
Sierra Leone, is generally positively held. The TRC was widely 
understood as functioning to bring those responsible for egregious 
crimes to the SCSL, and thereby contributed to justice. Robbie, a 
former SLA soldier, noted, “It was good that the TRC worked for the 
Court, they helped bring offenders to justice”87, while Eddie, a member 
of the RUF and AFRC felt that “the TRC helped the Court by giving it 
information, so we could have justice”88. This demonstrates a strong 
micro-level conceptualisation of justice as rooted in a retributive 
(punitive) model. Two factors account for the positive attitudes held 
towards the (mis)understanding of the two transitional justice 
mechanisms as linked. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, the SCSL was 
very effective in communicating the limited scope of its jurisdiction in 
its sensitisation work. Ex-combatants were widely aware of the limits 
of the SCSL’s reach and generally knew themselves to fall outside its 
jurisdiction, meaning they need not fear direct prosecution. Secondly, 
as previously noted, sampled ex-combatants, did (and do) not self-
identify as perpetrators, and therefore did not consider themselves to 
be the appropriate subjects of culpability before the SCSL. Henry, a 
former RUF fighter, gave the following explanation for his 
understanding of the TRC and the Court: “Why would I be afraid of the 
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TRC or the Court? I didn’t do anything wrong – they came to punish 
the perpetrators, and I fought for my country. I followed orders, I am 
not guilty”89. Henry’s self-perception of his own conflict experiences in 
relation to the work of the TRC and Court are widely echoed by ex-
combatant interviewees across warring factions.  
On providing justice and accountability, anticipated and actual ex-
combatant expectations both evidence perceived linkages between 
the TRC and SCSL, and the expectation that the TRC was therefore 
punitive in character. However, on the institutional level, the 
assumption that this perceived link would generate fears among ex-
combatants, and negatively affect their attitudes towards the TRC, is 
revealed to be false. Actual ex-combatant expectations of justice and 
accountability by the TRC were broadly positive, and reflect an 
understanding of the TRC as contributing to the punitive ambitions of 
the SCSL. These positive associations are rooted in ex-combatant 
understandings of the limited reach of the SCSL and their 
understandings of their own culpability (or rather, lack thereof), placing 
them outside the scope of potential prosecution. This further highlights 
the inadequacy of the simple binaries of the victim or perpetrator labels 
in transitional justice that do not appropriately reflect the complexity of 
lived conflict experiences. 
Conclusion  
This chapter has unearthed ex-combatant expectations towards the 
TRC in Sierra Leone, and analysed the impact of the concurrent SCSL 
and DDR processes on these expectations. It has revealed the ways 
in which such processes not only can, but do, intersect and affect one 
another. This chapter reveals the very real and significant impact that 
DDR and the SCSL in Sierra Leone had on ex-combatant expectations 
towards the TRC. It highlights the role that ex-combatants play, as 
necessary participants, in both TRCs and DDR, and the space wherein 
coordination intersects most meaningfully – that of (social) 
reintegration. In examining the origins and substance of ex-combatant 
                                                          





expectations, a multi-level comparison incorporating institutional-level 
anticipated expectations, adds both breadth and depth to findings. This 
multi-level comparison highlights the pervasive application of 
problematic and over-simplistic binary conflict identity labels onto the 
ex-combatant population (that of simple perpetrators), by TRC 
entrepreneurs, without grounded consideration of the complexity of 
their lived conflict experiences. These binary, top-down assumptions 
of ex-combatants as ‘guilty perpetrators’ are found to be as dogmatic 
as they are inappropriate. The aims of the TRC, as understood by ex-
combatants, were threefold: truth-telling and expression; reintegration 
and development; and justice and accountability. In the area of truth-
telling and expression, ex-combatants highlight the significance of the 
TRC as a peace process established to create a full and impartial 
historical record. However, expression was understood as a platform 
for contextualised narratives, while anticipated expectations diverged 
significantly from this and reinforce the binary identity model of TRC 
participation echoed in the discourse and practice more widely (see 
Chapter 4). A strong expectation for the provision of reintegration and 
development benefits by ex-combatants is also evidenced, with roots 
in the incomplete DDR process, notably its reintegration component. 
Lastly, ex-combatant expectations of justice and accountability are 
linked to unyielding myths of the inter-relationship between the TRC 
and the SCSL. Here again, divergence between anticipated and actual 
expectations is evident. These expectations cut across the potential 
fracture lines of faction, age, location, duration of conflict participation 
and DDR participation, further revealing their salience. This chapter, 
together with the preceding one (Chapter 6) have analytically and 
empirically addressed the dimension of ex-combatant expectations 
towards the TRC. The next two chapters of Part 3 of this thesis, 
Chapters 8 and 9, proceed to illuminate ex-combatant experiences of 
the TRC. Chapters 8 and 9 apply the framework of institutional 
engagement developed in Chapter 5 (in Part Two) of this thesis, with 
Chapter 8 focusing on the dimensions of ownership and inclusion, and 
Chapter 9 presenting a dedicated discussion on participation, and non-




























Institutional Engagement, Ex-Combatants and 
the TRC 
 
The vision we had for the TRC was a great one. It was to be a 
space for sharing, forgiveness, coming together as a country to 
shed the evils of the past by acknowledging them…but it did 
not match the vision we had for it. Many of the hopes we had 
for it did not come to pass, despite how much we called for 
them90.  
Introduction  
Chapter 5 has constructed a framework of institutional engagement, 
identifying the dimensions of ownership, inclusion and participation 
that together comprise the constellation of relationships between 
actors and institutions. Through the application of this framework onto 
the relationship between ex-combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone, 
this chapter analyses the normative (ritual) and structural (rhetoric) 
relationship between this population, and other elements of the local, 
and the TRC. It sheds empirical light on the institutional practices of 
exclusion that restricted and discouraged ex-combatant participation, 
and contributed to their larger experiences of exclusion from the TRC.  
A Summary of Institutional Engagement  
The institutional engagement framework constructed in Chapter 5 
conceptualises the relationship between the actors who affect, and 
those that are affected by, an institution. Any process or institution that 
seeks to impart an effect on a society inherently requires engagement 
of some form. This framework conceptualises institutional engagement 
to consist of three dimensions: ownership, inclusion and participation. 
Ownership interacts most directly with the normative domain (rhetoric), 
and refers to the body of transitional justice entrepreneurs that call for 
and establish a particular process and set its agenda. Inclusion 
captures the institutional level, and refers to the relationship between 
transitional justice actors in the design of transitional justice 
                                                          





institutional practices and activities (ritual). Lastly, participation reflects 
the practical level, capturing engagement of local transitional justice 
participants within the implementation of an institution’s activities 
directly (reality). In addition to this actor-based understanding of 
institutional engagement, these practices fall into one of two 
categories: engagement practices that are outreach oriented (top-
down knowledge transfer), and practices that are input-oriented (bi-
directional knowledge transfer).  
TRC Actors 
As operationalised in Chapter 1, transitional justice actors fall into two 
categories: entrepreneurs and local participants. Ownership and 
inclusion issues refer predominantly to engagement relationships 
between the TRC in Sierra Leone and its body of TRC entrepreneurs. 
The dimension of participation analyses institutional engagement 
practices in relation to the body of local TRC participants, including the 
ex-combatant community. However, these dimensions are not entirely 
distinct, and the treatment of participants as stakeholders means they 
are now relevant for the dimensions of inclusion and ownership (rather 
than simply participation). While this thesis therefore bases its analysis 
of institutional relationships and experiences along a framework of 
three dimensions, its analysis is not bound by their separateness, and 
recognises that these are not static or isolated elements.   
Institutional Engagement in Sierra Leone’s TRC  
Ownership in Sierra Leone’s TRC 
Within the ownership dimension of Sierra Leone’s TRC, three 
categories of TRC entrepreneurs contributed to the establishment of 
the TRC: civil society (TRC brokers), international actors (transitional 
justice experts) and the government of Sierra Leone (TRC 
implementers).  
Civil Society  
Civil society, as TRC brokers in Sierra Leone, played an instrumental 
role in the formation TRC, with calls for the institution’s original 





respondents strongly believe in the need for a formalised justice 
process as a pre-requisite for successful peacebuilding in Sierra 
Leone: to provide recognition, accountability and to shed light on the 
horrors of the war, and thereby contribute to societal healing and non-
recurrence of atrocities. The sentiment that “without some form of 
justice we were doomed to see the horrors of war return”91 is shared 
by civil society members who participated in the national consultations 
during this phase. Sierra Leone has a rich history of active justice-
seeking, evidenced in its dual legal system. Local court barrays, the 
traditional (informal) courts of Sierra Leone, which pre-date its colonial 
experience, exist alongside Western formal courts that were 
introduced with colonisation (Dale, 2008; M’Cormack-Hale, 2017). 
Historically, local court barrays have played (and continue to do so 
today) a significant role in community dispute resolution, providing a 
platform for community members to seek recognition of, and redress 
for, harms suffered. It is therefore unsurprising that calls for a formal 
justice process dedicated to the extraordinary circumstances of the 
war would emanate from ‘within’ Sierra Leone, reflective of the deeper 
justice-seeking practices that characterise the culture of recognition 
and redress for harms suffered that pre-date both the war and 
colonisation.  
Civil Society: Local and International  
The first calls for a TRC in Sierra Leone can be traced back to the 
efforts of two human rights organisations, Article 19, an international 
human rights organisation, and Forum of Conscience, a local human 
rights organisation. Forum of Conscience, led by John Caulker, is 
described by many civil society respondents as the primary local civil 
society organisation that advocated for the TRC on the local level. 
According to one civil society interviewee, “The TRC, and the need for 
some kind of accountability was our shared vision, and John led the 
movement that pushed for its creation”92. The first call for a TRC in 
Sierra Leone occurred in July of 1998, in a press release by Article 19, 
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which called for “the establishment of a Truth Commission in order to 
ascertain the true facts of the conflict and to assist efforts to find the 
right balance between the twin requirements of justice and 
reconciliation” (Lunn and Caulker, 2000, Appendix A; p. 1). Interviews 
with local civil society representatives in Sierra Leone reveal that the 
local appetite for justice among this population following the war was 
substantial. In describing the need for justice and accountability after 
the war, one civil society respondent stated that, “we needed justice 
after the war. It is well-known that without justice there can be no 
peace”93. The incorporation of a blanket amnesty provision in the 
peace negotiations was met with resistance by many, and seen by 
others as a “necessary but insufficient measure for peace”94. 
Spearheaded by Article 19 and Forum of Conscience, civil society in 
Sierra Leone pushed for the inclusion of a TRC as a “compromised but 
necessary form of justice”95 to provide some degree of 
acknowledgement, accountability and healing for wartime atrocities 
within the peace agreements leading to the end of the war; and 
continued to press for its expedient establishment in the post-war 
period.  
Consultations in the period leading to the TRC’s establishment took 
the form of several meetings between local and international 
transitional justice entrepreneurs, held for the purpose of identifying a 
viable path to peace in Sierra Leone. These consultations gave 
national human rights organisations (transitional justice brokers) a 
chance to influence the trajectory of transitional justice in Sierra Leone 
and to present a unified position on the need for a TRC (Selim, 2017). 
In July 1998, a UN Special Conference was held, where the idea of a 
TRC was discussed. This conference produced an inter-governmental 
Sierra Leone Contact Group, that met again in January 1999, where 
the idea of a TRC was again raised. In February 1999, a Human Rights 
Committee Meeting convened by UNOMSIL once again called for the 
establishment of a TRC as part of their recommendations for peace. A 
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June 1999 human rights manifesto that declared the establishment of 
a TRC as key in the “search for peace with justice and respect for 
human rights” (Lunn and Caulker, 2000, p. 13; Appendix J) was signed 
by the government, international and civil society actors. The UN, the 
primary transitional justice expert in Sierra Leone, pledged to provide 
technical assistance in the realisation of this transitional justice 
mechanism (Lunn and Caulker, 2000). According to Mahony and 
Sooka (2015), at the level of international ownership, it was the Office 
of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) in particular that 
“pressed for inclusion of a truth commission as a form of accountability 
that accommodated amnesty” (p. 37).  
Civil society respondents supported the establishment of a TRC as a 
path to justice in Sierra Leone primarily for two reasons: accountability 
and deterrence. Civil society envisioned a TRC that would enact a 
minimum degree of accountability through “acknowledgement”96 and 
contribute to conflict deterrence through a rich process of truth-telling 
that meant not only revealing “what happened but also why”97. 
Additionally, deterrence through reconciliation, was hoped for. A 
member of civil society reiterated that, “we needed reconciliation to 
ensure a lasting peace. Without it, the wounds of the past would never 
heal – they would fester”98. Civil society views around the role of, and 
space for, ex-combatants in the TRC differ, and resultantly no unified 
position around engagement with this population emerged in the 
research done for this thesis. Civil society representation of ex-
combatants and their justice needs is dealt with in further detail in the 
inclusion section of this chapter.  
The Lomé Peace Accord was signed in July 1999, and included a 
provision for a TRC (as well as the blanket amnesty which spurred 
much of the calls for the TRC in the first place), clearly evidencing the 
formative character of the consultations that preceded it, and revealing 
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a degree of formative local ownership at the level of civil society around 
the institution’s initial establishment.  
Government 
According to one of the chief negotiators of the Lomé Peace 
Agreement (a government official), the need for a TRC in the peace 
agreement was critical, as it was “through the TRC (that) the broader 
ambition of peacebuilding would be achieved”99. A week after the Lomé 
Agreement was signed, President Kabbah “pledged the unqualified 
support of his government to the process of reconciliation” (TRC Final 
Report, 2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 2, p. 49). Government ownership of the TRC 
was further achieved through its enactment of the TRC Act in 2000, 
firmly establishing the state as a TRC implementer.  
Ex-combatants 
No direct ex-combatant representation is evidenced in the 
consultations phase leading to the establishment of the TRC. 
Acceptance of the provision for a TRC could indicate broader ex-
combatant support for this mechanism of transitional justice if warring 
party leadership present at the negotiating table can be considered 
genuinely representative of the larger ex-combatant population. 
However, this does not appear to be the case. The chief negotiator for 
the Lomé Accord describes the incorporation of the TRC provision as 
successful primarily because:  
they were pre-occupied with the need for an amnesty, so as 
long as we had the amnesty we put in a clause for the TRC and 
hoped they would be happy enough not to see that we were 
still pushing for accountability”100.  
Short-sighted self-interest on the part of conflict party leaders, in 
combination with conflict fatigue by ex-combatants (Mitton, 2013) 
together indicate, at best, tacit consent towards the establishment of 
the TRC, and, at worst, the absence of representative leadership at the 
peace negotiating table.   
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Here the logic of assumed perpetrator participation is strongly 
evidenced – the calls for a TRC, in response to the blanket amnesty, 
by eliminating the possibility of punishment (understood in narrowly 
prosecutorial or punitive terms), was held as sufficient to ensure ex-
combatant participation therein, without consideration of their possible 
justice needs. In describing the infrastructure for participation in the 
TRC, one TRC official interviewee explained that, “to achieve 
accountability the TRC was special because it ensured accountability 
for perpetrators but also gave them a safe space to come forward. By 
removing the threat of punishment ex-combatants could come and 
confess freely”101.  
Local ownership for the TRC is strongly and formatively evidenced with 
the genesis of the TRC emanating from calls for justice, accountability 
and reconciliation by local civil society, with the support of international 
human rights advocates. The government, as an additional level of the 
local, showed its support for the TRC through its incorporation within 
the Lomé Peace Agreement and by pledging support for it.  Yet, it 
would be a mistake to label the genesis of Sierra Leone’s TRC fully 
locally-owned. International actors, in particular Article 19 and the UN, 
created an enabling operating environment for the consultations that 
allowed local civil society to present a unified position on the need for, 
and vision of, a TRC in Sierra Leone. It is therefore more accurate to 
characterise Sierra Leone’s TRC as a hybrid model of ownership, 
wherein both international and various levels of domestic ownership 
were present. Formative impact is evidenced for these three groups of 
transitional justice entrepreneur actors in the successful incorporation 
of provisions for the establishment of the TRC and its legal enactment 
through the TRC Act (2000). Civil society enjoyed both voice and 
agency in the ownership component of institutional engagement in the 
TRC, though representation of ex-combatants was largely absent. No 
dedicated space for their direct representation is evidenced at the level 
of civil society and a lack of consensus around the appropriate role and 
space for their involvement in the TRC showcases their exclusion at 
                                                          





this level. International ownership is also present, which enabled 
consultations to be formative and whose influence over the TRC (in its 
subsequent design and operations) only increased with time. The 
following section on inclusion analyses engagement practices with 
regards to the TRC’s subsequent design and operations, arguing that 
formative ownership does not in fact guarantee formative inclusion.  
Inclusion in Sierra Leone’s TRC 
Along the dimension of ownership, a combination of local and 
international transitional justice entrepreneurs together called for, and 
established, the TRC in Sierra Leone. Assessing inclusion in Sierra 
Leone’s TRC involves an analysis of engagement activities and 
developments in the period between the Lomé Agreement of 1999 
(during which the TRC was officially called for as part of the peace 
negotiations process) and the TRC’s statement-collecting and 
hearings phase (also referred to as its operational phase in the TRC 
Final Report - which will be discussed under participation in Chapter 
9). It is during this phase, of inclusion engagement practices, that the 
TRC’s mandate and design took shape, and wherein we can observe 
the role, agency and power relationships between different TRC 
actors.  
The TRC undertook both input and outreach-oriented engagement 
practices as part of its inclusion work. It engaged with several actors 
to cultivate an inclusive transitional justice process, in both formal and 
formative ways. The following analysis, of inclusion in the design and 
operations of the TRC, follows an actor-based approach.  
Transitional justice entrepreneurs in Sierra Leone’s TRC fall into two 
categories, the local, and the international. This analysis of inclusion 
as part of the TRC’s institutional engagement activities begins with the 
level of the local, first discussing the relationship between the TRC and 
the ex-combatant population, before treating other local actors. It 
subsequently looks at the role of international actors along the 





Inclusion of Ex-combatants 
Dougherty (2004) identifies ex-combatants as one of the four 
necessary groups whose participation in Sierra Leone’s TRC was 
“integral” to its “credibility” and success (p. 47). According to her, their 
participation was “considered essential to compiling a complete record 
of the conflict” (Dougherty, 2004, p. 47). However, despite their 
necessary participation (as local TRC participants), this study finds that 
ex-combatants were widely structurally excluded from direct or 
meaningful institutional engagement within the TRC, and that their role 
and relevance within the TRC was built on overly simplistic normatively 
constructed assumptions around their conflict experiences and post-
conflict needs and voices. As such, this study finds that ex-
combatants, while belonging to the category of explicitly-identified local 
TRC participants, were not meaningfully treated as stakeholders and 
did not receive the opportunity to inform the Commission’s operations 
or design as possible entrepreneurs. 
Civil Society and Ex-combatants 
Underpinning the need for civil society inclusion in TRCs more 
generally is the assumption that civil society broadly and genuinely 
represents local and affected populations more largely. Cornwall 
(2008) highlights that such categorisation risks homogenising groups 
whose members are diverse and may not self-identify as part of the 
group(s) they are lumped into and that the use of such categories 
“raises questions about the basis on which legitimacy is accorded to 
such defacto representatives” (Cornwall, 2008, p. 277). Given the role 
that civil society played as brokers of Sierra Leone’s TRC, can this 
segment of society be taken to appropriately have represented ex-
combatants within the TRC? As discussed in Chapter 7, interviews 
with civil society TRC brokers reveal two dominant narratives around 
the role and significance of ex-combatants within the TRC. The need 
for ex-combatant participation within the TRC is held by some as 
intrinsic; ex-combatants are seen by this group as a clear and 
necessary participant stakeholder group whose contributions to the 
TRC, through participation, were necessary to fulfil the Commission’s 





relevance of ex-combatants within the TRC as, “critical – the TRC was 
for everyone, to learn the truth and for us all to reconcile”102. However, 
a divergent understanding of ex-combatant participation is held by 
other members of civil society, who argue that ex-combatant 
participation served only an instrumental purpose; their participation 
was required only to further the grander aim of victim healing (in line 
with the wider rhetoric of transitional justice, illustrated in Chapter 4), 
and as such was desirable but not necessary. This latter narrative 
holds that DDR was dedicated to ex-combatant needs, while the TRC 
was established to provide redress for victims. Another member of the 
TRC Working Group illustrates this instrumentalised narrative of ex-
combatant participation within the TRC by holding that “the ex-
combatants had to confess (at the TRC) so that the victims could 
heal”103.  Both narratives are underpinned by the shared assumption 
of ex-combatants as guilty perpetrators, for which the TRC would 
provide a platform for apologies and forgiveness-seeking. Such 
external assumptions around choice and guilt do not reflect the reality 
of ex-combatant experiences, or the complexity of suffering, as 
elaborated in Chapters 4 and 7. In the words of former RUF fighter, 
Tony: “we did not all fight in the war, but we were all victims of it. I wish 
the TRC would have helped people to understand that”104. Civil society, 
as the primary conduit of the broader local within the TRC failed to 
effectively represent the voices and needs of ex-combatants, thereby 
contributing to their exclusion from meaningful institutional 
engagement therein.  
Together, the lack of direct engagement with ex-combatants, and a 
TRC premised around expectations of their participation but built on 
problematic external assumptions around their experiences and needs 
resulted in low ex-combatant institutional engagement within the TRC.  
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DDR and the TRC: a missed opportunity 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 7, a small but burgeoning literature 
on the nexus between DDR and transitional justice has begun to form. 
DDR, with its principal focus on the (ex-)combatant community, and 
having begun before the TRC was established, offered a unique 
opportunity for cross-institutional engagement that could have 
increased awareness of, support for, and participation in, the TRC 
among this population. It is notable then that no concrete relationship 
between these institutions was pursued, with only one formal meeting 
between TRC and NCDRR staff taking place. This highlights a crucial 
missed opportunity (Sesay and Suma, 2009) for institutional learning 
and cooperation to encourage ex-combatant engagement within the 
TRC.  
Outreach Engagement Activities 
While the TRC did not seek any direct or representative bottom-up or 
input-oriented engagement activities with the ex-combatant 
community, some efforts at outreach (top-down) activities were 
implemented. Outreach activities were underpinned by transitional 
justice entrepreneur concerns that ex-combatants would be reticent to 
participate in the TRC out of fear of reprisals or prosecution, due to the 
introduction of the SCSL, which was established after the TRC (the 
validity of these institutional concerns is critically examined in Chapter 
7). Unfortunately, by the time the SCSL was established, the majority 
of the TRC’s outreach and sensitisation campaigns had already been 
undertaken; the TRC had to therefore rely heavily on subsequent 
sensitisation and outreach work by the SCSL to allay ex-combatant 
concerns. Two targeted outreach activities merit attention. In response 
to concerns over potential ex-combatant fears of participating in the 
TRC linked to the advent of the SCSL, ICTJ funded a sensitisation 
project by local NGO, the Post-Conflict Reintegration Initiative for 
Development and Empowerment (PRIDE) (TRC Final Report, 2004, 
Vol. 1, Ch.5). This project involved sensitisation sessions with ex-
combatants, conducting a survey among them, and immediate 
statement-collection among this population thereafter (TRC Report, 





(2002), outreach-oriented engagement such as sensitisation is less 
effective in generating institutional understanding, support and 
participation than formatively consultative input-oriented activities. 
This, according to PRIDE (2002), accounted for the discrepancy 
between high reported levels of ex-combatant awareness of the TRC 
and low levels of understanding of the TRC. Additionally, the TRC 
supported awareness-raising outreach work, led by the local NGO 
Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), to “address the low level of 
statements given by members of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed 
Forces (RSLAF or SLA)” (TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, p. 
167). Despite these efforts however, “the number of statements given 
by members of the military remained low” (TRC Final Report, 2004, 
Vol. 1, Ch. 5, p. 167). This issue and possible explanations for low 
military participation are further discussed in Chapter 9, which is 
dedicated to analysing ex-combatant non-participation.  
The lack of direct engagement with ex-combatants, the problematic 
logic of assumed perpetrator participation, and inclusion activities 
limited to top-down outreach and awareness-raising culminated in low 
ex-combatant institutional engagement within the TRC. Inclusion was 
limited to top-down outreach activities, and moreover constrained in 
formative impact by a lack of effective representation and voice.  
The Government of Sierra Leone 
The Government of Sierra Leone played a significant role, as TRC 
implementers, in the establishment and operations of the TRC, 
particularly in the composition of the Commission and in exerting an 
influence over the scope of its subsequent (investigative) work.  
Government voice and agency within the design, and its impact on the 
operational agenda, of the TRC is clearly evidenced in several ways. 
Significantly, government influence over the TRC’s composition 
resulted in its elite political capture (discussed in detail below), which 
eroded its local legitimacy, and resulted in local perceptions of the TRC 





justice narrative of the war”105 by civil society, and as a “political witch 
hunt”106 by ex-combatants. 
Funding 
According to Dougherty (2004), “generally truth commissions are 
funded by their national governments” (p. 43). However, despite its 
commitment to provide support for the TRC (Mahony and Sooka, 
2015), the Kabbah government was “not in a position to offer much 
support” (Dougherty, 2004, p. 43). As a result, the TRC relied primarily 
on external international actors, in particular OHCHR, for financial 
support. The reliance of the TRC on external funds and the role played 
by external transitional justice experts in the design and operations of 
the TRC (as discussed below), expanded the scope of inclusion to 
include these international actors. The effect of this international 
inclusion was two-fold: on the one hand it expanded the formative 
space for inclusion to incorporate international actors with expertise in 
good governance and (transitional) justice, and who were independent 
from local political ties and biases. On the other hand, the TRC’s 
reliance on international support and the profound influence exerted 
by these transitional justice experts over the design and operations of 
the TRC, contributed to perceptions of the TRC as a “foreign 
process”107 and delegitimised it for many Sierra Leoneans. This 
tension is elegantly captured by Donais (2009) in his discussion on the 
problematic and necessary balancing act between external 
involvement and local ownership.  
Elite Political Capture 
From the outset, (civil society) calls for the establishment of a TRC in 
Sierra Leone stressed the importance of its independence. A 
consultative and transparent appointment process for its composition 
was considered necessary to ensure this independence. As early as 
February 1999, there were calls for TRC Commission members to be 
appointed “through consultations with all political, social, religious and 
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constituencies represented in the country” (Lunn and Caulker, 2000, 
Appendix F). In June 1999 Forum of Conscience reiterated that 
“independence from all political parties” should form a key principle in 
the composition of the proposed TRC, and that achieving this required 
an “open and transparent” appointments process (Lunn and Caulker, 
2000, Appendix I). International consultant and transitional justice 
expert Priscilla Hayner similarly suggested adopting “creative 
approaches to commissioner selection”, highlighting that “consultative 
processes…may increase the degree of legitimacy” of the Commission 
(Lunn and Caulker, 2000, Appendix M).  
Despite consistent calls for a transparent and consultative selection 
process within the TRC in order to safeguard its independence, Article 
3(3), in Part II of the TRC Act (2000) stipulated that both the 
Commission Chairman and Deputy Chairman were to be “appointed 
by the President”.  According to TRC Working Group Chairman, John 
Caulker, this formed the one percent deviation within the TRC Act, 
against the vision and expectations held for it by civil society. “We said 
this appointment should be left to the hands of the commissioners, but 
the government said no”108, resulting in the elite capture and 
politicisation of the TRC’s core composition, and this “one percent”109 
deviation “killed almost everything”110 that the TRC should have stood 
for. The entire TRC commissioner election process is described by 
Mahony and Sooka (2015)as “opaque” (p. 39), and the selection of its 
chairperson is held by members of civil society as a political move “to 
ensure that ruling party interests and a victor’s justice narrative”111 
would lead the work of the TRC. While OHCHR recommended Italian 
Bishop George Biguzzi to Chair the TRC, the government opted 
instead for staunch SLPP supporter Bishop Joseph Humper (Mahony 
and Sooka, 2015).  
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The politicisation of the TRC’s staffing did not end there. Mahoney and 
Sooka (2015) highlight that “the politics of the establishment of the 
TRC were complex” (p. 38). AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma was 
made chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace 
(CCP), responsible for overseeing the establishment of the TRC. 
According to Mahony and Sooka (2015) “Koroma’s appointment 
alienated the CCP from the RUF high command due to disintegrating 
relations between” (p. 38) them.  As such, accommodating the 
interests and representation of the RUF was not prioritised. 
Additionally, of particular note, was the appointment of Yasmin Jusu-
Sheriff, with strong and familial ties112 to the SLPP, as Interim 
Executive Secretary in the TRC. Her appointment was cause for much 
concern and controversy over the TRC’s independence. Newspaper 
reports claimed that Jusu-Sheriff’s appointment was “rammed through” 
(Dougherty, 2004, p. 42) by President Kabbah, despite 
recommendations for an alternative candidate by the TRC’s 
nominating committee. Opinions around Jusu-Sheriff were strongly 
polarised and she became a “lightening rod” within the TRC, with critics 
accusing her of incompetence and supporters exclaiming that she was 
a “scapegoat for the commission’s failings” (Dougherty, 2004, p. 42). 
As Interim Executive Secretary, Jusu-Sheriff appointed SLPP loyalists 
to key posts, despite objections from international consultants at the 
UN. According to one Commissioner “some of the staff hired by 
Yasmin did not appear to be very productive” (Sierra Leone Web, 
2002). Relations between the TRC on the one hand, and the UN and 
civil society on the other, were strained as a result of Jusu-Sheriff. She 
impeded international consultants in their efforts to initially set up the 
TRC, did not discuss TRC budget and strategic plans with them, and 
overrode their decisions, ultimately “making it impossible for the 
internationals to carry out their mandates” and delaying the operational 
phase of the TRC significantly (the TRC was not operational until 
November 2002) (Mahony and Sooka, 2015, p. 40). Management and 
                                                          
112 Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff is the daughter of Salia Jusu-Sheriff - prominent 
member of the SLPP and vice president of Sierra Leone between 1987 – 





staffing problems, largely attributed to Jusu-Sheriff, plagued the TRC’s 
preparatory phase (Dougherty, 2004; Sierra Leone Web, 2002) and 
culminated in a full-fledged staffing crisis in October 2002 (Dougherty, 
2004). Concerns over staffing recruitment were raised by UNDP as 
early as July 2002, when their review found approximately one third of 
TRC staff hired by Jusu-Sheriff to be unqualified, redundant and 
politically motivated (Dougherty, 2004). Calls to remove unqualified 
personnel did not result in any action by the TRC, and in October, when 
staff contracts expired, the TRC was left without a permanent 
secretariat in place. Reviews of new applications were brought to a halt 
when international commissioners questioned the fairness of the 
process (Dougherty, 2004). OHCHR, UNAMSIL and UNDP were 
asked to step in and lead staff recruitment, and Jusu-Sheriff “was not 
considered” (Dougherty, 2004, p. 43) for a permanent position in the 
TRC’s secretariat (Sierra Leone Web, 2002). A scathing newspaper 
commentary by the Sierra Leonean newspaper, Awareness Times (run 
by APC loyalist Sylvia Blyden - a journalist and former minister) in 2016 
reveals the depth and persistence of the controversy surrounding 
Jusu-Sheriff’s appointment and mismanagement of the TRC. Jusu-
Sheriff is described as bringing Sierra Leone “to shame” through her 
“very inappropriate manner of handling her duties; including employing 
her in-law(s)” (Awareness Times, 2016). She is further characterised 
as “a very primary cause behind the failure of the TRC to win the 
confidence of donors and be what it really should have been” 
(Awareness Times, 2016). “The stench of corruption around the 
recruitment done by the Secretariat she led” caused donors to lose 
faith in the TRC, and her “poor leadership derailed much of the (TRC’s) 
interim period which was a disaster on many fronts” (Awareness 
Times, 2016).  The profound politicisation of key positions in the TRC 
muzzled the scope and independence of the TRC, as “national 
commissioners found decisions (and issues) confronting” ruling party 
interests “extremely difficult” (Mahony and Sooka, 2015, p. 39).  
Civil Society 
Transitional justice efforts have traditionally been characterised by 





Dougherty (2004) “the involvement of civil society is generally seen as 
critical to the success of a TRC” (p. 41). Simangan (2017) reiterates 
this sentiment, highlighting that “various scholars argue transitional 
justice should listen to voices from below through” formative 
engagement that combines “participation and local agency” (p. 309). 
Civil society spearheaded calls for the establishment of the TRC in the 
first place, and its inclusion in the subsequent design was cemented 
through the establishment of the TRC Working Group.  
In August 1999, the TRC Working Group, chaired by Forum of 
Conscience’s John Caulker, was established (TRC Final Report, 2004, 
Vol. 1, Ch. 2). According to the TRC Report (2004) the Working 
Group’s purpose was:  
to involve Sierra Leonean civil society in the TRC process and 
to ensure that civil society’s concerns would be addressed in 
the design of the TRC Act and in the ways in which the 
Commission was going to undertake its task (Vol. 1, Ch. 5, p. 
157).  
According to John Caulker, the purpose of the Working Group was to 
“ensure that the views of Sierra Leoneans about how the TRC should 
operate were considered” (Caulker, 2012, p. 52).  
Members of the TRC Working Group describe it as “the bridge between 
the Commission and the people”113 whose function was to:  
give a voice to the people in the design of the Commission and 
its activities; widen the reach of the Commission to all corners, 
urban and rural, of the country; communicate the purposes and 
aims of the Commission throughout Sierra Leone; and ensure 
the cultural relevance of the TRC”114.  
Together, the mandate of the TRC Working Group, as understood by 
its members, would contribute significantly to ensuring “the highest 
participation with the largest potential for meaningful reconciliation and 
a full account of the war to emerge”115. Significantly, members of the 
TRC Working Group equally hold that their role was also one of 
national accountability, stating that “a core part of our function was to 
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localise the TRC”116, “to make sure the TRC worked in the justice 
interests of the people, and not the other way around”117 and:  
as the Working Group, it was our duty to advocate for a locally 
inclusive process, that would be embraced by Sierra Leoneans. 
As the only voice for the people, we stood at the frontline of 
legitimising the TRC and working to prevent its international 
capture”118.  
The sentiments of the TRC Working Group are mirrored by the 
international human rights advocacy group, Article 19, which played a 
significant role in both calls for the TRC and in supporting local civil 
society in Sierra Leone in their vision for, and work with, it. As early as 
March 1999 Article 19 emphasised the need for extensive public 
consultations on the structure and operations of the TRC. They argued 
that a broadly inclusive TRC would mobilise “local civil society and 
Sierra Leoneans and that this inclusion could help end the monopoly 
of official parties’ over the peace process” (Lunn and Caulker, 2000, 
p.13).  
Engagement with TRC brokers along the dimension of inclusion was 
therefore considered necessary to legitimise the TRC on the level of 
the local. Their inclusion was deemed necessary because they were 
seen to express the voices, interests and justice needs of the broader 
realm of the local in Sierra Leone. Engagement between the TRC and 
civil society, primarily the TRC Working Group, predominantly took the 
form of consultations. The Working Group itself also undertook 
engagement activities to gather local voices, facilitate discussions and 
disseminate information about the TRC across the country.  
In September 1999, the TRC Working Group, together with the 
National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR) 
published recommendations on the mandate and operations of the 
TRC. The two primary recommendations of a report produced by 
Article 19 and Forum of Conscience noted that the TRC should be 
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composed of both international and national commissioners, and that 
the TRC should operate with subpoena powers (Lunn and Caulker, 
2000). Both recommendations were incorporated into the final 
mandate of the TRC, evidencing formative inclusion for civil society 
voices, and granting them agency in influencing the design of the TRC. 
According to the TRC Working Group Chairperson, ultimately  the TRC 
Act substantively reflected the wishes and voices of the Working 
Group, who stated that “99 percent of that Act reflect(ed) our wish”119. 
However, members of the TRC Working Group emphasise three areas 
in which the TRC failed to translate their voices into influence, which 
significantly contributed to the TRC being seen as an “external 
imposition that lacked credibility and therefore could not be effective 
as a tool for genuine reconciliation”120. Firstly, poor public awareness 
and sensitisation of the TRC around the country is widely held to 
underpin low local inclusivity and perceptions of legitimacy. Secondly, 
calls for a localised approach to TRC operations went unheard. Lastly, 
the lack of transparency and consultations around the appointment of 
key TRC staff evidences its elite political capture, and was seen by civil 
society as an important indicator of the Commission’s politicisation. 
Together, the failure to translate civil society voice into influence along 
these dimensions highlights their restricted (or merely formal) inclusion 
in the TRC.  
Public Awareness 
Consistent calls from the TRC Working Group for increased public 
awareness, education and support activities throughout Sierra Leone, 
to enhance the breadth of inclusion went unheard. The draft TRC 
mandate, produced in September 1999 by UN Consultants, was only 
subject to “very limited circulation” (Lunn and Caulker, 2000, p. 15) 
within the country, despite requests by the TRC Working Group for 
wider distribution. The TRC Working Group organised two stakeholder 
workshops in October to broaden discussions around the draft 
mandate of the TRC between its architects (UN consultants) and the 
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wider population of civil society organisations. One of the UN 
consultants responsible for the draft TRC mandate participated in only 
one of the two workshops held, signalling a lack of commitment to 
broad inclusivity with civil society. Additionally, Article 19 together with 
the TRC Working Group proposed a number of ideas for promoting 
public awareness and support for the TRC to the UN, including 
expanded public sensitisation activities and the promotion of public 
ownership through the use of “share vouchers”, none of which 
materialised (Lunn and Caulker, 2000, p. 16). In February 2000 the 
final TRC Act was passed in Sierra Leone, without public 
consultations, and with limited distribution among civil society, despite 
calls for such engagement by the TRC Working Group. According to 
Article 19 and Forum of Conscience “a major opportunity to use the 
legislative process to build public support and understanding for the 
TRC had been missed” as a result (Lunn and Caulker, 2000, p. 16).  
Localising the TRC 
Since its establishment, the TRC Working Group advocated for a 
localised structure, calling for the creation of “mini commissions” 
(Caulker, 2012, p. 52) that would operate in all parts of the country, at 
the community level, and run by community members with training and 
external assistance from the TRC, that would feed into the overall 
reconciliatory aims of the TRC. According to one member of the TRC 
Working Group, such a localised approach was not only natural but 
necessary because:  
reconciliation was to take place everywhere and between 
people in their communities, so the TRC needed to come to 
them, and to help facilitate this healing. If we need to heal and 
reconcile in our own communities, in our everyday lives, this is 
where the TRC needed to take place121.  
As the TRC entered its operational phase, resource and time 
constraints inevitably limited both the reach and depth of its statement-
collecting and hearings activities. Statement-collecting took place over 
four months, and one week in each district was devoted to public 
hearings (TRC Final Report, 2004). Hearings were held in district 
                                                          





headquarter towns, with provisions made for the transportation of 
selected participants (selected primarily from among the statements 
collected in the statement-collecting phase) (TRC Final Report, 2004).  
According to TRC Working Group Chairperson John Caulker, there 
was “not enough time”122 allotted to hearings. Furthermore, holding 
them only in district headquarter towns kept the TRC “far away from 
many people”123. Despite the integral role of public participation in 
fulfilling the mandate of the TRC, limitations on time and reach of the 
hearings created significant barriers to participation. According to 
Dougherty (2004), people were eager to testify, but funding shortfalls 
and delays experienced by the TRC meant there was simply not 
enough time allocated to each province. Similarly, members of the 
TRC Working Group hold that the absence of a more localised 
approach to promoting participation (only holding hearings in urban 
centres around the country) made it impossible for many of those 
affected by the war to attend and participate. “For many Sierra 
Leoneans the TRC was simply not accessible”124 reiterated a member 
of the TRC Working Group.  
Finally, the politicisation of the TRC, in its composition and operations 
(as detailed above), formed a critical shortcoming that highlighted the 
increasingly formal character of inclusion practices, and contributed to 
low levels of cross-cutting participation and legitimacy.  
Consultations  
Engagement practices as part of inclusion took the form of both input 
and outreach-oriented activities during this phase of the TRC. The 
Commission clearly sought to create the kind of “communities of 
practice” (p. 272) envisioned by Quick and Feldman (2011), by 
fostering long-term and sustainable reconciliation and societal healing, 
an ambition inherent to the broader project of truth commissions. Yet, 
inclusion pursued by the TRC was limited in both scope and depth. 
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Due to the prescriptive character of civil society inclusion in the TRC, 
it is held to have, “at best contributed to moments of forgiveness 
without creating a larger process of community or national 
reconciliation”125. The restricted space for reconciliation within the TRC 
is echoed by other segments of the local, by respondents representing 
community members with diverse conflict experiences in areas where 
the TRC operated, civil society representatives, and those who worked 
directly with the TRC itself. Freddie, a former SLA soldier explained 
that, “reconciliation takes a long time. The TRC should have stayed if 
it was to really bring reconciliation to the communities”126. Similarly, 
one TRC official reiterated that, “reconciliation was an unreasonable 
ambition with the short time frame and budget we were given”127.  
Civil society, as the primary representative of the voices of local 
beneficiaries, was awarded an increasingly prescriptive (formal) voice 
in ongoing consultations, in the form of the TRC Working Group. 
Additionally, variance among civil society around whose needs the 
TRC should and did address indicate a lack of effective representation 
for the breadth of conflict experiences, all of whom were meant, at least 
in theory, to actively participate in, and benefit from, the platform for 
reconciliation and truth-telling offered by the TRC. This is particularly 
evident when considering the experiences of ex-combatants, labelled 
as perpetrators by the entire body of transitional justice entrepreneurs, 
including the TRC and civil society, whose needs did not receive 
dedicated expression as part of inclusion. Even the term ‘perpetrators’ 
used by the TRC to refer to the entire ex-combatant population is in 
and of itself indicative of the absence of representation and agency 
accorded to them. Many ex-combatants agree with the sentiment 
expressed by Darren, a former CDF fighter, that “this term was not fair. 
Yes I fought in the war, but I am not a perpetrator”128.  
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Role of Chiefs  
One significant dimension of consultative local inclusion in Sierra 
Leone’s TRC is the role accorded to local Chiefs in order to encourage 
participation and foster reconciliation among the local.  
One way to foster local inclusivity, build local ownership and promote 
participation is through utilising existing cultural practices and 
structures. The logic of participation here holds that the incorporation 
of cultural practices and structures creates more locally familiar and 
relevant processes and thereby increases local ‘buy in’. However, 
identifying appropriate pre-existing structures and practices is key to 
the success of such engagement activities, and forms another way to 
observe the breadth and formative character of engagement. 
The TRC utilised Sierra Leone’s chieftaincy structures in an effort to 
“legitimise reconciliation” (Mahony and Sooka, 2015, p. 46). The 
decision to base reconciliation “on the country’s own culture, tradition, 
and values” (Mahony and Sooka, 2015, p. 46) by involving chiefs and 
religious elders reflected an attempt to increase local ownership of the 
TRC’s reconciliatory mandate. However, this approach was 
problematic as it actually resulted in using the “very power structures 
that fermented conflict to enable reconciliation” (Mahony and Sooka, 
2015, p.46). Friedman (2017) reiterates the risks that accompanied 
such an effort at localisation, among Sierra Leone’s alternative 
reconciliation efforts, notably that of the grass-roots organisation 
Fambul Tok. She highlights that while Fambul Tok’s engagement with 
the chiefdom system in Sierra Leone helped provide “ownership and 
legitimacy” (Friedman, 2017, p. 120) it simultaneously risked 
“reinforcing pre-war social hierarchies and inequalities” (p. 121). The 
issue of chieftaincy in Sierra Leone, its role in causing and enabling 
the conflict, and as a conduit of local reconciliation, was fraught with 
challenges in the TRC. According to Mahony and Sooka (2015) the 
TRC was constrained in its ability to investigate and shed light on the 
role of chieftaincy as a contributing factor to the war, from the outset.  
Local chiefs in Sierra Leone play a historically significant role in 





politicised, by both colonial and successive governments (Enria, 
2015). While evidence on the role of chieftaincy and patrimonial power 
structures as contributing to the onset and continuation of the war now 
abounds, the TRC elected to adopt an engagement strategy that relied 
heavily on “chiefs, elders and religious institutions” (TRC Final Report, 
2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, p. 144). A study by a local NGO, Manifesto 99, 
commissioned by OHCHR to identify traditional methods of 
reconciliation and conflict resolution, identified chiefs, elders and 
religious institutions as significant local structures for facilitating and 
promoting reconciliation on the community level (TRC Final Report, 
2004). The TRC therefore elected to adopt an engagement strategy to 
promote local ownership that intimately involved local chiefs in its 
operations, to increase the institution’s local legitimacy and cultivate 
local ownership of the process. TRC investigators were required to 
obtain local chief consent before conducting their investigations, and 
chiefs participated in TRC hearings as part of the concluding 
reconciliation ceremonies (Kelsall, 2005).   
Mahony and Sooka (2015) highlight that the requirement to obtain 
chieftaincy consent by TRC investigators “diminished investigators’ 
ability to anonymously contact and interview witnesses” (p. 46). This 
weakened the capacity to “procure authentic testimony relating to the 
effects of chieftaincy power” (Mahony and Sooka, 2015, p. 46). 
Secondly, the issue of chieftaincy and addressing it, polarised the TRC 
at the level of its Commissioners as well. According to Mahony and 
Sooka (2015), “some domestic commissioners were especially 
hesitant about seriously addressing the chieftaincy issue” (p. 46) which 
left other Commissioners feeling they were “not able to go as far as 
they felt the evidence demanded in citing chieftaincy and patrimonial 
power structures as causing and enabling the conflict” (p. 46). Discord 
among Commissioners around addressing the chieftaincy issue 
evidences elite capture that ultimately negatively impacted the TRC’s 
ability to function effectively and without bias. This negative impact is 
further evidenced in the TRC Report, wherein “Sierra Leone’s 
patrimonial power structures were not attributed the responsibility the 





p. 46). This sentiment is echoed by a respondent in Sierra Leone’s 
justice sector in their statement that “justice, and transitional justice, is 
undeniably a political enterprise, shaped and also limited by the 
agendas of those who enforce it”129.   
Finally, chiefs were given a role in the reconciliation activities of the 
TRC, in particular in the reconciliation ceremonies that concluded TRC 
Hearings. While Kelsall (2005) emphasises the use of “traditional 
leaders” (p. 386) in the TRC as enabling reconciliation and diffusing 
tensions, Mahony and Sooka (2015) point out the darker side of this 
practise, whereby youth and perpetrators were required to “re-
subordinate themselves to the very power structures they cite as the 
source of their discontent and against which they rebelled” (p. 47). The 
role that chiefs played in “accepting and authenticating ex-combatant” 
(Mahony and Sooka, 2015, p. 47) apologies and directing their 
reconciliation within communities mirrored the power inequalities that 
lay at the root of the civil war in the first place. Ex-combatants who 
participated in a conflict geared towards dismantling inequitable power 
structures were made to ‘repent’ to chiefs, individuals who benefit(ted) 
from the structures of power that enabled that very conflict. This 
attempt at formative local inclusion served to further alienate the ex-
combatant community from the TRC, effectively delegitimising it and 
rendering perceptions of the TRC as a political “witch hunt”130.  
International Actors 
On the international level, along the dimension of inclusion, the TRC 
engaged with, and relied on, international support to shepherd its 
design, funding and operations. Several arms of the UN, OHCHR in 
particular, played a significant role within the TRC as transitional 
justice experts. OHCHR “led the process of establishing the TRC” and 
far exceeded its original commitment to providing merely “technical 
support” (Mahony and Sooka, 2015, p. 38). Its role in designing the 
Commission “was much more significant than that of any” other 
external state actor (Mahony and Sooka, 2015, p. 38). According to 
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Dougherty (2004), “OHCHR played an unprecedented role” in Sierra 
Leone’s TRC, “involving itself in every phase of the development of the 
Commission” (pp. 42-43). Furthermore, Sierra Leone’s TRC 
“represented OHCHR’s first substantial undertaking in support of a 
transitional justice mechanism anywhere in the world” (Dougherty, 
2004, p. 42). The three international Commissioners that gave the TRC 
its hybrid composition were selected by OHCHR, which allowed 
“national familiarity and international expertise to complement one 
another” (Dougherty, 2004, p. 42). The benefits of such hybridity are 
well recognised, but as Donais (2009) demonstrates, difficult to 
achieve in praxis. International inclusion served an important watchdog 
function and provided the financial backing that made the TRC 
operational. International Commissioners were more openly critical 
than their national counterparts, who were reticent to challenge ruling 
and established elites. However, it also fomented discontent on the 
local level, wherein this internationalisation was experienced as local 
disengagement and transitional justice imperialism. As the primary 
architect and administrator of the TRC, OHCHR exerted an influence 
proportionate to that role, establishing a hierarchy of agency along the 
dimension of inclusion among transitional justice entrepreneurs. 
Members of civil society, within the TRC Working Group and outside 
it, felt side-lined and considered their inclusion in the TRC increasingly 
prescriptive in character. According to one member of the Working 
Group:  
establishing the Working Group was necessary. We, in the 
Working Group, saw it as a signal of the TRC’s commitment to 
really engaging with us. But it became clearer over time that 
they didn’t really want to listen to us131. 
 Another reiterated that “the Working Group meetings with the TRC 
became a disappointment. The TRC was more interested in pleasing 
the donors and listening to outsiders than letting us really speak for the 
country”132. Thus, while inappropriate engagement with local culture 
and traditions (see above discussion on the role of chiefs) further 
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marginalised ex-combatants from the TRC, Friedman (2017) also 
notes that outright insufficient engagement of local culture and 
traditions were additionally particularly grave shortcomings that 
cultivated disappointment and discontent towards the TRC.  
In conclusion, along the dimension of inclusion, clear power 
asymmetries between different transitional justice entrepreneurs in 
Sierra Leone’s TRC come to the fore. Ex-combatants remained directly 
excluded from institutional engagement, and civil society 
representation of this group was neither unified nor representative. As 
the only non-state group of local actors belonging to the body of TRC 
entrepreneurs on the level of the local, civil society engagement within 
inclusion took on an increasingly prescriptive character. This bred 
discontent and strained cooperation between the TRC Working Group 
and the TRC itself. The government of Sierra Leone exerted a high 
degree of influence over the design of the TRC, though this agency 
was corrupted and resulted in the politicisation of the TRC’s 
composition and investigations. International actors played an 
important role in providing international expertise and serving an 
external watchdog function, though ultimately also exerted a 
disproportionate influence over the TRC’s designs and operations that 
curtailed the formative inclusion of other actors. Along the dimension 
of inclusion, TRC institutional engagement exhibited an increasingly 
shallow depth and narrow scope, with agency concentrated in the 
hands of unrepresentative national and international actors. According 
to the TRC Working Group Chairperson “the TRC we got was not the 
TRC we asked for”133.    
Conclusion 
Given the particular significance accorded to participation, this 
dimension of institutional engagement will be treated in detail in the 
subsequent chapter of this thesis, Chapter 9.  
                                                          






This chapter has applied the framework of institutional engagement 
developed in Chapter 5, to identify and empirically assess the 
structural relationship between the TRC in Sierra Leone and the ex-
combatant community in particular, and between the TRC and its 
larger population of transitional justice actors more generally. This 
framework draws from the literature on participatory approaches that 
has become mainstreamed in transitional and development research, 
and presents a more nuanced understanding of the inherent questions 
of power, agency and voice that underpin relationships between 
institutions and actors. This examination has exposed the consistent 
and structural exclusion of ex-combatants from meaningful institutional 
engagement, despite their identification as a necessary and vulnerable 
transitional justice participant category. Institutional engagement with 
other TRC entrepreneurs on the level of the local, namely civil society 
and the Government of Sierra Leone, showcases power asymmetries 
and the exploitation of agency. Institutional engagement with civil 
society exhibits, empirically, a decrease in depth and influence as 
engagement moved from ownership to inclusion. Conversely, national 
government agency increased across the two structural dimensions of 
institutional engagement, resulting in the elite political capture of the 
TRC with detrimental effects on its effectiveness and scope of 
investigations. At the international level, international actors played an 
important role, as transitional justice experts, in providing external 
expertise and support for the TRC, but also contributed to alienating 
local engagement. This highlights the practical challenges in balancing 
international involvement against the need to formatively involve, and 
buttress, local voices and capacities. Appropriate breadth and depth of 
institutional engagement underlie the logic of participation that 
effective institutional engagement requires. This is a balancing act that 
the case of Sierra Leone proves is difficult to achieve in practice. 
Chapter 9 will conclude this thesis’s discussion on institutional 
engagement and experiences by assessing ex-combatant (non-






Perpetrator Participation in Sierra Leone’s 
TRC: the untold ex-combatant story 
  
I was a fighter; I was also a victim. We need justice too – the 
ones that fought for our lives, and our families and our country. 
Tell the TRC to come back and hear our stories, to understand 
that we had no choice, and that we are not just fighters. We still 
struggle, and they should come back to help us134.  
Introduction 
This chapter is the second of two institutional engagement chapters 
that together capture the experiences of ex-combatants and the TRC. 
Chapter 8 has analysed practices of TRC institutional engagement in 
relation to ex-combatants along the dimensions of ownership and 
inclusion. Together, these two experience chapters (Chapters 8 and 
9), applying the institutional engagement framework built in Chapter 5, 
build on gaps in the broader participatory programming discourse. 
They advance and apply a more concrete and nuanced framework of 
institutional engagement practices, using the illustrative case of the 
problematic participation of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone. This 
chapter critically engages with the practical dimension (the reality) of 
the TRC in Sierra Leone, critiquing its practice of justice seeking, and 
argues that restrictions in its normatively derived (rhetoric) and 
institutionally defined participation model (ritual) created significant 
barriers to meaningful ex-combatant participation therein.  
The previous chapter has conceptualised institutional engagement in 
the context of TRCs, and applied this framework of engagement to 
Sierra Leone. It has used the experiences of ex-combatants to shed 
empirical light on their experiences of agency and exclusion along the 
dimensions of ownership and inclusion, within this restorative model of 
transitional justice. This chapter presents an empirical examination of 
ex-combatant experiences of non-participation, as the final dimension 
of TRC institutional engagement. Participation requires a separate and 
                                                          





dedicated space for investigation and consideration as it is within this 
dimension that engagement with affected populations (local 
transitional justice participants) is most highly sought. This chapter 
proceeds firstly with a theoretical analysis of the model of participation 
in truth commissions. An overview of participation within the structural 
context of Sierra Leone’s TRC is provided, followed by a brief summary 
of participation expectations held by the ex-combatant community 
specifically. The conflicts inherent to the general model of truth 
commission participation that deter ex-combatant participation are 
identified before turning to a substantive examination of these 
problems. This examination applies and expands on Nwogu’s (2010) 
three-part argument on the problematic narrative structure of truth 
commission participation, in relation to perpetrators specifically. 
According to Nwogu (2010), truth commissions fail to achieve their own 
attainable goals by failing to adequately investigate the motivations 
that underlie past violence; by placing binary narrative restraints on 
participation; and by elevating victim voices over perpetrator 
participation. Expanding on her work, this chapter contributes to an 
overall understanding of participation constraints and limitations in 
truth commissions by elucidating external and voluntary sources of 
exclusion (or participation deterrents) experienced by ex-combatants 
in Sierra Leone.  
Truth Commissions and Participation: a theoretical analysis 
The following section presents a theoretical analysis of participation 
within the context of truth commissions, as a restorative mechanism of 
transitional justice. It addresses the following questions: What does 
participation in TRCs mean according to their proponents and 
architects? What does participation achieve? Whose participation is 
sought, and why? And finally, why is this conventional model of 
participation problematic? The case of Sierra Leone is used throughout 
to illustrate the practice and associated problems of this model of 
participation.  
As outlined in Chapter 5, participation is the third and final dimension 





two dimensions of institutional engagement) comprise the structural 
components of institutional engagement, participation captures 
engagement between institutional actors (transitional justice 
entrepreneurs) and its local participants within the substantive 
activities of a particular process or institution. Institutional engagement 
along the dimensions of ownership and inclusion is widely geared 
towards enhancing engagement through participation in the 
substantive activities of an institution. According to the logic of 
participation (see Chapter 5), which underpins the advocacy and 
mainstreaming of participatory programming, highly locally-owned and 
inclusive processes bolster subsequent participation, through the 
mechanism of legitimacy which inclusion and ownership enhances. 
For TRCs, participation takes place within their statement-collecting 
and hearings activities135. The space for participation within TRCs is 
therefore small, restricted to one or two substantive activities. Yet the 
ambitions attached to such participation, of fostering healing, social 
repair and reconciliation, are lofty.  
What Does Participation Achieve? 
Participation is a defining feature of truth commissions. In her 2011 
revised definition of TRC aims Hayner (2011) states that a truth 
commission “engages directly and broadly with the affected 
population, gathering information on their experiences” (p. 12). The 
explicit incorporation of broad, direct and high participation as a 
constitutive element of TRCs is absent from her original 2001 
definition; the addition of participation to her revised 2011 definition 
evidences its increasing significance as a defining feature of TRCs 
over time. The need for participation, and the high intrinsic levels of 
participation attached to TRCs by their proponents, is fundamentally 
tied to the role that participation plays in achieving the aims of this 
mechanism of transitional justice. TRC aims can be grouped into three 
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categories: truth-telling, restoration and deterrence. Fulfilment of all 
aims requires participation, most saliently that of truth-telling 
(establishing a historical record). According to Macdonald (2013), 
TRCs enjoy a “significant advantage” in truth-telling because their high 
inherent degree of participation generates a “broad perspective” on 
past episodes of violence (p. 91). The “particular practice of memory” 
(Millar, 2015, p. 242) implicit within truth commissions requires high 
local participation in order to be realised. This “collective memory 
project” (Nwogu, 2010, p. 276) that requires participation serves not 
only to elucidate the events of the past, but significantly, also to 
uncover its underlying causes and motivations. According to Hayner 
(2006), a truth commission “must aim to understand the origins of past 
conflict and the factors that allowed abuses to take place” (p. 296). 
Participation that is “inclusive of a wide range of perspectives” (Hayner 
2006, p. 296) is a prerequisite to achieving such understanding. 
Nwogu (2010) reinforces this, arguing that a critical feature of truth 
commissions is that they effect “justice through a collective memory 
project…intended to provide an understanding of the violent past, 
repair social relations between warring parties and offer a lasting 
reminder of the atrocities to deter future generations” (p. 277).  
Participation Within the Constructs of Sierra Leone’s TRC  
The Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999 called for the establishment of a 
TRC that would “provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators 
of human rights violations to tell their story, get a clear picture of the 
past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation” (Art. 
XXVI). The TRC Act of 2000 established the objects of the 
Commission, mandating it to “create an impartial historical record” 
(Part III, Art. 6(1)) of the war. The TRC Final Report (2004) reiterates 
the purposes of the TRC as a body established to “promote 
reconciliation by providing an opportunity for victims to give an account 
of the violations and abuses suffered and for perpetrators to relate their 
experiences, and by creating a climate which fosters constructive 
interchange between victims and perpetrators” (Vo. 1, Ch. 1, p. 25). 





was the heart of the TRC”136, “without it there could be no TRC. 
Everything we did, we did to get people to participate. A TRC only 
works if people participate”137.  
Participation not only stemmed from legitimacy, but according to TRC 
officials, also served an external legitimising function for the 
Commission, which had to share the transitional justice stage with the 
SCSL. 
The Court (SCSL) had all the resources – the money, the 
experts. We (the TRC) had only meagre funds and time. But 
we had the people – by participating them we had a credibility 
that the Court never did. Participation gave us the legitimacy as 
a serious justice process to stand tall next to the Court. Even 
today, people know the TRC more than the Court, because the 
people participated in the TRC, not the Court138.  
The participatory framework upon which the TRC was built was 
therefore necessary for it to achieve its mandated truth-telling and 
reconciliation aims, but also imbued it with institutional credibility in a 
context of tense co-existence between multiple transitional justice 
mechanisms. Over the course of the truth commission’s participation 
activities in Sierra Leone, this “nationwide exercise in truth-telling from 
late 2002 to August 2003, memories of violence were gathered as 
written statements, narrated during public hearings and broadcast on 
the country’s electronic media” (Shaw, 2007, p. 184). Ultimately, the 
TRC collected over 7,000 statements (TRC Final Report, 2004).   
Whose Participation? 
Truth commissions are structurally obligated to seek participation from 
a cross section of conflict affected populations. The need for broader 
‘non-victim’ participation (in particular that of perpetrators) has already 
been established in Chapter 6. Sierra Leone’s TRC Final Report 
(2004) elaborates the statement-taking protocols and obligations that 
underpinned its participation work. It required statement-takers to 
“collect statements from both victims and perpetrators”, reiterating that 
“the purpose of the Commission is to give an opportunity to victims, 
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perpetrators and witnesses to the conflict to speak about their 
experiences” (Vol. 1, Ch. 5, p. 184; p. 185). In its manual for statement-
takers the Report (2004) emphasised that “the Commission is for 
everybody; it is to seek truth and promote reconciliation” (Vol. 1, Ch. 5, 
p. 185). The relationship between cross-cutting participation and truth-
seeking is once again apparent in the Commission’s mandate 
discussion (TRC Final Report, 2004), wherein it is asserted that “’truth’, 
including ‘historical truth’, must by definition be impartial. A ‘partial’ 
truth is no truth at all” (Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 32).  
Perpetrator expectations of the TRC in Sierra Leone 
The question of expectations around TRC participation, on both 
institutional and individual (ex-combatant) levels has been addressed 
in Chapter 7 where significant divergence has been revealed. For the 
ex-combatant community, the TRC should have been a place for the 
sharing of wartime experiences, and to catalyse broader reconciliation 
by achieving an understanding of these experiences through their 
contextualised narratives. What they in fact witnessed was a process 
that demanded confession and restricted the complexity of their 
experiences to “what they did, and not why they did it”139. 
While ex-combatants expected the TRC to provide a platform for the 
expression of contextualised narrative experiences, this does not 
mean that ex-combatants did not also hold justice expectations 
towards the Commission. Indeed, the notion of the TRC as a place for 
“perpetrators to confess”140 their crimes and wartime wrongs is widely 
linked to the TRC among this population, and it is generally seen as a 
platform wherein perpetrators could and should have “explained 
themselves”141 and asked for forgiveness. However, interviewed low to 
mid-level ex-combatants who constitute the majority of the ex-
combatant population, and who fall within the category of ‘perpetrators’ 
(alongside higher level commanders and architects of violence), 
overwhelmingly do not self-identify as perpetrators, and therefore 
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consider this purpose of participation as removed from their own 
potential role as participants in the TRC. They did not consider 
themselves therefore to be the appropriate participants of the TRC with 
regards to the classification of their wartime experiences imposed by 
the TRC.  
Interviewed ex-combatants agree the TRC was established in order to 
“learn the truth about the war”142 by collecting people’s experiences 
and creating a “comprehensive history”143 by consolidating these 
honest and contextualised narratives from its participants. However, 
many hold the conflict narrative produced by the TRC Report to be 
“incomplete”144, in two ways. Firstly, low levels of ex-combatant 
participation in the TRC inherently limited the TRC’s ability to gather a 
comprehensive history of the war, from exactly the population with the 
most direct experience of it. As one civil society respondent (TRC 
broker) said “the TRC did not talk to the right people (ex-combatants) 
in the right way. The ex-combatants were a critical but untapped 
resource for getting to the truth, but we did not engage them the right 
way”145.  Secondly, many ex-combatants claim that not only did their 
non-participation guarantee an incomplete historical narrative, but also 
an inaccurate one. It is unsurprising to observe ex-combatants 
question the legitimacy or veracity of the narratives produced by the 
TRC that “demonised”146 the groups or people for which they fought, 
with many former RUF combatants in particular holding that the “TRC 
blamed us (the RUF) for everything”147. However, beyond this, a 
number of ex-combatant respondents claim that several specific 
testimonies collected by the TRC were false; these testimonies would 
have been disproven through corroborating statements by other ex-
combatants, if those statements had been collected in the first place. 
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Felix recounted hearing a former RUF comrade’s testimony on the 
radio:  
At first I was surprised to hear his name and recognise his 
voice. But then I was more surprised by what he was saying, 
claiming he was fighting with the RUF in the North during the 
war when he was with me in my unit, and we were never in the 
North. I would have told them the truth, if they had asked me148. 
Another ex-combatant, Hector, forcibly recruited as a child-soldier into 
the ranks of the RUF, who was named in the Commission’s Final 
Report, but who never directly participated in the TRC, shared that: 
Yes I did some bad things, and some of what they reported 
about me is true. But not all of it is. They knew my name and 
where I was, but no one from the TRC ever contacted me to 
get the truth from me – who else can know the truth about what 
I did, or why? They should have talked to me149. 
Despite the explicit obligation to ensure cross-cutting participation, the 
practice and discourse of truth commissions widely posits that these 
bodies are ‘victim-oriented’. The restorative aims of such commissions 
refer significantly to the restoration of victim dignity and facilitating 
social repair through victim healing and reconciliation.  A fundamental 
conflict between victim primacy and the collective memory ambitions 
of truth commissions begins to emerge. This is further compounded 
when considering the reconciliation ambitions of these bodies, a 
concept which is treated in more detail in the next chapter of this thesis 
(Chapter 10).  
The Problematic Model of Truth Commission Participation 
Nwogu (2010) elegantly captures some of the participatory 
shortcomings of TRC practices in relation to perpetrators. She argues 
that “TRCs as a transitional justice mechanism, have fallen short of 
what is achievable within the context of their own aspirations” (Nwogu, 
2010, p. 276). This failure is “due primarily to the structural application 
of the narrative process” (p. 275) in three main ways. TRCs neglect an 
examination of the motivations behind violent actions; participant 
(victim and perpetrator) voices are restrained into archetypal binary 
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collective accounts; and finally, victim voices are elevated over 
perpetrators within TRCs. This chapter applies and expands Nwogu’s 
(2010) three-part argument on the problematic narrative structure of 
TRC participation; ex-combatant experiences of non-participation in 
Sierra Leone’s TRC are used to illustrate the Commission’s 
participatory shortcomings.  
Motivations 
Chapter 4 has discussed the importance of local actor motivations as 
a critical component of truth-telling; however, to-date truth 
commissions have largely ignored motivations in their memory-
collecting endeavours. The absence of motivations as part of the 
memory-collecting project in truth commissions fundamentally restricts 
the scope and transformative power of this truth-telling work. 
According to Nwogu (2010), the first problematic narrative condition of 
truth commissions “results from a disproportionate focus on the what, 
where and how of particular outcomes, which undermines the repair of 
social relations in the long term” (p. 276). Truth commissions “focus 
too much on memory-making marked by the narration of events, 
paying little or no attention to the…motivations of its agents, in the 
mental universe of its most humble perpetrators” (Nwogu, 2010, p. 
277). Nwogu (2010) argues that “accessing the underlying reasons for 
human rights violations is already clearly articulated in TRC 
mandates”, which are empowered to “investigate the foundations of 
violence if they so choose” (p. 279). The case of Sierra Leone is no 
exception, whose TRC was mandated to “investigate and report on the 
causes, nature and extent of the violations and abuses” of the war 
(TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 25). The TRC Act (2000) 
also explicitly outlines the appropriateness and need for the role of 
motivations in relation to the civil war; it called upon the Commission 
to uncover “to the fullest degree possible, including their antecedents, 
the context in which violations and abuses occurred” (Part III, Art. 6). 





she shared, “the TRC told us about what happened in the war, but not 
why”150. Another civil society respondent echoes this sentiment: 
The TRC failed in answering the ‘why’ question. It demanded 
only that the ex-combatants come forward and recount what 
they did, but did not give them the space or freedom to tell why 
they did these things – the record is incomplete and less useful 
as a result151.  
This narrative condition that neglects motivations thereby withholds a 
“democratising truth” (Nwogu, 2010, p. 279). Instead a demonstrative 
truth is sought, as highlighted by Posel’s discussion on South Africa’s 
TRC (2002). She argues that the South African TRC aimed “to produce 
enough truth to demonstrate and exemplify the inequalities of the past. 
A sample of the truth rather than the whole would suffice” (Posel, 2002, 
p. 157). Each ex-combatant interview conducted for this thesis, 
concluded by asking: ‘Is there anything else you would like to say or 
share before we end the interview?’152 Overwhelmingly, respondents 
used the opportunity provided by this question to elaborate the details 
around the sequence of events that resulted in their conflict 
participation as fighters, and resultantly their entry into the status of 
‘perpetrators’ according to the participation framework offered by the 
TRC. Even though the question of what prompted their transformation 
into combatants was previously asked, as part of the interview guide, 
over 85 percent of respondents repeated, and elaborated on, the 
details of why they fought in the war. Junior, an ex-combatant living in 
a slum in Freetown recounted: 
I was starving. I am a welder, even now I can barely feed myself 
– I have no wife or children. But then, during the war, it was 
even worse. There was no work for me, and I saw the rebels 
(RUF) had food and guns. They could offer me safety, so I 
joined. I fought so I could live153.  
Abdul, a former CDF fighter living in Bo also explained the reasons 
why he joined the fighting: 
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The government and the RUF were destroying the country, 
destroying the community. Nobody was fighting for the people 
– only the CDF. Injustice was everywhere. They raped my 
sister. I joined the CDF so that I could protect my family, and 
my community. To save the country from them who were eating 
it154.  
Michael, living in Makeni, recounts an altogether different, though also 
common entry into combatant ranks:  
I was forced to join the RUF. I was not a child, but still I had no 
choice. They came and stabbed my daughter, and they told me 
either I join or they would take my son. I had no choice. They 
took me from my family155.  
The pervasive use of this open opportunity in interviews, by ex-
combatant respondents, to express the motivations and reasons that 
transformed them into combatants evidences the degree to which 
motivations are indispensable to the wider ambitions of truth, memory 
and understanding. Jonathon, a former RUF fighter, was adamant in 
describing his conflict participation and the motivations for why: 
I am from here (Makeni). This is my home, it’s where I have 
lived most of my life. Not in the bush, but here in Makeni. One 
day, the soldiers came and they saw my brother. My brother 
was a big man, everyone listened to him and he made people 
laugh. The soldiers told him to carry their supplies for them. My 
brother said no, he would not do their job for them. The soldier 
men were angry, at the disrespect my brother gave them, and 
made an example of him on the street. They took him and put 
him inside tires they collected. We screamed, and begged for 
them to stop. They put him in the tires and set it on fire. They 
laughed and told us that this was the price of his disrespect. 
That is when I joined the war. I went to the rebels (RUF), they 
were easy to find, and I said I needed justice for my brother, 
and they told me that if I joined them that we would bring justice 
to the country. This is why I fought. When the TRC came, I 
heard they came to reconcile us. They talked to the victims to 
hear their stories, but the fighters – they only wanted to know 
what we did, and make us ask forgiveness. They didn’t ask why 
I fought, what my story was. I fought for justice, I experienced 
injustice: why should I be sorry?156 
Dimitrijevic (2006) advances the need to uncover perpetrator 
motivations in truth commissions as linked to their broader justice 
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foundations. He argues for reframing the “foundational justification” (p. 
368) of truth commissions, towards emphasising “the lost sense of 
justice in the community of perpetrators” (p. 369). By placing greater 
primacy on uncovering perpetrator motivations and the sequencing of 
events that led to abuses, truth commissions stand to fulfil their aims 
of “reconstructing moral foundations of a proto-democratic polity” 
(Dimitrijevic, 2006, p. 373). The contribution to justice that truth 
commissions can make is therefore expanded in Dimitrijevic’s (2006) 
work, moving from the conventional short-sighted focus on justice for 
victims, to illuminating and addressing the root injustices experienced 
by ‘perpetrators’.   
Binary Narrative Restraint 
The second problematic narrative condition practiced in truth 
commissions’ model of participation, is that of binary narrative 
restraint, discussed in Chapter 4. The dichotomy of designated conflict 
identities, of victim and perpetrator, dominate the discourse and 
practice of truth commissions, and underpin this thesis’s critical 
investigation. Several studies criticise the structural application of 
simple, binary categories of conflict identities that truth commissions 
impose, which fail to accommodate the complexity of lived conflict 
experiences or distinguish between action and identity. Humphrey 
(2002) discusses the homogenisation of individual experiences 
“through dominant narratives about those events” (p. 116). Kilroy 
(2014) and Borer (2003) similarly warn of the dangers in transferring 
generalised group assessments to all individuals within that group. 
According to Nwogu (2010), truth commissions enforce archetypical 
participation by restraining voices in the truth-telling space which 
results “in the essentialising of victims and perpetrators” (p. 279). 
“Grand narratives” (Nwogu, 2010, p. 280) that paint a neat picture of 
the “epic battle between good and evil as personified by” (p. 279) 
victims and perpetrators are sought out, over “personal narratives” (p. 
275) that grant agency and equality to participants in their contributions 
to the memory collection project of truth commissions. In her work 





(2007) similarly recognises the problematic restrictive narrative space 
therein. She argues that participation in the TRC silenced participants 
in new ways, through the imposed model of “redemptive memory” 
(Shaw, 2007, p. 202) that demanded the externalisation of past 
trauma, which did not align with her own findings around “directed 
forgetting” (p. 195) practices in Sierra Leone.  
This study finds that, in Sierra Leone, the essentialising (Nwogu, 2010) 
of conflict experiences into the binary identities of ‘perpetrators’ and 
‘victims’ had one particularly significant deterrent effect on ex-
combatant participation. As a result of the structural and homogenous 
application of the ‘perpetrator’ label, the majority of ex-combatants did 
not consider themselves to be the appropriate subject participants of 
the TRC. This stems from the absence of their self-identification as 
perpetrators. On the micro-level, within the ex-combatant community, 
this study finds that ex-combatants, universally, did not self-identify as 
perpetrators in the context of the war, and thereby did not consider 
themselves appropriate ‘perpetrator’ participants within the restrained 
‘grand narrative’ (Nwogu, 2010) space for their participation within the 
TRC.  
The fact that ex-combatants do not consider themselves to fall within 
the definition of appropriate perpetrator participants in the TRC informs 
us not only of their self-perceptions and the competing moral systems 
that they hold, but also sheds light on the definition of perpetrators 
according to this population. According to ex-combatant respondents, 
perpetrators in the context of the civil war, and in relation to the TRC, 
referred to the higher commanders and warring faction leaders as well 
as international intervention forces that drove the war.  
In Sierra Leone’s TRC, it is clear that the participation sought by the 
TRC was that of ideal-type perpetrators, defined by external 
transitional justice experts with little to no actual consideration of the 
complexity of combatant conflict experiences and the issue of self-
identification.  In an interview, Nicholas highlighted: 
I am not a perpetrator; I was a fighter. I did not commit any 





followed orders and I fought to help my country. There was no 
place for me in the TRC – they wanted us (the ex-combatants) 
to say we were criminals, that we were sorry. For what? I did 
what I was told, what I had to do, but the TRC was not 
interested in that157. 
 Ex-combatants from every warring faction share the view that they fell 
outside the definition of the perpetrator participant category for 
engagement in the TRC, as participants in its statement taking and 
hearings activities. Interviewed ex-combatants universally did not 
consider themselves to be the appropriate subjects of the simple and 
archetypal perpetrator identity category constructed by the TRC, and 
within which their participation was constrained to fit. Through analysis 
of ex-combatant interviews, a key group identity theme for each of the 
three major armed groups that participated in Sierra Leone’s civil war 
is uncovered, underpinning their failure to self-identify as appropriate 
perpetrator participants before the TRC. Each of these themes links 
back to Chapter 4’s discussion on the morality of violence. As 
discussed below, among (former) members of the military (SLA), 
participation in violence was justified as a result of winning the war, 
while members of the CDF/Kamajors reject their standing as 
appropriate perpetrator subjects before the TRC due to the moral 
grounds for which they fought. Lastly, rebel RUF respondents attribute 
a degree of morality to their own perpetrated abuses due to their own 
experiences of victimisation, and/or by blaming their command 
structures.  
The Victor, The Hero and the Victim 
The Military (SLA): The Victors  
(Former) SLA members widely consider themselves to have “won the 
war”158, and as the “victors”159 therefore fell outside the population of 
possible perpetrators. For the SLA, the population of perpetrators, 
referred to those who had participated in atrocities, and generally 
(former) military ex-combatants agree that even low-level ex-
combatants appropriately belong to this category. The unifying trait for 
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perpetrators then is their status as “losers of the war”160, revealing a 
widespread understanding of the ends as justifying the means, and 
that the legitimacy of these ‘means’ is determined by the winners. This 
evidences a type of victor’s justice logic, applied to the definition of 
wrongdoing, and perpetrators. In an interview with Adam, a senior 
member of the SLA who joined the military in 2003 (and therefore did 
not fight in the war), he shared that “history has shown us many times 
that winners don’t say sorry”161. This sentiment, of not belonging to the 
body of appropriate (perpetrator) TRC participants, is further reinforced 
by many (ex)military respondents who state that they were explicitly 
instructed “not to speak to the TRC”162. While a small number of 
interviewed military ex-combatants disagree (8 of 32 interviewed), 
stating that they were told by commanding officers and TRC officials 
that they could come forward and participate in the Commission, the 
majority of military ex-combatants (24 of 32 interviewed) believe that 
their participation in the TRC would have constituted a direct breach of 
military protocol and a violation of their military code of conduct. The 
sentiment that participating in the TRC amounted to a military 
infraction, and the reported origin of this opinion as an explicit directive 
received from commanding officers, is further indication of the 
politicisation of the TRC in Sierra Leone. As the victors of the war, while 
on paper they belonged to the larger perpetrator grouping, in practice 
the SLA did not. The TRC supported targeted outreach activities to 
promote military participation in the TRC and “address the low level of 
statements given” (TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, p. 167) by 
members of Sierra Leone’s Armed Forces (SLA). However, despite 
these efforts “the number of statements given by members of the 
military remained low” (TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, p. 167). 
Interview data from this study points to a wider military culture of non-
participation stemming from both the view that, as victors of the war, 
members of the SLA did not meet the appropriate definitional 
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requirements of archetypal perpetrators within the TRC, as well as 
explicit directives against participation from within the military.  
CDF: The Heroes 
Among members of the CDF/Kamajor ex-combatant group, the view is 
widely held that the perpetrator label did not refer to them, as they 
considered themselves, and were largely regarded as, “the people’s 
army”163. The widely held self-perception of being the “heroes of the 
war”164, is generally put forward in interviews to explain non-
participation among this warring group. Patrick, who joined the 
Kamajors early in the war and remained an active with the Kamajors 
and CDF for nine years explained: 
I fought for my country. The Kamajors are not like the others, 
we were bullet-proof, and protected from harm because we 
were fighting for the people. We were not the perpetrators in 
the war, we fought to save the people. Ask anyone and they 
will tell you. I am not a perpetrator; I don’t need forgiveness165.  
RUF: The Victims 
Lastly, prevalent among members of the RUF ex-combatant 
community is the view that they did not belong to the ‘perpetrator’ 
category of TRC participants because they were simply “following 
orders”166, and that the label perpetrator was best suited for 
commanders and higher-level individuals who “gave the orders”167 and 
“caused the war and its atrocities”168. The view among ex-combatants 
that notions of guilt and responsibility inherently associated with the 
label ‘perpetrators’ were inappropriately placed on them points to the 
larger issue of self-identity, held across ex-combatants from all warring 
factions. Universally, ex-combatants do not self-identify as 
perpetrators, as highlighted here. Significantly, this self-identification 
emanates from an absence of both associated responsibility and guilt, 
which are inextricably linked to definitions of ‘perpetrators’. Interviews 
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reveal that ex-combatants widely distinguish the identity of being a 
perpetrator from the experience of perpetrating abuses, as discussed 
in Chapter 4.  
 
The pervasive separation of both responsibility and guilt from 
respondents’ self-perceptions of participation in wartime atrocities is 
significant. While the removal of responsibility from the self is 
unsurprising, the associated finding of an absence of guilt associated 
with conflict participation is less expected. Ex-combatants, who are 
generally very forthcoming in recounting their wartime experiences, 
including abuses they participated in, do not frame their experiences 
in the rubric of regret or remorse. Rather they share these experiences 
fairly matter-of-factly, and often explain the strategic value around 
these acts. However, this is not an exercise in cognitive dissonance 
regarding understandings of the morality of such wartime abuses. The 
broader context of the war, as not only an enabling environment for 
abuses, but one that in fact necessitated their perpetration, is generally 
framed in negative terms: 
The time of the war was very bad. The war brought killing, 
looting, amputations and rape. So many lost everything, their 
homes and farms were burned, they might as well have 
died”169.  
The same respondents who express a deep repugnance for such 
abuses recount their own participation therein, and are simultaneously 
able to exogenously place blame and responsibility for such atrocities 
on higher command and environmental factors. This evidences the 
existence of simultaneously competing but co-existing moral systems 
that engender a lack of both responsibility and guilt among the self-
perceptions of ex-combatants.   
Among RUF ex-combatants the sentiment that they did not belong to 
the appropriate definition of ‘perpetrators’ as a result of following 
orders has links to the ultimate narrative of the war and the role played 
by different actors produced by the TRC, as well as the SCSL. In both 
                                                          





cases, the role of the RUF as responsible for a vast majority of abuses 
has contributed to the widespread portrayal of this group as the “worst 
offenders of the war”170. This makes associations to the RUF 
undesirable, as it means an association with the “worst monsters of the 
war”171. Bernath (2016) draws attention to the possibility of expanding 
recognition of victim to include ‘complex political victims’ as a means 
for ex-combatants to shed or distance themselves from their former 
armed group identity. She demonstrates that, for some, in Cambodia, 
acknowledgement of complex victimhood held value for its signalling 
power to others that they were no longer members of an armed group. 
According to Bernath (2016), complex victimhood can therefore help 
to dismantle the politics of guilt and blame by allowing ex-combatants 
to shed their wartime armed group identities. Yet the case of Sierra 
Leone demonstrates a different process of ex-combatant distancing in 
order to remove associations of guilt and responsibility from their 
wartime participation.  In Sierra Leone, ex-combatant respondents 
achieve this distancing from notions of guilt and responsibility attached 
to the ‘perpetrator’ category, not by distancing themselves from their 
RUF pasts, but rather by distancing themselves from their actions, 
portraying themselves as “victims of (their) orders”172. This dis-
association, through ‘victimisation’ rather than denouncement of 
wartime affiliation, is also evidence of the persistence, salience and 
relevance of conflict-generated (social) networks. Wartime networks 
and affiliations continue to dictate political allegiances and ex-
combatants report ongoing loyalties to their former comrades and 
commanders.  
Overall, ex-combatants from all fighting factions disagree with the 
essentialising term ‘perpetrators’ and its blanket application, indicating 
a pervasive absence of self-perceptions of simple binary or archetypal 
perpetrator experiences. Noteworthy however, is the sentiment 
expressed by Thomas, a former RUF rebel, who spent years 
                                                          
170 CDF ex-combatant Interviews, Bo, March 2017; SLA ex-combatant 
interviews, Freetown, October 2018.   
171 Ibid.  





imprisoned towards the end of the war, and who was grateful for the 
term perpetrator as applied by the TRC because it meant that “we are 
all the same, no one is worse or better than anyone else”173 – to him, 
its use was a significant equaliser and helped to reconcile and situate 
his own conflict experiences within a larger and shared community of 
combatants.  
As outlined in Chapter 2, primary respondent data for this study is 
limited to interviews with ex-combatants who did not participate in the 
TRC. However, in an effort to mitigate the impact this has on the 
representativeness of the sample generated, archival document 
analysis was undertaken on a random sample of public perpetrator 
statements collected from the TRC Archives. Firstly, it warrants 
reiterating that the statement-taking form for Sierra Leone’s TRC 
allowed for individuals to provide ‘composite’ or ‘complex’ statements 
(i.e. to fill in multiple statement sections, see Chapter6). Archival 
document analysis reveals that the majority of perpetrator statements 
sampled were not purely perpetrator statements – individuals who 
submitted perpetrator statements overwhelmingly submitted 
‘composite’ statements, filling in more than one statement-type (only 
two of 321 sampled statements were ‘purely’ perpetrator statements). 
This reinforces the finding that ex-combatant conflict experiences do 
not neatly conform to a binary narrative of simple perpetration.  
Additionally, the experiences, and framing thereof, in perpetrator 
statements collected by the TRC is evidence of their complex war 
histories and the absence of self-perceptions of being perpetrators. 
Almost universally, the content of perpetrator statements recount 
(mostly successful) battles between the statement giver’s warring party 
and another. No explicit committed abuses are present and there is no 
language of regret, confession or forgiveness-seeking among these 
statements. For the question of ‘why did you commit these acts’ 
answers oscillate between “for my country”174 and “I had no choice”175.  
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Even though there are limitations to the statement-taking process (see 
below), they remain less constrained by social pressures to conform to 
particularised narrative categories than the narrative space enforced 
through the Commission’s hearings. The perpetrator statement booklet 
was designed to capture accounts where individuals could confess or 
express wrongdoings and offer an explanation or express remorse, 
within a relatively private and even anonymised setting in some cases. 
Yet, the character of these statements still reflects the absence of self-
perceptions of guilt and responsibility. Instead they exhibit a degree of 
necessity as underpinning these accounts, and in some cases even 
pride, for successful battles. This differs from the public hearings of the 
TRC, where ex-combatant perpetrator participants were goaded and 
coerced into conforming to the ideal perpetrator type (including 
expressing remorse and guilt), as highlighted by Kelsall (2005) in his 
account of his experiences observing the TRC’s public hearings.  
It must be noted that there is a margin for mistranslation and 
misrepresentation of statement-giver accounts in the structure of the 
TRC’s statement collecting activities. TRC statements were manually 
recorded (written) in statement booklets by TRC statement-takers. 
This was a pragmatic measure to increase both the efficiency of the 
statement collecting process as well as in response to the high levels 
of illiteracy in the country, still present today, and particularly so in the 
immediate post-conflict environment. Eliminating the need for 
statement-givers to write their own statements increased the 
accessibility of the TRC’s work, though invariably introduces a 
possibility for misinterpretation and misrepresentation of statement-
giver views based on personal biases or the judgement of the 
statement-taker. While it can be argued that the possibility of such 
misrepresentation was addressed by the TRC requirement that every 
statement-giver approve their recorded (written) statement before 
signing it, this also evidences some margin for error. Statements were 
collected in the local language of statement-givers, and indeed 
statement-takers were recruited and dispatched based on their 
regional language skills. However, statements were recorded in 





statement-giver involved a dual translation process on the part of the 
statement-taker, whereby he/she firstly had to translate the statement-
giver’s account from their local language into English when recording 
this statement, and thereafter had to translate their written statement 
back to them, verbally, from English to their local language. The 
overwhelming uniformity of the character of perpetrator statements, 
despite being collected by different statement-takers across districts 
and regions, indicates this potential margin for misunderstanding was 
not sufficient enough to introduce a significant deviation between 
intended statements and produced ones.  
Ultimately, the restrictive essentialising or homogenisation of ex-
combatant experiences into a simple and archetypal perpetrator 
identity failed to recognise the significant complexities of their lived war 
experiences. As a result, the TRC suffered from widespread non-
participation simply because a vast number did not feel that their 
experiences were accommodated in the narrative framework provided 
by the TRC. Even among analysed perpetrator participant statements, 
the conflict narratives recounted do not reflect archetypal ‘pure evil’ 
perpetrators, but rather highlight the complexity of lived conflict 
experiences among this heterogeneous community of conflict-affected 
individuals.  
Victim Voice Elevation  
Nwogu’s (2010) third and final problematic narrative condition within 
the participatory model of truth commissions is that of victim voice 
privilege. It has previously been established that participation is the 
fulcrum of TRCs. Less recognised is the hierarchy of participation that 
such structures practice, through the traditional victim focus that they 
enforce. According to Nwogu (2010), “in an effort to acknowledge the 
pain and suffering of victims, truth commissions often elevate the 
community of victims over the community of perpetrators” (p. 283). 
This is contrary to the restorative justice aim “to integrate rather than 
alienate” (Nwogu, 2010, p. 281) as the elevation of one community 
over another is replicated rather than dissolved and creates new power 





structural exclusion, through primacy placed on victim participation, is 
particularly evident in Sierra Leone, where non-participation among ex-
combatant interviewees is often cited to result from simply never being 
asked.  Ex-combatants hold that they did not participate because 
“nobody asked”176 and that if there had been direct and sincere 
engagement in the form of inclusion, this would have incentivised 
participation by cultivating a sense of relevance (and ownership) within 
the TRC among this community. Christopher relayed, “I would have 
talked if someone had asked me. They didn’t ask, so they didn’t care 
about me or us the ex-combatants. They didn’t ask, so they didn’t want 
us to talk”177.  
The elevation of victim participation and voice in truth commissions 
also manifests in interviews with former TRC statement takers (TRC 
implementers). One former statement-taker, when asked about the 
obligation to obtain statements from perpetrators, responded by saying 
“yes of course we tried, but we were limited. The perpetrators, many 
of them didn’t stay in these communities so we couldn’t find them. And 
the ones that were there, they didn’t want to talk to us. Besides, we 
had so little time to collect the statements, the priority was to talk with 
the victims and give them a chance to tell us what happened to 
them”178. Another statement-taker respondent even went so far as to 
hold that the question of whether there was an obligation to corroborate 
victim testimony was offensive to the victims. She exclaimed “how can 
I tell a victim that in order to believe them I must confirm their story with 
their abuser? We didn’t need to talk to the perpetrators to know what 
happened, everyone in the community knew it”179. While this latter 
response does not reflect the broader TRC mandate, or opinions 
generally held among TRC officials about the need to engage with ex-
combatants directly, it does highlight the privilege that victim 
participation enjoyed within the TRC.  
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Nwogu’s (2010) three-part argument explaining the structural narrative 
shortcomings in the current practice of truth commission participation 
usefully and thoroughly elucidates the structural sources of perpetrator 
exclusion within these bodies. However, the case of Sierra Leone 
reveals additionally external and voluntary sources of perpetrator 
exclusion among the ex-combatant community that contributed to their 
high non-participation in the TRC. These findings expand Nwogu’s 
(2010) framework of perpetrator participation shortcomings in truth 
commissions. For TRCs, such shortcomings ultimately impede their 
restorative justice promises, and ability to achieve their mandates.  
External Exclusion 
Research for this thesis has identified two sources of external 
exclusion that further prevented ex-combatant participation within the 
TRC. Firstly, loyalties to conflict-generated combatant networks 
prevented participation among interviewed ex-combatants. At the 
heart of this external source of exclusion is the fear of betraying former 
command structures through participating in the TRC. This fear brings 
to the fore the question of punishment and the social costs of TRC 
participation. The second source of external exclusion identified within 
this research among interviewed ex-combatants is that of the timing of 
the TRC, which operated in an environment where participation directly 
competed with other, more pressing post-conflict needs. These 
sources of external exclusion, together with the voluntary source of 
exclusion (non-participation as protest) discussed below, evidenced in 
Sierra Leone, empirically expand Nwogu’s (2010) framework of the 
participatory shortcomings of truth commissions, in relation to the ex-
combatant perpetrator population.  
Conflict Network Loyalties 
The issue of conflict generated network loyalties brings to the fore once 
again earlier discussions on fear. Ex-combatants did not fear 
prosecution before SCSL as a result of TRC participation, debunking 





not mean that fear did not play a role in the calculus for non-
participation. Network loyalties showcase another form of fear that 
served to deter participation: the fear of being perceived to betray 
these networks. Conflict networks do not evaporate when war ends; 
they endure. Fear of the social costs of participation showcases the 
fact that punishment does not have to prosecutorial to be impactful; 
informal punishment also influences behaviour. Freeman (2006) 
alludes to the wider range of ‘effects’ that truth commissions can 
impart, in describing the “social and political effect of a truth 
commission” (p. 71). His work (Freeman, 2006) does not treat the 
concept of a nuanced understanding of punishment specifically, 
however the notion that punishment too can take social (or other) forms 
is empirically evidenced in this research and naturally extends the 
application of a layered understanding of the effects of truth 
commissions, along the dimension of punishment. It must be noted 
that due to the exclusive focus on non-participant ex-combatants within 
the primary data collection strategy of this thesis (see Chapter 2), this 
study’s discussion on punishment in the TRC cannot speak to the 
possible experiences of punishment and its forms among ex-
combatants who did participate in the TRC. As such, this discussion 
foregrounds the concept of the fear of punishment and its function as 
a participation deterrent. It reveals that fear of punishment along non-
prosecutorial lines (i.e. the feared social costs of participation) 
warrants a more detailed understanding of the relationship between 
punishment and truth commissions. This is elaborated in Chapter 11, 
in this thesis’s recommendations for future research.  
As introduced above, another observed deterrent to ex-combatant 
participation in the TRC is persistent loyalty to former comrades and 
commanders. Such loyalty constitutes an external source of TRC 
exclusion among the ex-combatant population in Sierra Leone. While 
the persistence of reported loyalties to conflict-generated networks 
today is noteworthy, given the significant time lapse, high ex-
combatant mobility and poor national communications infrastructure in 
Sierra Leone, its salience at the time of the TRC, immediately after the 





broker), the fragility of the immediate post-war environment and 
widespread sentiments around the uncertainty of peace and its 
promises meant that, for most ex-combatants, their conflict-generated 
networks were the “only source of stability and authority”180 in a new 
and fragile world. This increased ex-combatant reliance on their 
conflict networks and command structures as a primary source of 
information and legitimacy for navigating the post-conflict landscape, 
even for those who were forcibly recruited. The stigma of being an ex-
combatant and fears of revenge or reprisals from victimised individuals 
or communities further pushed ex-combatants towards their conflict 
networks in an effort to insulate themselves, seek support and avoid 
stigma. To be fair, an important purpose of the TRC was precisely to 
contribute to dismantling fear-based conflict networks and to build 
bridging social capital through reconciliation; however, as discussed 
previously, the blanket application of the term ‘perpetrator’, the priority 
placed on victim experiences and the lack of voice or agency given to 
the ex-combatant community, only served to contribute to their 
exclusion from any meaningful social repair, and advanced stigma 
associations against them. The promised gains of peace were 
uncertain, while conflict networks offered a proven route to 
acceptance, safety and survival. Loyalties to these networks were 
already strong as a result of the cohesion generated by the war, and 
took on a new dimension when faced with the “new world”181 that peace 
created, full of hope but also insecurity and fear for ex-combatants, 
due to their wartime participation. Conflict network loyalties prevented 
ex-combatant participation in the TRC in two ways: non-participation 
because they were explicitly told by members of these networks not to 
participate, and non-participation for fear that this may have negative 
consequences for other members of their conflict networks, notably 
their commanding officers and leaders. Even the ex-combatants that 
said that they would have participated in the TRC were it not for other 
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deterrents, widely hold that they would “never have named anyone”182, 
seeing this as an unacceptable betrayal, and further evidencing the 
strength of loyalties and salience of conflict networks in the immediate 
post-conflict period, as well as their persistence today.  
Timing and Needs 
Another external deterrent to participation by ex-combatants in Sierra 
Leone’s TRC were the existence of other more pressing post-conflict 
needs and priorities that diminished the relevance and value of the 
TRC to this population. In line with findings by authors such as Vinck 
and Pham (2008) who highlight that “basic survival needs and security 
are necessary precursors to the successful operation of transitional 
justice” (p. 398), this study lends empirical support to the importance 
of both the sequencing and timing of transitional justice. The issue of 
sequencing in relation to concurrently operating processes such as 
DDR and the SCSL has already been elaborated in Chapter 7. 
Regarding timing, it is widely reported by ex-combatants that during 
the time of the TRC’s operations they were too busy trying to find family 
members, (re)build their homes and livelihood sources, find 
employment, or in the case of several, “living in the bush – waiting to 
see if peace would last”183. The TRC, as a process that required 
people’s time to participate, was therefore directly competing with 
other, more pressing post-conflict needs that similarly required time to 
address. Unsurprisingly, the concrete nature of these post-conflict 
needs, as compared to the uncertain and prescriptive character of the 
TRC and its purported benefits, invariably led to the prioritisation of 
survival and security concerns. Additionally, this feeds into the 
discussion on local understandings of justice from Chapter 7, 
highlighted in work by authors such as Macdonald (2013). The 
existence of more pressing survival and security needs at the time of 
the TRC’s operations, and the socio-economic character of ex-
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combatant understandings of justice highlight that the TRC was 
competing with other more pressing post-conflict concerns.  
Voluntary Exclusion: non-participation as protest  
Lastly, a number of ex-combatants cite their dissatisfaction with other 
peace-making and peacebuilding interventions as contributing to not 
only their non-participation in the TRC, but their broader rejection of 
the Commission more largely. Cornwall (2008) distinguishes between 
structural and voluntary exclusion in her critique of participatory 
programming. She argues that understanding exclusion requires 
addressing the question of not only who is excluded but who excludes 
themselves (Cornwall, 2008). Nwogu (2010) alludes to the role of 
voluntary exclusion as a participatory inhibitor for perpetrators in truth 
commissions by positing that “often perpetrators respond to the hostile 
space of truth commissions with silence or denial” (p. 282). In Sierra 
Leone, this study finds support for the argument of voluntary exclusion, 
and the use of non-participation as protest, among ex-combatants in 
relation to the TRC. Among ex-combatant respondents who 
participated in the DDR programme in Sierra Leone, those with 
negative experiences therein express a disillusionment with the 
intentions and legitimacy of the TRC, as a result of the broken 
promises of DDR. Non-participation in the TRC for this group is seen 
as a form of protest against the inadequacies of the peacebuilding 
landscape in Sierra Leone that did not consult with, or deliver for, these 
ex-combatants in meaningful ways.  
Conclusion 
These structural problems in truth commission memory collection and 
narrative production do not operate in isolation. Rather they interact 
with and reinforce holistic structural and voluntary perpetrator 
exclusion. The elevation of victim voices restricts the potential to unveil 
the complexity of perpetrator experiences by “centring victims’ 
experiences as the starting point for truth reclamation” (Nwogu, 2010, 
p. 280). By Inverting power asymmetries (to advantage victims) and 
prioritising the reclamation of victim dignity at the cost of perpetrator 





achievable goal, it also potentially serves as a weapon of oppression” 
(Nwogu, 2010, p. 282).   
According to Nwogu (2010), “the key distinction between restorative 
and retributive justice mechanisms lies in their treatment of the 
perpetrator” (p. 284). The logic of assumed perpetrator participation in 
truth commissions assumes that the absence of legal punitive 
punishment sufficiently incentivises perpetrator participation (see 
Chapters 4 and 7). TRC advocates rely on this logic to advance the 
claim of high cross-cutting participation within these bodies. But this 
absence is not a magic perpetrator participation wand (Cornwall, 2008) 
– it does not mystically grant them standing or equality within the 
participatory structure of these commissions. Despite the absence of 
legal punitive measures (prosecution) for perpetrators who participate 
within these bodies, they are nonetheless disadvantaged in the 
narrative and participatory conditions applied by truth commissions. 
Unlike retributive justice processes, truth commissions offer no 
presumption of innocence – the perpetrator label is cast from the onset. 
Ex-combatants walk into truth commissions as perpetrators, and leave 
the same way. There is also no evidentiary burden in truth 
commissions, and contrary to truth commission advocacy, the absence 
of prosecution does not remove the absence of judgement (or 
punishment). Judgement as the possibility of prosecution exists in 
retributive measures such as trials. Within truth commissions, this 
judgement takes the form of social costs and stigma, as conflict 
experiences become entrenched into identities that alienate rather 
than integrate.  
The structural framework of truth-telling in truth commissions is not 
merely an exercise of narrative consolidation, but much more 
significantly, one of narrative production. Whose memories are 
collected, whose experienced are privileged, how, and by whom, 
significantly determines the ultimate narrative of conflict that is 
constructed and put into the official annals of history.  This impact is 
not only retrospective (determining how, and whose, history is written) 





Report (2004) recommendations were produced on the basis of the 
narratives of war it collected during its investigative, statement and 
hearings activities. These recommendations are (still) widely held as 
Sierra Leone’s “roadmap for post-conflict development”184. Privileging 
victim voices and experiences has not only placed this category of 
conflict-affected people at the forefront of these recommendations, but 
equally served to exclude ex-combatants from the post-conflict 
development agenda. A civil society respondent (TRC broker) 
emphasised that the “lack of ex-combatant participation not only 
excluded them from the TRC process and its explicit ‘ambitions’ but 
also effectively marginalised them from having a voice in the TRC 
recommendations. No ex-combatant needs are addressed in the 
recommendations. The TRC, together with the DDR process, 
essentially helped to create not only a class of unemployed citizens 
(ex-combatants) but unemployable citizens. The TRC did not generate 
social capital, and DDR did not effectively generate skills”185. Another 
interview highlighted that the failure of the TRC to grant agency to the 
ex-combatant community has “effectively excluded them from not only 
participating within the wider reconciliation aims of the institution, 
limiting its ability to fulfil its mandate, but also has served to exclude 
them from the country’s broader development agenda”186. This has 
wider-reaching effects on the population of ex-combatants, that 
continues to be stigmatised and viewed as a cause of the country’s 
persistent weaknesses, rather than as a symptom of their continuation. 
This sentiment is further echoed by a respondent in Sierra Leone’s 
justice sector in his reminder that “justice, and transitional justice, is 
undeniably a political enterprise, shaped and also limited by the 
agendas of those who enforce it”187. The significance of participation, 
and particularly, exclusion from participation, has wide-reaching 
ramifications, informing us of the structural shortcomings and potential 
dangers within truth commissions. Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis have 
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empirically analysed the legitimate subject position of ex-combatants 
within Sierra Leone’s TRC, as well as their expectations towards this 
mechanism of transitional justice. Together, these chapters treat the 
dimension of TRC expectations in relation to the ex-combatant 
population. Chapters 8 and 9 have addressed the dimension of TRC 
experiences. Chapter 8 has presented an institutional level analysis of 
engagement along the lines of ownership and inclusion, while this 
chapter, Chapter 9, has interrogated TRC non-participation among ex-
combatants.  
The subject of suffering and its significance within this thesis requires 
specific attention. The importance of suffering as part of the 
problematic binary identity framework in transitional justice has first 
been discussed in Chapter 4. In uncovering and describing ex-
combatant expectations towards the TRC, Chapter 7 has highlighted 
the complexity of ex-combatant conflict experiences, on the micro-
level. This chapter has revealed that lived experiences of suffering 
among this population similarly and significantly determined non-
participant ex-combatant experiences of the TRC. The ubiquitous 
character of suffering, as a shared common denominator of individual 
war-time experiences, on the micro-level, emerges strongly throughout 
the research for this thesis and merits revisiting Borer’s visual 
representation of individual conflict experiences, presented in Figure 1 
of Chapter 4. Across the normative, institutional and local levels of 
transitional justice, Borer has aptly highlighted the reality of messy and 
intersecting conflict experiences, between ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’. 
However, the empirical evidence from Sierra Leone gathered in this 
thesis reveals a need to further nuance Borer’s visual representation 
of intersecting conflict experiences. Building empirically from the 
complex conflict narratives of ex-combatants interviewed for this 
thesis, one persistent limitation of Borer’s visualisation of conflict 
experiences is that it fails to reflect the degree of overlap between 
experiences of suffering (victimhood) as retold and foregrounded by 
ex-combatants in this research. In expanding and reconceptualising 
Borer’s visualisation of intersecting conflict experiences, this thesis 





degree of overlap between victimhood and committing abuse, along 
the intersecting space of suffering: 
Figure 5:  
 
The final empirical chapter of this thesis, Chapter 10, addresses this 
thesis’s final dimension of inquiry: the question of impact. In particular, 
it empirically examines the impact of ex-combatant non-participation 
on questions of truth commission success, how this can and should be 










































The Impact of the TRC on Ex-Combatants: 
localising TRC evaluation and redefining success 
 
For me the TRC was a failure. It should have come to listen to 
us and to help us. But we are only blamed. People see our 
actions as evil but they don’t know our stories, and how we 
suffered too. For now there is peace in Salone, and for that the 
TRC did a good job. But the troubles, they continue, and I do 
not feel at peace188.  
Introduction 
This chapter empirically applies the localised framework for evaluating 
TRC impact constructed in Chapter 5. Application of this framework 
onto the ex-combatant population in Sierra Leone disaggregates this 
evaluation to one constituent element of the local within Sierra Leone. 
While it therefore nuances impact evaluation in the context of TRCs, it 
does not speak for the broader domain of the local in Sierra Leone, 
which, as highlighted in Chapter 1, is composed of a complex set of 
actors and levels. Previous chapters have illuminated local 
expectations and experiences of Sierra Leone’s TRC, through the lens 
of (predominantly non-participant) ex-combatants, a population whose 
role and relevance within TRCs has historically been neglected by 
research and practice. Ex-combatant expectations of the TRC reveal 
a significant mismatch between the mandate promises of the TRC, and 
actual ex-combatant expectations towards this justice process. 
Experiences of the TRC similarly expose the myth of TRC inclusivity 
and highlight the reality of ex-combatants’ multi-dimensional exclusion. 
Together, such a grounded understanding of ex-combatant 
expectations and experiences, presents an opportunity to 
reconceptualise impact in relation to transitional justice by 
foregrounding the affected populations these processes address 
directly. This provides a more meaningful and contextually relevant 
avenue for understanding transitional justice impact on the micro-level. 
This chapter’s analysis of TRC impact in relation to non-participant ex-
                                                          





combatants specifically enables an interrogation of the broader claims 
that truth commissions exercise effects on conflict-affected populations 
beyond merely the individuals that participate directly therein.   
The utility of localising impact evaluations of transitional justice has 
been established in Chapter 5. What then was the impact of the TRC 
on non-participant ex-combatants in Sierra Leone? This chapter 
applies the framework constructed in Chapter 5 to the experienced 
impacts of the TRC on the non-participant ex-combatant community in 
Sierra Leone, and evaluates its success on this disaggregated level. 
This framework localises impact through the evaluation of local 
expectations held towards the TRC (against its experienced outcomes 
among ex-combatants), the particular outcome of truth-telling, the 
TRC’s mandate (in particular the mandated goal of reconciliation), its 
institutional engagement, TRC recommendations (in particular its 
reparations framework), and lastly through an empirical assessment of 
the TRC’s impact on constructing and cementing restrictive conflict 
identities.  
Expectations and the TRC 
As argued in Chapter 5, local expectations are a critical component of 
this study’s localised impact evaluation framework. Unearthing the 
broader justice needs and particular justice expectations attached to a 
specific process, among locally affected populations uniquely informs 
us of both the legitimacy of a process, and the possibility of its success, 
from a localised perspective. When the design and outcomes of a 
justice process does not align with the associated and expected local 
justice needs it will, by nature, be unable to achieve ‘success’ by local 
standards.  
Chapter 7 has already demonstrated the significant mismatch between 
ex-combatant expectations tied to the TRC in Sierra Leone and the 
Commission’s institutional mandate. Chapter 7 details the anticipated 
institutional and actual ex-combatant expectations held towards the 
TRC in Sierra Leone. It has revealed that ex-combatants expected the 





material reintegration and development benefits, and to contribute to 
justice and accountability throughout the country. The specific 
expectations around expression, the provision of material benefits, 
localised conceptualisations of justice and coordination between the 
TRC and the SCSL all deviate significantly from the mandated 
objectives and limitations of the TRC.  
At its core, ex-combatant expectations of the TRC reflect their 
immediate post-conflict (justice) needs and inform us of 
conceptualisations of justice on the micro-level. In expecting the TRC 
to provide an opportunity to acknowledge the motivations behind their 
wartime participation and to generate an understanding of their conflict 
experiences (through their contextualised narratives), ex-combatants 
hoped to situate their experiences within the universe of larger 
grievances and injustices, and to expose the root causes of the war. 
Sulay was initiated into the Kamajors in 1998. According to him: 
Corruption has eaten our country. This is why there was war. 
Let them know that this why we (the Kamajors) fought – to 
protect our families and communities, to save them from the 
greedy rebels and soldiers. They looted the country and killed 
recklessly, and we suffered. We had to fight to bring justice189.   
The narrow truth that the TRC sought to expose did not allot a space 
for this, and thereby withheld a potentially powerful “democratising 
truth” (Nwogu, 2010, p. 288). They hoped for an opportunity to express 
the injustices that led to their wartime participation, while the reality of 
the TRC only extended to an understanding of justice as one of 
narrating the abuses of war, rather than seeking to understand them. 
Tejan was a member of the RUF for 3 years, and was forcibly recruited 
together with his older brother when he was 15 years old. He shared 
that, “if the TRC had come to me I would have told them that I had no 
choice – it was fight or die. They blame us but nobody from the TRC 
came to talk to us. They didn’t care that I suffered”190. The socio-
economic foundations of ex-combatant justice needs in the aftermath 
of the war are revealed by their expectations that the TRC would 
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provide material benefits, through reintegration and development 
assistance. Lahai emphasised that, “the TRC came to give us 
livelihoods after the war”191.  Francis also expected the TRC to provide 
“training, jobs and education”192. Similarly, Hassan expected the TRC 
to provide these material benefits “to end the poverty and grabbing 
(corruption) that brought the war”193 in the first place. Lastly, in 
understanding and expecting the TRC to collaborate with the Court, 
the desire for retributive measures of justice is demonstrated. In 
contrast to the common assertion that ex-combatants were fearful of 
the TRC due to perceptions of collusion between this institution and 
the Court, this thesis shows that ex-combatants largely did not in fact 
find this perceived collaboration threatening. In fact, several 
respondents echoed the sentiment expressed by Charlie (a former 
CDF fighter), that “the TRC was not separate from the Court – it helped 
the Court bring justice to those most responsible for the war in the 
country”194. This “mismatch” (Skaar, 2018, p. 417) underscores 
variance in local conceptualisations of justice, which had strong socio-
economic and retributive roots within this population. The justice 
expectations held by ex-combatants towards the TRC largely do not 
reflect the Commission’s mandate. The TRC therefore fails in respect 
to meeting the justice expectations held by the local population of its 
intended participants. Indeed, how can we claim success for a justice 
process whose outcomes did not reflect the justice needs of those it 
aimed to generate a benefit for? In fact, the mismatch between ex-
combatant expectations and TRC objectives significantly deterred their 
participation within the TRC at all, further limiting the reach, impact and 
therefore possibilities for success for this institution. Vincent fought 
with the Kamajors for almost two years. He gave the following 
explanation for his non-participation in the TRC: 
The TRC should have come to give us aid…to help us talk 
about why we had to fight…so that the civilians could 
understand us. But no one ever came to talk to me. then my 
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brothers (other Kamajors) told me that we should stay away 
from the TRC because it was trying to trick us – it was here to 
blame us and punish us for doing our duty195.  
Outcomes and the TRC 
Chapter 5 has demonstrated that, despite inconsistent results, 
measuring transitional justice impact through universally constituted 
outcomes remains the most common approach to evaluations of 
transitional justice (Ainley, 2015). Outcomes, by virtue of their 
dominance within transitional justice impact research, are therefore 
incorporated as another dimension of this localised framework of TRC 
impact evaluation. In particular, the central truth commission outcome 
of truth-telling is assessed within this framework.  
Truth-telling  
The critical role that truth-telling plays in truth commissions is widely 
established196. “Revealing, documenting and recording the ‘truth’’ are 
critical objectives of truth commissions (Skaar, 2018, p. 406), and they 
are commonly assessed on the provision of this truth (Ainley, 2015). 
According to Skaar (2018) “truth telling or seeking is achieved 
principally through truth commissions” (Skaar, 2018, p. 409). These 
bodies are “well placed to identify and address the root causes of war” 
(Ainley, 2015, p. 245), mandated to uncover and understand the 
violent past (Nwogu, 2010), and are “better able to examine the 
structural and ideological features of conflict and the contributions of 
collective actors” than criminal courts (Ainley, 2015, p. 245). According 
to Skaar (2018), truth-telling is held to positively influence peace by 
addressing past grievances, addressing causes of violence, promoting 
non-violent ways of dealing with social conflict, and creating an 
authoritative historical record that prevents the manipulation of history. 
The TRC in Sierra Leone is particularly commended for its extremely 
detailed report (Ainley, Friedman and Mahony, 2015). However, as 
highlighted in Chapters 9 and 10, simply because a truth commission 
is theoretically well-placed to examine these features (causes and 
underlying motivations) of conflicts does not mean they will be able to 
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do so in practice (Ainley, 2015). The politicisation of the TRC by the 
government in Sierra Leone limited the scope of its truth-seeking, and 
generated dissatisfaction among ex-combatants that contributed to 
their non-participation in two ways. Firstly, the TRC’s failure to access 
the underlying motivations that led ex-combatants to take up arms in 
the first place limited its focus to generating a superficial conflict 
narrative without understanding its root causes or motivations on the 
micro level. In describing his disappointment with the narrow space for 
ex-combatant participation in the TRC, Wesley, former RUF, 
recounted that, “the TRC gave the victims a place to talk about what 
they experienced. It should have been like this for us too. I also had to 
flee…I was also abused. I was also afraid”197. Secondly, the primacy 
placed on victim participation and the absence of robust obligations for 
corroboration, led some to feel that the narrative, or ‘truth’, produced 
was not only incomplete (lacking depth), but inaccurate as well. Santos 
voluntarily joined the RUF in 1993 and remained with them until 1997 
when a battle injury left him unable to continue fighting. 
During the war I went everywhere…my unit even went to 
Liberia. I know everything that happened in the war…the TRC 
put the blame on us so easily, but it is only half the story – we 
(the RUF) have the other half, but that is missing from their 
records198.  
According to Skaar (2018), “however imperfect or contested the ‘truth’ 
brought to the table” truth commissions “have often succeeded in 
documenting” violations (p. 418). She claims that “late truth may well 
be partial or imperfect truth, but I am willing to argue that it is better 
than no truth at all” (Skaar, 2018, p. 419). This directly contradicts the 
Final Report (2004) of Sierra Leone’s truth commission which asserts 
that “a ‘partial’ truth is no truth at all” (Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 32). The 
argument that partial outcomes still constitute a measure of success 
has practical merit as it implicitly recognises the very real and 
significant constraints under which truth commissions operate, 
including limited time, funds and political influence. It is nonetheless 
problematic as well – it assumes that the only alternative is ‘no truth’, 
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and does not consider the implications of whose truth is privileged, and 
the politics of memory, in the process. Accepting partial outcomes as 
evidence of success also risks muddying the already dark waters of 
defining success, and its boundaries, in transitional justice impact 
studies. By applying a localised framework evaluating the ‘truth’ 
produced by the TRC, through the lens of the ex-combatant community 
in Sierra Leone, this thesis reveals that the narrow truth sought by the 
TRC deterred ex-combatant participation, withheld a ‘democratising’ 
truth, and failed to provide the opportunity to cultivate understanding 
around their wartime experiences. It is therefore hard to argue in favour 
of the merits of a partial truth within a localised framework of measuring 
TRC success, through the particular outcome of truth, in Sierra Leone.  
TRC Mandate in Sierra Leone 
In theory, looking to mandates may provide an attractive alternative to 
larger societal goals that typify standardised and normatively 
constituted outcome evaluations. However, as established in Chapter 
5, truth commissions, in their own mandates, often explicitly delineate 
such broader and hard to measure goals for themselves. This was 
particularly the case for Sierra Leone, wherein the TRC was mandated 
to “address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for 
both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their 
story, get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing 
and reconciliation” (TRC Final Report, 2004, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 24). 
Elsewhere the Final Report (2004) refers to the object of the TRC as 
to “create an impartial historical record”, “to address impunity, to 
respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and 
reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses 
suffered” (Vol. 1, Ch. 1, p. 31). Using the TRC’s mandate as a 
framework for evaluating its success does not therefore offer a 
narrower or more concrete range of outcomes against which to 
measure impact. This localised approach to impact offers an 
alternative approach to the role of mandates in defining TRC success 
and impact. Rather than asking whether the TRC achieved its 





TRC’s mandate sufficiently reflected the justice needs of its local 
participant populations. This brings local expectations and justice 
needs vis-à-vis transitional justice to the centre. This foregrounds local 
expectations once again, which, as previously established, in Chapter 
7, diverged significantly from the TRC’s mandated objectives. In the 
case of Sierra Leone’s TRC therefore, among the ex-combatant 
population, the TRC’s mandate did not sufficiently reflect the justice 
needs of a constituent element of its local participants, thus necessarily 
limiting its ability to affect a positive impact on this group.  
One of the TRC’s mandated goals was to promote reconciliation. 
Perpetrators were integral to the achievement of this particular aim, 
with reconciliation on the micro and macro levels both requiring 
perpetrator participation (elaborated in Chapter 6). As such, specific 
attention to the outcome of reconciliation, within the TRC’s mandate, 
warrants consideration. Skaar (2018) emphasises the overlap between 
outcomes as abstract universal standards and outcomes as prescribed 
and contained by truth commission mandates, in highlighting that 
reconciliation in particular is often an explicit aim in many truth 
commissions, though it remains very hard to define and measure. 
Additionally, recognition that reconciliation, as an outcome, ultimately 
must be voluntary and emanate from within and among communities 
(Bloomfield, 2003) on the micro and macro levels of the local, adds 
difficulty to its achievability as an aim, by an externally imposed TRC.  
While the TRC in Sierra Leone was explicitly mandated to foster 
reconciliation, localising this outcome through the lens of non-
participant ex-combatant experiences of the TRC, a population 
uniquely affected by this aim, further reveals micro-level impact failure 
of the TRC. Interviewed ex-combatants widely agree that the “TRC did 
nothing for”199 them. However, interviewed ex-combatants also hold 
that reconciliation has largely occurred regardless, saying that they are 
“comfortable”200 in their communities, and do not fear retribution for 
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their wartime actions. Ex-combatant interviews thus demonstrate that 
this population, while largely feeling “safe”201 “integrated”202 and “at 
home”203 in their post-war communities, do not attribute this to the work 
of the TRC. While this certainly cannot be taken as proof of the TRC’s 
impact failure (it is futile to attempt to argue in favour of an unfalsifiable 
counterfactual), it introduces the concept of perceived causality of 
impacts (elaborated more below).  
Friedman (2017) argues that “reconciliation was inevitable” in Sierra 
Leone, and “’the only way forward’ for future development and peace” 
(p. 111). According to her, the need for peace and development widely 
outweighed the desire for punitive forms of justice within Sierra Leone 
(Friedman, 2017). Her research reveals a strong endogenous appetite 
for reconciliation, as recognition of the need to live together again after 
war in order to achieve a transformative peace (Friedman, 2017). This 
thesis affirms and nuances this finding. Progress in reconciliation, 
among ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, is evident, though some 
important deficits are also noteworthy. While the majority of 
interviewed ex-combatants claim to feel “comfortable”204 and 
“reintegrated”205 within their communities, a small number of ex-
combatant respondents also report a deterioration in reconciliation 
over time, and “wish the TRC had left a follow-up process to help us 
when people grew angrier and resentful towards me over time”206.  
Reconciliation has therefore not been a linear process for all, with 
some ex-combatants reporting that: 
Resentment in my community towards me has grown over 
time. Because there is no improvement, no development, their 
anger stays. At first, after the war, there was hope for a better 
future. I think this is what allowed me to be comfortable, people 
were willing to look past the past because the future held hope 
for all of us, and we needed each other. But now, the longer we 
all struggle, the angrier they are”207. 
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Reconciliation as linked to peace and development is therefore clear, 
validating findings from Friedman (2017). Its deterioration, for some 
interviewed ex-combatants, is equally tied to failure in progress along 
these dimensions.  
Additionally, despite its mandate to facilitate reconciliation, the short 
timeframe of the TRC is widely held to have made reconciliation an 
impossible outcome of the TRC. One of its Commissioners held the 
view that it was in fact unrealistic to expect this from the TRC. “The 
TRC wasn’t set up to facilitate reconciliation. It didn’t have that long-
term capacity. At best, it enabled moments of forgiveness, but it 
couldn’t generate the momentum and larger process needed for 
reconciliation to really take root”208.  
Localising impact through the particular aim of reconciliation in Sierra 
Leone’s TRC, reveals that for the ex-combatant community, 
reconciliation has been neither linear nor perceived to have been 
facilitated by the TRC. Once again, impact failure is clear.  
Institutional Engagement in Sierra Leone’s TRC 
The need for localising transitional justice has steadily grown. The 
proliferation of truth commissions has emerged in response to 
increased criticisms against the top-down and externalised character 
of previous generations of transitional justice (see Chapter 3). 
Participatory programming literature relies on the need for meaningful 
local inclusion and ownership in externally engendered interventions 
for these to accrue local legitimacy, and subsequently, sustainability of 
outcomes (see for instance Cornwall, 2008; Donais, 2009; and Selim, 
2017. This is elaborated in Chapter 5). In Sierra Leone, Ainley (2015) 
highlights the common position among critical scholarship, arguing 
“transitional justice there did not speak to local understandings of 
justice and reconciliation” (p. 249). This once more begs the question 
of whether a process can be considered successful if its aims 
                                                          





inherently diverge from the expectations held by the local populations 
it is designed to affect?  
A localised evaluation of TRC impact along the dimension of 
institutional engagement has two components: engagement with civil 
society and engagement with ex-combatants specifically. Engagement 
with civil society is a necessary measure of institutional engagement 
as this segment of the local functions as both a conduit and filter for 
wider local populations, whose interests and needs civil society is 
supposed to represent (at least in theory – a broader discussion of this 
can be found in Chapter 1). As exposed in Chapter 8, despite initially 
high levels of local engagement with civil society, within the dimension 
of ownership, this significantly diminished over time and soured the 
relationship between the TRC and the TRC Working Group 
considerably. The failure to engage formatively with civil society along 
the dimension of institutional inclusion contributed to wider perceptions 
of the TRC as a “foreigner”209 in Sierra Leone. One member of the TRC 
Working Group emphasised that “for the TRC to mean something for 
people it had to engage with them; it had to go to them. We were there 
to make this possible, but they didn’t listen”210. Increasingly prescriptive 
consultations, inadequate reach or localisation, and limited 
dissemination together fomented discontent between civil society and 
the TRC after its establishment. This engagement failure signals 
negative impact in relation to the TRC. However, Friedman (2017) 
argues that the TRC’s failure to be formatively inclusive of civil society 
nonetheless had a broader positive impact. Gaps left by the TRC, 
particularly along the lines of reach and culture, in fact galvanised the 
mobilisation of civil society and spurred the establishment of parallel 
reconciliation initiatives. Friedman’s (2017) argument draws attention 
to the complexity of conceptualising impact, highlighting the need for 
greater contextual and long-term perspectives when evaluating a 
particular process. Evidence around impact, in relation to institutional 
engagement with civil society, is therefore mixed. In the TRC’s direct 
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institutional engagement with civil society, strong local ownership with 
this group of TRC brokers has been established (in Chapter 8); calls 
for the TRC originated within this population of actors. However, the 
establishment of the TRC brought with it a shrinking space and 
increasingly prescriptive role and voice for civil society, whose 
inclusion was not formative. Overall, direct institutional engagement 
with civil society is negative, and showcases a significant missed 
opportunity for cultivating local legitimacy, and with it, sustainable 
outcomes that may have promoted the creation of ‘communities of 
practice’ (Quick and Feldman, 2011) as part of the work and legacy of 
the TRC. However, if we take a further step back, and place civil 
society and the TRC within a larger temporal context, Friedman (2017) 
demonstrates that this institutional engagement failure in fact pushed 
civil society to galvanise and fill the ‘void’ left by the TRC. The indirect 
impact that resulted from the TRC’s empty commitment to localism, 
was therefore a broader push for alternative grassroots reconciliation 
efforts.  
Secondly, given this thesis’s focus on the ex-combatant population in 
particular, institutional engagement between the TRC and this 
population specifically warrants summary. In the first instance, an 
absence of direct or formative institutional engagement with ex-
combatants is significantly showcased in the mismatch between ex-
combatant justice needs and expectations against the mandated 
justice objectives of the TRC itself. This mismatch, and its implications, 
between the rhetoric and ritual of the TRC, against the expectations 
held by ex-combatants, has been analysed in Chapter 7, and 
discussed under the dimension of expectations above. Secondly, as 
discussed in Chapter 9, ex-combatants faced multi-dimensional 
processes of exclusion within the TRC. Though they were explicitly 
identified and formally treated as part of the TRC’s population of local 
participants, in practice, they nonetheless were the object of several 
sources of exclusion, which together deterred their participation. These 
sources of exclusion existed along three dimensions: structural 
exclusion, external exclusion, and voluntary exclusion. Structural 





participation constrictions prevented the TRC from accessing the 
motivations for abuses committed. External sources of exclusion took 
the form of persistent conflict network loyalties, and the accompanying 
fear of betraying others as a result of participation; and the timing of 
the TRC, which directly competed with other, more pressing immediate 
post-war needs among this population. Lastly, voluntary exclusion 
among ex-combatants has also been uncovered, with respondents 
reacting to the TRC with active silence, to express their discontent with 
failures in the larger post-conflict environment and peacebuilding 
processes (specifically DDR). Ralph recounted, “I didn’t help the TRC. 
I didn’t speak to the TRC. I didn’t attend the hearings, and I turned the 
radio off. After the war, it was supposed to be better, but no one helped 
me”211. Altogether these various sources of practical exclusion, within 
the participation element of the TRC’s institutional engagement 
framework, highlight the absence of both ex-combatant voice and 
agency within the Commission, and formed significant participation 
deterrents among this population. This demonstrates, once again, 
impact failure, as these practices of exclusion contributed to preventing 
ex-combatant participation, necessarily limiting the reach and depth of 
TRC local engagement.  
TRC Recommendations 
A localised evaluation of TRC recommendations takes on special 
significance in the case of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone. As 
previously demonstrated, ex-combatants hoped to gain material 
benefit from the TRC, through reintegration and development gains 
(treated in detail in Chapter 7). This expectation of material benefits 
from TRC participation is argued to exist more widely on the local level 
as well (Ainley, 2015; Evans, 2012; Shaw, 2007). The body of 
recommendations produced by the TRC formed arguably the most 
concrete avenue through which the TRC could facilitate such benefits. 
As highlighted in Chapter 6, reparations are a particularly significant 
component of TRC recommendations. Ainley (2015) emphasises this, 
by arguing that reparations were probably the most important aspect 
                                                          





of transitional justice for most Sierra Leoneans. Durbach and Chappell 
(2014) argue that reparations hold transformative potential, but that 
this “transformative justice requires the realisation of three interlinked 
concepts – representation, (re)distribution and recognition” (p. 551). 
According to Williams and Opdam (2017) representation is achieved 
through “participation within the process itself, via active consultation 
in the design and implementation of reparative measures” (p. 1282). 
Chapter 8 has already shown significant shortcomings regarding ex-
combatants along this dimension, of what Williams and Opdam (2017) 
refer to as “internal representation” (p. 1282). Achieving (re)distribution 
involves dismantling hierarchies that prevent societal equality. Once 
again, Chapters 4 and 9 have called attention to the problematic 
(re)production of power asymmetries that the restrictive binary model 
of participation within TRCs, and the primacy placed on victims 
engenders. Finally, recognition involves acknowledging, valuing and 
validating local experiences and agency (Williams and Opdam, 2017). 
Once again, the restrictive binary of victims and perpetrators has 
already been shown to limit the agency of ex-combatants within the 
TRC in Sierra Leone. Additionally, the TRC’s failure to investigate the 
motivations behind acts of violence limited the space for participation 
among this population within the local. However, Chapter 6 has also 
highlighted that, at least formally, the TRC did not completely exclude 
ex-combatants from eligibility for reparations, indicating that some 
space for recognition within reparations may have been possible. 
While applying Durbach and Chappell’s (2014) framework of 
reparations and transformative justice already paints a bleak picture 
for ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, a deeper analysis of the TRC’s 
reparations implementation is needed to fully reveal the localised 
impact of this element of the TRC on this population.  
Glaring TRC recommendation implementation gaps evidence a failure 
to deliver on local expectations for this mechanism of transitional 
justice, and signal impact failure in this regard. There is broad 
consensus among interviewed members of civil society in Sierra Leone 
that “the TRC put together an excellent and comprehensive 





almost entirely fallen flat”212. According to one interviewed member of 
civil society, “the government has largely failed to take action on the 
TRC’s recommendations”213. This is repeated by another civil society 
respondent who stated that despite “some progress, much important 
work remains to be done”214. The Chairperson of the Human Rights 
Commission for Sierra Leone shared that “establishing our 
Commission (the HRCSL) was an important step forward, but there are 
still many more implementation failures than successes”215. In Sierra 
Leone, Williams and Opdam (2017) highlight that “although several of 
the TRC’s recommendations had transformative potential, much of this 
potential has not been realised due to the failure of the government to 
implement” (p. 1281). 
Despite the comprehensive recommendations framework and 
reparations programme put forward by the TRC’s Final Report (2004), 
its potential for transformation, “has largely been lost at the 
implementation stage” (Williams and Opdam, 2017, p. 1290). A lack of 
political will on the part of the Government of Sierra Leone was 
immediately apparent. It took eight months for the Government to 
respond to the TRC Report, in which it “accepted the 
recommendations in principle” (Evans, 2012, p. 180), but did not 
demonstrate a clear commitment to advance their implementation 
(Evans, 2012; Williams and Opdam, 2017). In 2008, only 20 of the 
TRC’s 56 recommendations had been “fully or partially implemented” 
(OHCHR Report, 2009, p. 13).  
The TRC’s Final Report (2004) called for the establishment of a follow-
up body to monitor implementation of its recommendations. In 2004, 
the National Human Rights Commission Act was adopted by 
Parliament, and in 2006 the National Human Rights Commission 
(NCHR - which is today the Human Rights Commission of Sierra 
Leone) was established, with considerable technical advice from 
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OHCHR (Evans, 2012; Williams and Opdam, 2017). Overall, Williams 
and Opdam (2017) recognise that “some progress was made in 
education, skills training and intermittent medical service for victims in 
the years immediately following the TRC Report” (pp. 1290-1292). 
However, implementation of recommendations remains “modest and 
many of the structural factors that caused the origins of the conflict 
remain unchanged” (Evans, 2012, p. 180). “There has been little 
evidence of broader structural or societal change in Sierra Leone, and 
the government has ignored many of the recommendations concerning 
political reforms and good governance” (Williams and Opdam, 2017, 
p. 1291).  
Regarding reparations specifically, Evans (2012) asserts that “an area 
where the government showed little interest in implementing 
recommendations was disappointingly, although not unexpectedly, 
that of reparations” (p. 181). The pre-existing National Commission for 
Social Action (NaCSA) (established in 1996) was tasked with 
implementing the TRC’s reparations programme. Despite the 
Government’s initial reluctance (Evans, 2012), NaCSA established a 
taskforce for reparations in early 2007, with representation from civil 
society, victims and a former TRC Commissioner (Williams and 
Opdam, 2017). By the end of 2007, the UN and the NHRC “urged the 
government to publish a completion strategy for the implementation of 
the TRC’s recommendations” (p. 1291).  
In August 2008, the Government, with support from the UN’s Peace 
Building Fund (PBF) undertook a joint one-year project “to provide the 
foundations for an institutional structure and framework that would 
facilitate the implementation of reparations” (Suma and Correa, 2009, 
p. 2), entitled the Year One Project. Williams and Opdam (2017) 
describe the “urgent measures” incorporated into the Year One Project 
as “ambitious”, and note that the project ultimately “failed to deliver on 
its promises” (p. 1292). In 2009, ICTJ undertook an evaluation of the 
Year One Project (Suma and Correa, 2009). The Year One Project is 
described as “an important achievement that bears testament to the 





programme” (Suma and Correa, 2009, p. 13). Yet despite this 
“remarkable” step forward, the report criticises the inadequate number 
of victim registrations achieved, and argued that this must be 
“augmented and expanded” (Suma and Correa, 2009, p. 13). 
Implementation problems included a “notable lack of political will to 
implement the recommendations regarding reparations, which 
translated to a lack of financial support” (Williams and Opdam, 2017, 
p. 1291), inadequate victim registration work, and only partial 
reparations payments (Williams and Opdam, 2017). Low political will 
from the government was evident in their low financial support to the 
Project, contributing only eight percent of its total cost (Williams and 
Opdam, 2017). Victim registration numbers were especially low in rural 
areas, where the additional burden of “travelling long distances” made 
registration effectively inaccessible (Williams and Opdam, 2017, p. 
1292). The “interim payment(s)” received by some victim groups 
additionally “only partly satisfied the TRC’s recommendation of 
permanent monthly pensions” (Williams and Opdam, 2017, p. 1292). 
In December 2009, the Special Fund for War Victims (Special Fund) 
was established, no less than a decade after it was first called for in 
the Lomé Accord, and five years after its recommendation by the TRC. 
The Special Fund was established to guarantee the sustainability of 
the reparations programme and oversee the Year Two 
implementation. However, this came to a standstill due to funding 
shortfalls (Williams and Opdam, 2017). Williams and Opdam (2017) 
highlight that while the Year One Project “had provided the necessary 
catalyst for developing a reparations programme, the programme was 
fatally flawed by its dependence on international funding” (p. 1292).  
By 2011, persistent reparations implementation failures led OHCHR to 
warn that “there is a dire need for further support from the international 
community” (Evans; Williams and Opdam, 2017, p. 1292, citing 
OHCHR, 2011). Following from this, renewed international support 
provided funding for the “approximately 10,753 registered victims” that 
had yet to receive any reparations (IOM, 2012). Despite episodic 
international support for reparations, these efforts remain “hampered 





Opdam, 2017, p. 1291). Williams and Opdam (2017) attribute the poor 
implementation of Sierra Leone’s TRC recommendations, and 
reparations particularly, to a combination of the following factors: the 
absence of an accountability mechanism to compel government 
implementation; a lack of political will from the government regarding 
reparations specifically; diminishing international support and funding; 
limited national resources; and the recent public health crisis brought 
on by the Ebola outbreak.  
The technical eligibility of ex-combatants to participate within the 
proposed reparations programme put forward by the TRC (Final 
Report, 2004) has already been established. However, evidence 
overwhelmingly points to their practical exclusion from this 
programme, for two reasons: the need to avoid privileging perpetrators 
in the distribution of peacebuilding benefits; and their marginalisation 
from legitimate victimhood within reparations efforts.  
As highlighted in Chapter 6, reparations envisioned by the TRC were 
constructed as an important counterweight to concerns that 
perpetrators had received “better care” than victims as a result of the 
reintegration packages they were able to access through DDR (TRC 
Final Report, 2004, Vol. 2, Ch. 4, p. 236). The need to dispel 
perceptions of ex-combatants being ‘rewarded’ for their wartime 
participation, and fears over volatile inequalities this might engender, 
are widely echoed in reparations literature on Sierra Leone. Evans 
(2012) underscores the argument put forward by former TRC 
Commissioner Yasmin Sooka that:  
disproportionate investment by the international community in 
DDR programmes stands in stark contrast to the lack of support 
for victims and signalled that failure to sustain support for Truth 
Commission recommendations relating to reparations may 
result in a crisis of legitimacy of transitional justice processes 
(p. 176).  
OHCHR emphasised that reparations failures risks “fuelling anger, as 
the victims’ fate is in contrast to that of former combatants (apparent 
perpetrators) who have received financial assistance and training as 





quoted in Williams and Opdam, 2017, p. 1292). Williams and Opdam 
(2017) further lend support to the binary and oppositional construction 
of victims and perpetrators by arguing that “many victims were 
disillusioned by the government’s support for disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes and the 
emphasis on demobilising combatants rather than implementing 
reparations” (p. 1292). Consensus around the need to avoid rewarding 
perpetrators, the role of reparations as a moral counterweight to this, 
and the practical primacy given to idealised victims in the reparations 
programme indicate the practical exclusion of ex-combatants from 
meaningfully accessing reparations called for by the TRC, 
demonstrating positive impact failure for this population in relation to 
the possibility of receiving reparations.  
Secondly, ICTJ’s evaluation (Suma and Correa, 2009) of the Year One 
Project evidences ex-combatant exclusion from reparations eligibility, 
despite their technical inclusion in the TRC’s Final Report. Problems 
inherent to defining victimhood eligibility are cited as one explanation 
for the observed discrepancy between the number of registered victims 
and its anticipated total (Suma and Correa, 2009). The report refers to 
the problem of individuals who were “actually combatants who tried to 
pass as victims” (Suma and Correa, 2009, p. 5). This framing strongly 
suggests a practical incompatibility for victimhood eligibility for 
reparations among ex-combatants, that reinforces the oppositional and 
binary presentation of these identities discussed above. Practical 
assessments and writings on the TRC’s reparations programme 
therefore contrast the legitimate subject position of ex-combatants as 
potential reparations beneficiaries, embodied in the TRC Final Report 
eligibility criteria, against their treatment as its inappropriate 
beneficiaries, in practice. While remaining cognisant of the fact that 
funding limitations remain a very real and necessary consideration and 
limitation for any peacebuilding effort, the arguments illuminated above 
nonetheless advance a problematic normative assumption within 
transitional justice: that of pitting victims against perpetrators, and the 
assumption that individuals neatly conform to these binary labels 





demonstrated the inadequacy and inaccuracy of this binary identity 
model.  
No evidence of ex-combatant participation within the various phases 
of Sierra Leone’s reparations programme has been found. 
Documentation on the identification of victims and the eligibility 
protocols adopted in practice are not available for analysis. No ex-
combatant respondents report participating in any reparations efforts. 
Indeed, no respondents even report attempting to register for these 
benefits. Several hold that “there were no reparations programmes, I 
never heard of them”216, highlighting poor awareness and potential 
outreach shortfalls. Others, who reported knowing of these episodic 
efforts, hold that “as a fighter I could not ask for help, even though I 
need it too”217, maintaining their ineligibility from meaningfully 
accessing these benefits. Martin shared that “having reparations is 
good. We need help. The victims deserve these benefits. And so do 
we (the ex-combatants), because we are also victims”218, thus 
reinforcing the inadequacy, and deleterious effects, of static identity 
binaries normatively constructed, structurally captured, and practically 
implemented, within the TRC, in not only its own lifetime, but within the 
legacy of its impact as well.  
A disaggregated local evaluation of the TRC’s recommendations 
shows the exclusion of ex-combatants from its reparations programme 
in practice. Despite their technical inclusion as potential beneficiaries 
of reparations within the TRC’s Final Report reparations eligibility 
requirements, evidence on the implementation of reparations points to 
their practical exclusion within a poorly implemented recommendations 
framework moreover. Ex-combatants therefore faced processes of 
exclusion not only from processes of engagement and participation 
within the TRC, but were also meaningfully excluded from the work of 
its longer term legacy efforts. This reveals significant impact 
deficiencies in relation to the ex-combatant population in Sierra Leone, 
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who were disadvantaged in reaping any (potential) benefits from the 
TRC’s work from the start.  
Lastly, it is important to reflect on views of the TRC, its 
recommendations, and in particular its implementation failures, within 
the current political landscape of Sierra Leone. Despite significant 
implementation gaps, sporadic international support and limited 
government political will, calls for implementation of the TRC’s 
recommendations still exist. Persistent implementation gaps within the 
TRC’s recommendations have become an empty promise within the 
political rhetoric of the country, invoked by politicians but with little to 
no accompanying action. The newest calls to reinvigorate progress in 
implementing the TRC’s largely stagnant body of recommendations 
emerged during and after the most recent 2018 presidential elections. 
Reference to persistent implementation gaps in the TRC’s Final Report 
recommendations and their continued relevance, as a roadmap to 
development, was evident in the pre-election period, with presidential 
candidates referring to the TRC and promising to push implementation 
progress as part of their respective political rhetorics. Shortly after his 
election to office (May 10th, 2018), SLPP President, HE Julius Maada 
Bio announced plans for the establishment of an Independent 
Commission for Peace and Social Cohesion, dedicated to addressing 
the root causes of poverty and conflict identified by the TRC Report. 
On the 22nd of November 2018, this governmental commitment was 
reiterated, through an official press statement, promising the 
establishment of this Commission by June 2019. As of February 2020, 
no such Commission has come into existence. The gap between 
political rhetoric and practice show a continued absence of political will 
to enforce the measures put forward by the TRC’s body of 
recommendations. A discussion on my own researcher positionality in 
relation to this proposed Commission can be found in Chapter 2. 
Additionally, the country’s leading journalist and political commentator, 
Umaru Fofana, regularly shares what he has termed his ‘weekly TRC 
quote’ on social media, as a persistent reminder of both the continued 
relevance of the TRC’s findings, and to draw attention to 





Perceived Causality of the TRC 
Ex-combatants widely perceive the TRC to have “brought peace to the 
country”219 but simultaneously hold that the “TRC did nothing for 
me”220. A sharp contrast between the micro-level impact of the TRC 
and its broader national level contributions are ubiquitous among this 
population. This lends empirical validation to Ainley’s (2015) argument 
that the truth commission in Sierra Leone “could never have 
guaranteed reconciliation on an interpersonal level - it could only act 
at the level of the collective” (p. 254). Deeper probing into the national-
level impact of the TRC, as held by ex-combatants, highlights the 
practical conflation of correlation and causality on the local level. 
“Before the TRC there was war, now there is peace”221 is the logic that 
underlies the perceived contribution of the TRC to peace and 
democracy on the national level. Questions of how the TRC helped 
secure or cement peace are met with the same answers, though ex-
combatants also widely report that while the TRC has contributed to 
peace, it “could”222 and “should have done more for us”223. “The country 
has peace now which is a good thing the TRC brought, but the TRC 
did nothing for me”224. Perceptions of the TRC as contributing to 
securing a lasting peace at the national level are therefore widely 
positive, while perceptions of its contributions to interpersonal healing 
or improvement are overwhelmingly negative. Within the domain of the 
local, multiple and contradictory perceived causal impacts, between 
the micro-level of the individual (ex-combatant) and macro-level state, 
exist in relation to the contributions made by the TRC. The TRC 
“brought nothing”225 to the individual ex-combatant, but it “gave peace 
to the country”226. This begs the question: do perceptions of causality 
(on the national level) hold value as a measure of impact or success? 
In line with Sirleaf (2013) (see Chapter 5), I argue they do, though it is 
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clear that this localised approach cannot distinguish between the TRC 
as causing outcomes or coinciding with them (Ainley, 2015). 
Perceptions of a causal relationship to peace on the national level 
continues to legitimise the TRC retrospectively on the micro-level 
among interviewed ex-combatants who hold that “the TRC was 
good”227, “we needed the TRC”228, and that “it helped bring peace to 
the country”229. Additionally, several ex-combatant respondents hold 
positive associations between the wider domain of the local, 
comprising the state and national levels broadly, and peace, as a result 
of the TRC. According to Foday, “the government helped bring the 
TRC, to make sure there was peace”230. Santos similarly stated that 
“the government did a good thing by having the TRC, because there is 
peace now”231. Furthermore, Joel shared that “if the government did 
not really want peace, they wouldn’t have let the TRC come”232. Among 
ex-combatants, by contributing to peace on the national level, the TRC 
is regarded as a significant signal of the government’s commitment to 
peace and democracy after the war, serving further to enhance local 
perceptions of its institutional legitimacy among ex-combatants.  
While this finding of perceived causality within the domain of the local 
does not overcome the problems of isolating causality, it is still 
informative. This finding reinforces the fact that local understandings 
of truth commission contributions cannot be exclusively sought through 
causal examinations. However, it also highlights the utility of 
considering perceived causality when examining the local, as these 
perceptions nonetheless contribute to determinations of institutional 
legitimacy – in Sierra Leone, the conflation of correlation and causality 
in relation to the TRC’s contributions to peace at the national level have 
served to legitimise both the TRC and the post-war government, as a 
reflection of the post-war commitment to peace by the state.  
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Impact and Identities in Sierra Leone 
The narrative structure of the TRC, normatively derived from the larger 
binary framework of the transitional justice discourse, demonised ex-
combatants in order to restore dignity to victims (see Chapters 4, 7 and 
9). The impact of this identity framework has entrenched, rather than 
dismantled, perceptions of ex-combatants as ‘bad’, across the local. 
According to a former TRC official, and current member of civil society, 
the wider absence of ex-combatants from the TRC’s broad 
recommendations framework, and their practical exclusion from its 
reparations programme specifically, has “in effect removed them from 
the broader development agenda”233. They “remain stereotyped and 
disadvantaged in accessing opportunities to climb out of 
multidimensional poverty”234 as a result of their invisibility within the 
work and legacy of, among other processes, the TRC. The negative 
identity structure imposed on ex-combatants, through the TRC and 
other institutions, has incurred long-term economic and social costs for 
this population.  
In her examination of reconciliation in Sierra Leone, Friedman (2017) 
describes a “frozen peace with simmering problems beneath the 
surface” (p. 119). She attributes this to gaps in formal transitional 
justice efforts that had limited reach, little consideration of culture and 
no long-term follow-up or implementation measures (Friedman, 2017). 
She further draws attention to local perceptions that ex-combatants 
“were still ‘drifting,’ and had little economic opportunity” (Friedman, 
2017, p. 119). Enria (2015) and Friedman (2017) both emphasise the 
role of external interventions in exacerbating the economic 
disadvantage experienced by ex-combatants in Sierra Leone. Enria 
(2015) highlights that reintegration packages “have focused on labour 
supply and largely failed to match training with existing labour demand” 
(p. 643). Friedman (2017) echoes this, positing that reintegration 
training failed “to lead to gainful employment” (p. 119). A civil society 
respondent, who worked as part of the DDR programme in Sierra 
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Leone, reinforced this view, commenting “the training provided for ex-
combatants did not consider which skills would be useful or where they 
could be used. What good is a mechanic if there are no cars in his 
village?”235 He further attributes widespread ex-combatant 
resettlement within the capital of Freetown to these poorly considered 
reintegration training schemes, stating that “even if they didn’t want to 
settle in Freetown, the skills they were given give them little hope for 
jobs anywhere else”236.  
The social costs of the perpetrator narrative implanted on the ex-
combatant population, which the TRC not only failed to dismantle, but 
actively embedded, through its politics of blame, are similarly high. The 
majority of ex-combatant respondents demonstrate a desire to shed 
their ex-combatant identity. To be clear, this desire to distance 
themselves from their pasts is not a reflection of shame or an attempt 
at erasure. As previously discussed in Chapter 9, ex-combatants 
demonstrate a remarkable willingness to speak openly about their 
fighter histories. What they do seek is recognition that they are no 
longer combatants, and that they were not only combatants. In an 
interview outside his home in rural Makeni, Mansaray shared: “I am not 
just ex-RUF. I am a father, I am a carpenter, I am a husband… I am 
not RUF anymore”237. In expressing the desire to remove the heavy 
cloak of their ex-combatant identities, respondents commonly state “I 
am not a fighter anymore”238 and emphasise that “I will not fight 
again”239. The view is commonly held, in academic and policy circles, 
that ex-combatants are especially prone to violence because their 
“hands are particularly accustomed to diabolical acts” (Mitton, 2013, p. 
324). However, Mitton (2013) argues that the opposite is in fact true. 
According to him, the high social costs that come with the perpetrator 
label contribute to dis-incentivising renewed violence among exactly 
this population (Mitton, 2013). This thesis reinforces Mitton’s findings 
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of the social costs of peace among ex-combatants, along the two 
dimensions presented in his argument: (i) ex-combatants widely reject 
a desire to return to violence; (ii) though remain labelled as ‘bad’ and 
likely to rearm. This second dimension, of negative perceptions 
towards ex-combatants, warrants attention.  
Despite generally feeling safe and comfortable in their communities, 
the social costs and stigma that have accompanied the embedded ex-
combatant perpetrator identity are clear. This does not appear to 
manifest in everyday life, but comes to the fore in particular 
circumstances: political violence and criminality. In a separate 
research project, investigating political violence during the 2018 
elections in Sierra Leone, a study that I led revealed that across the 
country ex-combatants remain widely held to form the bulk of the 
‘political thug’ population in Sierra Leone. Among other levels of the 
local, previous histories of violence are the primary explanations 
offered for why people attribute episodes of electoral violence to the 
ex-combatant population (a bias that has clearly been reinforced by 
the static binary identity framework within transitional justice). 
Similarly, ex-combatant interviewees at times highlight the 
disadvantage they face in their communities in respect to suspicion for 
crimes. Ben, who has lived in Waterloo since the end of the war, and 
earns an unsteady living selling mobile phone credit, shared that “any 
time there is a crime here and they don’t know who it was, they accuse 
me”240.  
Overwhelmingly, ex-combatant respondents seek to unburden 
themselves from their ex-combatant pasts, and the long-term 
economic and social costs that this perpetrator identity has brought. 
The guilty perpetrator label casts a shadow over the ex-combatant’s 
past, and also obscures his future. However, throughout the course of 
fieldwork for this thesis, two notable, and indeed frightening, 
exceptions deserve attention.  
                                                          





William is a former RUF fighter, who joined the rebels voluntarily in 
1993, and remained with them until the end of the war. He is an active 
supporter of the RUFP – the political party into which the RUF was 
transformed following the end of the war. At the time of his entry into 
the RUF, William was 30 years old, and he reports to have joined 
“because I was tired of only watching and hearing about the war, I 
knew it was my duty to join”241. Within the RUF, William found 
community and power – “your unit is your family, they never abandon 
you”242. When asked if he ever considered leaving the RUF, William’s 
response was “no, of course not. How could I leave my family? In the 
war I had everything, power that I can’t get through peace”243. William 
recounts his responsibilities to train ‘new recruits’ who were often 
children, the forcible recruitment of which he referred to as ‘adoption’ 
rather than abduction. At the end of the war, William shared that he 
refused to participate in any peacebuilding process, rejecting both 
DDR and the TRC, claiming that neither brought any ‘good’ to the 
country. He works as an okada driver in Bo, where he has settled, 
though he is originally from Kailahun. He describes his life since the 
war as “difficult. I am not free. I struggle”244. When asked about the 
future and the state of peace in the country he holds that “I should be 
president of this country by now”245 and openly hopes for a return to 
violence, emphasising, “I want to fight. I am ready. I’m waiting”246.  
William’s longing for a return to war is shared by Alpha, an ex-
combatant living in his hometown of Makeni. Alpha was, in his own 
words, ‘adopted’ by the RUF when he was 13 years old, in 1994. Over 
the course of the remaining years of the war, he reports to have fought 
“for every group, even in Liberia with Taylor”247. As a child soldier, 
Alpha participated in two disarmament processes during the war, and 
describes each instance as taking place against his will, “I did not 
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choose to go, they took me”248. Both times, Alpha recounts his escape 
from the disarmament camps (he “ran away”249) and his voluntary 
return to the war. Alpha comments that he “was good at war”250 and 
even stated that “I hope the elections go badly, so that I can hold my 
gun again. I am a soldier”251. He describes his combatant experience 
during the war as one wherein “I was powerful, and I had control. If I 
wanted something, I could take it. People listened to me, because they 
were loyal, or they were afraid. In the war I had power. Now, I don’t”252. 
While Alpha has found gainful employment in the years after the war, 
working currently as a security guard for a mining company, he still 
considers his post-war situation as one of powerlessness. According 
to him “there is more power in taking than receiving”253.  
William and Alpha’s experiences highlight a critical theme: power and 
powerlessness. For both William and Alpha, the war brought them 
power, while peace has left them vulnerable, dependent and 
powerless. It stands to reason that the social and economic identity 
costs accompanying the TRC (though not exclusively stemming from 
it – it is clear that the TRC is one piece of a larger problematic 
normative and narrative post-conflict framework) have either 
contributed to this powerlessness, or at the very least failed to 
empower ex-combatants.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, when applying a localised framework of impact 
evaluation through the disaggregated lens of the ex-combatant 
population in Sierra Leone, impact failure of the TRC is widely 
evidenced. The localised framework of impact evaluation developed in 
Chapter 5 has been applied along its six dimensions: local 
expectations, outcomes (in particular truth-telling), institutional 
mandate, institutional engagement, recommendations (in particular 
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reparations), and identities. Along the dimension of expectations, the 
significant mismatch between ex-combatant justice needs and 
expectations towards the TRC and its institutional mandate evidence 
impact failure. For the particular outcome of truth-telling, the restricted 
participation space granted to this population further highlights impact 
failure and the generation of a narrow truth, that ex-combatants widely 
hold to be incomplete and inaccurate. Regarding mandate evaluation, 
particular attention is paid to the TRC’s mandated role of facilitating 
reconciliation. Interviewed ex-combatants do not attribute their 
personal experiences of reintegration or reconciliation to the TRC, 
further evidencing impact failure along this dimension. Institutional 
engagement as an evaluative measure is once more highlighted to 
have excluded ex-combatants from the design, operations and 
potential benefits of the TRC. On the dimension of recommendations, 
persistent implementation gaps and evidence of the meaningful 
exclusion of ex-combatants from the Commission’s reparations 
scheme specifically showcase impact failure once more. Furthermore, 
the long-term identity impact of the TRC, treating ex-combatants as 
simple perpetrators, has cemented negative associations against 
them. This has brought significant economic and social costs for this 
population, and reinforces Chapter 9’s discussion on the social forms 
of punishment produced by the TRC. A negative impact of the TRC 
among ex-combatants is once again clearly evident. However, on the 
issue of perceived causality, it is possible to identify a positive impact 
of the TRC experienced by interviewed ex-combatants. Despite not 
experiencing a positive personal (or micro-level) impact with regards 
to reconciliation or reintegration from the TRC, ex-combatants do 
widely hold a positive macro-level impact between the TRC and peace 
at the national level. The TRC is believed to have helped cement peace 
in the country. Additionally, its establishment by the government has 
granted the state a measure of institutional legitimacy as a body 
committed to peace, as well. 
Two important limitations to this localised framework application 
warrant recognition. Firstly, while disaggregating the local adds 





findings reflect only one component within the larger and complex 
domain of the local. Additional disaggregated research, focusing 
individually, and comparatively, on other constituent populations and 
levels of the local, is needed to adequately reveal the breadth of local 
transitional justice impacts within the contexts in which they are 
implemented. Secondly, this study’s exclusive engagement with ex-
combatants who did not directly participate in the TRC means that it is 
not possible to speak to the impacts that may have been felt by ex-
combatants who did participate in the TRC, or identify differences 
between ex-combatant participants and non-participants. The impact 
failure of the TRC among non-participant ex-combatants does not 
preclude the possibility that impact success (positive impacts) 
occurred elsewhere, only that such potential successes are not 










This thesis has undertaken an empirically detailed examination of the 
relationship between ex-combatants and the TRC in Sierra Leone. The 
particular focus of this research has been the population of non-
participant, low to mid-level ex-combatants, defined as belonging to 
the wider population of ‘perpetrators’ and explicit TRC participants by 
the TRC itself. This thesis has sought to illuminate, describe and 
understand the relationship between ex-combatants and the TRC 
along two axes. Firstly, it has interrogated the rhetoric, ritual and reality 
dimensions of transitional justice and truth commissions more broadly, 
and that of the TRC in Sierra Leone specifically. This detailed critique 
of the normative, institutional and practical dimensions of post-conflict 
truth commissions and transitional justice has empirically revealed 
serious shortcomings within the binary identity framework of 
transitional justice. In Sierra Leone, these shortcomings constricted the 
inclusive, participatory and transformative potential of its truth 
commission. The second axis of this thesis has provided a 
comprehensive localised examination of TRC experiences among ex-
combatants in Sierra Leone. It has developed a comprehensive micro-
level understanding of ex-combatant expectations, experiences and 
impacts in relation to the TRC. This grounded evaluation adds nuance 
to growing calls for localised research within transitional justice, among 
a segment of the local that is both necessary to, and neglected within, 
research, policy and practice.  
It is, however, critical to note that Sierra Leone’s TRC is not an 
example of transitional justice, or a truth commission, gone bad. The 
criticisms levelled against the TRC in this thesis illustrate a larger, and 
normatively produced, shortcoming within the practice of this particular 
mechanism of transitional justice, and inherent to the field of 
transitional justice more broadly – namely its binary identity 
participation framework. Processes and sources of exclusion faced by 





Leone. Liberia’s truth commission evidences the pervasive application 
of transitional justice’s problematic binary identity framework of 
participation. The TRC in Liberia similarly implemented a binary 
framework of local participation, of victims and perpetrators, evidenced 
in its mandate and Final Report documents. Further research exploring 
and localising examinations of the relationship between ex-combatants 
and truth commissions is therefore necessary to validate the 
exploratory findings compiled within this thesis, and to allow for the 
construction of grounded theory, to propel the industry of truth 
commissions towards realising their transformative potential. 
In many respects, Sierra Leone’s TRC can be commended. Described 
by a member of the TRC Working Group, who now (at the time of 
writing) holds a prominent position in the country’s justice sector, as 
the (Special) Court’s “poor cousin”, the TRC was still “incredible value 
for money”, that nonetheless produced a detailed (albeit narrow) report 
whose “findings remain relevant and important guidelines for 
addressing ongoing sources of fragility in Sierra Leone”. The TRC in 
Sierra Leone did not enjoy the high levels of funding, visibility or time 
that other commissions, such as that of South Africa, did. Nonetheless, 
its legacy is widespread, and continues to be seen as a concrete signal 
of a commitment to peace.  
The first axis of this thesis illuminated the inadequacies of the binary 
identity framework that currently dominates the discourse and practice 
of transitional justice. Victim and perpetrator identities are normatively 
and externally constructed and designated without consideration of the 
complexity of lived conflict experiences among local transitional justice 
participants, onto whom such labels are cast (articulated in Chapter 4). 
This identity rhetoric was strongly translated onto the ritual of 
participation in the design of the TRC in Sierra Leone (discussed in 
Chapter 6). In reality, despite an explicit space accorded to the 
participation of perpetrators, this thesis has revealed multiple 
processes and sources of exclusion that resulted in the practical 
alienation of ex-combatants within the TRC (Chapters 7-10). The 





has been both conceptually articulated, in Chapter 4, and empirically 
demonstrated, in Chapter 7. Secondly, the TRC’s hierarchical 
participation model, privileging the ‘innocent victim’ as both the 
exclusive beneficiary of transitional justice, and as the starting point for 
truth-telling, marginalised ex-combatants within the Commission and 
prevented their voluntary participation (see Chapter 8). The application 
of both this institutional logic of assumed perpetrator participation and 
a hierarchical model of participation, with the innocent victim at its 
apex, failed to consider the role of motivations or acknowledge 
experiences of suffering among ex-combatants in Sierra Leone. 
Resultantly, the TRC largely failed to achieve either its inclusive and 
cross-cutting participation aims or to produce a ‘democratising truth’. 
Finally, the conflict identities of victims and perpetrators, enforced by 
the TRC have further entrenched stigma against ex-combatants (see 
Chapter 10). 
Along its second axis of examination, this thesis has uncovered the 
expectations, experiences and impacts of ex-combatants in relation to 
the TRC, through a localised approach. Illuminating ex-combatant 
expectations towards the TRC (in Chapter 7) has shed empirical light 
on their post-conflict justice needs, and the impact of the concurrently 
operating processes of DDR and the SCSL, on perceptions of the TRC. 
Empirically revealing these expectations also showcases significant 
divergences between the localised level of ex-combatants, against the 
mandated aims and institutional aspirations of the TRC itself (Chapter 
7). The discrepancy between local expectations and institutional 
objectives raises the important question of whose justice interests 
underpin truth commissions and transitional justice broadly.  In 
developing the localised framework of institutional engagement for this 
thesis Chapter 5 introduced the dilemma that emerges when local 
justice expectations do not align with institutional objectives. It 
presented the following questions: when local expectations and 
realistic outcomes are mismatched, where does the fault of failure lie: 
is it the responsibility of affected populations to lower their justice 
expectations? Or does it lie with the institution itself, for failing to 





and beneficiaries? The multi-level empirical investigation of Sierra 
Leone’s TRC within this thesis reveals that in reality, the answer to all 
of these questions is yes. Achievable and realistic boundaries on what 
a truth commission can achieve need to be drawn in absolute 
(external) as well as relative (localised) terms. Reconciling the 
normative rhetoric and institutional ritual of this field against the 
complex realities within the local requires greater accommodation of 
this complexity within the framework of truth commissions, as well as 
realistic and achievable justice demands among the local. Establishing 
and managing expectations within truth commissions is therefore bi-
directional, requiring clear limits on what truth commissions can offer, 
as well as formatively incorporating the particular justice needs and 
expectations of affected populations. 
This thesis empirically reinforces salient criticisms against the Western 
justice paradigm at the heart of transitional justice.  Along the 
dimension of ex-combatant TRC experiences, this thesis exposes the 
structural space for ex-combatant engagement within the TRC to have 
been largely exclusionary. The prescribed inclusion of ex-combatants, 
as explicit TRC participants, is revealed in Chapter 6. The juxtaposition 
of this prescribed inclusion against their practical exclusion is revealed 
firstly in Chapter 8, through the empirical and localised application of 
the framework of institutional engagement developed in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 8 has revealed that formal incorporation of ex-combatants 
was constructed on the basis of normative assumptions around the 
distinct, homogeneous and mutually exclusive binary conflict identities 
of victims and perpetrators that pervade the enterprise of transitional 
justice more broadly. An absence of ex-combatant voice and agency 
within the ownership and inclusion dimensions of institutional 
engagement within the TRC, despite recognition of their necessary 
participation (illustrated in Chapter 6) by TRC entrepreneurs, is a 
significant shortcoming. This showcases the persistent and 
problematic practice of transitional justice to idealise conflict 
experiences that are in reality much more complex than simple 
archetypes, and privilege the justice needs of innocent victims, at the 





the complexity of individual conflict experiences within the structure of 
the TRC is found within the statement-taking form it designed, that 
allowed for individuals to share experiences of personal victimisation 
as well as of victimising others. Yet, the perpetrator was not 
represented within the TRC, and this is evident in the problematic 
binary model of participation that was implemented. In fact, the space 
given to TRC brokers moreover, on the level of the local, in particular 
civil society, progressively diminished across the dimensions of 
ownership and inclusion (evidenced in Chapter 8). The uneven and 
deteriorating distribution of agency among TRC entrepreneurs 
showcases the pitfalls of elite capture, particularly evidenced in the 
influence exercised over the TRC’s designs and operations by the 
Government of Sierra Leone. In its disaggregated investigation of the 
local in relation to the TRC, this thesis importantly draws attention to 
the diversity inherent among the local, whose interests not only diverge 
but compete, and the deleterious effects of asymmetric power 
relationships that resultantly enabled the politicisation of the TRC in 
ways that limited its justice-seeking capacities, practices and impacts. 
Along the dimension of participation, this thesis lends empirical support 
to the problematic normative limitations of the binary identity structure 
of transitional justice, delineated in Chapter 4 and empirically 
evidenced throughout Part Three. Chapter 9 showcases that, in 
practice, this normatively-constructed and institutionally-manifested 
participation model served to alienate ex-combatants from exactly the 
transitional justice process that sought to (re)integrate, reconcile, 
repair and positively transform relationships on the individual, 
community and national levels. The TRC’s failure to seek a rich 
understanding of the past, by limiting its universe of injustice to the 
experiences of the ideal victim excluded motivations from its memory-
collecting project. Its binary participation model of imposed identities 
meant that ex-combatants did not consider themselves appropriate 
participants within this institution. The analysis has also exposed the 
severe inadequacy of the logic of assumed perpetrator participation 
that pervades the normative and structural planes of truth 





meaningful participation among the local. The intrinsic absence of legal 
punitive measures within the restoratively-oriented model of justice in 
truth commissions is not the same as the absence of punishment. 
Rather, punishment masks itself in social and political forms instead, 
as a result of the blame and guilt that are nonetheless ascribed to the 
body of TRC participants designated as perpetrators. A politics of 
blame strongly underpinned the structure and operations of the TRC, 
in relation to its participation model. The role of blame within the TRC 
in designating and demonising the perpetrator centralises the concept 
of punishment within this mechanism of transitional justice. Further 
critical research is needed to investigate and unpack the relationship 
between punishment and truth commissions, which this thesis argues 
requires re-examination.  This thesis shows that an understanding of 
punishment as restricted to judicial measures (i.e. prosecution), 
presents a normative fallacy. Punishment can exist along several 
dimensions, including social, economic and political ones. As this 
thesis highlights, it was not the fear of punishment in the form of 
prosecution, but rather fear of punishment along its social axis, that 
prevented much ex-combatant participation in the TRC. Findings 
around the need to unpack the concept of punishment within truth 
commissions are, however, restricted by this thesis’ primary focus on 
the population of non-participant ex-combatants in relation to the TRC. 
While the need to re-examine the concept of punishment within truth 
commissions is clearly evidenced, this study’s findings cannot speak 
to the potential experiences of punishment (or positive outcomes) 
among participant ex-combatants. Further research on ex-combatant 
participants within truth commissions is needed to adequately 
understand the full breadth of the various forms of punishment that 
truth commissions may impart.  
Unsurprisingly, along the dimension of TRC impact, Chapter 10 of this 
thesis finds the TRC to have largely failed to exert a positive effect on 
the population of non-participant ex-combatants. This challenges the 
claim of cascading benefits, beyond the population of direct 
participants, that is held among truth commission proponents. 





expressed through a diametric justice model that required reducing 
complex individual conflict experiences into simple binary identities. 
This identity structure, among ex-combatants, has defined their conflict 
histories as well as limited their post-conflict development. 
Altogether, the unforgiving and inflexible binary identity framework of 
the TRC in Sierra Leone significantly deterred ex-combatant 
participation in the TRC. The ritual of Sierra Leone’s TRC was 
constructed to exorcise the perpetrator; however, this firstly involved 
demonising the ex-combatant. This process, of demonising the ex-
combatant in order to exorcise him/her, as part of the TRC’s victim-
oriented agenda, served effectively to distance this population from the 
TRC, in multi-facetted processes of structural, external and voluntary 
exclusion, which this thesis has illuminated. 
Borer (2003) reflects that “if truth is the first casualty of war, then 
complexity must surely be the second” (p. 1116). The examination of 
non-participant ex-combatants in relation to Sierra Leone’s TRC 
decisively demonstrates the failure of transitional justice to 
acknowledge, let alone incorporate, the complexities of individual 
conflict experiences. This thesis empirically supports Borer’s (2003) 
argument that “it is easier and more satisfying for people to think in 
terms of absolutes” (p. 1116). However, and more importantly, it has 
also amply demonstrated the need for transitional justice to break 
existing binaries, if it is to realise its transformative potential. 
Universally, interviewed ex-combatants have shared the complexity 
inherent to their lived conflict experiences, the desire for 
acknowledgement of their own experiences of suffering, and of a 
platform to achieve a contextualised understanding of these 
intersecting experiences, of both victimisation and perpetrated abuses.  
Freeman (2006) writes optimistically that the “history of truth 
commissions is still being written” (p. 22). This thesis has importantly 
called attention to who has authored this history to-date. In the 
chapters of transitional justice to come we must re-examine whose 
history this discourse writes.  The genuine localisation of both the 





commissions specifically, requires breaking the binaries of simple 
victims and perpetrators. Experiences of suffering and committing or 
participating in abuses cannot be neatly catalogued into distinct, 
homogenous and oppositional identities. They do not occur in isolation, 
nor are they mutually exclusive. This thesis has empirically 
demonstrated that post-conflict truth commissions need to recognise, 
and accommodate, the universe of the ex-combatant’s intersecting 











Appendix A: Ex-Combatant Respondent Data 
*All respondent names have been changed to ensure their anonymity. 
Interviews with 112 ex-combatants took place between 2017 and 
2019.  
Ex-Combatant Respondents 
Name* Affiliation Location Date 
Thomas RUF Freetown February 18 2017 
Jeffrey RUF Freetown February 20 2017 
Kevin RUF Freetown February 20 2017 
Lahai RUF/AFRC Freetown February 21 2017 
Eddie RUF/AFRC Freetown February 21 2017 
Felix RUF Freetown February 22 2017 
Hector RUF Freetown February 23 2017 
Respondent 8 RUF Freetown February 24 2017 
Omar SLA Freetown February 25 2017 
Respondent 10 SLA Freetown February 26 2017 
Alie RUF Makeni February 28 2017 
Anthony RUF Makeni February 28 2017 
Ibrahim RUF Makeni March 1 2017 
Robbie SLA Makeni March 1 2017 
Richard CDF Bo March 12 2017 
Simon CDF Bo March 12 2017 
Darren CDF Bo March 12 2017 
Josef CDF Bo March 13 2017 
Charlie CDF Bo March 13 2017 
Respondent 20 CDF Bo March 13 2017 
Respondent 21 CDF Bo March 13 2017 
Respondent 22 CDF Bo March 13 2017 
Osman CDF Bo March 14 2017 
Respondent 24 CDF Bo March 14 2017 
Respondent 25 CDF Bo March 14 2017 
Respondent 26 CDF Bo March 15 2017  
Respondent 27 SLA Makeni September 18 2017 





Respondent 29 SLA Makeni September 19 2017 
Respondent 30 SLA Makeni September 20 2017 
Respondent 31 CDF Bo September 28 2017 
Abdul CDF Bo September 29 2017 
Patrick CDF Bo  September 29 
2017 
Respondent 34 CDF Bo September 30 2017 
Ralph RUF Bo September 30 2017 
Reggie RUF Bo October 2, 2017 
Timothy RUF Bo October 2, 2017 
Adam SLA Freetown November 4 2017 
Respondent 39 SLA Freetown November 4 2017 
Respondent 40 SLA Freetown November 5 2017 
Francis Kamajor Bo January 15 2018 
Henry RUF Bo January 16 2018 
Respondent 43 SLA Bo January 16 2018 
Freddie SLA Bo January 17 2018 
Peter RUF Makeni February 1 2018 
Tony RUF Makeni February 1 2018 
Jonathon RUF Makeni February 2 2018 
Nigel RUF Freetown May 21 2018 
Junior RUF Freetown May 21 2018 
Nicholas SLA Freetown June 1 2018 
Respondent 51 SLA Freetown June 2 2018 
Respondent 52 SLA Freetown June 3 2018 
Respondent 53 SLA Freetown June 3 2018 
Christopher CDF Bo June 20 2018 
Respondent 55 CDF Bo June 21, 2018 
Foday CDF Bo June 21, 2018 
Respondent 57 CDF Bo June 22 2018 
Emanuel CDF Bo June 22 2018 
Respondent 59 CDF Bo June 23 2018 
Respondent 60 CDF Bo June 24 2018 
Respondent 61 CDF Bo June 24 2018 
Respondent 62 CDF Bo June 24 2018 
Saidu Other Bo June 25 2018 





Martin RUF Freetown July 2 2018 
Jonah RUF Freetown July 3 2018 
Sallieu RUF Freetown July 3 2018 
Respondent 68 RUF Freetown July 4 2018 
Harold RUF Makeni August 20 2018 
Michael RUF Makeni August 20 2018 
Santos RUF Makeni August 20 2018 
Mansary RUF Makeni august 21 2018 
Alpha RUF Makeni august 21 2018 
Respondent 74 SLA Makeni august 22 2018 
Joel SLA Makeni august 22 2018 
Amadu RUF Makeni august 22 2018 
Gregory RUF Makeni august 23 2018 
Santos RUF Makeni august 23 2018 
Respondent 79 Other Makeni august 24 2018 
Respondent 80 RUF Makeni august 24 2018 
Respondent 81 SLA Freetown August 28 2018 
Respondent 82 SLA Freetown August 28 2018 
Thomas RUF Bo September 8 2018 
William RUF Bo September 9 2018  
Gibril RUF Bo September 9 2018  
Respondent 86 RUF Bo September 10 2018 
Respondent 87 SLA Bo September 10 2018 
Respondent 88 SLA Bo September 11 2018 
Respondent 89 SLA Bo September 11 2018 
Wesley RUF Freetown October 17, 2018 
Respondent 91 RUF Freetown October 17, 2018 
Respondent 92 RUF Freetown October 17, 2018 
Respondent 93 SLA Freetown October 19 2018 
Siaka SLA Freetown October 19 2018 
Respondent 95 SLA Freetown October 19 2018 
Respondent 96 SLA Freetown October 20 2018 
Respondent 97 CDF Freetown October 21 2018 
Respondent 98 SLA Makeni October 26 2018 
Respondent 99 SLA Makeni October 26 2018 
Respondent 100 RUF Makeni October 27 2018 





Respondent 102 RUF Makeni October 27 2018 
Hassan RUF Makeni October 27 2018 
Respondent 104 RUF Makeni October 29 2018 
Respondent 105 RUF Makeni October 29 2018 
Respondent 106 RUF Makeni October 30 2018 
Sulay CDF Freetown November 15 2018 
Respondent 108 CDF Freetown November 15 2018 
Vincent CDF Freetown November 15 2018 
Respondent 110 CDF Freetown November 15 2018 
Barry RUF Freetown January 5, 2019 












  Position Location Date 
1 statement taker/research and outreach unit Freetown May 3 2017 
2 
TRC Regional Coordinator/research and 
outreach unit Freetown May 5 2017 
3 statement taker Freetown May 8 2017 
4 statement taker Freetown May 10 2017 
5 statement taker/research and outreach unit Freetown  May 11 2017 
6 statement taker/research and outreach unit Freetown May 14 2017 
7 statement taker Makeni March 2 2017 
8 research and outreach unit/statement taker Freetown May 20 2017 
9 research and outreach unit 
remote 
interview August 15 2018 
10 TRC Commissioner 
remote 
interview April 27, 2018 
11 government official freetown December 18 2018 
 
 
TRC Brokers (members of civil society): 
*All interviews except for one have been anonymised. TRC Broker 15, 
John Caulker, was the chairperson of the TRC Working Group and is 
the founder of Fambul Tok (a well-known alternative grass-roots 
reconciliation organisation in Sierra Leone). John Caulker consented 
to the use of his name as part of this research (which would have been 
difficult to anonymise given his positionality as a TRC broker 
specifically and transitional justice expert in Sierra Leone more 
generally). This consent is part of the recorded interview conducted 





TRC Brokers (Civil Society) 
  Interviewee Location Date 
1 TRC Broker 1  Freetown  November 19 2016 
2 TRC Broker 2 Freetown November 19 2016 
3 TRC Broker 3 Freetown  November 21 2016 
4 TRC Broker 4 Freetown November 23, 2016 
5 TRC Broker 5 Freetown December 3 2016 
6 TRC Broker 6 Freetown December 5, 2016 
7 TRC Broker 7 Freetown December 1, 2016 
8 TRC Broker 8 Freetown December 2 2016 
9 TRC Broker 9 Freetown December 4 2016 
10 TRC Broker 10 Freetown December 6 2016 
11 TRC Broker 11 Freetown March 8 2017 
12 TRC Broker 12 Freetown March 9 2017 
13 TRC Broker 13 Freetown March 10 2017 
14 TRC Broker 14 Bo March 15 2017 
15 John Caulker* Freetown  October 8 2017 
16 TRC Broker 16 Freetown February 19 2018 
17 TRC Broker 17 Freetown  March 4 2018 
18 TRC Broker 18 Freetown March 6 2018 
19 TRC Broker 19 Freetown April 15 2018 
20 TRC Broker 20 Freetown January 19, 2019 







Appendix C: Ex-Combatant Interview Guide 
 
The following questions were used to guide ex-combatant interviews. 
Important to note is that interviews were not restricted by these 
questions – their primary purpose was to guide and structure 
interviews along the main themes of this thesis’s investigation. 
Consent was verbally received from all respondents, who were 
informed three times (before, during at the end of each interview) 
during each interview about their ability to withdraw this consent at any 
point, as well as reiterating their right not to answer any question(s) 
they did not want to.  
Ex-combatant profile questions: 
1. Age 
2. Affiliation: Which group did you belong to during the war? 
3. Nature of affiliation: voluntary or forced 
4. When did you join? Leave? 
5. Where were you located during the war? 
6. Where did you go in the years after the war? 
7. Did you participate in the DDR program? 
TRC: 
8. Did you know about the TRC during its time of operation? 
9. How did you hear about the TRC? 
10. Where were you during the time the TRC operated? 
11. Why did the TRC come to Sierra Leone? 
a. What were its purposes? 
12. How did the TRC work to achieve these purposes? (what were 
its activities, can you name an example?) 
13. Was the TRC successful? How? Why or why not? 
14. Did you participate in the TRC? Attend? Talk? 
a. Why not? 
15. Did you want to talk (participate) to the TRC? Why/not? What 
prevented this?  





17. Were ex-combatants supposed to talk in the TRC? 
a. All ex-combatants? If not, which ones? 
18. Should ex-combatants have participated (more) in the TRC? 
Why or why not? 
a. Why do you think not more ex-combatants participated? 
Why was there such low ex-combatant participation? 
How could this have been improved? 
19. The TRC defines all ex-combatants as perpetrators, do you 
think this is accurate? Why not?  
20. Do you consider yourself a perpetrator? 
21. What does reconciliation mean to you? 
22. Do you feel reconciled? 
a. Did the TRC contribute to this? How? 
23. What does reintegration mean to you? 
24. Do you feel reintegrated? 
a. Did the TRC contribute to this? How? 
25. What does justice mean to you? 
a. Do you feel satisfied with the justice measures served 
in Sierra Leone? Did the TRC contribute to justice? 
How? 
26. What does accountability mean to you? Who should be held 
accountable and why? 
Contemporary relevance of TRC 
27. Does the TRC still mean anything? 
28. How well was the TRC implemented? 
29. Is there still a need for TRC?  
30. What could the TRC do today?  
TRC and DDR: 
31. Did you participate in the DDR program? Why or why not? 
a. What was your experience of the DDR program like? 
32. Was DDR successful? Why? How?  
33. What was the purpose of the DDR? 





TRC and SCSL 
35. What was the SCSL? What did it do? Purposes? How?  
36. What was the relationship between the TRC and the Special 
Court? 
Final Question: 
37. Is there anything else you would like to share or talk about 
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